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This research assesses how Iraq as an external factor influenced, shaped and altered 
intra-alliance relations between Turkey and the US between 1990 and 2003. It develops 
an integrative foreign policy model of Turkey-US intra-alliance behaviour with a 
specific focus on the parameters that enable security cooperation between Turkey and 
the US on Middle Eastern issues. It studies Turkey’s cooperative and non-cooperative 
relations with the US vis-à-vis Iraq in three major phases: During the 1990 Gulf Crisis 
and 1991 Gulf War and their immediate aftermath, Turkey and the US shared a 
common understanding of the nature and urgency of the threat Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait posed to their national interests, and on the requisite strategy to deal 
with that threat. Between 1991 and 2001, it became apparent that the unintended 
economic, political and strategic consequences of the conflict in the Gulf had 
disproportionately affected Turkey’s interests, creating serious dilemmas for Turkey-US 
relations, while both countries closely cooperated on Northern Iraq, albeit with different 
motivations. From the inauguration of the Bush-Cheney administration in 2001 to 1 
March 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused to allow the opening up of a northern 
front through Turkey for the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey diverged entirely from the US 
over the level and urgency of the threat from Iraq and also the devised US strategy for a 
military solution, but attempted to pursue a policy of unwilling cooperation in the hope 
of preserving the alliance and indirectly securing its interests in the future of Iraq 
without compromising domestic stability. The research thus tests its integrative foreign 
policy model on an empirical case study of Turkey-US relations, and thereby aims to 
contribute to the academic understanding of intra alliance behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over five decades, the relationship between Turkey and the United States (US) has 
often been defined either to reflect Turkey’s position in the Western alliance as a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or its role in the 
international system. The richness of the terminology used to describe the relationship is 
an indication of its complex, dynamic, and multi-layered character of the relations 
themselves, which have often required an innovative approach as their geopolitical 
context has changed. In the Cold War era, the most commonly used terms were ‘staunch 
NATO member’ or ‘long-standing and dependable ally’, while the 1990s and post 9/11 
period saw the rise of terms such as ‘enhanced partnership’, ‘strategic partner’, and 
‘model partnership.’ 1 This multiplicity of terms indicates the convergence and 
divergence of the two countries’ foreign and security policy objectives and national 
interests on many regional and international issues, as well as in their characteristic 
approaches to the international system, both individually and in concert with one 
another. 
Throughout the Cold War, consecutive US administrations assigned Turkey a crucial 
role in containing the Soviet Union. Turkey was a strategic asset in US policy during 
the East-West rivalry due to its position as a frontline country in the Western bloc.2 On 
the Turkish side, the decision to join the Western security bloc after the Second World 
War was a result of the need to balance the Soviet threat. Soviet territorial demands, 
driven particularly by Joseph Stalin, forced Turkey to seek refuge in the Western 
1 Respectively: Intervention by Secretary of State James A. Baker II at the Special Session of NATO’s 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 10 August 1990; President Clinton and Turkish Prime Minister Çiller, 
Opening Statements at a News Conference, The US and Turkey: Developing an Enhanced Relationship, 
Washington DC, 15 October 1993, 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no44.html; Statement by the Press 
Secretary, Prime Minister of Turkey to Visit Washington, 20 December 2001, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=79279; President Bush Meets with President Gül of 
Turkey, 8 January 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080108-
3.html; White House, B. Obama, Remarks to the Turkish Parliament, 6 April 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-
Parliament/; Bruce R. Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the West’, Foreign Affairs, 70:2 (1991), pp.34-48; Heinz 
Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p.xi. 
2 Cf. Mark R. Parris, ‘Starting Over: US-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era’, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, 2:1 (2003), pp.1-9; Mark R. Parris, afterword to Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present 
and Future, by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.252-
253; Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign 
Policy (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.1; Kramer, Changing 
Turkey, p.202; Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western 
Relations: Towards a Strategic Plan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp.79-80; Kuniholm, ‘Turkey 
and the West’. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                9 
 
alliance. The convergence of Turkish and Western security interests thus served the 
collective defence interests of the transatlantic alliance. Turkey’s commitment to the 
Western security cause and its pro-Western vocation were mutually reinforcing 
objectives that both led to a prominent role within NATO,3 and also facilitated the 
country’s efforts to integrate into European structures.4  
In the late 1980s, profound changes in the international system brought about a 
significant change in Turkey’s strategic environment.5 The end of the Cold War 
removed the overarching threat to the Western alliance without any immediate 
replacement,6 and Turkey felt the impact of these changes in the international setting 
relatively early on.7 For Ankara, the pressing issue was to assess the implications of the 
conciliation between the East and West, and determine Turkey’s new international 
circumstances. The broader question was of the effect these changes would have on 
Turkey’s strategic importance and value for the transatlantic alliance;8 particularly 
regarding Ankara’s relations with Washington. Turkey retained a strong interest in close 
ties and an alliance with the US for political, economic, and security reasons.9 Ankara 
had to re-evaluate how the unparalleled geopolitical shift and the end of its traditional 
containment role would undermine the ‘core concept’10 of its relations with the US. In 
the early 1990s, Turkey was uneasy about the ‘political and military value of the 
existing alliance,’11 facing the question of whether the special bilateral relationship with 
the US would be deprived of its strategic importance in the absence of a commonly felt 
and clearly defined security threat to the Western alliance.  
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 had far-reaching consequences for the 
international system and the Middle East, and returned Turkey to the strategic forefront. 
3 Graham E. Fuller, From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World 
and Its Implications for Western Interests (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p.5; Nasuh Uslu, The 
Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), pp.1-5. 
4 Gülnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), pp.1-2; Gülnur Aybet and Meltem Müftüler-Baç, ‘Transformations in Security and 
Identity after the Cold War: Turkey’s Problematic Relationship with Europe’, International Journal, 55:4 
(2000), pp.567-582. 
5 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s role in NATO and its relations with the West, see Kuniholm, 
‘Turkey and West’. 
6 Makovsky and Sayari, Turkey’s New World, pp.1-2. 
7 Fuller, Eastern Europe, p.1. 
8 James Brown, ‘Turkey in the Age of Glasnost’, Current History, 89: 550 (1990), pp.377-394; Duygu B. 
Sezer, ‘Turkey's Security Policy: Challenges of Adaptation to the Post-INF Era’, RUSI Journal, 134: 4 
(1989), pp.47-54; Sabri Sayari, ‘Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf 
Crisis’, Middle East Journal, 46:1 (1992), pp.9-21. 
9 Nüzhet Kandemir, interviewed by author, Ankara, 5 November 2009. 
10 The term ‘core concept’ is borrowed from Mark Parris, US Ambassador to Ankara, 1997-2000. 
11 Kramer, Changing Turkey, p.20. 
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Turkey’s crucial role in the allied coalition during the Gulf War set a new bilateral 
agenda and became a milestone in the reorientation of Turkey-US relations. The 
subsequent Turkey-US cooperation vis-à-vis Iraq endured for over a decade and 
redefined the strategic utility of their alliance. Consequently, the US perception of 
Turkey as a geopolitically important strategic ally evolved into that of a reliable partner 
in producing stability and security across the Middle East and Eurasia. However, in the 
decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq was one of the most significant 
external factors that shaped the Turkey-US agenda.  
1. Historical Focus  
This research intends to analyse the parameters of security cooperation between Turkey 
and the US on issues related to the Middle East. To this end, it will undertake an 
empirical study of how Iraq became the central issue in Turkey-US relations between 
1990 and 2003, analysing how policy was made and what roles key individuals played 
over three major phases of contemporary history.  
The first of these phases is the period between the invasion of Kuwait and the 
immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in April 1991. Here, the research examines the 
evolution of the factors that shaped and influenced Turkey-US policies vis-à-vis Iraq 
during the Persian Gulf crisis. This period is key for the impact of Iraq on Turkey-US 
relations as it marked the transition from the end of the Cold War to the establishment 
of a new international paradigm defined as the new world order. During this period, 
Turkey strategically aligned with the US, immediately denounced Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, called for the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, swiftly joined the 
international coalition, implemented the UN sanctions against Iraq, and allowed the US-
led multinational force to use its bases for operations during the war.  
The second phase runs from April 1991 to the inauguration of the Bush administration 
in 2001. Here, the analysis deals with the unintended consequences of the Gulf War and 
the dilemmas they created for Turkey in its relations with the US. During this period, 
the two countries cooperated closely on Iraq, albeit with different motivations. As the 
containment of Saddam Hussein and his regime emerged as a top priority for 
Washington, Turkey remained an essential US partner in both essential elements of that 
strategy: ensuring that Iraq complied with all relevant United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions (UNSCRs) and military deterrence through Operation Provide 
Comfort (OPC) and later Operation Northern Watch (ONW), which enforced the no-fly 
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zone (NFZ) over Northern Iraq from the Turkish base at İncirlik. However, although 
Ankara’s role in US strategy against Saddam’s regime now became even more pertinent 
than its contribution during the Gulf Crisis and War, supporting the US strategy of 
containment also posed major challenges for Turkey. Firstly, The Turkish economy 
suffered severe losses due to the open-ended international sanctions imposed on Iraq. 
Secondly, the military component of the US strategy eventually resulted in Baghdad’s 
limited sovereignty over Northern Iraq, and Saddam’s total withdrawal from the region 
in October 1991 created a political power vacuum in the region. The terrorist campaign 
of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) from its safe base of operations in Northern Iraq 
compelled Turkey to carry out several cross-border military operations, which incurred 
heavy diplomatic costs. Turkey faced a third and related challenge in the emergence of a 
de facto Iraqi Kurdish state in Northern Iraq with its implications for separatist Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey. Paradoxically, while Turkey opposed these efforts at state-
creation, it also had to co-lead the mediation with the US during the intermittent clashes 
between the main Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the 
Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan (PUK); a conflict which also enabled the PKK to 
expand its presence in Northern Iraq. Despite all these dilemmas, Turkey continued to 
support the policy of containment in line with the perception that cooperation with the 
US on Iraq suited broader Turkish interests. Nevertheless, the tangible costs of 
supporting the containment policy created a legacy of discontent and resentment in 
Turkey.  
The third phase covers the period from the inauguration of President Bush in 2001 to 1 
March 2003 when the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi) refused to allow the US to open up a ‘northern front’ through Turkey 
during its invasion of Iraq. This decision became a diplomatic milestone and moved 
Turkey-US relations into a new strategic context in which Iraq became a real source of 
controversy, jeopardising the very essence of the Turkey-US strategic partnership.  
2. Scope of the Research  
Turkey’s behaviour during this last period has sparked a policy debate reassessing the 
strategic utility of Turkey-US cooperation and a re-modelling of the foundation upon 
which Turkey-US ties had been based for fifty years. Therefore, an analysis of the 
impact of Iraq as an external factor and the extent to which it dominated and influenced 
Turkey-US relations during this period is an essential component of any redefinition 
and understanding of the future orientation of the Turkey-US alliance.  
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Through an empirical analysis of the extent to which Iraq influenced, shaped, and 
altered traditional patterns Turkey-US relations between 1990 and 2003, this study aims 
to develop a conceptual model of when and how Turkey and the US have security 
cooperation on issues related to the Middle East. The integrative model focuses 
specifically on the parameters that produce security cooperation and non-cooperation 
between the two countries vis-à-vis the Middle East, which is intended as a theoretical 
basis for studying the subject matter. At the same time, the examination of the influence 
of Iraq as an external factor in intra-alliance relations from 1990 to 2003 offers 
empirical cases through which to test the real-world and policy relevance of the 
theoretical framework. Thus, within the broader discipline of international relations, this 
research aims to contribute to a theoretical understanding of one of the most enduring 
Cold War era alliances and to the political history of the periods under study. 
Within this structure, the research will address the following two categories of 
questions. The first category relates to the conceptual framework, asking: Is it possible 
to build, on the basis of alliance theory, a coherent integrative model that would 
incorporate sub-systemic/unit-level causal factors into the systemic structure? To what 
extent would such a model, integrating the international and domestic sources of state 
behaviour, successfully apply to Turkey’s actions with its ally the US vis-à-vis the 
Middle East in general and Iraq in particular? Could such a model explore and analyse 
the parameters of how to get Turkey-US security cooperation on Middle Eastern issues? 
Could such a model serve as the basis for explaining Turkey’s cooperative and non-
cooperative behaviour towards the US regarding Iraq during the Gulf crisis, its 
aftermath and the US invasion of 2003?  
The second category of question deals with the nature of Turkey-US relations, asking: 
What dynamics have been significant in Turkey-US relations since World War II? How 
did this relationship materialise vis-à-vis issues that fell outside of the NATO 
framework, namely those in the Middle East? How did Turkey and the US manage 
common and conflicting interests within this alliance? What was the role of Iraq from 
1991 onwards as an ‘external factor’ in the Turkey-US alliance? What was the strategic 
rationale for Turkey-US cooperation in Iraq? How did the period between 1991 and 
2003 influence Turkey-US approaches to Iraq and the TBMM’s decision to refuse to 
allow the US to open a second front in the Iraq War? What were the implications of 
Turkey’s decision for Turkey-US relations?  
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The integrated model derived over the course of this research may be applied both to 
cases that relate to Turkey-US relations vis-à-vis the Middle East and within wider 
Turkey-US relations, though the latter would need to be tested against relevant 
empirical cases, which falls beyond the focus of this research. 
3. Literature Review  
Analysing the impact of Iraq on Turkey-US relations is necessarily an interdisciplinary 
enterprise drawing on a broad range of topics and subfields in international relations. 
Firstly, it requires study of the theoretical background, especially alliance theory and 
neoclassical realism. Secondly, the literature on the general foreign policy dynamics of 
Turkey and the US must be explored. It also requires examination of the relevant 
academic literature on the broader Iraqi question, the Iraqi Kurds and their politics. 
Therefore, this review of the literature is grouped under six subheadings: i) Alliance 
theory and neoclassical realism, ii) Turkish foreign policy in general; iii) Turkey-US 
relations; iv) Turkey’s policies towards the Middle East, Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds; v) the 
broader Kurdish question and Northern Iraq; and, vi) other sources, such as the memoirs 
of the decision makers.  
i) Alliance Theory and Neoclassical Realism 
The central objective in developing theoretical models is to explain the behaviour and 
foreign policy formulation of states. The realist and structural realist paradigms provide 
powerful tools from which to develop applicable conceptual models. However, the 
model developed here will also draw on the insights of alliance theory and of 
neoclassical realism.12 In doing so, it will take into account micro and unit-level factors, 
such as statesmen’s perceptions of the relative cost and benefit of particular strategies, 
and the influence of domestic political concerns on state behaviour at the systemic level. 
This section will briefly assess the literature on the major tenets and shortcomings of 
alliance theory and neoclassical realists’ attempts to introduce unit-level factors into 
neorealist structural-level analysis. 
First of all, there is considerable theoretical debate in international relations theory on 
the mechanics of alliance formulation, politics, and management. Walt posits that the 
causes of alliances and alignment are central questions when examining the patterns of 
12 For overviews of the relative validity and institutional position of the different strands of international 
relations theory, see Jack L. Snyder, ‘One World, Rival Theories’, Foreign Policy, 145 (2004), pp.55-62, 
and Stephen M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, 110 (1988), 
pp.29-46. 
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foreign policies of states.13 He also presents an explanation of what determines states’ 
choice of allies,14 which is shared by G. H. Snyder.15 Kenneth N. Waltz, on the other 
hand, formulates a powerful systemic theory and addresses the issue of state behaviour 
at the international/systemic level by conceptualising ‘balance-of-power’ theory as a 
natural outcome of interstate rivalry, whereby states pool their strength through 
alliances to restore a more balanced international distribution of power.16 Walt 
introduces a ‘balance-of-threat’ proposition to replace the balance-of-power theory.17 
According to him, the primary motivation of states in forming an alliance relationship is 
to unite members’ means to continue furthering their interests, especially in the security 
field, against external factors/threats.18 Walt follows Waltz in defining the contrast 
between ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ hypotheses within the balance-of-threat 
framework.19 Randall L. Schweller, however, criticizes the balance-of-threat 
proposition and introduces ‘balance-of-interests’ theory, arguing that states, whether 
threatened or unthreatened, respond not only to threats but also to opportunities in their 
environment.20  
Most significantly for this study, Snyder’s work on alliances expands neorealist theory, 
contending that alliances emerge due to the ‘security dilemma’ in an anarchic 
international structure in which states fundamentally seek to secure their survival. 
However, Snyder’s deductive theory posits that, while the primary objective of an 
alliance is to ‘gain security against an opponent,’21 alliance formation is based on a 
‘cost-benefit’ analysis.22 For him, bandwagoning is not a form of concession through 
which states subjugate themselves to more powerful states’ demands but simply a form 
13 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, International Security, 9:4 
(1985), pp.3-43. 
14 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia’, International 
Organization, 42:2 (1988), pp.275-316. 
15 Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Alliances, Balance and Stability’, International Organization, 45:1 (1991), pp.121-
142. 
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 
pp.121-122; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, 6:1 
(1996), pp.54-57; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories’, American Political Science Review, 91:4 
(1997), pp.913-917. 
17 Cf. Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.169-170. 
18 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliances in a Unipolar World’, World Politics, 61:1 (2009), pp.86-120; Stephen M. 
Walt, ‘The Progressive Power of Realism’, American Political Science Review, 91:4 (1997), pp.931-935; 
Walt, ‘Alliance Formation’, pp.3-43. 
19 Walt, ‘Alliance Formation’, pp.3-43. 
20 Randall L. Schweller, ‘New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining Not Refuting Waltz’s Balancing 
Proposition’, American Political Science Review, 91:4 (1997), pp.927-930. 
21 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.320. 
22 Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp.43-44. 
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of allying behaviour.23 As he succinctly observes, the management of an alliance 
involves ‘pursuing both common interests (to preserve the alliance) and competitive 
interests (maintaining the benefits of the alliance).’ The relationship thus proceeds 
through intra-alliance bargaining; ‘in such a way as to maximize joint benefits and 
minimize costs to one’s independent interests.’24 He also addresses how alliance 
partners deal with long-term management of the alliance, especially in terms of the 
‘alliance security dilemma’; namely, the tension between fears of abandonment and 
entrapment.25 Abandonment is a defection that can take several forms; realignment with 
an opponent, de-alignment, termination of the alliance, or failure to meet explicit 
commitments. Entrapment, on the other hand, denotes conflict on behalf of an ally’s 
interests; that is, unintentional participation in conflict against an opponent for the sake 
of preserving the alliance, the value of which surpasses the cost of fighting for the ally’s 
interests.26 The most significant determinants of state behaviour in the alliance security 
dilemma are thus the degree of dependence on the alliance, the perception of each 
other’s dependence, and the strategic interests that the parties have in defending each 
other. Additional factors are the explicitness of the alliance agreement and the degree to 
which the allies share interests that are in conflict with the adversary.27 When a state is 
more dependent on its ally (asymmetrical dependence), it is more likely to face the 
pressures of abandonment, and will therefore extend its support to the partner despite 
the risk of becoming entrapped. In essence, the risk of abandonment will outweigh the 
costs and risks of entrapment.28 In this case, a strategy of strong commitment and 
support for the alliance, and seeking assurances in this regard, leads to less fear of 
abandonment. However, as this strategy brings with it the unintended consequence of 
reducing bargaining leverage over the ally, it increases the risk of entrapment. In such a 
strategy, the ally is able to exploit this support and commitment to advance its own 
interests. In contrast, distancing oneself from the ally offers increased bargaining power 
and avoids entrapment, but might lead to abandonment. Due to the inverse relationship 
between the risks of abandonment and entrapment, the choice of strategy to resolve the 
alliance security dilemma involves a comparison and trade-off between the relative 
23 Ibid., p.160. 
24 Ibid., pp.165-166. 
25 See, Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, 36:4 (1984), 
pp.461-495; Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security’, 
International Security, 27:1 (2002), pp.149-173; Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.307; Randall L. Schweller, 
Review of Alliance Politics, by Glenn H. Snyder, Political Science Quarterly, 113:3 (1998), pp.513-514. 
26 Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 180-182; Snyder, ‘Security Dilemma’; 
27 Ibid. 
28 Andrew Bennet, Joseph Lepgold, Danny Unger, ‘Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War’, 
International Organization, 48:1 (1994), p.41. 
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costs and risks of both choices.29 In short, the alliance security dilemma is ‘mostly a 
function of tension’ between these related risks.30 Unlike in Waltz’s structural approach, 
Snyder highlights that fears of abandonment and entrapment are largely contingent upon 
‘the statesmen’s perception of these variables.’31 Also significant is Charles A. 
Kupchan’s emphasis on the coercive potential of the alliance leader’s ability to exact 
cooperative behaviour from its weaker partners as the defining contributory factor to the 
alliance security dilemma.32  
A further discussion concerns the relative influence of unit- and system-level factors in 
state behaviour and foreign policy formulation. The issue here is whether the neorealist 
focus on systemic-level factors has sufficient explanatory power when analysing state 
behaviour.33 For this purpose, one of the limitations of structural realism and alliance 
theory is their emphasis on systemic conditions as the primary determinant of state 
behaviour and motivation. This is revealed in a disagreement among structural realists 
on the ‘the relative importance of domestic versus system-level causes.’34 William Curti 
Wohlforth notes that many critiques underline the ‘lack of correlation between 
independent and dependent variables’ as a significant weakness of realist theories.35 
Barry Buzan argues that the explanation of international events cannot be tied to either 
the systemic or the unit level alone, since all levels interact with each other.36 Yet, as 
Fareed Zakaria observes, inter-state relations and domestic politics remain beyond the 
29 Synder, ‘Security Dilemma’, p.467; Snyder, ‘Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism’, p.165 
30 Snyder, ‘Security Dilemma’, p.484 
31 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.308. 
32 Charles A. Kupchan, ‘NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior’, International 
Organization, 42:2 (1988), pp. 317-346. 
33 Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories’. There is vigorous debate among scholars on the validity of the neorealist 
paradigm and its compatibility with foreign policy. For critical approaches, see Waltz, ‘International 
Politics’; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, Journal of Politics and Society, 15 
(2004); Robert O. Keohane, ‘Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics’, in Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.1-26, cited 
in T. S. Mowle, ‘Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict’, Political 
Psychology, 24:3 (2003), pp.561-592. On the other hand, Colin Elman, makes a compelling case for 
neorealist theory’s compatibility with foreign policy; See Colin Elman, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not 
Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?', Security Studies, 6:1 (1996), pp.7-53; Colin Elman, ‘Cause, 
Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz’, Security Studies, 6:1 (1996), pp.58-61; John J. 
Mearsheimer, ‘Reckless States and Realism’, International Relations, 23:2 (2009), p.241; John J. 
Mearsheimer, ‘Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Parts I & 
II)’, International Relations, 20:2 (2006), pp.105-243 
34 Walt, ‘Progressive Power of Realism’, p.933 
35 William Curti Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of Cold War’, International Security, 19:3 (1994-
1995), pp.91-129, p.93 
36 Barry Buzan, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp.198-215. 
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realm of the realist approach.37 For Robert Powell, a related weakness of structural 
realism is that it takes the units’ preferences for possible actions and outcomes as 
given.38 As Robert Jervis notes, security policy studies highlight that realism needs to 
be supplemented by an account of the ideas that guide decision-makers to achieve their 
objectives.39 
In the late 1990s, neoclassical realism emerged to overcome this limitation by offering a 
model that combined the interaction between system-level and unit-level factors.40 This 
paradigm dissolves the distinction between structural and foreign policy analyses and 
focuses on the interaction between the domestic sources of foreign policy and the 
structure of the international system.41 Gideon Rose contends that the making of foreign 
policy is a result of the choices made by actual leaders and policy elites, and that it is 
thus their perceptions of relative power, threats, and interests that matter.42 Similarly, 
Zakaria underscores the critical influence of domestic politics on foreign policy,43 
arguing that statesmen, rather than the states, are the primary actors in international 
affairs and that their perceptions of power matter in formulation of foreign policy 
preference.44 Schweller seeks to bridge the gap between the classical and structural 
realist strands, dwelling on the role of domestic politics as an intervening variable in 
state behaviour, and its significance for balance-of-power theory. He argues that the unit 
level factors—such as the internal and external considerations of policy elites, and their 
preferences and perceptions—play an essential role in determining how states respond 
to threats and opportunities, concluding that unit- and structural-level causes interact to 
produce systemic outcomes.45 Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen also construct a 
model of domestic politics by combining state-level and systemic-level analyses. They 
contend that non-systemic elements—such as domestic politics, the leaders' calculations 
of the balance of power, perceptions, ideology, and other factors—play a major role in 
37 Fareed Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, International Security, 17:1 (1992), 
pp.177-198. 
38 Robert Powell, ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate’, 
International Organization, 48:2 (1994), pp.313-344. 
39 Robert Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), 
pp.971-991. 
40 Randall Schweller, review of From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, 
by Fareed Zakaria’, The American Political Science Review, 93:2 (1999), pp.497-499. 
41 Little, Balance of Power, pp.261-262. 
42 Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), 
pp.144-172. 
43 Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics’. 
44 Schweller, review of From Wealth to Power. 
45 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’. 
International Security, 29: 2 (2004), pp.159-201. 
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shaping systemic choices and outcomes.46 Similarly, Wohlforth argues that, when 
reacting to external conditions, state authorities are under the influence of domestic 
considerations and that, ‘any realist discussion of international change must combine 
the domestic and international levels of analysis.’47 He draws attention to the fact that 
definitions of interests are related to the decision-maker’s assessment of power and that 
perceptions and expectations link power to policy. He then introduces ‘an amalgam of 
classical realism and the hegemonic variant of neorealism coupled with a pragmatic 
empirical focus on decision-makers’ capabilities assessments.’48 For him, state 
behaviour in response to any perceived decline in relative power capabilities in the 
international system is mainly shaped by decision-makers’ assessment of power and 
expectations.49 Finally, as Samuel Barkin claims, the neoclassical realists’ multi-level 
approach paves the way for neoclassical realism to serve as a predictive theory of 
foreign policy.50 
Thus, due to the growing desire in the literature to achieve a richer concept of 
international politics with real-world relevance, there is an increasing focus on how and 
at what level state interests are defined, the domestic sources of foreign policy, and the 
interplay between international and domestic structures. The neoclassical realist school 
offers a new conceptual paradigm to explain outcomes in the international system by 
incorporating systemic- and unit-level factors, thus demonstrating the interaction 
between domestic politics and international politics as a whole.51 
ii) Turkish Foreign Policy in General 
In order to heuristically address the nature of the alliance between Turkey and the US 
and their respective foreign policy behaviours towards Iraq, it is necessary to identify 
the way in which each is conceptualised in the international system. The following 
critical review of the available literature aims to understand what type of actors these 
two states are within the remits of realist theory.  
The literature argues that the US became firmly established as a military, economic and 
political superpower after the Cold War; perhaps a symptom of the optimism prevailed 
46 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances’, The 
American Political Science Review, 91:4 (1997), pp.919-922. 
47 Wohlforth, ‘Realism’, p.107 
48 Ibid., p.126 
49 Ibid. 
50 Samuel Barkin, ‘Realism, Prediction and Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 5 (2009), pp.233-
246. 
51 Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics’, International 
Organization, 49:4 (1995), pp.751-774. 
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in Western capitals that the US would become a truly hegemonic power in a unipolar 
world. Such claims again proliferated in the wake of George H.W. Bush’s rhetoric of 
building a new world order and the two wars in Iraq that followed. However, with the 
changing course of events after the turn of the millennium, there emerged a new 
literature emphasising ‘a shift in power towards the East’52 and ‘the age of non-
polarity’53 or a multipolar world. As evidence, these writers cite the rise of new power 
hubs in the global system such as China, Russia, the European Union (EU), India and 
Brazil. Nevertheless, regardless of these discussions over the precise weighting within 
the international system, the US remains the strongest military giant, and a huge 
economic and political power with immense global leverage.  
In contrast, the literature tends to treat Turkey as a rather mediocre actor in the global 
system; a definition that suited Turkish foreign policy actors well enough until the end 
of the Cold War. However, subsequent developments intensified debates within Turkey 
about its position in the international arena and how its foreign policy should be 
redesigned. Arguably, this soul-searching dominated the agenda of Turkish politicians 
and international relations scholars during the 1990s. 
Analyses of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period generally concentrate 
on Turkey’s geostrategic importance and highlight its potential influence on 
developments in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. In a 
comprehensive and authoritative account of Turkey’s foreign relations,54 Hale surpasses 
that tradition in naming Turkey a ‘middle power’ in the international system. As a 
confessed realist scholar, Hale also narrates Turkish foreign policy as largely dictated 
by the imperatives of the international security environment. Yet, as Andrew Mango 
observes, Hale’s study also deserves credit for relating foreign policy to the Turkish 
domestic scene.55 Thanks to its broad historical perspective, Hale’s study conveys the 
continuity, change, and evolution of foreign policy reflexes from the Ottoman period to 
modern Turkey.  
52 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 
53 Richard N. Haass, ‘The Age of Non-Polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?’ Foreign Affairs, 87:3 
(2008), pp.44-56. 
54 William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 3rd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
55 Andrew Mango, review of Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, by William M. Hale, International 
Affairs, 77: 2 (2001), p.457. 
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In the second volume of a notable collection inspired by Hale’s work,56 editor Baskın 
Oran employs the notion of ‘strategic medium power’ to describe Turkey’s standing 
both globally and within the Turkey-US alliance. As a medium power, Turkey’s room 
for manoeuvre and independent action is portrayed as limited and conditional. The 
volume divides the period 1980–2001 into two decade-long sections: ‘1980-90: Turkey 
on the Axis of the Western Bloc’ and ‘1990-2001: Turkey on a Global Axis’. The 
strength of this chronology lies in the way it frames the analyses of individual events 
within the international and domestic contexts.  
Britain’s most noted expert on Turkey, Philip Robins, addresses Turkey’s foreign policy 
after 1999 in a finely-titled study of its civilian and military ‘suits and uniforms’.57 
Similarly to Hale and Oran, Robins classifies Turkey as a ‘status quo power’ with a 
firmly established westward orientation which is both ‘cautious’ and ‘daring’ in its 
external dealings (the latter terms are Malik Mufti’s). Robins’ research presents not only 
an outline of the making of Turkish foreign policy and the motivations behind it, but 
also its relationship to the Turkish public. According to Robins, Turkey’s foreign policy 
is motivated by two factors: its Middle Eastern identity and its goal of EU membership. 
Robins’ thematically arranged book is enriched with case studies of Turkey’s bilateral 
relations with Israel, the Central Asian Republics, Bosnia, and Iraq after the Persian 
Gulf War. However, he accuses Turkey’s foreign policy makers of ‘normative 
anachronism’, and uses inverted commas to refer to PKK ‘terrorism’, apparently to 
deny the reality that the PKK is internationally designated a terrorist organisation by the 
EU, US, UN and NATO.58 
Reflecting on Turkey’s post-Cold War behaviour, Bülent Aras offers a guide to the 
“new geopolitics of Eurasia” and the regional orientations of Turkey’s foreign policy.59 
Unusually, Aras sees Turkey as an influential ‘soft power’ in the Middle East due to its 
dynamic and multi-dimensional foreign policy. He asserts that the transformation in the 
discourse and practice of Turkey’s Middle East policy is a result of how Turkey’s new 
foreign policy actors imagine and apprehend the region. This new conception of the 
56 Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 
Volume II: 1980-2001 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001). 
57 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2003). 
58 Andrew Mango, ‘Perplexed by Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 39:4 (2003), pp.206-228. 
59 Bülent Aras, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002). 
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region deems the traditional practice of considering all neighbours potential enemies 
unnecessary and sees a new opportunity for Turkey to serve as a regional leader.  
Likewise, a well-organised joint study of Turkey’s ‘new geopolitics’ by Fuller et al. 
addresses Turkey’s geopolitics and the sphere of influence the country enjoys, from the 
Balkans to China.60 Henze’s section provides the reader with a general account of the 
linkages between domestic and foreign policy in Turkey. This work is also an 
argumentative sketch of the trends in Turkey’s regional affairs, and Fuller presents 
several interesting hypotheses on Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East and the 
former USSR. He evaluates President Turgut Özal’s approach to the Gulf crisis, the 
Kurdish question, and Turkey’s political relations with Central Asia and the Trans-
Caucasus. Finally, Lesser argues that Turkey’s ties to the European Union are 
weakening whereas its relationship with the United States is prospering.  
At the turn of the millennium, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s current Foreign Minister and 
widely believed to be the architect of the sea change in Turkish foreign policy, 
published a monograph entitled Strategic Depth.61 Defying descriptions of Turkey as a 
‘middle’, ‘medium’ or ‘status quo’ strategic power, Davutoğlu declared his aims as ‘to 
determine and reassess Turkey’s strategic position after the Cold War’ and ‘to develop 
frameworks of strategic analysis through which alternative perspectives on the country’s 
future may be generated.’ To endorse a new foreign policy vision for Turkey, 
Davutoğlu provides a detailed analysis of the pre- and post- Cold War eras of Turkish 
foreign policy, focusing on Turkey’s historical relationship with its proximate regions; 
not only to Anatolia but also to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, North 
Africa, and Western Asia. In the third chapter, ‘Fields of Application’, Davutoğlu 
evaluates the role and positioning of Turkey in various international organisations such 
as NATO, the EU, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the developing 
eight countries (D-8), arguing that Turkey must employ an inclusive political strategy 
towards those regions with which it has historical and organic ties. It is Davutoğlu’s 
vision that has, by and large, driven the contours of Turkish foreign policy in the new 
millennium.  
60 Graham E. Fuller et al., Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder and 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 
61 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre, 2001). 
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iii) Turkey-US Relations 
Since the 1990s, Turkey-US relations have become an increasingly popular topic among 
international relations experts and scholars with extensive knowledge of Turkey, 
Turkish foreign policy and Turkey-US relations, including Morton Abramowitz, Ian O. 
Lesser, Graham Fuller, Henri Barkey, Paul Henze, Alan Makovksy, Stephen Larrabee, 
Bruce Kuniholm, Philip Gordon, Mark Parris and Ömer Taşpınar. 
In the early 1990s, works on Turkish foreign policy and Turkey-US relations generally 
took a realist perspective on geopolitics.62 As Lesser notes,63 the focus of US strategic 
cooperation with Turkey has generally been its geo-strategic position. After 1990, the 
shift in the international system introduced new regional dynamics in terms of Turkey’s 
relations with wider Eurasia. In the late 1990s, Turkish foreign policy evolved to 
address the changes in the international environment and Ankara became an 
increasingly assertive actor in surrounding regions. The importance attributed to 
Turkey’s role in US foreign and security policies in these regions led to growing 
numbers of edited volumes and articles to cover newly emerging issues, especially from 
Turkey experts in leading US think tanks and universities.64 By identifying how 
Turkey’s foreign policy could influence its wider region, these works defined Turkey as 
a pivotal state and a regional actor,65 and addressed the possible impact of identity 
issues and changes in the domestic political landscape on Turkish foreign policy and 
relations with the US. This was in stark contrast to earlier scholarship, which had tended 
to avoid debate on these questions while focusing solely on the impact of security 
considerations. 
Following the decision by the TBMM on 1 March 2003 not to allow the opening of a 
northern front in Turkey for the US invasion of Iraq, Turkish foreign policy received 
particularly close attention from American experts with a special focus on how to re-
evaluate and redefine Turkey-US relations and Turkey’s policy in the Middle East, 
62 For example, Fuller, Eastern Europe; Graham Fuller, Turkey Faces East: New Orientations towards 
the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the 
West’; and Brown, ‘Turkey in the Age of Glasnost’. 
63 Ian O. Lesser, ‘Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics’, Survival, 48:3 (2006), 
pp.83-96. 
64 Some volumes worthy of mention here are: Makovsky and Sayari, Turkey's New World; Khalilzad, 
Lesser, and Larrabee, Future of Turkish-Western Relations; Morton Abramowitz, Turkey’s 
Transformation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000); Cengiz 
Candar and Graham E. Fuller, ‘Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 12:1 
(2001). 
65 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 
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including Iraq.66 These works offer expert guides to the US perspective on Turkey’s 
foreign policy and Turkey-US relations after 2003. However, these studies tend to offer 
policy prescriptions rather than presenting an academic basis for analysing the Turkey-
US relationship.  
One of the most comprehensive academic studies of Turkey-US relations is Turkish-
American Relations, edited by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan,67 though it presents 
mainly descriptive contributions from historians, political scientists, and retired state 
officials. Another key text on the Turkey-US relationship to 2003 is by Nasuh Uslu.68 
This study, based on a coherent theoretical framework, applies it to a pertinent analysis 
of decision-making processes in Turkey and the US and elaborates on the evolution of 
the bilateral relationship since the 1960s. Also, Aylin Güney’s article stands out as a 
comprehensive analysis of the anatomy of the transformation of the Turkey-US alliance 
from the Cold War to the Iraq War.69 Güney presents a coherent examination of the 
factors behind the transformation in Turkey-US relations and concludes that Turkey 
gradually began following a more independent and multidimensional policy.  
In an article on the crossroads facing Turkey-US relations,70 Bill Park factors in the 
changes in Turkey’s domestic politics to understand the transformation in its attitude 
towards the US. He argues that Ankara increasingly chooses to ‘regionalise’ those 
issues that Washington sees as having an inevitably international character. According 
to Park, Turkish and American interests, perspectives, and policies frequently align, 
although this alignment occurs in a somewhat independent fashion and is circumstantial 
and contextual. Moreover, it is balanced by other issues where alignment is not possible 
or where there is conflict.  
66 The most important reassessments are: Ian O. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking Us-Turkish 
Relations (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007); Philip Gordon 
and Ömer Taşpınar, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading 
Partnership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Turkey 
Rediscovers the Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, 86:4 (2007), pp.103-114; and Bruce Kuniholm, ‘Turkey 
and the World in Twenty-Five Years: Thinking about the Future’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 102:2-3 
(2003), pp.471-489. 
67 Mustafa Aydın, and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
68 Uslu, Turkish-American Relationship. 
69Aylin Güney, ‘An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to 
“War on Iraq”’, Turkish Studies, 6:3 (2005), pp.341-359. 
70 Bill Park, ‘US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?’ Defense and Security Analysis, 
23:1 (2007), pp.41-54. 
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iv) Turkey’s Policy towards the Middle East, Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds 
Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East, Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurds received substantial 
attention from academia. The earlier works of Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Marcy Agmon 
are well-articulated samples of security oriented approach on Turkey’s Middle East 
policy.71 During the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath, the works of three scholars 
in particular offered detailed analyses of Turkish policy; Philip Robins, William Hale 
and Sabri Sayarı: In 1991, Philip Robins filled an important gap with an early and 
informative study of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and its bilateral 
relationships with Iran, Iraq and Syria.72 However, weaknesses of this work relate to its 
use of mainly non-Turkish sources and its thematic/horizontal approach to the bilateral 
relations which excludes cross-cutting factors in foreign policy behaviour. In 1992, 
comprehensive and satisfying articles by William Hale and Sabri Sayarı focused on the 
transformation of Turkey’s security environment in the post-Cold War era and 
examined the extent to which the Gulf crisis and the Kurdish problem had influenced 
Turkey’s more proactive involvement in the Middle East.73 In the mid-1990s, a Turkish-
language monograph by Baskın Oran, The Poised Hammer: OPC and Kurdish State,74 
offered the first detailed exploration of Turkey’s Iraq policy, the dynamics of Turkey-
US cooperation on Iraq, and Ankara’s relations with the Iraqi Kurds. It focused on the 
widespread public concern in Turkey about US policy in Iraq and whether the US 
sought to establish an independent Kurdish state through OPC. In 2007, Turkey expert 
William Hale highlighted the evolution and the dynamics of Turkey-US relations 
regarding Iraq since the Gulf War.75 During and after the 2003 Iraq War, Meliha Benli 
Altunışık examined Turkey’s Iraq policy.76 She argued that neither the failure of Turkey 
and the US to cooperate fully in the Iraq War, nor the post-2003 Iraq policy of Turkey 
could be explained by rational analysis alone. Instead, she suggests, Turkey’s Iraq 
policy may be understood by factoring in the impact of identity politics and historical 
narratives on Turkey’s interests.  
71 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Turkey's Security and the Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, 62:1 (1983), pp.157-175; 
and Marcy Agmon, ‘Defending the Upper Gulf: Turkey's Forgotten Partnership’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 21:1 (1986), pp.81-97. 
72 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991).  
73 William Hale, ‘Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis’, International Affairs, 68:4 (1992), 
pp.679-692; and Sayari, ‘Turkey’. 
74 Baskın Oran, Kalkık Horoz: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1996). 
75 William Hale, Turkey, the US and Iraq (London: Saqi, 2007). 
76 Meliha Benli Altunışık, ‘Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, 14:2 (2006), pp.183-196. 
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Most works in the literature assume Turkish foreign policy towards the Gulf crisis to be 
a departure from Turkey’s firmly established principles of non-involvement and non-
interference in Middle Eastern conflicts.77 This argument has some merits, but does not 
account for the fact that changes in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbourhood since the 
1980s occupy an ever larger place in Turkey’s strategic calculations and threat 
perceptions, and have forced Turkey to assume a more active role in the region.  
Another oversight relates to Turkey’s initial reaction to Gulf crisis. For instance, Hale 
argues that Turkey tried to continue ‘its previous policy of remaining strictly aloof from 
Middle Eastern conflicts,’78 that Ankara expected that the crisis would ‘soon blow 
over,’ and assumed it could be approached as a ‘purely inter-Arab dispute’ in which 
Turkey could ‘preserve a neutral attitude . . . without damaging its links with the 
Western powers.’79 Robins passes a similar judgement in defining Turkish policy during 
the Gulf crisis as ‘intuitive’ and a ‘traditionalist Kemalist reaction’ of ‘extreme caution 
and measure.’80 However, in actuality, the Turkish leadership, and particularly President 
Özal, were resolved to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait from the outset and played an 
instrumental role in convincing the US to impose sanctions.  
v) The Broader Kurdish Question and Northern Iraq 
In the 1990s, many studies emerged on the broader Kurdish question due to the 
internationalisation of Kurdish issues in Northern Iraq and in relation to Turkey’s 
struggle with the PKK. Martin Van Bruinessen has pioneered work on Kurdish history 
with a sociological background,81 and his early articles examined the role of the PUK 
and KDP during the Iran-Iraq War and the PKK’s violent terror campaign.82 His work is 
unique in offering a historical and social context based on Turkish sources, especially 
on the question of Kirkuk and the policies of Turkey, Syria and Iran on the Kurdish 
question.83  
77 Larrabee and Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.47; Sabri Sayari, ‘Turkey and the Middle East in the 
1990s’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 26:3 (1997), pp.44-55; Sayari, ‘Turkey’; Hale, ‘Turkey, Middle East 
and Gulf Crisis’; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.223-224. 
78 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.220.  
79 Hale, ‘Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis’, p.683.  
80 Philip Robins, ‘Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?’ in Clement H. Dodd 
(ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy (London: The Eothen Press, 1992), pp.70-87.  
81 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan 
(London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992). 
82 Respectively: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘The Kurds between Iran and Iraq’, MERIP Middle East Report, 
141 (1986), pp.14-27; and Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: The 
Workers’ Party of Kurdistan’, Middle East Report, 153 (1988), pp.40-42, 44-46, 50. 
83 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Iraq: Kurdish Challenges’, in Walter Posch (ed.), Looking into Iraq (Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp.45-72. 
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In a voluminous and well researched book, David McDowall depicts the history of 
Kurds and the emergence of ethno-politically oriented Kurdish movements in the 
Middle East.84 The book presents a detailed account of developments with regard to the 
Iraqi Kurds, including the oppression of successive Iraqi regimes, their role in the Iran-
Iraq War, the internecine fights between the KDP and PUK, and the situation in 
Northern Iraq in the period after the Gulf War. McDowall, however, takes an overly 
sympathetic view of Kurdish movements, representing the cooperation between Turkey 
and the KDP and PUK as a trap at the expense of Kurdish people, and losing balance in 
failing to address why both parties were motivated to deal with the PKK’s dominant 
presence in Northern Iraq. 
Michael M. Gunter has produced important scholarly studies on the broader Kurdish 
question. However, for the purposes of this study, his analysis of the politics of Iraq’s 
‘Kurdish predicament’ stands out in examining the period of conflict between the KDP 
and PUK in Northern Iraq in the 1990s.85 He undertakes a comparative analysis of the 
ideology and leadership of the KDP and PUK, and their relationships to the Iraqi 
opposition. However, this is still mainly a descriptive work derived from secondary 
sources. 
In their report for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,86 Henry 
Barkey and Graham Fuller chiefly analyse the PKK, the surge in Kurdish identity-
consciousness, the shortcomings of the Turkish security-based perspective, and the 
impact of these issues on Turkey’s foreign policy, while also offering a series of 
proposals to resolve these problems. 
Also significant for this study is Bill Park’s work on Turkey’s policy towards Northern 
Iraq.87 Park’s scholarship offers a detailed analysis of the importance of Northern Iraq 
and the relationship of the KDP and PUK to Turkey’s security and foreign policy. Park 
explores the conditions of the Kurdish population in Turkey and the Middle East by 
examining the relationship between Turks and Kurds from a historical perspective. He 
attempts to clarify the Kurdish problem within Turkey's domestic setting and 
84 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996). 
85 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999). 
86 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 
87 Bill Park, Turkey's Policy towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives (London: IISS, 2005); 
Bill Park, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Complex’, Adelphi Papers, 45: 374 (2005), pp.11-27; Bill Park, ‘Iraq’s 
Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy,’ Parameters, 34 (2004), pp.18-30. 
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emphasises the significance of Northern Iraq in the fight against the PKK. He also lays 
out several scenarios for Iraq’s future, including whether Iraq would ultimately stay 
intact or disintegrate, whether the Iraqi Kurds would take control of additional 
territories, and what the prospects would be for relations between Turkey and the 
Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. Other scholarly works also approach the overall 
Kurdish question and Turkey’s policy towards the PKK and Northern Iraq, including 
Kemal Kirisçi and Gareth M. Winrow’s edited collection and Robert Olson’s work on 
Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s, though these are again generally descriptive and 
based on secondary sources.88 
Indeed, most scholarly works on Kurdish question are based on secondary sources, 
particularly with reference to Turkey’s foreign and security policy. For instance, in his 
analysis of Turkey as an ‘overlord state’,89 Philip Robins claims ‘to explore the Kurdish 
issue in both the domestic context and the foreign policy of Turkey’.90 He argues that 
the revival of Turkey’s bilateral ties with Iraq was somehow related to the Kurdish 
question, reminiscent of Bagdad Pact, which also aimed to contain the potential impact 
of the Kurdish problem. However, as the primary sources in this research demonstrate, 
the Baghdad Pact was a strategic consensus between Turkey and the US for the 
containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East; an overriding objective 
superseding any other regional concerns. Turkey’s involvement in the Pact was not 
driven by a need to contain Kurdish question, but rather to secure Turkey’s Cold War 
role. Robins further notes that the ‘the close relationship which had been forged 
between Ankara and Baghdad over the Kurdish issue began to unravel after the 
ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988’. However, this neglects the actual 
reasons behind the change in Turkish policy and Iraq’s approach to the Iraqi Kurds; it 
takes into account neither Iraq’s 1988 decision to end the 1983 memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) on hot pursuit due to Turkey’s rejection of an Iraqi request for a 
cross-border operation against Iraqi Kurds fleeing to Turkey, nor the cooling of 
relations due to the Turkish reaction to the Halabja massacre. The article thus misses the 
underlying reasons for Turkey’s contacts with the Iraqi Kurdish groups in March 1991.  
88 Respectively, Kemal Kirişci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of 
a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997); and Robert W. Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1996). 
89 Philip Robins, ‘The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue’, International Affairs, 69:4 
(1993), pp.657-676. 
90 Ibid., p.658 
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Most works on Turkey’s policy towards Northern Iraq rightly describe Turkey’s 
primary motivation in working to prevent Iraq’s disintegration and the establishment of 
a Kurdish state as the prospect of a spill-over effect on Turkey’s Kurdish population. 
However, they overlook an equally important Turkish concern with the repercussions of 
Iraq’s dismemberment on the regional balance of power, especially regarding the 
influence of Iran. Turkey’s interest in the Iraqi Turkomens is generally simplified as an 
effort that started only after the Gulf crisis to control and counterbalance the 
achievements of Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq. However, this ignores Ankara’s many 
previous démarches towards Bagdad over its oppression of Iraq’s Turkomen 
community. For instance, during the visit of Iraqi President Ahmed Al-Bakr to Turkey 
on 19-20 September 1972, President Cevdet Sunay expressed Turkey’s concerns about 
the oppression of the Turkomen and requested their fair treatment by the Iraqi 
government. Also, in 1980, even at a time when Turkey depended on Iraq for one third 
of its crude oil import, Ankara strongly protested Iraq’s execution of three Turkomen 
leaders. Iraq, in return, issued warnings to Turkey not to interfere in its internal affairs.91 
In addition, the wider literature asserts that Turkey used the KDP and PUK against one 
another or against the PKK in order to prevent a unified administration in Northern Iraq, 
thus precluding an independent state, and claims that continued intra-Kurdish hostilities 
were related to Turkey’s role. Admittedly, Turkey did seek to constrain Kurdish 
ambitions for statehood. However, the literature on the matter overlooks the fact that 
both the KDP and PUK sought to use the intervention of outside actors in their fight for 
political survival against each other. Cases in point are KDP Chairman Masoud 
Barzani’s request for help from Saddam in August 1996, and the PUK’s joint attack on 
the KDP in cooperation with the PKK in 1997. The literature also tends to explain Iraqi 
Kurdish groups’ fight against the PKK as due to Turkish pressure, while not adequately 
addressing the KDP and PUK’s own motivations to fight the PKK, which became a 
threat to both in their quests for wider control of Northern Iraq. 
vi) Memoirs  
The academic literature has also made rigorous efforts to explain the motivations behind 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and behind Turkey’s parliamentary refusal of US 
requests for the Northern option. A central problem for any researcher is the need to 
understand the factors that shaped the decisions of the policy makers, and the immediate 
context in which those decisions were made. In this sense, political memoirs are one of 
91 ‘Iraq Warns Turkey Not to Interfere’, Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1980. 
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the most valuable forms of primary sources. As George Egerton argues, the role of the 
memoirists in the making of a foreign policy decision, their knowledge about the 
operation of the political system, and their personal engagement and experience through 
access to, participation in and observation of events in flux offer ‘invaluable sources of 
privileged information on contemporary history long before the official documentation 
becomes accessible.’92 He argues that such memoirs have a unique value in their ability 
to describe ‘the events, actions, and conditions, to explain the causes of these events, 
and to interpret their meaning.’93 
However, political memoirs also have inherent shortcomings. As Stephen M. Walt 
observes, ‘national security issues are highly politicized … and work on these topics is 
often written for political rather than scientific goals’.94 As memoirs are what Egerton 
calls a ‘personalized narration of history’, the risks associated with them are the 
tendency of politicians to advocate and justify their acts of policy, and employ post-
facto reasoning to rationalise a decision or explain past perspectives and motives, which 
deviates from the perspective of a scholar.95 In most cases, however, political memoirs 
ultimately provide first-hand and accurate information and introspective insights from 
foreign policy actors, despite their limitations of scholarly perspective. 
Comprehensive explanations of US foreign policy before and during the Gulf War can 
be found in memoirs by President George H. W. Bush and his National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and his Secretary of State James Baker.96 Likewise, the 
origins of the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the context of that decision, the 
details of the personalities involved, and the deliberations within the administration are 
best revealed in the memoirs published by nearly every senior member: President 
George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser and Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Undersecretary of 
Defense Douglas J. Feith, and finally US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director 
George Tenet.97 All these books present valuable insights into the way the Bush 
92 George Egerton, ‘Politics and Autobiography: Political Memoir as Polygenre’, Biography, 15:3 (1992), 
p.233 
93 Ibid., p.237. 
94 Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 35:2 (1991), 
p.213. 
95 Egerton, ‘Politics and Autobiography’, pp.224, 236. 
96 Respectively: George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 
1999); and James A. Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and 
Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995). 
97 Respectively: George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010); Dick Cheney, 
In My Time (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011); Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of 
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administration made foreign policy decisions and shaped the overall US defence and 
national security policy, including the highly contentious decision to occupy Iraq.  
Elsewhere, one of the best examples of political memoirs and case studies in decision 
making during both the Gulf and Iraq Wars is by Richard Haass.98 In a well-
documented and insider account of US policy on Iraq from 1990 to 2003, Haass argues 
that the Gulf War was a ‘war of necessity’ with the realist objective of reversing Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait and destroying Baghdad’s military capability. In contrast, he claims 
that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a ‘war of choice’ resulting from an inadequate 
decision-making process and based on convictions rather than facts.  
From the Turkish perspective, the most compelling book on Turkey-US diplomacy in 
2003 is The 1 March Incident: The Iraq Motion and Its Aftermath by retired ambassador 
Deniz Bölükbaşı, who served as the chairman of the Turkish negotiating team during 
the talks.99 Based on his notes and classified Turkish documents, Bölükbaşı provides a 
first-hand analysis of the Turkish position during this contentious episode in Turkey-US 
relations. Turkish columnist Fikret Bila’s The Iraq War in Ankara: The Attempted Civil 
Coup and 1 March Motion in Light of Confidential Documents is a valuable source in 
terms of its annexes of official classified Turkish documents from Turkey’s negotiations 
with the US before the Iraq War in 2003.100  
To conclude, this research differs from the broad literature outlined above in being 
neither a purely theoretical, nor a mainly empirical study. Certainly, it contributes to an 
understanding of the impact of Iraq on Turkey-US relationship over three historical 
phases largely as an empirical work based on primary sources. However, it also applies 
a theoretical framework in the form of an integrative model deduced from an amalgam 
of structural realism, neoclassical realism and alliance theory. Therefore, the theoretical 
approach sets the framework for the empirical analysis, and the research itself is not an 
examination of alliance theory. The unique contribution this dissertation makes to the 
literature is the detailed integrative model of foreign policy behaviours of two allied 
My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011); Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: 
A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011); Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision (New York: HarperCollins, 
2008); and George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: 
HarperCollins: 2007). 
98 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2009). 
99 Deniz Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası (I�stanbul: Dog�an, 2008). 
100 Fikret Bila, Ankara'da Irak Savas�ları: Sivil Darbe Giris�imi ve Gizli Belgelerle 1 Mart Tezkeresi 
(I�stanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2003). 
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nations that it both deduces from and applies to an empirical case study Turkey-US 
cooperation and non-cooperation on Iraq in the given period.  
4. Methodology  
In developing an integrated model in relation to an empirical case, this research has 
necessarily been what Harry Eckstein’s describes as a ‘disciplined-configurative 
study’,101 emphasising the application (or synthesis) of theories in case interpretation. 
As Graham Allison observes, analysts of foreign policy may use description, 
explanation, prediction, evaluation, and recommendation as related, but logically 
separable, methods.102 In terms of methodological consistency, there are two principle 
challenges for any attempt to understand, analyse and explain foreign policy and intra-
alliance behaviour patterns in international relations. The first is to demonstrate causal 
links between theoretical debates and the practice of foreign policy. The second is to 
demonstrate the relevance of the theoretical debates themselves to the subject of study.  
It is not usually possible to avoid the problems pertaining to these challenges by 
employing a single method of investigation. In order to overcome them, this research 
has chosen a multifaceted approach which has been called ‘multiple strategies of field 
research,’103 and distinct but complimentary methods have been used in the different 
phases of this thesis. The primary and secondary sources outlined below have thus been 
consulted using a combination of process tracing, discourse analysis and content 
analysis. 
The major organisational/methodical decision at the outset of this research was whether 
to structure the account of the whole period chronologically or to focus more 
systematically on key topics. This thesis is a case study which aims to articulate why 
different states of relations occurred between Turkey and the US regarding Iraq in 
different instances and to understand which dynamics are worth exploring in similar 
situations. As Yin points out, a case study necessitates an investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.104 Because the research required 
multiple sources of evidence to support it, the final methodological decision was to 
blend chronology with systematic analysis of the key phases, as this better reflected the 
101 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, ‘Burden-Sharing’. 
102 Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, American Political Science 
Review, 63:3 (1969), pp.698-718. 
103 Robert G. Burgess, Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual (London: Allen and Unwin, 
2005), p.144. 
104 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994). 
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positions of those engaged in shaping policy on Iraq and its subsequent influence on 
Turkey-US relations.  
This research is based chiefly on qualitative data gathered from several types of source. 
The primary sources used are official communiqués, diplomatic correspondence, 
government policy papers, minutes, press statements, press releases and background 
briefing notes. Additional primary sources are the semi- and un-structured interviews 
with key political figures, analysts, scholars, and former and current government 
officials in Turkey, the US, Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdish region. The study also employs 
open source materials, such as official statements, the collected works and memoirs of 
former presidents, politicians, and foreign policy makers, newspaper databases and 
Turkish and the US journals. The primary sources have been carefully reviewed and 
crosschecked, and rigorous efforts have been made to carefully consider every available 
piece of evidence and to reflect the views of the interviewees themselves. 
The strength of this research is that the majority of the sources used are primary 
material. This was made possible through a unique opportunity to have unlimited access 
to the primary source material at the archives of the Turkish MFA, which has enabled 
and unprecedentedly detailed presentation of the Turkish perspective, and a well-
informed analysis of US policy.  
The semi-structured or unstructured interviews were carried out between 2008 and 2012 
with top-level politicians and senior Turkish, US and Iraqi Kurdish officials directly 
involved in the policy formulation process during the periods in question. The 
interviews have been instrumental in understanding the reasons, motivations, and 
context of the policy makers’ responses to specific issues. Having a certain level of 
command of the events based on the primary written sources added value to the 
interviews. In most cases, the interviews turned into sessions of genuine exchange of 
personal reflections, perceptions and interpretations of events. The interviewees were 
asked to focus on why, how, and the context in which policy was formulated rather than 
simply sharing their recollections of what happened. This was useful in sourcing further 
primary archive material and also made it possible to combine such material with the 
personal reflections, interpretations and perceptions of individuals involved in the 
policy making process. The researcher’s official position both provided access to these 
actors and encouraged frankness and openness during the interviews. Each interview 
took shape according to the knowledge, position and experience of the interviewee. 
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However, it must be noted that interviews are in certain ways risky enterprises. Some 
inherent problems with the form are the post-facto reasoning interviewees may apply to 
the given policy choices, their emotional attachment to a particular person, cause or 
stance,105 and the sheer difficulty of recollecting events after many years. As Robert 
Jervis argues, determining the accuracy of statesmen’s perceptions of actions during 
wartime presents a real problem; not only is one required to ‘tease the person’s views 
out of confused and conflicting evidence and try to separate his true beliefs from those 
he merely wants others to believe he holds,’ but a statesman with no well-defined 
perceptions at the time might develop them retrospectively to conform to the actions he 
has taken.106  
For all these reasons, critical content analysis was applied to substantiate the 
information during the interviews. For instance, the claim about Özal’s perceived 
intentions to annex Kirkuk-Mosul region is an example. Information from Özal’s close 
confidants, such as his chief foreign policy advisor Kaya Toperi, was cross-checked 
against the accounts those politicians who resigned from their posts allegedly in 
opposition to Özal’s plans, such as Ali Bozer, then Foreign Minister, and against that of 
M. Abramowitz, then American ambassador to Turkey. The risks inherent in the 
interviews also apply to public statements about past policy and events. For instance, 
nearly a decade after the Gulf crisis, Korkut Özal, a former politician and the elder 
brother of President Özal, publicly accused the foreign policy elite and the Turkish 
military of preventing Özal from carrying out his courageous strategic/military plan to 
annex Kirkuk and Mosul. However, in an interview, the then Foreign Minister Ali 
Bozer claims that Korkut Özal visited him at the MFA during the Gulf crisis to lobby 
against prospects for Özal’s adventurism in Kirkuk and Mosul. In short, the challenge of 
relying on first hand accounts was to crosscheck all the information obtained through 
primary source material and interviews instead of accepting it at face value.  
The final source of primary material was the researcher’s personal experience as a 
member of the Turkish diplomatic service for nearly two decades. An academic aspect 
was added to this diplomatic experience through co-authoring a book in 1996 on OPC 
105 For instance, Yıldırım Akbulut lost his seat as the leader of the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, 
ANAP) and thereby the post of Prime Minister in June 1991 because of his publicly perceived 
subordination to President Özal, especially during the Gulf crisis and the war. 
106 Robert Jervis, ‘War and Misperception’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:4 (1988), p.680. 
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and Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy,107 as well as successfully completing an MA 
dissertation on ‘The Future of Iraq’ at King’s College in 2006.  
Lastly, as detailed in the literature review, a range of secondary sources have also been 
consulted in the form of books, journal articles, policy papers and monographs by think 
tanks, covering academic approaches to Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-US relations, 
Turkey and Iraq, and the Kurdish problem. Secondary sources were also used to 
contextualise and interpret primary sources, and leading newspapers, biographies and 
historical works were also consulted to illuminate the contextual background to policy-
makers mind-sets and policy choices.  
5. Structure of the Dissertation  
Chapter 1 of the thesis focuses on the conceptual framework. It develops an integrative 
model to understand and analyse the parameters of security cooperation between Turkey 
and the US in the Middle East, especially on Iraq, with a particular focus on how Iraq 
impacts Turkey-US relations. The model is inspired by the realist school and is an 
amalgamation of structural realism, neo-classical realism and alliance theory, 
incorporating incidents from the historical record of Turkey-US relations. The aim here 
is to develop a model which has sufficient explanatory power to facilitate an analysis of 
the impact of Iraq on the Turkey-US alliance relationship. By way of historical 
background and validation, the chapter then applies the model to Turkey-US relations 
up to 1990. 
Chapter 2 attempts to reconstruct Turkey’s strategic calculations in cooperating with the 
US-led international coalition during the Gulf crisis and Gulf War. It analyses the 
strategic thinking behind the formation and implementation of Turkey’s policy between 
the emergence of the crisis and the war, explaining the major dynamics at play and the 
way the crisis influenced and shaped Turkey’s relations with the US. It argues that the 
Turkey-US agreement on the threat from Saddam’s regime and the consequent joint 
strategy to deal with it by reversing his invasion of Kuwait led to close cooperation 
during this period.  
The following three chapters all deal with the period of ‘unintended consequences’ from 
1991 to inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001. This period is examined in 
three separate chapters for a number of reasons. The first is for practical purposes since 
107 Oran, Kalkık Horoz. As the book was being published, I became a diplomat at the MFA and my name 
had to be withheld as co-author due to MFA regulations. 
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a single chapter covering all the developments during this period would be too lengthy. 
The second is to demonstrate how Turkish and American perceptions of threat from Iraq 
and their respective strategies evolved within different timeframes. Chapter 3 covers the 
period from 1991 to 1994, when the first KDP-PUK clashes in Northern Iraq introduced 
a new dynamic in Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq. Chapter 4 covers the 1994-1996 
period, which was marked by intensifying intra-Kurdish hostilities that eventually led to 
the KDP’s invitation of Saddam’s forces into the region at the end of August 1996. 
Chapter 5 covers 1996-2001, examining the joint Turkey-US efforts to reconcile the 
Kurdish groups. Taken as a whole, these three chapters examine Turkey-US cooperation 
on overall Iraq strategy, including Turkey’s increasingly reluctant support for the US 
containment policy. These chapters also trace the emergence of Northern Iraq as a 
distinct issue in Turkey-US relations, including the creation of a de facto Kurdish entity, 
the PKK’s infiltration into and use of the region to stage terrorist attacks against Turkey, 
and Ankara’s response to the situation.  
Chapter 6 deals with the period from the inauguration of the Bush-Cheney 
administration in January 2001 to US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. It examines how 
Saddam’s regime was elevated to a clear, primary, and present threat to vital US 
interests and how the use of force for regime change evolved into the central US 
strategy to deal with the perceived threat from Iraq. The chapter analyses the Turkey-US 
discussions over US requests from Turkey to assist in implementing the strategy of 
regime change through the military option. It also examines the factors leading to the 
TBMM’s 1 March 2003 decision not to allow US troops a northern front, including 
Ankara’s non-agreement with Washington on the level of threat from Saddam’s regime 
and the military option for regime change as the corresponding strategy. It also 
addresses how Turkey and the US’ respective strategic objectives and calculations for 
the invasion of Iraq differed regarding the possible outcome of a post-Saddam Iraq.  
The concluding chapter looks briefly at the immediate fallout from the 1 March decision 
in terms of the ‘Iraq gap’ it created in Turkey-US relations and especially US 
perceptions of Turkey. It then summarizes how the historical cases studied correlate to 
the integrative foreign policy model, showing how, rather than being the result of 
individual diplomatic errors or intelligence failures, a combination of divergence of 
interests, alliance politics, expectations and trust gaps, and domestic political pressures 
all led to Turkey’s refusal of the US request for full cooperation during the Iraq War.
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This research seeks to explain the foreign policies of Turkey and the US vis-à-vis Iraq 
between 1990 and 2003, and to trace how Iraq became such a central issue. This 
involves constructing an analytical/conceptual framework to explain both the 
parameters of security cooperation that can successfully be applied to Turkey-US 
relations in general, including when Turkey and the US can have security cooperation 
on issues related to the Middle East, and the specific impact of Iraq as an external factor 
in the evolution, or definition, of the Turkey-US relationship.  
Glenn H. Snyder and Stephen M. Walt identify three criteria to assess international 
relations research; precision and logical consistency, creativity/originality, and 
empirical validity, to which Snyder also adds a fourth; policy relevance.108 This chapter 
thus has two objectives: The first is to devise and construct a coherent integrative model 
and hypothesis that can potentially meet all four criteria in analysing the impact of Iraq 
on Turkey-US relations in 1990-2003. A key challenge here centres on the question of 
whether it is possible to deduce such a model from the general propositions of structural 
realism, alliance theory and neoclassical realism. The model must then be developed in 
light of the key research question of why Turkey pursued security cooperation with the 
US during the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War but failed to establish such cooperation during 
the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. It will thus have to take into account the following: the 
patterns that the Turkey-US alliance has exhibited since 1952; how this alliance 
relationship materialised vis-à-vis issues such as the Middle East that fell outside of the 
NATO framework; how Turkey and the US managed their common and conflicting 
interests within this alliance; and the factors at play during the processes of intra-
alliance bargaining on global and regional issues of mutual interest.  
The second objective of this chapter is to explore if this model can be successfully 
applied to Turkey’s relationship with the US regarding the Middle East in general and 
Iraq in particular. It tests the integrated model it develops against three empirical cases 
in Turkey-US relations related to the Middle East from Turkey’s entry into NATO in 
1952 until the Gulf crisis in 1990: the formation of the Turkey-US alliance; the 
establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955; and the period following the pact’s demise 
108 Glenn H. Snyder, review of In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics, by 
Robert Powell, Political Science Quarterly, 115:1 (2000), pp.132-134; Stephen M. Walt, ‘A Model 
Disagreement’, International Security, 24:2 (1999), pp.115-130.  
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in 1958 until 1990. Thus tested, the conceptual model will then serve as the basis for 
analysing and testing the impact of Iraq on Turkey-US relations in 1990-2003 in the 
following four chapters. 
1.2. An Integrative Model of Security Cooperation between Turkey and the US vis-
à-vis the Middle East 
As it develops and argues for an integrative model and hypothesis to explain Turkey’s 
relationship with the US, especially as regards security cooperation in the Middle East 
in general and the Gulf crisis and its aftermath in particular, the analysis of this chapter 
is based on two key assumptions: 
1. Following admission to NATO in 1952, Turkey’s role in the Western alliance, 
particularly its relationship with the US, became a key determinant of its policy 
towards the Middle East. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Turkey-US 
alliance relationship led necessarily to cooperation on Middle Eastern issues in 
all cases, as the Middle East and the Gulf crisis were both of out-of-area in the 
NATO context.  
2. Turkey and the US continued to enjoy a formal alliance relationship when Iraq 
occupied Kuwait in 1990. Although the Cold War was about to end, and the US 
no longer considered the Soviet Union a primary threat to be balanced against, 
this did not undermine Turkey’s motivation to maintain the alliance relationship, 
since it continued to depend on NATO and the US for its national security. In 
addition, Turkey’s ideological Western orientation remained a key motivation in 
its foreign policy behaviour.  
The integrative model constructed in this chapter posits that, in order to have security 
cooperation between Turkey and the US on Middle Eastern issues, the existence of two 
conditions are essential: (1) agreement on a significant/strategic common threat and (2) 
agreement on strategy to deal with that threat.109  
(1) Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
The first condition posits that there should be agreement between Turkey and the US on 
a significant common threat and thus an overriding shared strategic objective on the 
nature of that threat. The common concern and the overriding strategic objective can be 
109 I would like to thank Professor John Mearsheimer for his feedback on this model during his trip to 
Turkey in October 2012, which was of great assistance in reviewing and reconstructing the conceptual 
framework as it is developed here. I would also like to thank Professor Stephen Walt for taking time to 
comment on an earlier version of the framework during the interview in September 2010. 
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considered systemic level factors in the form of Walt’s proposition about balance-of-
threat against an external power and Schweller’s balance-of-interests. 
(2) Agreement on strategy to deal with the common strategic threat  
The second condition posits that there should also be agreement between Turkey and 
the US on the strategy how to deal with the common strategic threat. This raises the 
question of perceived national interests in the region, and is thus related to the influence 
of domestic politics as an intervening variable in state behaviour, and thus in foreign 
policy making. As discussed in the review of realist theories, solely systemic-level 
analyses often fail to incorporate sub-systemic/unit-level/domestic causal factors in 
explaining state behaviour in an alliance relationship. The model developed here, 
therefore, draws on the neoclassical realist emphasis on the interaction between 
complex domestic political processes and systemic-level factors. In other words, even 
though structural factors constrain any nation’s strategic/national interest at the systemic 
level, its perceptions are primarily defined through the domestic political process. As 
Schweller observes, foreign policy is also formulated in response to unit-level factors 
such as policy elites’ considerations of cost versus risk, perceptions of the external 
environment, views on the nation’s goals and challenges, preferences for the means of 
serving those purposes, and the domestic political risks associated with certain foreign 
policy choices.110 The model outlined here thus combines unit- and structural-level 
causes in its analysis of foreign policy formulation.  
Agreement on strategy to address a common threat also involves the question of 
whether the mutual expectations of each party converge in the implementation of the 
actual strategy. This dimension relates to the questions of whether there is agreement on 
the division of responsibilities and whether both sides have the ability to carry out the 
requisite strategy.  
Table 1 (overleaf) demonstrates how the model uses these scenarios to decide when 





110 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, 
International Security, 29: 2 (2004), pp. 159-201. 
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Table 1: Scenarios 1–2 for Turkey-US security cooperation on the Middle East 
  Independent Variable 1: 
 
Agreement on significant/ 
strategic common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to 
deal with perceived 
strategic threat 
Dependent Variable / 
Result 
 Scenario 1 Yes Yes  Cooperation 
 Scenario 2 Yes No Non-cooperation 
According to scenario one, if there is agreement on the independent variables of (1) and 
(2), then the dependent variable, and thus the result, will be security cooperation. 
On the other hand, scenario two posits that if there is agreement on independent variable 
(1), but no agreement on (2), the dependent variable, and thus the result, will be non-
cooperation.  
This model also suggests the possibility of other scenarios. For instance, if the states did 
not agree on (1), would there be any possibility of them agreeing on (2)? What would be 
the prospects for such an option? What would be the defining factors and parameters for 
any state to agree on (2), even if it did not agree with the other state on (1)? In such a 
scenario, what would be the prospects for security cooperation?  
In fact, the two scenario model outlined above does not account for what might compel 
or induce a state to agree on (2) in the absence of agreement on (1). In such cases, the 
defining factors for an agreement on (2) would become matters of alliance management, 
cost versus benefit, relative gains, and whether the expectations of both parties 
converged or diverged. For instance, state (a) might not agree with state (b) about the 
nature of a threat (1), but if the demands and expectations of (b) from (a) in the strategy 
to address the threat were minimal or there were gains to (a) from its cooperation, there 
would be no expectations gap, no costs or risks, and (a) could agree on the actual 
strategy (2), yielding security cooperation. In contrast, if (a) did not agree on (1), and if 
the demands and expectations of (b) from (a) for the actual strategy were likely to create 
high costs and risks for (a), there would be an expectations gap, and (a) would disagree 
on (2), most likely resulting in non-cooperation. However, even in cases where (a) 
disagrees on the nature of both (1) and (2) due to an expectations gap regarding the 
demands and expectations of (b), (a) might still feel forced to cooperate with (b) on the 
implementation of the actual strategy if it perceived the costs of non-cooperation to be 
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higher than those of cooperation. In short, with the addition of a third scenario, the 
results for security cooperation vary from cooperation to reluctant, limited or non-
cooperation in the absence of agreement on (1), but conditional agreement on (2), as 
illustrated in table 2.  
Table 2: Scenarios 1–3 for Turkey-US security cooperation on the Middle East 




common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to 
deal with perceived strategic 
threat 
Dependent Variable / 
Result 
 Scenario 1 Yes Yes Cooperation 
 Scenario 2 Yes No Non-cooperation 
  
 Scenario 3: 
 
No 
a. Conditional yes, subject to: 
minimal cost of cooperation / 
relative gains / no expectations 
gap 
 Cooperation 
b. Conditional yes, subject to: 
costs of non-cooperation > 
costs of cooperation / 
expectations gap 
 Cooperation / limited or   
 non-cooperation 
While scenario three certainly helps to finesse the hypothesis, the model still does not 
factor in the impact of the existing relationship between the states involved on security 
cooperation. Thus, if states (a) and (b) did not enjoy good relations, would agreement on 
(1) and (2) automatically lead to security cooperation? For instance, a bilateral problem 
can cast a shadow on security cooperation in different fields, as did the ‘poppy crisis’ 
between Turkey and the US in the 1970s.111 In addition, where an external factor 
emerges in which (a) perceives its fundamental interests to be at stake, yet (b) pursues a 
policy that runs against that interest, cooperation in other fields could be undermined or 
prevented. The US position on Cyprus in the 1960s, for instance, caused Ankara to 
urgently redefine its relationship with Washington. President Johnson’s notorious letter 
to the Turkish Prime Minister in 1964 severely strained Turkey’s ties with the US, 
despite their strategic consensus on addressing the shared Soviet threat through 
NATO.112 However, on balance, the state of relations between the relevant countries 
should not be considered an independent variable determining the outcome of security 
cooperation scenarios. For instance, during World War II, the US and the Soviet Union, 
111 Çağrı Erhan, Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu, (Bilgi Yayınevi: Ankara, 1996) 
112 Baskın Oran (ed), Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2010), p.413-415 
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despite a lack of mutual trust and good relations, were able to develop security 
cooperation against Germany. Nevertheless, the absence of good relations between 
states may have a certain—but indecisive—impact on the possibility of security 
cooperation between them. A good state of relations is likely to create goodwill among 
foreign policy-makers and the public at large towards cooperation on the issues at stake. 
Accordingly, it would be unrealistic to dismiss the impact of the contemporary state of 
Turkey’s relationship with the US in analysing, for instance, its active involvement in 
the Baghdad Pact and participation in the US-led alliance during the 1991 Gulf war and 
its aftermath.  
1.3. Testing the Model against Empirical Cases 
1.3.1. Case One for Scenario One: Turkey’s Entry into NATO  
(1) Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
Turkey and the US have enjoyed a formal alliance since Turkey’s admission to NATO 
in 1952. Walt presents Turkey’s alliance with NATO and the US following World War 
II as a compelling case for balancing state behaviour.113 After the war, Turkey was 
faced with an increased threat from the Soviet Union in several forms, including 
Moscow’s rejection of the Soviet-Turkish Non-Aggression Treaty, demands for the 
revision of the Montreux Convention governing the status of the Turkish Straits, and for 
territorial concessions in eastern Turkey. The Soviets threatened Turkey’s survival as an 
independent and sovereign state, and Turkey chose to ally itself with the West to 
balance this threat.114  
Thus, Ankara’s fundamental strategic interest was in achieving its national security 
through a US-led Western collective defence. Turkish foreign policy between 1945 and 
1960 reflected this Western alignment and was devised primarily to contribute to 
Western collective defence and establish good relations with the US and with Europe.115 
This policy converged with Turkey’s broader aim to establish economic, social, and 
cultural links with the West, and Ankara sought to utilise its role in the alliance to 
maintain its Western orientation. The dual commitment to the Western security cause 
and pursuit of a pro-Western orientation were mutually reinforcing and led to a 
113 Stephen M.Walt, ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,’ International 
Organization, 42: 2 (1988), pp.275-316. 
114 Ibid. and Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and 
NATO, 1945-1952’, Journal of American History, 71:4 (1985), pp.807-825. 
115 Güney, ‘Anatomy of Transformation’, p.341. Indeed, During the Cold War years, Turkish foreign and 
security policy circles applied the term ‘West’ to both the US and Western Europe without differentiation. 
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prominent Turkish role within Western security.116 This ‘core concept’ remained one of 
the structural determinants in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy from 1945 to 
1960. To this end, Turkey sent a brigade of 4,500 soldiers to the Far East to support 
American forces in the Korean War in 1950, and was consequently admitted to NATO 
in 1952 with explicit American backing. American aid to Turkey also started to pour in 
as part of the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1950).117 In short, Turkey 
and the US had agreed on the nature of a common strategic threat; the expansion of the 
Soviet Union.  
(2) Agreement on strategy to deal with the common strategic threat  
From the late 1940s to the end of the 1950s, the chief strategic objective of Western 
thinking on the Middle East was containment of the Soviet Union. Indeed, beyond its 
commitment in Korea, Turkey’s unique geopolitical situation, linking the Soviet Union 
with the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, was one of the key factors for its 
admission into NATO.118 Walt characterises Turkey’s alignment with Europe and the 
US after World War II as ‘substantial support for testing balancing behaviour,’119 and 
his balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy suggests that ideology has a modest effect on 
alliance preferences.120 While Turkey’s national interest in maintaining the Turkish 
Republic’s security and survival in the face of the Soviet threat dictated that it 
participate in the Western bloc as a balancing behaviour, this also converged with a 
prior ideological orientation towards Westernisation. In the end, agreement on the 
Soviet threat and agreement on admission of Turkey into NATO as a strategy to deal 
with that threat led to a formal alliance and security cooperation between Turkey and 
the US, and became the central pillar of their relationship.  
1.3.2. Case Two for Scenario Two: The Baghdad Pact 
(1) Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
As explained above, following World War II, Turkey considered the Soviet Union the 
primary threat to its national security. It aligned itself with the US policy of regional 
116 Fuller, Eastern Europe, p.5. 
117 Güney, ‘Anatomy of Transformation’, p.342. 
118 Charles A. Kupchan, ‘American Globalism in the Middle East: The Roots of Regional Security 
Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, 103:4 (1988-1989), pp.585-611. 
119 Walt, ‘Testing Theories’, p.297 
120 Cf. Robert O. Keohane, ‘Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism’, International Security, 13:1 
(1998), pp.169-176. 
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containment to prevent Moscow from exploiting intra-Middle Eastern instability.121 In 
this period, there was explicit agreement between Washington and Ankara that the 
Soviet Union was a common strategic threat. 
(2) Agreement on strategy to deal with the common strategic threat  
The US strategy to contain Soviet expansionism in the Middle East concentrated on the 
link between the region’s security and the defence of Western Europe based on the 
concept of the ‘Northern Tier,’ which referred to the line of countries that formed a 
border between the Soviet Union and the Middle East.122 The chief proponent of this 
idea was John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State. It entailed containing the Soviet 
Union by creating a collective security structure through an alliance that would link the 
southernmost member of NATO, Turkey, with the westernmost member of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Pakistan.123  
Following its admission to NATO, Turkey lobbied hard to ensure that other NATO 
members recognised Turkey as part of Europe, rather than the Middle East. Turkey 
considered itself to be an integral and inseparable part of a Europe confronting the 
Soviet Union. It therefore fervently opposed British proposals to establish an ‘Eastern 
Mediterranean Command,’ which would encompass Greece, Turkey, the eastern 
Mediterranean, and the Middle East under a British Supreme Commander, and insisted 
that its forces serve under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).124 At 
the same time, Ankara recognised that its Middle East policy had to be based on 
calculations related to its new role in the broader global context of the Western Alliance 
against the Soviet Union and aligned with US policies accordingly. According to Marcy 
Agmon, Washington intended for Turkey to defend NATO’s southern flank and the 
Middle East, both directly and by providing basing and staging sites for US units.125 
Turkey, in essence, was attributed a primary leadership role as the ‘cohesive element’ in 
organising the defence of the Middle East in line with the Northern Tier concept.126 As 
the Soviet Union was regarded as the principal threat to Turkey’s security, the Persian 
121 Memorandum of the meeting between the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the British 
Ambassador in Ankara Sir James Bowker in Ankara on 17 June 1954.  
122 Foreign Relations of the US, 1955-1957 Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Document 1, 
‘Editorial Note,’ http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d1 
123 ‘The Middle East: After the Baghdad Pact’, Time, 11 August 1958,  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,825407,00.html 
124 Agmon, ‘Defending the Upper Gulf’; Leonard Binder, ‘The Middle East as a Subordinate International 
System’, World Politics, 10:3 (1958), pp.408-429. 
125 Agmon, ‘Defending the Upper Gulf’.  
126 Binder, ‘Middle East’, p.424 
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Gulf was given high priority in US military planning and force procurement.127 Turkey 
remained the only NATO country bordering both the Soviet Union and the Middle East; 
its boundaries were effectively on the frontlines of the East-West strategic rivalry,128 
and its role was an essential element of the US strategy to prevent Soviet intrusion into 
the Middle East. In short, in addition to agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat, 
Turkish and American interests and strategy to address that threat overlapped, allowing 
them to pursue security cooperation against the Soviets as an external threat in Middle 
East. Successive Turkish governments’ perceptions of national interest and the resultant 
policy of ensuring a role in the Western alliance thus converged with the special role 
attributed to Turkey in the US strategic calculation.  
In 1955, this consensus between Washington and Ankara led to the establishment of the 
Baghdad Pact; a collective defence organisation among Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, the UK 
and Iran.129 Turkey-US cooperation on the Baghdad Pact was due to the convergence of 
three factors; agreement on the strategy to contain the Soviet threat in the Middle East, 
Washington’s expectations that Turkey assume regional leadership to achieve this 
objective, and Ankara’s perception that playing such a role was in accordance with its 
national interests.  
Nevertheless, the pact itself was ill-fated. While the US signed individual agreements 
with members of the Baghdad Pact, it refrained from formally joining because of the 
difficulty of obtaining Congressional approval. This was due to controversy over Israeli 
objections and possible requests for similar guarantees which in turn would be rejected 
by the Arab members of the Pact.130 The US also considered close cooperation with the 
UK essential for establishment of a Middle East defence arrangement.131 However, US 
non-adherence to the Pact left the UK with major burden while Britain’s prestige and 
strength in the Middle East were on the wane and allowed the US to distance itself from 
the UK ‘in a colonial area context.’132 More importantly, according to the US Secretary 
127 Robert H. Johnson, ‘The Persian Gulf in US Strategy: A Skeptical View’, International Security, 14:1 
(1989), pp.122-160. 
128 Sezer, ‘Turkey's Security Policy’. 
129 For detailed background on the Baghdad Pact, see İsmail Soysal, ‘The 1955 Baghdad Pact’, Studies on 
Turkish Arab Relations, 5 (1990), pp.43-92; Sezer, ‘Turkey's Security Policy’.  
130 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), U.S. Adherence to 
the Baghdad Pact, 30 November 1956, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d153  
131 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), U.S. Position 
Regarding Middle East Defense, 16 June 1955, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-
57v12/d44  
132 Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, 15 November 1956, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d142; Special National Intelligence Estimate 
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of State, Washington viewed the British role in Baghdad Pact as: ‘largely an instrument 
of U.K.-Arab politics; … under the Pact the British are trying to use Iraq to advance 
their interests in the Middle East.’133  
The other Arab states, in the sway of intense Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, 
opposed Baghdad Pact, which they viewed as an arrangement to sustain Western 
political dominance in the Arab world, reminiscent of resented British rule.134 Egypt, 
competing for regional leadership, led Arab opposition to the pact. From the outset, the 
Soviet Union protested Turkey’s initiative as a design among periphery states to turn the 
Middle East into a NATO military base. According to the Soviet government, the 
timing of this initiative, as Moscow was making efforts to improve its bilateral 
relationships with countries in the region, was not coincidental. In the end, the interests 
of the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Syria overlapped to undermine the Baghdad Pact.135 
Following a series of regional developments between 1956 and 1958, the pact 
ultimately collapsed and officially came to an end with Iraq’s withdrawal in 1959. The 
other signatories formed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was 
formally disbanded in 1979.136   
1.3.3. Case for Scenario Two: Turkey-US Relations towards the Middle East, 
1960–1991 
(1) Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
Starting in the early 1960s, the US strategic focus shifted from the southern flank of 
NATO and the Middle East to Central and Southeast Asia. The Northern Tier was no 
longer perceived to be in immediate danger from the Soviet threat, despite US 
recognition that the independence and integrity of Greece, Turkey, and Iran were vital 
US interests.137 For Washington, the Middle East lost importance as a theatre of 
operations in its strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union.138 Simultaneously, intra-
SNIE 30–7–56, Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-adherence to the Baghdad Pact, 14 
December 1956, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d170  
133 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 16 November 1956, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d144 
134 Gordon C. Smith, ‘The Emergence of the Middle East’, Journal of Contemporary History, 3:3 (1968), 
pp.3-17. 
135 Declassified CIA Research, Soviet Policy towards the Middle East, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000499549.pdf, 
136 US State Department, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1953-1960, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/CENTO  
137 Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised): Basic US 
Interests in the Middle East, 30 January 1969. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v24/d2 
138 Johnson, ‘Persian Gulf in US Strategy’, p.122. 
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regional disputes gradually took precedence over and then began to direct the global 
rivalry.  
When US global priorities shifted, Ankara recognised that, so long as the Soviets 
remained an external threat, Turkey’s role in the Western alliance would remain the 
principal factor in the formulation of its global foreign and security policies. However, 
it also drew several conclusions from the failure of the Baghdad Pact, which henceforth 
constituted the fundamental elements of its Middle East policy. Turkey’s involvement 
in the pact had been driven by its role in the global East-West rivalry and had not been 
intended to interfere with intra-regional disputes unless they had a bearing on the global 
context. However, developments in the region in the late 1950s proved that intra-
regional disputes could prevail over the global East-West conflict and be instrumental in 
nationalist Arab states’ decisions to enter into alliances with the Soviet Union. A logical 
extension of this analysis was the need to refrain from seeing the Middle East through 
‘East-West’ eyes and from blaming the Soviet Union for every regional destabilisation. 
In the end, while the external Soviet threat remained a significant factor for both 
Turkish and American strategic calculations, starting from the 1960s, it became 
increasingly subordinate to intra-regional priorities.  
Thus, in spite of the broader agreement between Turkey and the US that the Soviet 
Union still posed threat to their vital interests, from the 1960s to the 1980s, it was no 
longer perceived to be an overriding/primary security threat in the Middle East context. 
Turkey, nevertheless, remained firmly committed to NATO and its alliance with the 
US.139  
(2) Agreement on strategy to deal with the common strategic threat  
In this period, the containment of the Soviet Union remained a shared strategic 
objective for Turkey and the US. Both countries supported CENTO as a successor 
organisation to the Baghdad Pact, albeit less vigorously.140 Turkey also reconsidered its 
position within the Middle East and took a more independent perspective on regional 
issues. However, because of its non-Arab character and persistent identity issues, Arab 
nationalists continued to see Turkey as a former colonial power and opposed the 
139 David S. Patterson, James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook, eds. Foreign Relations of The United 
States, 1969–1976 Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2012), p.196  
140 National Intelligence Estimate NIE 29.2–70, Turkey Over the Next Fıve Years, 3 February 1970, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d428 
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‘operation of a dominant Turkish power in Middle Eastern affairs.’141 This was 
compounded by changing political circumstances; Arab states began to reject alignment 
with the US due to its domestic and intra-regional political costs.142 In addition, 
Turkey’s active involvement in regional security arrangements outside the NATO 
alliance further undermined its standing among Arab nations, which perceived it as an 
agent of Western interests in the region. Intra-regional disputes and Western 
intervention also widened the gap between countries’ different approaches to the US 
and the Soviet Union. Turkey remained a staunch member of the Western alliance, and 
continued to regard the Soviet Union as the principal threat both to its own and to 
regional security. In contrast, most Arab nations viewed Western interference as the root 
cause of intra-regional disputes and the Arab-Israeli conflict as the primary source of 
regional instability. They blamed the US for backing Israel and regarded Moscow as a 
counterbalancing power against excessive Western dominance in the region. As Fuller 
and Çandar argue, Turkey and the Arabs were now ‘on different sides of the strategic 
fence.’143 With the Middle East already fraught with local sources of instability, the 
conflagration of intraregional conflicts had the potential to become an extension of great 
power competition. Turkey now risked being drawn into regional conflicts in which it 
had no direct interest and that would eventually undermine its security. 
Turkey redefined its policy towards the region, adopting principles of non-involvement 
and non-interference in intra-regional disputes. These principles were carefully crafted 
to strike a balance between diplomacy that would complement both Turkey’s position 
as a US ally and NATO member with a clear sense of the Soviet threat and its own 
regional agenda to contain potential challenges to its security without being dragged 
into intra-regional conflicts that would detract from containment of the Soviet threat. 
This strategy also evolved in the following decades: First, Turkey began to 
acknowledge its vital interest in regional stability; political fragility and intra-regional 
disputes such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the civil war in Lebanon undermined 
regional stability, and, in certain cases, as in the Iran-Iraq War, had a direct impact on 
Turkey’s security. Secondly, Turkey enhanced its bilateral ties with countries of the 
region, especially after Ankara initiated a multidimensional foreign policy in the mid-
1960s to attract international support on the Cyprus problem.144 Turkey also had 
141 Binder, ‘Middle East’, p.424  
142 Kupchan, ‘American Globalism’, pp.585-611. 
143 Çandar and Fuller, ‘Grand Geopolitics’,  p.26. 
144 Andrew Mango, ‘Turkey in the Middle East’, Journal of Contemporary History, 3:3 (1968), pp.225-
236. 
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increased economic interests in the region; it was dependent on Gulf oil, and, by the 
1980s, trade with the Middle East accounted for a significant portion of Turkish foreign 
trade volume.  
As a result, from the 1960s onwards, Turkey increasingly sought to decouple its role in 
the Western alliance from its regional policy.145 Due to shifting priorities, this was 
mutually convenient, if not totally satisfactory, for both Turkey and the US. The Soviet 
threat in the region remained of secondary importance to US strategy despite an 
increase in Soviet power and influence in the Middle East, with intraregional dynamics 
presiding.146 The Kennedy administration’s policy of reducing US overseas military 
commitments later transformed into the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ and its corollary ‘Twin Pillar 
Policy,’ which delegated responsibility for maintaining regional security to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia.147 The comparatively low level of US expectations from the alliance in 
this period also suited Turkey’s policy of non-involvement and non-interference in 
intra-regional disputes. Thus, with the exception of Syrian claims to Turkey’s Hatay 
province, intra-regional issues remained secondary in Turkish foreign policy.  
Unlike during the 1950s, US expectations from Turkey in the region during this period 
remained limited to its general role in the Western alliance at the south eastern flank of 
NATO. Turkey wanted to help prevent further destabilisation in the region, but 
essentially lacked the influence to change the course of interstate rivalries, regional 
conflicts or the power struggle for pan-Arab leadership. Turkish policy-makers’ choices 
were selective involvement in cases where they might have influence and non-
interference in cases where they had no role. Ankara’s balancing of its alliance 
responsibilities with its regional policy did not generally lead to a clash of interests with 
Washington, except when the latter requested to use Turkish bases for non-NATO 
contingencies, which Ankara was reluctant to allow.148 In short, the international and 
regional circumstances allowed Turkey to pursue an agenda to improve bilateral ties, 
expand its economic opportunities, and avoid embroilment in intraregional problems 
without feeling direct pressure on its national interests. Another important factor was 
the change in the state of Turkey-US relations following the 1960s, when the 
relationship was overshadowed by both the Cuban missile crisis and the Turkish-Greek 
145 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.170. 
146 Kupchan, ‘American Globalism’. 
147 Agmon, ‘Defending the Upper Gulf’, pp.81-97. 
148 Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the West’; Larrabee, ‘Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East’. 
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conflict over Cyprus.149 These events, in turn, made Turkey question the value of the 
NATO alliance150 and the US military commitment to its defence,151 questioning what 
role—if any—the alliance would play in a conflict that fell beyond the scope of the 
NATO Treaty. Turkey therefore felt justified in adopting a policy of avoiding 
responsibility and making no formal strategic commitments in the region outside the 
scope of the NATO treaty.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political and strategic environment in the Middle 
East underwent significant changes as a result of the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War. These developments created direct 
challenges to the position and strategic interests of the US in the region. Following the 
Soviet advances in Afghanistan, US strategy was reoriented to deter the increased 
Soviet threat in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.152 In recognition of the need to 
meet this threat, the US declared the Carter Doctrine to defend the region against 
aggressors, marking a reorientation of US regional priorities and strategy.153 In 1980, 
the US began to include potential contingencies in Southwest Asia in NATO planning. 
This initiative was forestalled by the Europeans, however, who objected to out-of-area 
involvement by NATO.154 The US strategy also encompassed the establishment of a 
‘new security framework’ on the basis of ‘strategic cooperation between regional states 
and the United States.’155As a result, Turkey once again became critical in US strategic 
considerations.156 However, unlike in the 1950s, when Turkey had been assigned a role 
as pacesetter for a regional security framework, this time it was mainly involved 
because of the utility of the Turkish bases for military contingencies. The invasion of 
Afghanistan had also revived Ankara’s concern about Soviet expansionism, and it 
believed that the US would now be more sensitive to Turkey’s strategic importance. 
Indeed, in 1980, Turkey and the US initialled a new Agreement on Defence and 
Economy, covering 27 military facilities, which would formally remain under Turkish 
149 Gülnur Aybet, Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its Implications for the West: A Turkish Perspective 
(London: RUSI, 1994), p.4. 
150 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘The Superpowers and the Northern Tier’, International Security, 4:3 (1979-1980), 
pp.6-30. 
151 Agmon, ‘Defending the Upper Gulf’. 
152 Soviet Policy towards the Middle East, Declassified CIA Research, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000499549.pdf  
153 Presidential Directive NSC-63 on Persian Gulf Security, 15 January 1981, 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf,  
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155 Charles Kupchan, ‘American Globalism’ in the Middle…, 
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command. Nevertheless, upon Turkey’s insistence, the cooperation was ‘limited to 
obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty,’ and in ‘support of NATO Defence 
plans.’157Ankara’s strict limitation of the American military’s use of Turkish bases to 
NATO commitments and its objections to requests for basing rights for the Rapid 
Deployment Force were extensions of its policy of balancing its alliance commitments 
with its individual approach to intra-regional problems. As then Prime Minister Turgut 
Özal said in 1985:  
It would be a mistake for us to allow the Rapid Deployment Force to use 
the Turkish bases. We are living through a time when Turkey’s influence 
is increasing in the Middle East, which I believe would also be to the 
benefit of the US. It would be wrong to spend Turkey’s credit in the 
Middle East on the RPD. If we choose to do so it would ultimately 
undermine Turkey’s credibility in the region, whereas we can play the 
most influential role (of an honest broker) in the Iran-Iraq war and I 
guess in the Middle East question (Arab-Israeli conflict).158 
Thus, while Turkey remained a staunch US ally during the renewed East-West tensions 
in accordance with the confluence of mutual interests in the new political and strategic 
environment from the 1960s to early 1980s, it remained wary of the political and 
regional risks of extending Turkey-US cooperation to Middle Eastern problems outside 
of NATO’s remit. While Turkey and the US still agreed on the common Soviet threat, 
that agreement had not translated into actual security cooperation on Middle Eastern 
issues because of the absence of an agreement on an explicit strategy to deal with them. 
It was also linked to lowered US expectations from Turkey in terms of the actual 
implementation of Middle East strategy and to Ankara’s resolve to decouple its regional 
role from its alliance relationship with the US.  
The key argument of this chapter has been that a conceptual model is a necessary 
comparative and analytical tool for presenting a coherent and fully detailed account of 
the Turkey-US relationship vis-à-vis the Middle East. The chapter has developed an 
integrative model of the parameters of when and why Turkey has security cooperation 
with the US on Middle Eastern issues. In the following chapters, the model will be 
tested as it serves as the basis for an empirical study of Turkey’s cooperative and non-
cooperative foreign policy behaviours with the US vis-à-vis Iraq during the Gulf War 
and its aftermath and the Iraq War. 
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CHAPTER 2: GULF CRISIS TO GULF WAR AND IMMEDIATE 
AFTERMATH, AUGUST 1990 to APRIL 1991  
From the onset of the Gulf Crisis in August 1990, the question of how to reverse Iraq’s 
aggression dominated the agenda of Turkey-US relations. For the US administration, 
Turkey emerged as a key partner in achieving its objectives, and it expected Turkish 
cooperation in the implementation of UN sanctions, the use of Turkish bases in case of 
an attack against Iraq, the deployment of Turkish troops to its Iraq border to help 
discourage Saddam from moving troops south to Kuwait, and finally, as a residual 
request, the dispatch of a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the allied forces.159  
The formulation of Turkey’s own policy during the Gulf Crisis reflected the changes in 
its international, regional and bilateral strategic environment. In the new strategic 
setting, the containment of a commonly defined Soviet threat had dropped out of the 
equation in Turkey’s relations with Europe and the US.160 Turkey increasingly felt 
pressure to readjust its relations with its Western allies. This was not a matter of 
changing the well-established direction of Turkey’s foreign and security policies, but 
rather of identifying common ground to maintain Turkey’s relevance to the West, and 
the US in particular, in the absence of an overarching threat. The objective for Ankara 
was to achieve an enhanced partnership with Washington in the new international 
setting in which the US emerged as the supreme power, and which President Özal 
termed ‘indecisive balance.’161 According to Özal, US supremacy would define the 
international system in the following decades, but Washington would still depend on 
alliances with a number of countries for the regional components of the new 
international paradigm. As Morton Abramowitz, then US Ambassador to Ankara, 
observed:  
For Özal, who was always keen to find ways to deepen and maximize 
relations with Washington, and therefore wanted Turkey to be closer to 
the US, the Gulf War offered an extraordinary opportunity to cement the 
American relationship over the longer term, especially in face of the 
decline of the Soviet Union.162  
 
159 Morton Abramowitz, ‘The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey’, in Morton 
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Turkish-Iraqi relations, on the other hand, were strained due to a combination of factors. 
Ankara’s increased perception of a threat emanating from Baghdad and President Özal’s 
deep personal distrust of Saddam were largely due to latter’s unambiguous regional 
ambitions, agitation over increased Iraqi assertiveness in the cross-boundary water 
dispute,163 intelligence reports detailing Baghdad’s support for the PKK presence and 
activities in Northern Iraq, and Iraq’s huge military arsenal.164 Thus, on the eve of the 
Gulf Crisis, Turkey’s foreign and security policies were already predisposed to respond 
to the challenges presented by the shifting strategic environment. The eruption of the 
crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait confirmed the convergence of Turkey’s 
national interests and US policies, particularly in the eyes of Özal.165  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the parameters of Turkey-US cooperation during the 
Gulf Crisis and the ensuing conflict through the integrative model explained in the 
previous chapter. It will first analyse how Turkey and the US agreed on the nature of the 
threat that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait posed. It will then demonstrate how 
concurrence on the strategy to deal with that threat led to Turkey-US cooperation during 
the crisis, and covers Turkey’s contribution to allied operations during Operation Desert 
Storm (ODS). The chapter also examines the war’s unintended consequences, including 
Özal’s unexpected move to engage in direct contact with the Iraqi Kurds and the 
launching of OPC.  
2.1. The Initial Phase: The Turkish Assessment of the Gulf Crisis and Policy 
Formulation, 2–10 August, 1990 
For the US administration, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 posed a 
clear threat to vital US regional and global interests. It almost immediately declared its 
national security objectives to be ‘the immediate, complete, and unconditional 
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate 
government; a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and, the 
protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.’166 
Özal had also come to see Saddam as a serious threat, and his suspicions long predated 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. In fact, during a meeting with President Bush on 17 
163 Yıldırım Akbulut, interviewed by author, Ankara, 12 November 2009. 
164 Kaya Toperi, interviewed by author, Ankara, 5 November 2009. 
165 Hale, Turkey, the US and Iraq, p.39. 
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January 1990, Özal had called Saddam ‘the most dangerous man in the world,’ who 
would ‘cause serious trouble for Turkey and the US.’167 During a telephone 
conversation on 22 July 1990, Özal reminded Bush of his earlier warning, and told him 
that Saddam was about to invade Kuwait.168 In addition to his personal dislike for 
Saddam and his emissaries, Özal was wary of Iraq’s significant military power and 
regional ambitions. Not only did he believe Iraq posed a threat to Turkey’s national 
security interests,169 he also thought that only the US was powerful enough to counter 
Saddam’s military capability.170 Özal feared that, once Saddam had ensured the 
annexation of Kuwait, he would proceed to invade Oman, the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia, and would eventually turn against Turkey.171  
On the day of the invasion itself, Özal called an extraordinary meeting of the Turkish 
National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) to assess the crisis.172 At the 
strategic level, the MGK was primarily concerned with the possible repercussions of 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on Turkey’s national security. Firstly, the invasion seemed an 
initial step in Baghdad’s regional ambitions, and these had the potential to undermine 
the balance of power on which the political map of the Middle East was drawn. The 
Gulf region had traditionally been a sphere of strategic rivalry between Iran and Iraq, 
but the invasion of Kuwait greatly increased Iraq’s regional influence and power. The 
change in the status quo was likely to prompt Iran to pursue policies to offset Iraq’s 
strategic achievement, further destabilising the region. Secondly, it was feared that 
Turkey would also face an ever-greater direct threat from Saddam’s emboldened 
regime. Thirdly, Iraq’s fait accompli would set a dismal precedent for future Iraqi 
aggression in the region. The MGK concluded on the same day that the stability and the 
future of the region, and Turkey’s interests, hinged upon whether Iraq was to gain from 
this aggression. Forcing a swift Iraqi withdrawal was a ‘sine qua non’ to constrain 
Saddam within Iraq’s borders.173  
167 Abramowitz, interview. 
168 Toperi, interview. 
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However, at that point, forcing Iraq out of Kuwait seemed highly unlikely without 
drastic, US-led, international action, and it was unclear whether such action would be 
taken at all.174 The first plausible policy course was to apply a trade embargo since 
Iraq’s dependence on oil exports made it vulnerable to economic coercion.175 
International military action appeared as an alternative but unlikely option at that stage. 
Both options would require Turkish involvement and involved serious challenges for 
Turkey. The closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline, flowing from Iraq across 
Turkey and into the Mediterranean, would be crucial for the success and credibility in 
any strategy of economic coercion.176 Iraq was one of Turkey’s major trading partners, 
and participation in an economic coercion strategy would likely inflict heavy losses on 
Turkey’s economy. Politically, the potential economic consequences would make 
participation in sanctions difficult to justify to the Turkish public. In addition, Saudi 
cooperation was imperative for the effective enforcement of any sanctions regime. 
Saudi failure to endorse sanctions, and any opposition from other Arab countries, would 
seriously undermine the prospects of economic coercion. Furthermore, it was unclear 
whether the sanctions would suffice to reverse Iraq’s aggression. The second plausible 
policy course was a large-scale military operation against Iraq, in which Turkey would 
be a logical staging area. Ankara would then face the difficult decision of whether to 
allow the use of Turkish bases and/or open a front against Iraq through Turkish 
territory; especially sensitive given that Turkey had refused to allow the US to use 
Turkish bases for previous non-NATO contingencies.177 Above all, participation in 
either option carried the risk of antagonising Iraq into taking retaliatory measures 
against Turkey. Exposure to Iraqi threats and aggression, therefore, had to be part of 
Turkish strategic calculations. Such calculations would pave the way to Turkey’s 
demands that NATO draw up contingency plans to provide for its security.  
Thus the major contours of Turkish policy towards the crisis had already been 
established by 2 August. The Turkish leadership, and particularly President Özal, were 
resolved to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. First, Turkey declared its agreement with 
the UNSCR 660 that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was an unacceptable and flagrant 
violation of international law, and stated its intention to pursue a principled policy for 
174 Ali Bozer, interviewed by author, Ankara, 10 November 2009. 
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restoration of Kuwait’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate 
government.178 Second, Turkey would consider taking part in possible sanctions, 
provided they were mandated by the UNSC, and the Saudis were also involved. Finally, 
Ankara’s security concerns regarding possible Iraqi reactions to Turkish participation 
required that the international effort be couched in NATO Treaty obligations. 
2.2. The Initial Phase: Emerging Strategy  
In addition to concurring that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait posed a paramount threat to 
regional and global stability, Turkey and the US also agreed on the strategy to address 
Saddam’s aggression. For the first time in decades, Turkey’s perception of its national 
interest in an intra-Arab/regional problem converged with US expectations of it; 
namely, that Turkey assume a pivotal role in the strategy to reverse Iraq’s aggression. In 
the initial phase of the crisis, this strategic calculation guided Özal’s policy of active 
engagement through ‘telephone diplomacy’ with President Bush and regional leaders. 
Özal first called Bush on 3 August 1990: First, he argued that Saddam should be taught 
a ‘lesson’ and, in a reference to appeasement of Nazi Germany, that ‘the international 
community should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War II.’179 
Second, based on his earlier conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Özal 
confided that the Saudis might refrain from taking action, confirming the US concern 
about possible Saudi accommodation with the new status quo. In response to Bush’s 
inquiry as to whether Turkey intended to accept closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık 
pipeline from Iraq, Özal argued the embargo itself would be inadequate to counter Iraqi 
aggression. Finally, he also pushed for discussion of the situation in NATO.180 
Following this telephone conversation, Bush said that he and Özal viewed the crisis 
with the same ‘sense of urgency and concern.’181 
Iraq, on the other hand, expected to easily deter Turkey from taking part in any 
international coalition. Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraq’s first Deputy Prime Minister, on his 
first mission abroad after the invasion of Kuwait,182 paid a visit to Ankara on 5 August 
1990, to relay Saddam’s intention to forcefully deter Turkey from taking part in the 
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international response to the crisis. Özal’s response to Ramadan reflected Turkey’s 
unequivocal position:  
This conduct of the Iraqi regime is contrary to all principles and rules of 
international law and has further aggravated the tense situation in the 
Middle East. No one will let you annex Kuwait. Turkey can help find a 
face-saving solution for Iraq. You have to be realistic and withdraw from 
Kuwait without delay. We will not remain aloof from international actions 
against Iraq.183  
Ramadan responded that Iraq had no intention of pulling out, and planned to 
permanently annex Kuwait. He claimed the West was bluffing, that Iraq could endure 
sanctions, and would fight till the end if necessary.184 He urged Turkey to refrain from 
participating in any effort against Iraq and also delivered a hostile statement to the 
Turkish press as he left Ankara. He declared any attack on Kuwait would be treated as 
an attack on Iraq, that any economic embargo or foreign military intervention would 
mean a loss for the other side, that Turkey’s closure of the pipeline would create 
mistrust, and that Ankara had to take into account the two countries’ mutual interests.185  
Immediately after Ramadan’s visit, Özal again called Bush to share his view of Iraq’s 
intentions. Ramadan’s non-conciliatory and antagonistic approach confirmed Özal’s 
conviction that Iraq had no intention of withdrawing from Kuwait or allowing the 
restoration of the status quo. Özal argued that, without a forceful Western response, the 
odds of further Iraqi military aggression against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates were also high. He advised Bush to swiftly initiate UNSC authorised 
sanctions, to which Turkey was prepared to adhere by shutting down the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalık pipeline, provided that Saudi Arabia agreed to follow suit. However, Özal 
reasserted the inadequacy of sanctions alone and stressed the need to contemplate 
military action. He also sought to rally US support for NATO guarantees to deter any 
possible Iraqi retaliation for Turkey’s involvement in either sanctions or military action. 
Bush confirmed that the US would support the Turkish request to convene a special 
meeting of the NAC.  
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On 6 August, UNSCR 661 called for a total embargo on all commerce with Iraq and its 
puppet regime in Kuwait. The UNSC also invoked article 51 of the UN Charter, 
opening the way for individual or collective self-defence. Comprehensive international 
sanctions now became a crucial first step towards reversing Iraq’s aggression, and their 
success depended on the closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. That day, Bush 
informed Özal that US Secretary of State James Baker would commence his regional 
tour with a visit to Turkey on 9 August, self-evidently to try to persuade Ankara to 
enforce UNSCR 661. On 7 August, Özal confirmed plans to shut down the pipeline 
with the government, though this was far from being a unilateral decision on Özal’s 
part.186 Agreeing to implement the sanctions before Baker’s visit aimed at avoiding 
public misperceptions that the government was caving in under strong US pressure or 
that the policy derived from Özal’s pro-US stance.187 In fact, the closure of the pipeline 
accorded with Turkey’s own strategy of countering Saddam’s aggression. Nevertheless, 
failure to comply with the sanctions would have had high international legal and 
political costs, isolated Turkey within the Western alliance, and damaged Turkey-US 
relations. In addition, Özal himself firmly believed that alignment with Washington 
during this vital strategic effort would serve Turkey’s interest in better relations with the 
US and allied Western nations after the war.188 Above all, though, any blow to 
Saddam’s regional ambitions was also in Turkey’s own national security interests.  
Thus, on 7 August, Turkey implemented UNSCR 661 by shutting down the two Iraqi 
oil pipelines, stopping trade with Iraq and closing Turkish borders and ports to the trans-
shipment of goods to Iraq.189 Ankara informed Baghdad that it would immediately halt 
the loading of Iraqi oil in Yumurtalık, and Iraq stopped pumping oil into the pipeline the 
same night. Turkey officially announced its decision on 8 August, a day before Baker’s 
visit.  
2.3. The Second Phase: Emerging Dynamics of Cooperation  
Baker’s visit to Ankara on 9 August was part of a larger strategy to encircle Iraq in an 
economic chokehold and implied a military threat to prevent future attacks. Baker 
undertook extensive consultations with Turkish officials, including Özal. He explained 
186 Vehbi Dinçerler, interviewed by author, Ankara, 11 November 2009. 
187 Engin Güner, ‘Çankaya Fırtınası’, Hürriyet, 19 February 1998. 
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the principles that would guide US policy,190 and stressed that the US administration 
would not allow any hostile power to gain a stranglehold on the energy resources of the 
Gulf region. In terms of policy options to resolve the crisis, the US was committed to 
the restoration of the status quo through peaceful and diplomatic means. Baker also 
conveyed Washington’s satisfaction with Turkey’s firm stance and Ankara’s rapid 
implementation of the UN sanctions. 
In response, Özal and other senior Turkish government officials reaffirmed their full 
agreement with the US policy. Özal again denounced Saddam as a dangerous despot 
and pushed for his overthrow, stating that his regime’s survival would pose a perpetual 
threat to every nation in the region. For him, the destruction of Iraq’s military power 
was crucial to curtail Saddam’s future ambitions. Additionally, Iraq should be expelled 
from Kuwait even if military action was necessary.191 From the Turkish perspective, 
firm and uniform implementation was vital for the success of the sanctions. The Turkish 
officials also requested Baker share the US assessment of the sanctions’ effectiveness 
and proposed policy course if they failed. Baker stated that the US administration 
viewed comprehensive sanctions and their effective implementation as crucial to 
reversing the Iraqi invasion. The immediate US concern, however, was to deter further 
Iraqi aggression, especially against Saudi Arabia, through deployment of a 
multinational force in the Gulf region. He emphasised that non-defensive military 
options were not being considered, and that he was not seeking Turkey’s support for the 
use of force or permission to use Turkish bases for military attacks against Iraq. The US 
would only call for these sorts of Turkish contributions if Iraq attacked Saudi Arabia, 
and if and when the US decided a military solution was unavoidable.192 Baker added 
that the US would appreciate the deployment of a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia as a 
symbolic contribution to the allied multinational force.193  
In addition to exchanging perspectives on the future policy course, the Turkish leaders 
provided Baker with full account of the $2.5 billion financial losses Turkey expected to 
suffer from implementing the sanctions. Turkey requested at least partial assistance with 
the burden, and US backing for increased World Bank loans. Baker provided assurances 
that the US would offset the estimated annual Turkish losses, promising that the World 
190 US Department of State Dispatch, ‘The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles’, 1:1, 3 September 1990, 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1990/html/Dispatchv1no01.html. 
191 Baker and DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, pp.284-285. 
192 Akbulut, interview; Bozer, interview. 
193 Abramowitz, ‘American Policy’, pp.154-155. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                59 
 
Bank would extend between $1 billion and $1.5 billion in loans for each of the next two 
years. He also reported a pledge made to Washington by the legitimate government of 
Kuwait to minimise Turkey’s financial losses.194  
Turkey’s national security was also discussed with Baker. While Ankara did not fear 
imminent Iraqi reprisals for Turkish policy, Iraq, with its history of aggression and 
military capacity—including 5,700 modern tanks and 10,000 armoured vehicles—did 
pose a credible threat to Turkey. They felt that NATO contingency planning was 
essential to deter Baghdad from future attacks. Baker confirmed that the US had already 
consulted key NATO allies and, at the upcoming special meeting of the NAC, would 
work to ensure the Alliance’s commitment to collective defence obligations under the 
NATO Treaty. In response to Özal’s remarks that Turkey desired to maintain its status 
as a member of the Western alliance and to join the European Community (EC), Baker 
reiterated that the US recognised Turkey’s strategic role ‘as a bridge between East and 
West’, and pledged continued US endorsement for Turkey’s membership application.195  
At the NAC session on 10 August, a day after his visit to Ankara, Baker called for the 
council to confirm that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would apply in the event of Iraqi 
aggression against Turkey, and that, pursuant to Article 4, the council should be 
prepared to meet at any time should the territorial integrity or security of any member 
state be threatened.196 The council agreed that Article 5 would apply in case of an Iraqi 
aggression against Turkey.197 The meeting was a milestone in NATO history, marking 
the first such agreement on an ‘out-of-area’ conflict.  
2.4. The Domestic Setting: Decision Making in Ankara and Tensions over Policy  
Özal now sought to make the case for Turkey’s involvement in the crisis to the public, 
stating that, ‘This invasion will give rise to even bigger problems in the region. It must 
not be seen in terms of private interests … This is not just a problem for the Arabs; it’s a 
world problem.’198 Özal argued that Turkey had no choice other than to comply with the 
UN resolutions. The repercussions of the crisis would endure for years after its 
resolution, and Turkey had to protect its national interests by pursuing a dynamic 
194 Baker and DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 284-285; Thomas L. Friedman, ‘US Says Turkey Plans 
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foreign policy. Any solution to the crisis without Ankara’s involvement could 
potentially create serious trouble for Turkey, including the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Turkey coveted no Iraqi territory, yet had to 
be part of the international coalition against Iraq in order to influence events and secure 
its place at the negotiating table. It was thus essential that the president and the 
government have maximum room to manoeuvre in conducting policy. Özal insisted that 
force would be a last resort due to its severe and enduring implications for the region. 
More importantly, he believed the new international order would differ greatly from the 
Cold War system and the West had to understand that Turkey remained an 
indispensable ally in the region. He emphasised to the Middle Eastern nations that 
Turkey was not a military base for Western interests. For Özal, good relations with the 
West and the Arab world were mutually reinforcing and encapsulated Turkey’s bridging 
role. He did not expect Turkey’s policy to immediately secure EC membership, but 
believed its prospects of joining would increase as the crisis made its strategic 
indispensability more evident.199  
However, from the outset of the crisis, there was public opposition to Özal’s active 
involvement in and control of the decision making process. The opposition parties 
claimed that Özal had overstepped his constitutional powers in directing foreign policy. 
Özal called a meeting with the leaders of the opposition parties, but they declined to 
attend, claiming it was designed to legitimise Özal’s misconduct.200 Many 
commentators also argued for a cautious foreign policy approach towards the Middle 
East, a strategy they claimed had always served Turkey well in the past.201  
According to then Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut, the government itself was content 
with Özal’s leading role during the crisis.202 According to Bozer, Özal attached special 
significance to the coordination of policy with the government, which aimed at 
minimising friction over policy. Özal wanted a freer hand in maintaining Turkey’s 
active posture in dealing with the crisis, and that required a war powers resolution from 
the TBMM.203 Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution grants the TBMM powers to 
authorise the declaration of a state of war, to send the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) to foreign countries, and to allow foreign armed forces into 
199 See, Aykan, Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi. 
200 TBMM Tutanakları, pp.423-478. 
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Turkey, subject to ‘international legitimacy.’ The real point of dissent was Özal’s 
insistence on a mandate for the use of force, including sending Turkish forces abroad.204 
According to Akbulut, Özal felt that parliamentary authorisation was unnecessary while 
Akbulut believed it was the only course of action.205 Bozer and Vehbi Dinçerler, the 
then Minister of State, resisted Özal on the grounds that any unnecessary use of Turkish 
forces in a regional military intervention would create immense long-term troubles for 
Turkey.206 However, in interview, none of the then policy makers claimed that Özal’s 
intention in seeking the powers was to involve Turkish armed forces in a conflict with 
Iraq. On the contrary, they all confirm that Özal never raised the prospect of authorising 
military intervention during any cabinet or MGK meetings. They also note that the 
Turkish leadership, including Özal, was unanimously against opening a second front for 
ground operations against Iraq unless Turkey was directly attacked.207 Akbulut 
underscored that the Turkish General Staff (TGS) raised no objections to policy 
throughout the crisis, adding that the US tabled no request that Ankara open a second 
front through Turkey. According to some contemporary advisers, Özal considered 
dispatching a frigate to the Gulf to contribute to ODS as a gesture of solidarity with the 
US.208 However, his public statements claimed that Turkey had no current plans to send 
troops to join the US-led international force, though that was open to change. On the 
other hand, Özal, the government and the Turkish military recognised that Turkish air 
bases, and especially İncirlik, would be strategically vital to US war plans, and there 
was thus no disagreement on authorising the American military to use them.209 On 5 
September, the government secured the TBMM’s mandate for the requested war powers 
under Article 92, though revised to strictly limit their use to cases of direct 
aggression.210 On 12 September, the government obtained a new mandate with broader 
war powers. As part of contingency planning, the TSK almost doubled troop 
deployments along the Turkish side of the Iraqi border to more than 100,000 troops 
supported by tanks and warplanes. This move was in line with US efforts to ‘encourage 
Iraq's neighbours, Syria and Turkey, to increase their forces along their borders with 
204 Akbulut, interview; Bozer, interview; Dinçerler, interview. 
205 Akbulut, interview.  
206 Bozer, interview; Dinçerler, interview.  
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Iraq so as to draw off Iraqi forces from, and resources devoted to, the Kuwait theatre of 
operations.’211  
2.5. The Third Phase: September 1990 to January 1991  
From mid-September to the start of the Gulf war, Ankara defined its national interests 
and the policies pursuant to them on three levels: The primary level concerned strategy 
towards Iraq itself. The sanctions were proving inadequate as Iraq seemed easily able to 
weather them, suggesting that the Turkish economy would suffer long term damage. 
Iraq was also exploiting the Arab Street’s historic mistrust of the US and Israel to 
propagandise against the blockade, suggesting that uniform implementation of sanctions 
through the international coalition would prove harder than anticipated. Furthermore, 
even if economic sanctions did coerce Iraq into withdrawing from Kuwait, if it were 
thereby allowed to maintain its unmatched military might and capabilities, the Iraqi 
threat to the regional balance of power would remain, and Saddam would continue to 
blackmail other nations with impunity. On the other hand, a military solution to the 
crisis and Iraqi threat would create risks for the future of Iraq. The military devastation 
of the Iraqi regime could lead to the dismemberment of Iraq or leave it too weak to 
check the regional power of Iran and Syria. According to Kaya Toperi, then 
Spokesperson for the Presidency, this analysis was the context of Özal’s active policy to 
ensure that Turkey wielded influence over the course of the crisis. For Ankara, the best 
outcome would be a territorially integrated and stable Iraq with curbed military might 
and potentially without Saddam in power.212 It was concerned to prevent any 
disintegration of Iraq that could inspire a separatist drive by Iraqi Kurds looking to 
carve out an independent state in the region.213  
Secondly, at the regional level, Ankara’s key motive was preserving the regional 
balance of power. From the outset of the crisis, Turkey remained wary of the policies of 
its Middle Eastern neighbours, Iran and Syria, allies since the late 1970s.214 Iran’s 
policy towards the crisis was a duplicitous pragmatic opportunism. Tehran condemned 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, called for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, and endorsed 
the UN sanctions, yet also pursued a strategy of limited rapprochement with Baghdad. It 
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was a sensitive situation for Iran. First, Iraq was a long-time rival, and Iraq’s annexation 
of Kuwait would provide Saddam, Iran’s archenemy, with unrestricted access to the 
Gulf and vast oil assets. The prospect of an Iraqi hegemony in the Gulf thus posed a 
vital threat to Iran. However, Tehran was also wary of increased Western presence and 
called for the coalition to withdraw from the region. In contrast, for Syria, the Gulf 
Crisis created an opportunity to decrease its international isolation by improving ties 
with the West, and Damascus endorsed the US strategy, deploying troops to the 
multinational force in Saudi Arabia. Ankara was especially watchful of Syrian policies 
as Damascus was known to sponsor PKK terrorism against Turkey. It also remained 
alert to how the enduring alliance between Damascus and Tehran would develop in 
response to the Gulf Crisis. Paradoxically, Ankara believed it was crucial to establish a 
uniform approach in concert with both Syria and Iran to ensure the preservation of 
Iraq’s territorial integrity if Saddam’s regime collapsed following a war. 
Thirdly, at the international level, Ankara acted with a renewed confidence that the Gulf 
Crisis had proven Turkey’s strategic importance. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had been the 
first major crisis of the post-Cold War era, and was seen as an opportunity to create a 
new world order, reflecting a general desire to re-establish stability in the international 
system based on shared values and common interests.215 Özal believed supporting the 
US policy from the start of the crisis would ensure that Turkey became a pivotal actor in 
the new global paradigm. In fact, Bush affirmed that the Gulf Crisis had demonstrated 
the ‘indisputable strategic importance of Turkey to NATO and the US.’216  
Against this backdrop, Turkey-US discussions on the Gulf Crisis focused on Saddam’s 
political situation, the efficiency of sanctions, Iraq’s military capabilities, and the future 
policy course. Özal took every opportunity to remind Bush that Saddam did not have 
the flexibility to back down.217 Although sanctions were the preferred policy course, 
when they showed no sign of effecting change in Iraq’s behaviour,218 the military option 
gradually emerged as the most viable alternative. Özal advised the US administration 
215 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public 
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that military action should be considered in the event that the economic embargo 
failed.219 He claimed that the Iraqi army was seriously overestimated in the West, was 
no more powerful than that of a Third World state, and could not hold out against a US-
led international force.220 However, if Saddam remained in power, his military would be 
as strong as ever, he would be politically emboldened, and any concession to him in 
return for withdrawal would encourage future Iraqi aggression.221 Özal declared Turkey 
would not oppose an armed intervention, provided that the UNSC sanctioned the 
action,222 but also underlined that Turkey would not become a second front unless Iraq 
attacked Turkish territory.223 In fact, Özal repeatedly dismissed the prospects of a 
second front through Turkey, and did not commit to US military requests until war 
became inevitable.224 Abramowitz observed that Özal ‘had kernel doubt about the US 
determination to deal decisively with Saddam,’ particularly about whether the US 
would ultimately opt for a military course. He thus remained wary of giving any 
immediate carte blanche to the US on Turkish bases which would potentially further 
antagonise Iraq into reprisals against Turkey.225 The legal basis for any US-led military 
campaign was also questionable until the UNSC explicitly authorised the use of 
force,226 and Ankara believed it was imprudent to expend political capital so long as 
war itself remained avoidable. Thus, the question of whether Turkey would allow the 
US to conduct offensive military action from Turkish territory or military facilities 
remained unclear until the start of the war.227  
Özal’s strategy of aligning with the US also aspired to make Turkey a player in a post-
war scenario. He acted on the assumption that participation in the coalition would 
secure Turkey a place at the table after Saddam’s defeat.228 He argued that new regional 
security arrangements had to be put into place, irrespective of how the crisis was 
resolved, as intraregional relations were bound to change: 
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Seeds of dissent have been sown all over the Arab world. Elements of 
instability in the area are likely to become more pronounced. That is why 
the conditions for lasting peace and stability in the region need to be 
established. The resolution of the Gulf Crisis will not be enough to 
achieve this goal.229  
The Turkey-US discussions in this period also involved compensation for the economic 
burden of the sanctions on the Turkish economy. By the end of 1990, Turkey was 
feeling the severe and immediate economic consequences of the sanctions, especially on 
its fragile balance of payments and inflation levels. Uncertainty over the likely duration 
of the crisis compounded the problem.230 Turkey required offsetting action and expected 
US assistance to that end. Özal repeatedly emphasised that Turkey’s interests were 
served by more export opportunities to US and Western markets, rather than direct 
aid.231 Turkey aspired to increase trade with the US by elimination of trade barriers and 
improve economic and security cooperation, and Washington agreed, pledging to 
initiate negotiations towards a new agreement on textiles. Turkey was also assured that 
the 13 nations contributing over $20 billion to the US burden-sharing initiative would 
offer it aid.232  
Turkey additionally requested military assistance from the US to improve its defence 
capability and modernise the TSK, which was equipped with obsolete weaponry. 
Ankara submitted a detailed list of requirements to Washington, requesting that the US 
assist with the finance for a second package of 120 F-16 aircraft,233 and calling for an 
end to the cuts to its military assistance and the removal of the 7:10 ratio.234 Turkey 
expected that the US administration would respond positively and ensure congressional 
authorisation for military sales and assistance. Bush pledged to Özal that his 
administration would work with Congress to ensure that Turkey received ‘its fair share 
of security assistance’ in the fiscal year 1991, and would help to modernise the Turkish 
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Air Force (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri, THK) through future sales of F-16s and provision of 
other military equipment.235  
However, by the end of 1990, tangible US economic and military assistance had still not 
materialised. Özal’s frustration was reflected both in his public statements and official 
approaches. He was disappointed by what he termed a lack of a fair and accurate 
understanding of Turkey’s role in the crisis and an appropriate response to its 
contribution. He was particularly annoyed that the US had not accommodated Turkish 
requests for modernisation of the THK. The factors that most upset Ankara were 
continued uncertainty about the financing of the second package of F-16s, the continued 
application of the 7:10 ratio in military assistance, and the US president’s regular report 
on Cyprus, which Ankara viewed as ever more biased. The Turkish leadership was also 
frustrated at the inadequate financial assistance that Turkey had received despite being 
one of the countries most affected by the crisis, especially as the US had written off 
Egypt’s $7 billion FMS debt but made no offer to relieve Turkey’s $3 billion debt. In 
terms of Turkey’s security, a delay in the decision to deploy NATO’s Allied Mobile 
Force to Turkey due to German objections cast doubt on the validity of NATO’s pledge 
to invoke Article 5 in the event of an Iraqi attack on Turkey, intensifying domestic 
political pressure on the government. Ankara was also extremely frustrated by the 
congressional decision to tie the increase in the annual level of military assistance to 
Turkey from $700 million to nearly $2 billion to parallel increases for Greece. Özal 
complained of Congress’ unfavourable disposition towards Turkey and the limited 
efforts of the US administration.236  
From September 1990 to the start of the war, while Özal’s stature and prestige as an 
international player heightened, he faced tremendous domestic opposition and criticism. 
Opposition parties accused him of misusing presidential powers and exceeding his 
constitutional authority by single-handedly guiding policy.237 Özal’s critics described 
his policy as adventurism that would drag Turkey into a war for the sake of playing a 
role in the Middle East and Özal’s personal prestige.238 They also argued that Turkish 
policy was subservient the US, that Özal was more committed to a bellicose course than 
the US,239 and that Turkey risked becoming a regional policeman.240 From October to 
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December, three senior officials resigned from their posts: In mid-October, Bozer 
resigned as Foreign Minister to protest the insulting tone of the press reports of his non-
attendance at a September meeting in Washington between Özal and Bush.241 However, 
Bozer emphasised in interview that his resignation had nothing to do with Iraq policy, 
and his disagreement with Özal was limited to his objection to an open-ended war 
powers resolution.242 This was followed in November by the resignation of Defence 
Minister Sefa Giray after a disagreement with Akbulut over his leadership of the 
ANAP. Giray too insisted that he never had any problem with Özal about the Gulf 
Crisis policy.243 The most remarkable resignation of all occurred in early December 
when General Necip Torumtay, the Chief of the TGS resigned, allegedly over practical 
reservations against engaging in a war with Iraq.244 However, both Akbulut and Bozer 
underlined that Torumtay never raised any objections to the policy course during MGK 
or crisis committee meetings.245  
Also during this period, speculation arose in Turkey about the oil-rich Iraqi province of 
Kirkuk-Mosul, former Ottoman territories ceded to British rule by the League of 
Nations in 1926. It was widely reported that Özal expected annexation of the region as a 
reward for Turkey’s support of US policies.246 Some have even claimed that plans to 
annex the region led to Turkey’s involvement in the international coalition.247 However, 
Özal repeatedly dismissed these reports as speculative, underlining that the issue had 
been over for Turkey since 1926,248 that Turkey did not ‘covet Iraq’s or any country’s 
soil,’249 and that Iraq’s territorial integrity was crucial for regional stability.250 Akbulut, 
Bozer, Dinçerler and Kandemir all confirm that Özal never broached the Kirkuk-Mosul 
issue during cabinet or MGK meetings, and had no recollection of official discussions 
on the matter,251 while Torumtay claims that Özal raised the issue during the crisis 
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management meetings and once at the MGK meeting in November without detailed 
discussion.252 However, Abramowitz also confirms that Özal never raised the issue with 
him or the US administration, but remembered hearing that Özal had talked about it 
with others in Turkey. For Abramowitz, ‘I looked upon that as his way of starting a 
debate, not a serious thing. On the other hand, very early on, he saw the need for Turkey 
to be involved in Northern Iraq.’253 It appears that Özal did in fact explore the historical 
and legal context of the League of Nations decision in 1926, examining the issue with 
his close advisers, especially once the prospects of use of force against Iraq 
increased.254 Any military action against Saddam risked Iraq’s disintegration and 
subsequent redrawing of the regional map.255 Özal, who was resolved that Turkey 
should have a say in post-war arrangements for the region, possibly launched the debate 
about Kirkuk-Mosul as part of contingency planning to explore Turkey’s options in 
response to Iraq’s possible disintegration.256 Another calculation may have been an 
effort to forestall international support for Kurdish separatism. Controlling Kirkuk-
Mosul would have provided Turkey with the means to both check Kurdish separatism 
and conceivably wipe out the PKK presence in Northern Iraq.257  
2.6. The Gulf War  
The multinational force commenced air strikes against Iraq on 16 January 1991. 
Akbulut stated the following day that, despite Turkey’s regret that war had become 
unavoidable, Ankara supported military action and hoped Saddam would realise the 
gravity of the situation before considerable loss of life occurred.258 From 18 January to 
the end of hostilities, coalition forces launched air attacks from military installations in 
Turkey. Due to the tremendous public opposition even to Turkey’s limited involvement 
in the war, a news blackout was implemented for operations from İncirlik air base. Özal 
argued that Turkey had no choice but to support the US-led coalition because of the 
possibility of post-war political turbulence in Iraq or a coalition government of Shiites 
252 Mehmet Ali Birand, Soner Yalçın, The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001), 
p.430-433 
253 Abramowitz, interview; Morton Abramowitz, second interview by author, Washington DC, 10 
February 2012.  
254 Toperi, interview. 
255 Torumtay, Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anılari, pp. 115-116; ‘The World This Week’, Channel 4, 2 
January 1991; ‘Newsnight’, BBC 2, 24 January 1991; Pope, ‘Iraq Land Claim’; ‘Profile: Turgut Özal’. 
256 Kandemir, interview; Birand and Yalçın, The Özal, p.434-439. 
257 ‘Still Needed, Still Stalwart’, The Economist, 12 January 1991; Goltz, ‘Dealing Turkey’. 
258 Akbulut, interview. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                69 
 
and Kurds intent on regional autonomy.259 Iraq sent official warnings and veiled threats 
to Ankara in protest at Turkey’s participation in the international coalition.260 Ankara 
categorically rejected Iraq’s allegations, holding the Iraqi government solely responsible 
for the crisis while reiterating the importance of Iraq’s continued sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.261 During the hostilities, Özal repeatedly stressed the need for a 
post-war regional security arrangement:  
Now that the liberation of Kuwait has begun, the international 
community must start thinking about ways to stabilize the region after 
the conflict. There is no question but that the crisis has had, and will 
continue to have, repercussions in the Middle East.262  
The Middle East will never be the same… The [regional] questions 
should be properly addressed… We may help bring peace to the region, 
but all these questions primarily need to be dealt with by the peoples of 
the region. Outside powers should facilitate their task.263  
According to Özal, once the Gulf Crisis ended, it would be imperative to resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, to build a ‘peace water pipeline’ to carry water from Turkey’s 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers down to the Arabian Peninsula, and to create regional 
economic interdependence. Özal also urged the launch of a democratisation process in 
the region.264  
The Gulf War ended on 28 February 1991 with a swift and decisive allied victory and 
Iraq’s acceptance of ‘immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.’ The 
coalition stopped the ground war without marching to Baghdad or overthrowing 
Saddam—a decision which would remain controversial in the following decade and 
generate a range of explanations. First, from the US perspective, the downfall of 
Saddam had not been a coalition objective and anyway fell beyond the mandate 
provided by the UNSC. The replacement of the Iraqi leadership would only have 
become an explicit US objective had Iraq sought to ‘use chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons, [support] terrorist acts against US or coalition partners anywhere in the world, 
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or destroy Kuwait's oil fields.’265 Second, and above all, overthrowing Saddam would 
have demanded a tougher and more costly military effort. It would have required the US 
to assume responsibility for replacing his regime and governing Iraq. Such an 
undertaking could also have led to the break-up of Iraq, which the major US allies in the 
region—Turkey and Saudi Arabia—strongly opposed.266 Third, while Washington 
publicly stated its preference for the removal of Saddam’s regime, it hoped that this 
would be a by-product of the war. The US believed the security and stability of the 
region depended upon reducing Iraq’s means to be a further threat to the region. For 
Bush, the normalisation of relations with Iraq could not be effected with Saddam in 
power, but it was inappropriate to try to shape or suggest the form the government 
should follow. The US looked for stability and order, and for ‘somebody to lead that 
country in the way of peace,’ preferring an Iraqi government ‘that could work very 
compatibly with the Western powers ... without threatening its neighbours.’267 
With victory achieved, the broader security questions regarding the future course of 
policy fell into two categories: The first question concerned Iraq itself. The US decided 
to continue the UN sanctions and only consider lifting them conditional on political 
commitments by Iraq including, to some degree, to whether Saddam remained in power. 
Washington was convinced that Iraq’s ability to threaten its neighbours or wage war 
against them had been sufficiently diminished, if not totally eliminated.268 It seemed 
very unlikely that Iraq would be able to reconstitute its military capability in the near-
term. However, some of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its missile 
capacity and programs remained intact. The US wanted sanctions on weaponry and 
some forms of dual-use technology to remain in place, and hoped to prevent the use of 
oil revenues to rebuild Iraq’s military capabilities. In short, Washington adopted a 
policy to ‘neuter’ Saddam’s regime even if it survived the aftermath of the conflict.269 
The second question was the need to restore order in the Gulf and establish a regional 
security arrangement to prevent further hostilities. However, any initiative to create a 
regional security setting had to address the absence of a border settlement between Iraq 
and Kuwait, and the challenge of fitting Iran into that framework. It would also require 
265 National Security Directive 45.  
266 Freedman, Choice of Enemies, pp.229-230.  
267 President’s News Conference with President Turgut Özal of Turkey, 23 March 1991, 
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some form of US military engagement, even though a continued US ground presence in 
the region could create political difficulties for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. 
Turkey agreed with the fundamental US principles and strategy. The first area of 
convergence was the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity and the restoration of 
stability. Throughout the crisis, the US had assured Turkey that the territorial integrity 
of Iraq was not in question as it felt that Iraq’s stability would contribute to overall 
stability in the region. Even before the conflict began, the US had officially underlined 
that the US ‘recognizes the territorial integrity of Iraq and will not support efforts to 
change current boundaries.’270 The second area of concurrence involved the risk that the 
survival of Saddam’s regime posed to regional peace. From the Turkish perspective, a 
strong Iraqi regime had to be a part of any strategy for ensuring Iraq’s unity and 
stability—a calculation that the US seemed to agree with in principle. However, it posed 
a significant challenge for both countries to square this objective with their dislike for 
Saddam’s regime itself. For Ankara, the continuation of sanctions until regime change 
would certainly have severe economic implications for Turkey, and pose a further 
political challenge. The third area of Turkey-US convergence was ensuring that Iraq 
would not become so weakened that it would fall prey to Iranian and Shiite influence, 
with all that implied for the regional balance of power.271 Lastly, the two countries 
agreed on Turkey’s role in the post-war settlements. Özal sought Turkish influence in 
security arrangements and peace plans for the Middle East, and Washington confirmed 
that Turkey could make a significant contribution as plans for security and stability in 
the Gulf developed.272 
2.7. The Immediate Aftermath of the Gulf War: Dialogue with the Kurds and 
Operation Provide Comfort 
Having refused to talk to the Iraqi Kurds for decades, Turkey now opened up an 
unofficial dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders—Jalal Talabani of the PUK and 
Masoud Barzani of the KDP—revealing a new aspect to Özal’s policy of active 
involvement in the crisis.273 The meeting took place in early March 1991 during the 
rebellion against Saddam’s regime in Northern Iraq with the participation of Talabani 
270 National Security Directive 45.  
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272 President's News Conference with Özal. 
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and Barzani’s representative, Mohsin Dizaee.274 According to the then KDP 
Spokesperson Hoshyar Zebari, when Turkish officials deliberately leaked details of the 
meeting to the media, it was ‘a breakthrough for Iraqi Kurds.’275 It was a remarkable 
move given the US had proscribed all contact with Iraqi dissidents since 1988, mainly 
to avoid alienating Turkey. The State Department had refused to talk to Talabani, who 
visited Washington in August 1990, just to prevent a backlash by Turkey and Iran, and 
undermining Talabani’s hopes that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait might affect a change in 
US policy. At the same time, Washington repeatedly rejected the recommendations of 
the US Ambassador in Ankara to officially engage Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Yet, as 
Abramowitz explains, ‘a few days later, we saw that Turkey started talking to them. 
Afterwards, we began to talk to the Iraqi Kurds, but we had to be exceedingly 
cautious.’276 
To date, there are a number of explanations for Özal’s ‘dramatic’ initiative to initiate 
contact with the Iraqi Kurds. More cynical explanations argue that it was Turkey’s 
intention to achieve the annexation of Northern Iraq as compensation for its losses 
during the Gulf war. However, this argument does not withstand inspection since 
Turkey firmly and consistently stood by its policy of maintaining Iraq’s territorial 
integrity.277 The second argument is that, through talks with Iraqi Kurds, Turkey wanted 
to demonstrate its willingness to assist them in easing their suffering under Saddam. 
Ankara expected this policy would eventually prove that Turkey’s real problem was 
with the PKK, rather than with Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin or the Iraqi Kurds. 
Third, Turkey was concerned that a power vacuum in Northern Iraq might enable the 
PKK to establish a base for terrorist operations there.278 Given that the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties sheltered the PKK in the 1980s, Turkey believed its interests demanded isolating 
the PKK from the Iraqi Kurds and preventing their further cooperation, which had 
traditionally been supported by third parties. Fourth, Özal intended for Turkey to have a 
say in the construction of post-war Iraq. According to Abramowitz, ‘Özal had some 
vision to deal with Iraqi Kurds and was more interested in ensuring Turkey would have 
an influence in Northern Iraq.’279 Özal’s response to the tremendous domestic criticism 
274 Kamran Karadaghi, interviewed by author, London, 8 June 2008; Saffeen Dizai, interviewed by 
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of his policy revealed this vision: ‘There is nothing to be afraid of in talking. We must 
become friends with them. If we become enemies, others can use them against us.’280  
The dialogue with Turkey cleared the way for the Iraqi Kurds to establish contact with 
the US administration. Washington opposed the dismemberment of Iraq and set this as a 
prerequisite in its engagement with the Iraqi Kurds, urging the Iraqi Kurdish parties to 
heed Turkey’s concern for Iraq’s territorial integrity and renounce any secessionist 
course.281 Ankara had no power of veto over Washington’s contacts with any dissident 
Iraqi groups. However, Turkey was a major ally, and its contribution to US policy was 
crucial for Washington. The contacts would simultaneously serve as instruments to keep 
the Iraqi Kurdish agenda in line with Washington’s strategy of organising a unified 
opposition to Saddam’s regime.  
Following the end of hostilities, a humanitarian crisis began to unfold in Northern Iraq, 
with mass displacements as people fled the Iraqi army’s suppression of the Kurdish 
uprising. By 2 April, about 400,000 people, mostly Kurds, had fled to the Turkish 
border, a remote and mountainous area that was experiencing severe weather 
conditions. The Turkish government immediately started a relief operation to provide 
emergency food and medical aid to the refugees. At the same time, Ankara urged 
Baghdad to immediately cease its oppression and deportation of innocent people. On 5 
April 1991, the UNSC, acting at the request of the Turkish and French governments, 
passed UNSCR 688, which condemned Iraq’s actions and called for a large program of 
international relief. Özal introduced the idea of establishing camps in ‘temporary 
settlement areas’ in Northern Iraq, where geographical conditions were more convenient 
for effective relief actions, while putting pressure on Iraq to restore the conditions 
required for the displaced persons to return to their homes.282  
The human tragedy in the north demanded US military intervention. However, the US 
administration, which was determined to achieve rapid military disengagement from 
Iraq, remained reluctant to intervene in an Iraqi civil war.283 According to Scowcroft, 
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any US involvement would require the occupation of Iraq and the replacement of the 
Iraqi regime, but the new government might be overthrown immediately after the 
departure of the coalition forces. US military involvement was therefore unacceptable 
from a policy standpoint.284 However, Turkey was in trouble and the entire Turkish 
political spectrum placed the blame squarely on Özal, arguing that the situation was a 
direct result of his policies.  
Following a joint tour of the region by Secretary Baker and Turkish Foreign Minister 
Alptemoçin on 8 April to assess the unfolding tragedy, Turkey and the US agreed to 
‘closely cooperate’ to effect UNSCR 688 and an international relief operation that 
would enable the refugees to return to their homes.285 In interview, Abramowitz 
confirmed that the main reason behind US intervention was ‘Turkey’s concerns.’286 
Özal’s initial proposal of settlement areas in Northern Iraq evolved into a plan for a 
‘safe haven’, introduced by British Prime Minister John Major.287 Faced with the 
difficulty of acquiring a new UNSCR mandating military intervention, the US 
unilaterally informed Iraq that it should cease all military activities in the air and on the 
ground north of the 36th parallel so that relief operations could proceed. After securing 
Turkey’s cooperation, on 16 April, Bush announced the beginning of OPC to create a 
safe haven in Northern Iraq while providing life-saving help to the displaced. OPC was 
mainly achieved by American, French and British troops operating from Turkish 
territory and the İncirlik base.288  
2.8. Conclusion  
Turkey-US cooperation during the Gulf Crisis stands out as an example of scenario 1 of 
the integrative model, in which Turkey and the US agreed on both independent 
variables one and two. The convergence of Turkey and the US’ perceptions of the Iraqi 
threat, and the ensuing sense of urgency and concern yielded to a consensus in devising 
and implementing a coordinated strategy, resulting in cooperation on the response to 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, as table 3 shows. 
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Table 3: Integrative model of Turkey-US cooperation during the Gulf Crisis and War 
Independent Variable 1: 
Agreement on a 
significant/strategic common 
threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
Agreement on strategy to deal 
with perceived strategic threat 
Dependent Variable /  
Result 
Turkey and the US agree that 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait posed 
vital threat to the regional and 
global order 
Turkey and the US agree that 
reversing Iraq’s aggression 
through implementation of 
sanctions and by use of force if 
necessary is the requisite strategy 
to deal with the common threat. 
Cooperation 
 
Independent variable one, agreement on a strategic threat, occurs at the systemic level. 
The integrative model argues that it appears in Walt’s proposition about balance-of-
threat against an external power and/or Schweller’s balance-of-interests.  
From the outset, the US defined Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as a vital threat to security, 
stability, and strategic balance in the Middle East, as well as to its regional interests. 
Turkey concurred with the US perception of threat from Iraqi action based on a number 
of factors. Before detailing these factors, it must be noted that the evolution of Turkish 
perceptions during the crisis was effected within a domestic political process. At this 
unit-level of analysis, it was President Özal who was the primary actor defining and 
formulating Turkey’s perception of threat from Iraq with a view to responding to 
structural-level changes. In other words, in line with the neoclassical perspective, the 
assessment of the Iraqi threat at the structural-systemic level of analysis as well as how 
Turkey viewed its interests in terms of Schweller’s balance-of-interests proposition was 
effected through the domestic process in which Özal was the key figure. It is thus 
necessary to analyse the factors that were instrumental in the way Özal perceived the 
crisis.  
First, at the systemic level, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait occurred at a time when Turkey 
felt increasingly pressured by strategic changes in its international, regional and bilateral 
environment. While the Soviet threat had vanished, how the strategic relationship with 
the US/West could be maintained now became an important question. In this sense, 
Turkey’s role in the Western alliance, and its relations with the US, was a key 
determinant of its policy during the Gulf Crisis; the first major international crisis since 
the end of the Cold War. Özal realised that the US would be the dominant and sole 
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super power in the new world order,289 and he looked for ways to strengthen Turkey-US 
bonds.290 The Gulf Crisis offered Özal a unique opportunity to redefine Turkey-US 
relations as the US focussed on addressing the threat posed by Saddam to regional 
stability and balance of power. Saddam’s blatant invasion of an independent country 
made it impossible for Turkey to remain outside the global consensus,291 and was thus a 
reminder of Turkey’s strategic significance. The situation dictated Turkey’s 
involvement, at the very least in the enforcement of the sanctions regime. Özal made ‘a 
virtue out of necessity’292 while seeking to secure an increased regional role for Turkey 
in the aftermath of Saddam’s defeat.293 Özal also expected Turkey’s active involvement 
in the crisis to be rewarded with increased US backing,294 and hoped it would raise 
Turkish prospects of joining the EC.295 
Secondly, at the regional level, the strategic changes that had taken place in the 1980s in 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbourhood made it essential for Ankara to formulate 
strategies to address threats such as the rise in PKK terrorism, strained relations with 
Syria due its support for the PKK, and the water dispute with Iraq and Syria. At the 
bilateral level, after the Halabja massacre and the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, Turkey had 
become increasingly wary of Saddam’s regional ambitions, his huge military arsenal, 
and Baghdad’s more assertive tone, especially on the cross-border water dispute. Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait compounded Turkey’s concerns for its national security, including 
the disruption of the regional balance of power and the potential of a direct threat from 
Saddam’s regime itself.  
In short, Turkey believed opposing Iraq’s antagonism conformed to its national interests 
both in the global and regional contexts. In essence, Özal took ‘a grand position against 
Saddam, whose future looked bleak, and made no secret of his desire to see him 
overthrown.’296 
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Turkey and the US also agreed on independent variable two; the requisite strategy to 
address the commonly-defined threat and reverse Iraq’s aggression. This strategy 
included ensuring immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, deterring an immediate Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, and restoring the 
ante bellum status quo and balance of power in the region. The instruments of this 
strategy were UNSC mandated international sanctions and use of force when economic 
coercion proved ineffective. Most importantly, US expectations of Turkey were also 
congruent with Turkish perceptions of its possible contribution in the actual 
implementation of that strategy. For instance, the US never asked to open up a ground 
front against Iraq through Turkish territory; a concept that Turkish politicians, including 
Özal, dismissed outright. The US requested Turkey’s cooperation in the enforcement of 
sanctions, use of military bases on Turkish soil during any attack on Iraq, and 
deployment of Turkish troops to the Iraqi border. Turkey unequivocally condemned 
Iraq's actions, extended prompt and decisive support for sanctions, and closed the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline; all critical in rolling back Saddam’s aggression.297 Turkey 
also mobilised 100,000 troops along its northern border of Iraq, forcing Saddam to 
redeploy six to eight Iraqi divisions to the north,298 and allowed coalition forces to use 
Turkish bases once military operations commenced on 16 January; also crucial to the 
allied victory. The US recognised at the time that Turkey had made ‘an invaluable 
contribution to the military effort’.299  
As a result of their agreement on independent variables one and two, Turkey and the US 
cooperated closely throughout the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War. Turkey’s decision to 
strategically align with the US marked a milestone in Turkey-US relations and Turkey’s 
Middle East policy.300 It also added Iraq as a positive dimension of the alliance 
relationship, redefined Turkey’s value as a security partner for Washington, and set 
Turkey-US bilateral cooperation in a new context. Turkey’s alignment with US policies 
and the key role that it played during the crisis served its national interests well. Turkey 
and the US had been friends and NATO allies for over 40 years,301 yet Turkey-US 
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relations took a dramatic turn for the better with Özal’s unhesitant and steadfast support 
of US actions to liberate Kuwait.302 The strategic consensus on the Gulf Crisis added a 
new dimension to the US-Turkish security partnership. For Washington, it redefined 
Turkey’s value as a strategic partner and set their bilateral cooperation in a new context. 
US Vice President Dan Quayle described the ‘renewed appreciation in the US, in 
Europe, and in the Middle East, of Turkey's strategic and critical importance.’303 Ankara 
was convinced that Turkey's regional role would continue to grow in the post-crisis 
period. 
Throughout the Gulf Crisis, Özal’s cachet in the US continued to grow. Even before the 
crisis, he was a ‘well respected and popular figure in the US . . . notably because he was 
seen as pro-American and changing Turkey in the right direction.’304 Richard Perle 
observes that Özal was an intelligent and visionary leader who had a clear 
understanding of where the world was moving and appreciated the value of the Turkey-
US relationship.305 Özal became a major ally and confidant of Bush,306 helping to lead 
the effort to reverse Saddam's aggression, especially thanks to his ‘leadership, courage 
and determination’ in the ‘hour of international crisis.’307 In fact, the US administration 
even shared ‘President’s Eyes Only’ reports with Özal.308 Nevertheless, Özal’s resolve 
also entailed political and security risks for Turkey, as well as high costs and economic 
hardship. Turkey suffered substantial economic losses and incurred significant security 
risks because of its support of the UN resolutions and US policy. The US did eventually 
help to offset some of Turkey’s losses and provided military assistance for the 
modernisation of the TSK, particularly in the area of air defence. Nevertheless, in stark 
contrast to his heightened international prestige, Özal came under tremendous domestic 
criticism and lost his power base, largely due to the unintended consequences of the 
crisis following the allied victory. According to Abramowitz: 
Özal was under serious political attack in the country on the basis that he 
got so little after so heavily investing and taking risks in the crisis. He 
was disappointed with the US, not in a way to change the direction of 
Turkey-US relations, but the short-term benefits were incomparable to 
the heavy political risk that he had taken.309 
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The residual consequences of the crisis also created certain difficulties for Turkey’s 
national interests. The curbing of Iraq’s military power was an achievement, but 
Saddam stayed in power, against Özal’s strong conviction that his removal was essential 
for regional stability. The US decided to maintain the sanctions as long as Saddam 
survived as Iraq’s leader, but their indeterminate continuation meant a greater burden on 
the Turkish economy, which was by then suffering a severe balance of payments 
problem and spiralling inflation. Moreover, the fate of the Iraqi Kurds surfaced as an 
international issue. OPC and its creation of a safe haven in Northern Iraq brought about 
new complications for Turkey, especially in its own struggle against PKK terrorism. In 
the final analysis, however, the prospects for enhanced and strategic Turkey-US 
relations in the new world order made the overall balance sheet look optimistic.
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CHAPTER 3: THE PERIOD OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, 1991-1994 
During the period between 1991 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Turkey-US 
relationship with regard to Iraq was marked by both cooperation and a gradual 
emergence of discontent due to conflicting goals and interests. From Washington’s 
perspective, Saddam’s regime remained a significant threat to vital US interests—a 
conviction that persisted for nearly a decade after the Gulf War until the toppling of his 
regime in 2003. The elements of US strategy to deal with that perceived threat were 
maintaining sanctions, preventing Iraq's WMD and missile programs through intrusive 
inspections to ensure Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions, containment 
and isolation of Saddam’s regime to prevent it from threatening its neighbours, 
organisation and support of Iraqi opposition groups to secure regime change, and use of 
limited force against Iraq for tactical and strategic purposes.310 
In contrast, the Turkish perception of threat from Saddam’s regime gradually abated as 
it began to experience the negative repercussions of the unintended political and 
economic consequences of the Gulf War. Turkey nevertheless remained a US partner in 
implementation of the sanctions regime to force Iraq to comply with all UNSC 
resolutions and the US policy of containment in broader terms.311 The two essential 
elements of the containment strategy—the continuation of the sanctions regime and the 
military enforcement of the NFZ through OPC II—both depended heavily upon 
Turkey’s continued cooperation with the US.312 Yet, the unintended consequences of 
the Gulf War, and the dilemmas that they created for Ankara, generated several 
interlinked dynamics that would characterise the Turkey-US joint agenda on Iraq in the 
following decade. Major challenges included the economic losses Turkey incurred by 
maintaining sanctions, the increased PKK presence in and terrorist activity from 
Northern Iraq, and the emergence of a de facto Iraqi Kurdish entity.  
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This chapter aims to examine the emergence of the unintended consequences of Gulf 
War on Turkey’s political, security and economic interests from 1991 to 1994, and trace 
their effects on Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq. During the period, despite the gradual 
changes in threat perception, the ensuing shifts in priorities, and some grievances, 
Turkey-US cooperation on containing Iraq remained largely within the concepts of 
security cooperation and alliance politics. This chapter analyses the paradox of the 
gradual divergence of Turkey-US perceptions of threat from Iraq yet continued 
cooperation on strategy. In the following period, covered in chapters 4 and 5, these 
issues and problems would expand to have a more direct impact on alliance relations.  
3.1. The First Stage: Defending Northern Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds, 1991 
3.1.1. Evolution of OPC into a Deterrent Force  
By the end of June 1991, as a result of OPC’s success, the Kurdish refugees had 
returned to their homes, and the situation had stabilised sufficiently for coalition ground 
units in Northern Iraq to redeploy to Turkey. However, Washington was determined to 
continue protecting the peoples of Northern Iraq, maintaining the sanctions for ensuring 
full compliance of Iraq with all relevant UNSC resolutions, and encouraging a change 
in Iraq’s leadership.313 The US believed the best way to bring about Iraqi compliance 
was through deterrence. Washington informed Ankara of its intention to continue with 
the OPC, arguing that a complete withdrawal would constitute abandonment of the Iraqi 
Kurds, and signal that Iraq would enjoy a free hand in Northern Iraq. Initially, 
Washington recognised the need to limit the duration and extent of its involvement in 
Iraq and did not want to undermine the prospects for an accord between the Iraqi Kurds 
and Baghdad.314 Nevertheless, the restoration of sufficient stability seemed unlikely, 
and the US remained ready to respond militarily to Iraqi actions as the situation 
warranted.315 OPC would maintain an appropriate level of air and ground forces to 
prevent recurrence of Saddam’s oppression against the Kurds, and to ensure Iraqi 
compliance with the UNSCRs and the conditions laid down by the coalition. The air 
components of the OPC would ensure the continued prohibition on Iraqi aircraft above 
the 36th parallel. Iraqi military and special/secret police would remain prohibited in the 
313 Testimony of John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State, before the International Relations Committee of 
the House of Representatives, 17 June 1991. 
314 According to Alan Makovsky, who served in OPC as State Department Representative, January-
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December 2009.  
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security zone.316 The US also informed the Kurds of the decision to perpetuate OPC for 
their protection, but explicitly stated that the US forces would not respond to any Iraqi 
action that the Iraqi Kurds provoked.317  
On 18 July 1991, the Turkish government informed its OPC partners of its agreement to 
the activation of OPC-II. Turkey would allow the use of İncirlik and Batman 
installations for non-NATO purposes ‘on an exceptional basis.’ It would contribute to 
OPC-II by assigning an appropriate-sized unit under national command whose 
commander would be of equal rank with that of the multinational component. However, 
it did specify that certain ground rules would apply to the conduct of the operation. 
Turkish territory, territorial waters and air space would under no circumstances be used 
for operations of an offensive nature against Iraq without explicit approval of the 
Turkish government. The operation would last until 30 September 1991, extendable 
only once for a maximum of 90 days.318 
3.1.2. Iraq’s Unilateral Withdrawal from Northern Iraq 
Concurrently with OPC, the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Front (KF), composed of 
eight Kurdish groups including the KDP and PUK, entered into negotiations to set the 
terms and the boundaries of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) in line with the 
1974 autonomy agreement. Disagreements over the KAR boundaries remained a key 
area of conflict. The KF sought to incorporate the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, and 
demanded international guarantees for a prospective agreement and the introduction of 
democratic reforms, all of which the Iraqi regime rejected.319 In addition, despite their 
apparent solidarity in the KF, there were reportedly divisions between the two Kurdish 
leaders. The history of animosity between the Barzani family and Talabani dated back 
to the Kurdish uprisings in the 1960s and 1970s; notwithstanding their armed clashes 
during the Iran-Iraq War, they had long been rivals for control of the Kurdish 
movement. It was also reported that they disagreed on the nature of a possible 
agreement with Saddam’s regime.320 While Barzani sought to get the best possible 
agreement that the current conditions allowed, Talabani believed it was imperative to 
reach a satisfactory agreement with Baghdad regardless of the timeframe. The key 
316 Philip A. Meek, ‘Operation Provide Comfort: A Case Study in Humanitarian Relief and Foreign 
Assistance’, Air Force Law Review, 37 (1994), pp.225-238. 
317 Makovsky, interview.  
318 Verbal Note of the MFA to Coalition partners, 18 July 1991.  
319 Alan Cowell, ‘Iraq’s Kurds Reject Autonomy Deal as Allied Plan Stirs Some Confidence’, The New 
York Times, 30 June 1991. 
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difference between them concerned the status of Kirkuk: Talabani refused to support 
any agreement that would not include Kirkuk in the KAR, while Barzani seemed more 
flexible, and willing to concede that Kirkuk’s status be determined at a later date.321 The 
Iraqi Kurds were wary of Saddam’s real intentions and would not feel secure so long as 
he remained in power. At some point in the near term, Saddam would apparently seek to 
reassert full control of the north and scale back Kurdish autonomy.322 The continuation 
of OPC and the US resolve to deter Baghdad constituted the only security guarantee 
restraining the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi Kurds, therefore, fervently called for Washington 
not to abandon their security.323  
In late October 1991, Saddam made an unexpected move which would henceforth 
change the status of Northern Iraq. Iraqi forces unilaterally withdrew beyond the 
boundaries of the KAR as defined in the 1974 law on autonomy, which also 
encompassed a region south of the 36th parallel, and re-established a defensive line just 
outside. This was followed by a blockade of food and fuel and the cutting off of the 
salaries of all officials, pensioners, and state and municipal employees.324 The exact 
reasons for Baghdad’s decision to give up significant control of the region were 
uncertain. First, Baghdad might have judged that the Iraqi army would be in a stronger 
defensive position to contain the Kurds, thereby consolidating security in the rest of 
Iraq. Second, Baghdad would have had a political argument for creating a KAR in 
accordance with the 1974 autonomy agreement. A third and more plausible reason was 
that Baghdad aimed to isolate the Kurdish region from the rest of Iraq and impose an 
economic blockade that would strangle the Iraqi Kurds to the point where they would 
accept the terms the central government dictated.325 
The KF denounced the withdrawal as a selective economic blockade and an act of 
economic warfare against the Kurdish population. The Kurds now faced a precarious 
situation, subjected to two simultaneous embargos from the UN sanctions and the 
economic and political isolation imposed by the central government. The KF had to 
administer and secure the KAR while providing subsistence without adequate economic 
321 Kurdistan in Time of Saddam, A  staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, 
November 1991 (Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Office, 1991), p.1-7; William Safire, ‘The 
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Unprepared for Winter’, Washington Post, 17 October 1991. 
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325 For a similar discussion, see, Daniel Byman, ‘Let Iraq Collapse’, The National Interest, 45 (1996), 
pp.48-61. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                84 
 
resources.326 It remained uncertain how long the new status quo of de facto autonomy 
for the Kurdish region could persist. The continuation of OPC-II, dependant on 
Turkey’s agreement, was the only security umbrella against Baghdad, making Turkish 
links even more significant for the Iraqi Kurds. Ankara’s support also became essential 
for the economic survival of the region since Turkey remained the key viable outlet and 
source of economic activity for the Kurdish region.327  
3.2. The Second Stage: Further Consequences of Containment, 1991-1994 
During this period, the US pursued a policy aiming at regime change in Baghdad. 
However, US expectations from Ankara on Iraq policy focused on Turkish support in 
maintaining sanctions and agreement to continue its deterrence through OPC-II.328 The 
issues arising over this cooperation created a number of interlinked dynamics in the 
Turkey-US joint agenda. Fundamentally, a tripartite relationship emerged between 
Turkey, the US and the Iraqi Kurds. Secondly, Saddam’s oppression of the Iraqi Kurds 
led to the entry of a broader Kurdish issue onto the international scene. Additionally, the 
security umbrella that OPC-II provided and Baghdad’s loss of control over Northern 
Iraq progressively led to the creation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in the 
region. Finally, the resultant political and military power vacuum created the conditions 
for the PKK to use Northern Iraq as a sanctuary and a base for escalating cross-border 
terrorist attacks, posing a growing challenge to Turkey’s security and stability.  
3.2.1. Internationalisation of the Kurdish Issue and Emergence of a De Facto Iraqi 
Kurdish State 
Saddam’s renewed oppression of the Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War led to the 
emergence of a broader Kurdish issue, which took on ‘a momentum of its own’329 on 
the international scene. As a CIA report on the Kurds from 1992 stated:  
The Gulf War and rising ethnic consciousness and conflict around the 
world have created a new context for the long-standing struggle of the 
Kurds to achieve autonomy if not outright independence. More broadly, 
Pan-Kurdish identity is being strengthened… OPC, the presence of 
coalition states and international relief workers in Northern Iraq, and 
continuing international press attention introduce some new dynamics to 
326 Nechirvan Barzani, interviewed by author, Erbil, 30 October 2009. 
327 Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy: Competing Perspectives,’ Insight 
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one of the world’s oldest ethnic problems.330  
For the CIA, the establishment of an internationally protected zone under the security 
umbrella of OPC-II had emboldened the Iraqi Kurds to achieve greater autonomy from 
Baghdad.331 During this period, the KF established new institutions of self-government. 
Elections were held in May 1992, followed by the establishment of a ‘Kurdish 
Parliament,’ ‘Kurdish government,’ and the declaration of a ‘Federated Kurdish State’ 
within Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish groups also lobbied intensively for US recognition of the 
legitimacy of the de facto entity in Northern Iraq, and requested commitments from 
Washington regarding continued protection, economic freedom, and political status 
within Iraq. They also became active in US-sponsored anti-Saddam Iraqi opposition 
activities. US commitment through OPC-II remained the only effective instrument for 
Iraqi Kurds to ensure their protection from Saddam. OPC-II was critical in ‘determining 
the prospects’ of Iraqi Kurds maintaining the new self-governing institutions and de 
facto autonomy. Therefore, OPC’s non-extension by Turkey would potentially have led 
to the swift reassertion of Iraqi control over Northern Iraq.332  
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership, while resourcefully striving to establish de facto 
statehood, was also constantly trying to reassure Turkey and the US that it did not 
intend to create an independent Kurdish state, but simply increase Kurdish autonomy 
inside Iraq. According to Talabani, the Kurdish leadership had recognised that changing 
the maps of all the countries across which the Kurds were dispersed was implausible, 
and had therefore set itself no impossible goals.333 The strategy of the Iraqi Kurdish 
leadership in declaring the limited prospects for independence was a reflection of their 
rational assumptions. The neighbouring states of Turkey, Iran and Syria all had Kurdish 
populations and were all concerned about the spill-over effect of any pan-Kurdish 
movement for their security,334 and all ardently opposed the disintegration of Iraq and 
the emergence of a Kurdish state. Any Kurdish entity would therefore be precarious as 
it would be landlocked in largely mountainous terrain, depending totally on 
neighbouring states’ for trade routes and economic partnership. It would also require 
330 CIA, ‘National Intelligence Estimate: The Kurds; Rising Expectations, Old Frustrations’, NIE92/27, 
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much more sophisticated weaponry for its defence than it had, and would therefore need 
international support to guarantee its borders.335  
In fact, the security of the Iraqi Kurdish zone depended exclusively on Turkish approval 
for the continuation of OPC-II, but Turkey strictly opposed any Kurdish move towards 
independence. Turkey repeatedly reminded the US that maintaining Iraq’s territorial 
integrity was vital for regional peace and stability. Washington responded that the US 
was absolutely committed to preserving Iraq’s independence and territorial integrity, 
which it viewed as an essential element of security in the region. It would therefore not 
support the emergence of an independent political entity in Northern Iraq. Additionally, 
regional security and stable relations with close allies was the cornerstone of US policy. 
For Washington, the greatest threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity was Saddam’s regime, 
and it sought a government in Baghdad able to maintain Iraqi borders without 
threatening its neighbours. Finally, the US vision for Iraq was a pluralistic country in 
which all groups could be represented.336 
Nevertheless, Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq continued to progress towards a de 
facto statehood that increasingly undermined Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
For Ankara, the challenge was to find ways to curtail the Iraqi Kurds’ ambitions for 
increasing autonomy even while the continued protective umbrella of OPC-II created 
circumstances for them to further their agenda for a de facto independent state.  
3.2.2. Continuation of OPC-II 
For Washington, OPC-II had evolved into an essential deterrent to renewed Iraqi 
aggression and was preventing Saddam from reinstituting control over Northern Iraq.337 
It was thus significant to the US administration both as a military instrument of 
containment, and in conforming to its determination to remove Saddam’s regime. Any 
refusal by the Turkish government to renew OPC-II’s mandate would thus drastically 
undermine US policy. American officials now began to explicitly underscore that 
Ankara’s cooperation against Saddam’s regime through OPC-II was a crucial factor in 
Washington’s perception of Turkey-US relations.338  
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Washington insistently lobbied to secure Turkish parliamentary authorisation to 
maintain OPC-II. However, OPC-II and the NFZ undermined the territorial integrity 
and political unity of Iraq, which Ankara viewed as vital for regional stability, 
irrespective of who held power in Baghdad. The US was resolved to sustain the policy 
of limiting Iraqi sovereignty in Northern Iraq as long as Saddam stayed in power, 
creating circumstances for the Iraqi Kurds to march towards semi-independent 
statehood. The Turkish public was frustrated with a situation in Northern Iraq that also 
paved the way for an escalation of PKK terrorism against Turkey.339 The US again 
sought to provide Turkey with assurances about OPC-II, Iraq’s territorial integrity, and 
US opposition to its fragmentation.  
3.2.3. Escalation of PKK Terrorism 
As international recognition for the Iraqi Kurds’ establishment of self-rule in Northern 
Iraq was increasing, the PKK mounted intensified terror attacks against Turkish security 
forces and civilian targets. The PKK had been conducting a separatist terrorist campaign 
against Turkey since August 1984. Its central camp was in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa 
valley in Lebanon, and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, lived in Damascus, sponsored by 
Syria.340 During the 1980s, Syrian support had been instrumental in the PKK shifting its 
focus to Northern Iraq and establishing a common front with the KDP.341 The 
declaration of KDP-PKK solidarity in 1983 provided shelter for the PKK in KDP-
controlled regions of Iraq. The PKK then used the region as a base for terrorist 
incursions into Turkey.342 Operating from camps in Turkey’s Syrian border and 
Northern Iraq, it commenced hit-and-run activities in August 1984, later escalating to 
full-scale indiscriminate terrorist attacks against soldiers, local civilians and economic 
targets.343  
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In late 1992 and 1993, the situation deteriorated as the PKK embarked on a full-scale 
campaign of terror. Ankara now came to believe the PKK had increasingly become an 
instrument of countries with disagreements or conflicts of interest with Turkey; 
particularly Syria and Iraq.344 Indeed, the protection and logistical and financial support 
of the Syrian regime was critical for the PKK.345 The PKK also became more valuable 
to Damascus in the new strategic environment of the early 1990s. As Soviet support 
faded away with the end of the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a more assertive power 
allied with the US, putting additional pressure on already strained Turkey-Syria 
relations. Despite Ankara’s tireless efforts to establish a cordon sanitaire along its 
Middle Eastern borders, Syrian sponsorship enabled the PKK to escalate its terrorist 
violence. The new situation in Northern Iraq further compounded the situation. From 
the Iraqi perspective, while OPC-II and the NFZ were designed to deter and restrain its 
actions against Iraqi Kurds, they also declared Northern Iraq beyond Baghdad’s control. 
The consequent power vacuum and chaotic situation enabled the establishment of PKK 
terrorist camps outside the Turkish border, from which the PKK could pose a growing 
threat to Turkey’s stability. Baghdad now reportedly extended the PKK logistical and 
material support to exact revenge for Turkey’s Gulf War policy, and also sought to use 
the PKK against the KDP and PUK.346  
For Ankara, the intensified PKK campaign of terror constituted a serious threat to its 
national security. The military dimension of the strategy to deal with the threat required 
cross-border military operations against PKK safe havens in Northern Iraq. The political 
dimension involved enlisting political support (if not active assistance) from the US and 
Western allies in the fight against the PKK and ensuring that the PKK was recognised 
as a terrorist organisation. Both dimensions of the strategy, however, faced severe 
challenges. Western democracies were increasingly failing to make a distinction 
between the Kurdish question in Iraq and the aims of the PKK, and Ankara had to strive 
to prevent the international legitimisation of the PKK due to the plight of the Iraqi 
Kurds.347 It was also having difficulty curbing PKK violence in south eastern Turkey,348 
and the half-hearted measures taken by the KDP and PUK against the PKK in Northern 
Iraq fell short of rooting out the terrorist presence in the region.  
344 Barkey and Fuller, Kurdish Question, p.31.  
345 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s problems with Syria with regard to the PKK see Aras, ‘Threat as a 
Peace-Maker’.  
346 CIA, ‘National Intelligence Estimate’, p.1. 
347 Frank J. Gaffney Jr., ‘The Kurdish PKK: Terrorists, Not Victims’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 March 
1992. 
348 Sayari, ‘Turkey: Changing European Security’, pp.9-21. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                89 
 
3.2.4. Reaction to the Economic Sanctions 
Another significant unintended consequence of the Gulf War was the profound 
economic losses Turkey suffered due to the continuation of the sanctions. The halting of 
all trade with Iraq, the closing down of the two oil pipe-lines, the financial losses of 
Turkish contractors operating in Iraq, and the decline of tourism revenues all added up 
to billions of dollars lost. The impact of the sanctions on the economy of south eastern 
Anatolia was considerable, exacerbating the high unemployment rate and low level of 
income. This in turn created a fertile ground for the propaganda and recruitment 
activities of the PKK.349 Turkish public opinion turned against the US-led embargo, 
accusing the Turkish government of being ‘more royalist than the king’ in enforcing it.  
3.3. Major Contours of the Turkey-US-Iraqi Kurdish Trilateral Relationship  
Cooperation on Iraq policy became one of the major determinants in the broader post-
Cold War Turkey-US alliance relationship, which Ankara strove to elevate to an 
enhanced partnership. During this period, the US referred to Turkey as ‘a model, a 
bridge, and a gateway’ for the newly emerging states of Central Asia. For Ankara, the 
US was the major partner in assisting these republics to establish democracy and free 
market economy, and integrate into Western institutions. The two nations also agreed 
on the need to curb the influence of non-democratic and non-secular models in the 
region, namely Iran. For instance, Washington’s support was essential in Turkish efforts 
to energise the EC and the international community to address the turmoil in the 
Balkans, especially the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and in resolving the conflict 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.350  
In terms of specific policy objectives on Iraq, the US remained the driving force of the 
UN and international community’s overall strategy, and the future of US policy was tied 
to whether Saddam would remain in power. There was no clarity, however, on how long 
the situation would endure and what would happen if Saddam continued to rule Iraq. 
Washington’s persistence in maintaining OPC-II and the renewal of its mandate every 
six months thus created a dilemma for Ankara. On one hand, Ankara had to take into 
account that the operation was the key factor in averting recurrence of the very large-
scale humanitarian problems in Northern Iraq in 1991. On the other, the Turkish public 
increasingly deemed OPC-II an umbrella to help the Iraqi Kurds create an independent 
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Kurdish state.351 Fierce rhetoric against OPC-II while in opposition notwithstanding, the 
ruling parties needed to identify a rational policy to reverse the emergence of a de facto 
Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which was dependent on the continuation of OPC-II, 
irrespective of the operation’s major objectives. Each extension of six months sparked 
questions over whether ending OPC-II was conditional on the removal of Saddam from 
power, to which the US had no convincing answer. In addition, the debate about OPC-II 
caused the Turkish public to scrutinise the duality of the US approach: Why had the 
international community acted so fiercely to reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait 
and protected the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s revenge, but failed to take any action 
against Armenian aggression in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Serbian massacres of Bosnian 
Muslims?352  
It seemed that, if US policy stayed on the same course, Turkey would continue to have 
to live with the UN sanctions that substantially damaged the Turkish economy, the 
emergence of a de facto Kurdish state, and the PKK presence in Northern Iraq. Despite 
growing discontent in Turkey with the implications of US policy, Ankara continued to 
see cooperation with Washington as the only viable alternative. Nevertheless, Ankara 
also devised a multi-track strategy to address the post-Gulf War situation. The first 
component was imposing certain operational restrictions on OPC-II. The second and 
most crucial aspect was the fight against the PKK. From the Turkish perspective, 
Washington’s support for Turkey’s military and diplomatic strategies against the PKK 
became a crucial element in the Turkey-US relationship. The US extended solid 
political support and explicitly endorsed Turkey’s fight against PKK terror, even when 
Ankara faced harsh criticism from several European countries.353 Washington defined 
the PKK as an organisation engaged in terrorist acts that was not representative of the 
Kurdish people of Turkey,354 and it supported Turkey’s right to defend itself against 
terrorism.355 This support was in sharp contrast to the positions of countries like 
Germany, which cut off arms shipments to protest Turkish use of German weapons 
against the PKK.356 At the same time, Ankara sought US assistance in urging the Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders to take a firmer stand against the PKK and expand their cooperation 
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with Turkey. US officials regularly raised the issue of the PKK in contacts with the 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership, stressing how essential it was for them to both prevent support 
for the PKK and stop it from operating out of Iraqi territory.357 In essence, Ankara and 
Washington both faced a dilemma in protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq through 
OPC-II while also trying to prevent the PKK from exploiting the power vacuum that 
OPC-II had created. Washington also urged the Syrian government ‘to cease its 
toleration of these kind of terrorist activities, either in Syria or in the Bekaa Valley of 
Lebanon.’358 
The relationship with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership was the third component of Turkey’s 
strategy. During this period, Turkey’s ties with the KDP and PUK substantially 
improved.359 Barzani and Talabani made prominent visits to Turkey and were received 
by the whole spectrum of Turkish leadership, whilst both Kurdish parties posted 
permanent representatives in Ankara. For Ankara, improving cross-border ties with the 
Iraqi Kurds was essential to wield influence over developments in Northern Iraq.360 The 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership’s cooperation with Turkey was also crucial to both improving 
border security and curtailing PKK presence and activities in the region.361 The strategy 
aimed to prevent a recurrence of the cooperation between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurds 
in the 1980s, and focused on isolating the PKK and preventing the region from 
becoming a base for its terrorist activities.362 It was also designed to rein in any 
influence that Iran and Syria could wield in Northern Iraq. Syria persisted in its hostility 
against Turkey, using the PKK as its proxy. Iran, though Syria’s principle strategic ally 
in the region, did not seem directly involved with the PKK, but did have ties with the 
KDP and PUK as tactical allies in its conflict with Iraq.  
In terms of international diplomacy, improving ties with the Iraqi Kurds would also 
potentially serve to demonstrate Turkey’s willingness to ease their suffering and 
eventually to draw a distinction between the Iraqi Kurdish issue and Turkey’s policy of 
curbing PKK terrorism. To this end, Ankara even promised the Iraqi Kurds security 
guarantees. During discussions with Barzani and Talabani from 1992, Prime Minister 
Demirel and senior officials underlined that Turkey would no longer remain indifferent 
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to the suffering or persecution of the Iraqi Kurds on the basis of their kinship with 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Turkey would neither leave the Iraqi Kurds to their 
fate nor permit any recurrence of Saddam’s oppression, even if the coalition states were 
unable to provide such protection.363 Ankara also made the pledge public, announcing 
that Turkey would act as ‘the guarantor of security for all peoples such as Kurds, 
Turkomens, Arabs and Assyrians’ and would never allow these peoples to be subjected 
to oppression.364 Turkey’s preference was a democratic Iraq, respectful of the rule of 
law and human rights, where all parties, including the Kurdish groups, were equally 
represented in government. The new Turkish strategy was a stunning departure from its 
pre-Gulf War approach towards the Iraqi Kurds.  
For their part, Barzani and Talabani were also interested in cultivating and developing 
good relations with Turkey. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership ‘fully recognized Turkey’s 
importance in the Western alliance and its crucial role to permit the OPC-II to provide 
protection for the Kurds against any Iraqi aggression.’365 They recognised that they 
depended on Turkey’s benevolence for the continuation of OPC-II, which provided 
them with security and an opportunity to control territory. Turkey was also the crucial 
lifeline for Northern Iraq, which had suffered mounting economic problems due to the 
continued UN sanctions and Baghdad’s simultaneous blockade of the north that together 
stifled economic activity in the region.366 The economic vitality of the Kurdish political 
entity was contingent upon the partial exemption of Northern Iraq from application of 
the UN sanctions regime,367 and increased economic activity with Turkey. Moreover, it 
was Turkey’s blessing and encouragement that cleared the way for the Iraqi Kurds to 
engage in direct dialogue with the US administration. Talabani even suggested that the 
Iraqi Kurds would prefer to join a democratic Turkey as the only serious alternative if 
they could no longer survive in a non-democratic Iraq.368  
As a result, Talabani and Barzani were partially responsive to Turkey’s demands that 
they curtail the PKK presence in Northern Iraq, issuing public condemnation and 
denouncement of PKK terrorism: 
We have publically condemned and denounced PKK terrorism. We are 
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diametrically opposed to the PKK philosophy, means and tactics. Their 
activities are detrimental to the Kurdish cause. We are committed to 
deprive them of sanctuary and prevent them from making use of our 
present difficulties. We have taken a number of practical measures to 
ensure border security and to tighten control of important crossing point 
areas… We will not sacrifice the interests of the Kurdish people for the 
sake of the PKK’s idealistic and terrorist objectives.369  
Barzani further directed serious accusations against the PKK: First, the PKK had a ‘self-
righteous regard for themselves as the sole representative of Kurds everywhere’;370 
second, the Iraqi Kurds would never accept any dictatorship by Öcalan, whose 
organisation was used by Syria and outside powers as a tool to apply pressure on 
Turkey;371 and third, the PKK did ‘Saddam’s work for him.’372 During contact with 
Turkish officials, Barzani stated that PKK terrorism was a shared problem, that 
Baghdad was using it to undermine Turkey’s dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds, and that the 
KDP would take every necessary measure to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK.373 
The Iraqi Kurdish leaders also provided Turkey with evidence of the links between Iraqi 
intelligence and the PKK.374 Öcalan, in contrast, continued to insult the Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders as ‘backward, tribal, and lackeys of imperialist and regional powers.’375 
Nevertheless, Barzani and Talabani had divergent perspectives on the PKK presence in 
the region. The PKK posed a direct challenge to the KDP since it used areas that the 
KDP controlled, including the Turkish/Iraqi border. Barzani, therefore, was Turkey’s 
most willing partner in military actions against the PKK.376 Talabani, on the other hand, 
denounced PKK terrorism, relayed documents to Ankara that showed Iraq’s links with 
the PKK, yet was less willing to condemn the organisation. He claimed that the PKK 
presence in Northern Iraq could only be tolerated if the organisation renounced its 
‘guerrilla activities and operated solely as political party.’377 He also assumed a self-
declared role of mediator between Ankara and the PKK. The KDP accused Talabani of 
insincerity based on his close relationship with the PKK and advised Turkey to urge 
369 Masoud Barzani’s 13 May 1992 Reply to the US Government’s 6 May 1992 Message on Turkey and 
the PKK. 
370 Jonathan Rugman, ‘Kurdish Leader Hits Out at Militants’, The Guardian, 2 April 1992. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Finkel, ‘Embargo and Poor Harvest’.  
373 Demirel, interview.  
374 Rugman, ‘Kurdish Leader’. 
375 ‘Independence by Stealth’, pp.65-66. 
376 The KDP fought against the PKK especially in the 1992-93 period with substantial assistance from 
Turkey. Turkey helped the KDP to establish around 65 military control points, and provided weapons for 
12,000 peshmarga forces to prevent PKK infiltration from the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi border. 
377 MFA, Talking Points of 22 June 1992. This was regarding the meeting between Demirel and Talabani 
in Ankara, 9 June 1992. 
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Talabani to dissociate himself from the terrorist organisation.378 However, the 
increasing PKK presence and influence in the region directly threatened the power bases 
of both the KDP and the PUK. The PKK even retaliated against the KDP and PUK’s 
alignment with Ankara by blocking Turkish trucks bringing essential supplies to 
Northern Iraq.379 Thus, even without their uneasy alliance with Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds 
had their own motivation to reassert their authority and expel the PKK from Northern 
Iraq. In October 1992, Barzani and Talabani joined forces with the Turkish military in a 
major operation in Northern Iraq against the PKK, delivering a heavy blow to the 
terrorist organisation.380 In interview, then Prime Minister Demirel asserted that the 
Iraqi Kurdish groups’ fight against the PKK was motivated by self-interest rather than 
loyalty to Turkey, since the KDP and PUK were mainly Kurdish liberation movements 
seeking to place Northern Iraq under their own rule.381    
The fourth component of the new Turkish strategy involved alliance politics. In 
December 1992, Ankara succeeded in establishing a political and consultation 
mechanism with its OPC-II allies—the US, the UK and France—to address its concerns 
over the situation in Iraq. In this consultative mechanism, the allied nations reiterated 
their governments’ commitment to the preservation of the independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity of Iraq, confirming their determination to oppose actions that could 
lead to its division and dismemberment.382 They also agreed that the future political 
structure of Iraq had to be decided democratically by all Iraqi citizens, and the allies 
would not encourage any constitutional arrangement that did not reflect the will of all of 
Iraq’s peoples. The allied nations condemned terrorism, voiced their full support for 
Turkey’s right of self-defence against the violence of the PKK, and confirmed that the 
territory of Iraq should not be a safe haven for terrorists. They called upon the 
government of Iraq to lift the economic embargo and all restrictions that it had imposed 
upon the northern part of the country and acknowledged the heavy economic losses that 
Turkey had incurred due to the Gulf War.383  
The fifth aspect of the Turkish strategy involved increased regional engagement, 
including establishment of a regional trilateral consultation mechanism between Turkey, 
378 The Minutes of the Meeting between Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP and MFA officials, Ankara, 15 June 
1992. 
379 Alan Cowell, ‘Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan’, The New York Times, 4 September 1992. 
380 Barzani, interview.  
381 Demirel, interview.   
382 Press Statement by the Turkish Embassy in Washington DC on the meeting between high-level 
officials from Turkey, France, the UK, and the US in Ankara on 11 December 1992. 
383 Press Statement by the Turkish Embassy, 11 December 1992. 
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Iran and Syria and diplomatic rapprochement with Baghdad. These countries all had 
distinct approaches to the Kurdish issue in general, and enjoyed a complex set of 
relations with various Kurdish groups which they would, at times, even direct against 
each other in pursuit of rivalries. However, their interests converged in preserving the 
status quo, maintaining the inviolability of national boundaries, and thus preventing any 
Kurdish secessionism. In November 1992, the Turkish government convened a Turkey-
Iran-Syria trilateral mechanism at the foreign ministers level in the conviction that any 
move towards independence by the Iraqi Kurds would prove futile provided all three 
nations opposed it. Ankara initially considered Iraqi participation in the mechanism, yet 
both the situation in Iraq and international circumstances prevented Baghdad’s 
involvement.384 Through meetings held every six months at senior and foreign minister 
level, the three nations reaffirmed the importance they attached to the ‘preservation of 
the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq’ and their resolve to oppose any efforts 
to ‘divide Iraq and developments that could lead to its disintegration’ which would have 
‘negative and dangerous consequences for regional peace and stability.’385 Turkey also 
sought to ensure that Iran and Syria agreed to condemn terrorism. However, the 
statements of the trilateral meetings made no explicit reference to the PKK as a terrorist 
organisation due to the fervent objections of Syrian officials, and despite agreement on 
the Iranian side.386  
During this period, Iraq complained bitterly that the ‘anomalous situation’ in Northern 
Iraq was the result of direct military intervention by the US, Great Britain and France. 
According to Baghdad, the threat of force through OPC-II prevented Iraqi authorities 
from exercising their functions in this part of the country, despite being ready to resume 
all of their normal responsibilities in the region. Baghdad argued that this was 
interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, that the region had come under the control of 
‘armed bands,’ that ‘a state of virtual secession was imposed,’ and that the region had 
become open to interference by the Iranian regime.387 
By 1994, Turkey had also started to suggest to the US that OPC-II should 
simultaneously work for the ‘normalisation’ of the conditions in Northern Iraq. The 
emphasis on normalisation reflected Turkey’s understanding that the ad hoc political 
384 Çetin, interview.  
385 Statement by Hikmet Çetin, the Turkish Foreign Minister, following the Trilateral Meeting on 14 
November 1992.  
386 Korutürk, interview. 
387 Letter dated 10 June 1993 by Muhammed Said Al-Sahaf’s to the UNSC on the humanitarian and 
security situation in Iraq. 
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process in Northern Iraq had to remain a temporary arrangement that would not 
undermine Iraq’s territorial integrity. This strategy reflected Ankara’s preference for the 
reinstitution of Iraq’s sovereignty in the region, and its resolve to deter any Kurdish 
move towards independence. It was an extension of Turkey’s warnings to the Iraqi 
Kurdish leadership to contain their aspirations for independence and its calls for the 
resumption of dialogue with Bagdad. Another part of this new Turkish strategy was the 
decision to resume the operations of the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad at the chargé 
d’affaires level. Ankara argued that this decision was not in itself a change in its Iraq 
policy, which would remain within the framework of and in conformity with UNSC 
resolutions. From Ankara’s viewpoint, such a channel would be useful in approaching 
the Iraqi government to urge full compliance with UNSC resolutions, an end to 
Baghdad’s economic embargo against Northern Iraq, and de-escalation of the tension 
between the Iraqi military and Kurdish groups. This new strategy, however, diverged 
from the US policy of maintaining Baghdad’s diplomatic isolation. Washington 
expressed deep and serious concern about Turkey’s decision to elevate relations with 
Iraq, and requested Ankara not encourage or accept high-level Iraqi delegations. 
The sixth component of Turkish strategy related to the damage that the continued 
sanctions were inflicting on the Turkish economy. Iraq continued to defy the sanctions, 
and it seemed that, irrespective of whether Saddam fully complied with UNSC 
obligations, the removal of the sanctions depended solely on regime change in Baghdad. 
Apart from Iraq itself, Turkey was the country hit hardest by the sanctions, and the 
economic burden seemed set to worsen for an indeterminate period. Turkey requested 
US assistance as compensation for part of the economic losses that it incurred during 
and after the Gulf Crisis. Under the ‘oil for food’ program encapsulated in UNSC 
Resolutions 706 and 712, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline had been allowed to 
resume operation so Iraq could export $1.6 billion worth of oil for humanitarian 
purchases. Turkey then argued that the pipeline itself was at serious risk of corrosion, 
and a potential rescue operation could flush the system with fresh crude oil on an 
exceptional basis. Washington, in contrast, categorically opposed any modification of 
the sanctions while recognising their implications for Turkey’s economy. Turkish 
endeavours for even a limited reoperation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline within the 
sanctions regime became a problem for Washington, threatening ‘a potential crisis in 
Turkish-US relations.’388 The question for both countries was to find a way to save and 
388 Mark Parris, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, 8 December 2009. 
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maintain the pipeline without damaging the integrity of the UN sanctions regime. 
Following a long process of negotiations, an agreement was reached to allow Turkey to 
drain the pipeline and sell the proceeds, and the UN agreed to allow an exception to the 
sanctions regime to make that possible, yet its implementation was cancelled due to 
Saddam’s refusal. As the sanctions remained with no end in sight and its calls for 
compensation went unheeded, Turkey’s discontent turned into ever deepening 
frustration with US policy on Iraq. 
The last Turkish concern involved the fate of the ethnic Turkomen in Northern Iraq, 
whose welfare Turkey sought to protect.389 In essence, Turkey remained wary of 
successive Iraqi regimes’ policy of repression of the Turkomen minority and sporadic 
execution of Turkomen leaders.390 Ankara had intermittently directed harsh criticism 
against Iraq’s suppression of the Turkomen people—even at times of improved relations 
with Baghdad during the 1970s. The Turkomen issue was a sensitive one with public 
interest and had had a substantial impact on successive Turkish governments’ Iraq 
policy. It was almost impossible for Ankara to remain indifferent to the fate of the 
Turkomen, who lived just a few hundred miles away from Turkish territories. Ankara 
was concerned about the dual pressure on the Turkomen from both the central Iraqi 
government and the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. From 1991 onwards, Turkish 
society rediscovered their plight and became increasingly interested in their situation in 
Northern Iraq. The desire was to help and protect an ethnic group of Turkish origin 
under attack by Saddam and losing ground due to rising Kurdish influence in their 
historic homelands. The widespread concern in Turkey was that Kurdish groups would 
dominate and force the Turkomen either to submit to Kurdish rule or leave their 
territories. A more political reason was to generate a Turkomen dynamic as a balancing 
element against the Kurdish groups in the region. Consequently, the Turkomen became 
a substantial factor in Turkey’s Iraq policy. 
3.4. Conclusion 
Iraq became a central factor in continued Turkey-US strategic ties in this period. In 
interview, Zalmay Khalilzad underlined that Iraq was part of the regional issues in the 
Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East which became preeminent in Turkey-US 
relations, replacing the Soviet issue in the post-Cold War era. According to him, the 
Turkey-US agenda adapted to a more regional focus, in which Turkey became 
389 Fuller, ‘Fate of the Kurds’. 
390 Even before Saddam came to power, Iraq had executed the leaders of the Turkomen community in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
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extremely important in relation to many of these regional issues in which 
the US was very active, with the case of Iraq, during the Iraq-Kuwait 
crisis or the Balkans, which preoccupied Washington for a substantial 
period of the 1990s and remained a continuing concern.391  
Alan Makovsky also noted that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Iraq became the 
primary issue that ‘gave Turkey relevance in US policy priorities.’392 However, 
according to Marc Grossman, then US Ambassador to Turkey, despite the significance 
of continued Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq, it was only ‘one of the three or four top 
issues’ in Turkey-US relations. Grossman stressed that while Iraq ‘remained a constant 
part of the conversation between Turkey and the US,’ Washington wanted to expand the 
Turkey-US agenda ‘beyond the security question’ in the 1990s. He underscored that 
cooperation on Iraq had ‘its own logic,’ but issues such as support for Turkey’s bid for 
EU membership, its democratisation process, and endorsement of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline project were equally important topics on the Turkey-US agenda at this 
time. Washington’s support on these issues, according to Grossman, was part of a US 
vision for Turkey as a member of the EU with advanced pluralism and democracy.393  
Table 4 below illustrates the integrative model of Turkey-US cooperation in this period.   
Table 4: Integrative model of Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq, 1991-1994 
Independent Variable 1: 
 
Agreement on a 
significant/strategic 
common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to 
deal with perceived strategic 
threat 
Dependent Variable /  
Result 
I. The US 
 
Saddam’s regime remained 
a significant threat to vital 
US interests.  
 
II. Turkey  
 
Saddam’s regime no longer 
considered a significant 
threat. 
 
Agreement on strategy and its 
elements 
 
1. Regime change (-) 
2. Containment (+) 
 i. Maintaining sanctions (+) 
 ii. NFZs through OPC-II (+)  
Cooperation despite Turkey’s 
increasing resentment of US 
policy: 
 
1. Risks of non-cooperation 
higher than cooperation 
2. Importance that Turkey 
attached to its alliance 
relationship with the US 
 
Factors straining Turkish 
cooperation with the US: 
 
1. Economic losses 
2. Increased PKK terrorism from 
bases in Northern Iraq 
3. Emergence of a de facto Iraqi 
Kurdish state  
4. Need to mediate between 
fighting Iraqi Kurdish groups 
391 Khalilzad, interview (2009).  
392 Makovsky, interview.  
393 Grossman, interview.  
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In terms of independent variable one, a fundamental change occurred in Turkey-US 
cooperation on Iraq during 1991–1994. Thus, while the US continued to perceive a vital 
threat from Saddam’s Iraq, Turkey’s perception of threat from Iraq diverged from that 
of the US for two key reasons. First, the curtailment of Iraq’s military power and its 
continued isolation through the containment strategy removed Iraq’s potential threat for 
Turkish policy makers. Second, but more importantly, the enormous costs and burdens 
of the unintended consequences of the US strategy on Iraq for Turkey’s national 
security and economic interests took precedence over any other concerns vis-à-vis Iraq. 
This led to a shift in Ankara’s perception of threat from the Iraqi regime, as well as the 
emergence of a view that continued cooperation with Washington on Iraq ran counter to 
Turkey’s national interests.  
On independent variable two, the strategy to deal with the perceived threat, Turkey still 
felt compelled to cooperate with the US. The US persisted with its strategy of 
containment and, if possible, regime change in Iraq, and Turkey wielded no influence 
over the US policy course. The cooperation on strategy had a number of elements. First, 
Ankara fundamentally agreed with Washington that Iraq had to fully comply with the 
UNSC resolutions, and supported maintaining the sanctions. However, Turkey had to 
bear substantial economic losses and political costs when the sanctions remained in 
effect for longer than initially planned. Despite endorsing the US policy, Turkey’s 
numerous calls for compensation went unheeded. The economic impacts were most 
severe in south eastern Anatolia, one of the most underdeveloped regions in Turkey, 
creating a fertile basis for the PKK’s propaganda and recruitment activities. 
Second, there was divergence between Ankara and Washington over the policy of 
seeking regime change in Baghdad. During the 1990–1991 crisis and war, Özal stated a 
preference for a change in Iraqi leadership and establishment of a democratic 
government representative of Iraq’s different groups.394 In the post-war period, there 
was a broader agreement on the need for a change in Iraqi leadership. Since Ankara no 
longer viewed Saddam’s regime as an urgent threat, Turkey distanced itself from 
involvement with the Iraqi opposition and from US activities and covert operations 
against Saddam. However, when the initial US covert operations aiming at regime 
change failed and the removal of Saddam became a precondition for lifting the 
394 David Aikman, ‘Interview with Turgut Özal: Hoping Saddam Would Just Go Away’, Time, 13 May 
1991.  
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sanctions, Ankara increasingly sought to decouple its Iraq policy from the US strategy 
of regime change.  
Third, the military dimension of the US policy of isolation and containment of 
Saddam’s regime and the enforcement of the NFZ in Northern Iraq rested mainly on 
OPC-II, conducted from the Turkish base at İncirlik. OPC-II gradually evolved from a 
deterrent against the recurrence of a refugee crisis in Northern Iraq into a military 
component of the US strategy to isolate Baghdad and to provide security, mainly for the 
Iraqi Kurds. However, Baghdad’s limited sovereignty over part of its territory and 
Saddam’s decision to withdraw his forces from Northern Iraq in October 1991 enabled 
the Iraqi Kurds to establish the institutions of a de facto state in the region under the 
protection provided by OPC-II. This development had implications for separatist 
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and constituted a further dilemma for Ankara. The 
containment policy had thus resulted in precisely what Turkey opposed.  
Turkey’s concern for the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity now presented a 
paradox. Despite Turkey-US agreement on this objective, their views diverged on how 
to restore Iraq’s unity. Turkey viewed the risks to Iraq’s territorial integrity as a direct 
consequence of US policy. Moreover, it considered the situation in Iraq to be an ad hoc 
arrangement that had to end with normalisation and the reinstitution of Baghdad’s 
authority over the whole country as the only viable alternative. The US, in contrast, was 
resolved to contain Iraq until Saddam was removed from the scene. The resultant 
political and military power vacuum in Northern Iraq created the conditions for the 
PKK to use the region as a base for cross-border terrorist attacks against Turkey. This 
became a major threat to national security and Turkey had to fight the PKK both at 
home and in Northern Iraq by carrying out cross-border military operations. Turkey also 
encountered heavy diplomatic costs in the form of harsh criticisms of these operations 
by European and Arab nations.  
In this context, Turkish cooperation with the US on Iraq strategy suggests a case of 
alliance security dilemma. Accordingly, Turkey cooperated with the US strategy, 
despite the repercussions of such cooperation on its interests, since the costs of non-
cooperation were more certain than the benefits. The perception of Turkish policy 
makers remained that continued cooperation with the US on Iraq suited broader Turkish 
interests by underpinning the strategic value of Turkey-US relations in the new post-
Cold War international setting. US expectations from Ankara on Iraq fit into this 
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broader strategic perspective of Turkish regional leadership in an enhanced partnership 
with the US. In the wake of the Gulf War, Ankara acknowledged that continued 
cooperation with the US on Iraq had become a major component of Turkey-US ties.  
However, the costs of cooperation were also high because of the difficulty of pursuing 
divergent interests on the strategy, and, ultimately, the net costs surpassed the relative 
gains in achieving Turkish interests during this period. As a result, while Ankara 
maintained its cooperation with the US on economic sanctions and allowed OPC-II to 
use Turkish bases for military deterrence against Saddam’s regime, it simultaneously 
devised a multi-level strategy for dealing with the damage to its national interests. By 
1994, Turkey was arguing for normalisation of relations with Baghdad, a concept that 
Washington categorically rejected. Nevertheless, despite all the dilemmas it faced, 
Turkey continued to support the US strategy of containment.  
Such cooperation also entailed the response of Turkish foreign and security policies to 
the internationalisation of the Iraqi Kurdish issue, which involved working to ensure 
Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also involved the fight against the 
escalating terrorism of the PKK consequent on the power vacuum in Northern Iraq. 
Washington’s support was critical in containing Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for self-rule 
within the limits of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Turkey also increasingly looked for US 
political support for its cross-border military operations against PKK terrorism in 
Northern Iraq. In May 1994, the start of intra-Kurdish hostilities further aggravated 
Turkey’s dilemmas in unwillingly cooperating with the US on Iraq policy, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE FIRST CLASHES BETWEEN IRAQI KURDISH 
FACTIONS, 1994-1996 
During the period 1994-1996, the fundamental dynamics of Turkey-US relations 
continued to follow the same course in relation to their respective strategies on Iraq; 
Turkey cooperated with US containment of Iraq despite its growing discontent with the 
unintended consequences of the post-Gulf War period. Northern Iraq also emerged as a 
separate issue in Turkey-US deliberations on Iraq due to two factors. First, while the 
KDP and PUK united their forces to create a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, the 
US became interested in creating ‘a stable area in this region’ to ‘allow the (Iraqi) 
opposition to have a toehold inside the country.’395 The region became a centre for the 
US-sponsored activities of the Iraqi National Council (INC) and opposition to Saddam’s 
regime.396 Second, the conflict between the KDP and PUK became a common challenge 
that would last from May 1994 to the Washington Agreement in September 1998. The 
intermittent clashes among the Iraqi Kurdish factions, the ensuing increase in the PKK 
presence and activities, and the interference of Baghdad and Tehran in developments in 
the region all meant that Northern Iraq gradually became a new strategic priority in the 
Turkey-US relationship on Iraq policy.  
This chapter presents an account and analysis of the Turkey-US relationship during 
1994-1996 with a particular focus on Northern Iraq. While the period of conflict and 
Turkey-US joint efforts towards Kurdish reconciliation continued until 1998, this 
chapter will focus only on 1994-1996 to introduce the dynamics present in the initial 
situation in more detail. The period leading from 1996 to the inauguration of the Bush-
Cheney administration in 2001, a turning point in US policy towards Iraq, will be 
covered in the following chapter.  
395 Robert S. Deutsch, interviewed by author, Brussels, 15 October 2010. 
396 For a detailed account of INC activities in Northern Iraq, see the Statement of Ahmed Chalabi, 
President of the Executive Council, INC, Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown? Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations US 
Senate, 105th Congress, 2 March 1998, US47-150 CC (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1998). The INC even planned and initiated an unsuccessful military operation from Northern Iraq in 
March 1995, from which the US allegedly withdrew its support at the last minute. Robert Baer, See No 
Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2002). 
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4.1. First KDP-PUK Clashes 
The KDP-PUK arrangement for administration of Northern Iraq operated on a sensitive 
power sharing agreement. The Parliament was split with 50 seats for each party, with 
five seats allocated for Assyrian Christians.397 Both parties agreed to address 
outstanding problems in the administration of the region and hold general elections in 
May 1995. However, in May 1994, a factional armed conflict broke out between the 
KDP and the PUK. This arose after dispute over the power sharing arrangement, 
representation in the Kurdish Parliament and government, and, above all, access to 
customs revenues, primarily from the Habur border gate with Turkey.398 The KDP 
collected far more revenues than the PUK, primarily from the sale of diesel to Turkish 
truck drivers (a violation of UN sanctions), the collection of customs duties levied at the 
Turkey’s border with Iraq, and taxes on trade across the demarcation line with Baghdad-
controlled territory. The PUK, however, only had access to customs duties levied on 
trucks crossing the Iran-Iraq border and a few other internal sources.399 This disparity in 
revenue created serious problems of political survival for the PUK, which found itself 
unable to meet its expenditure requirements. The conflict between the two sides 
escalated and became increasingly volatile despite the efforts of the INC to act as an 
intermediary.400  
Turkey and the US now pursued separate efforts for KDP-PUK reconciliation with 
distinct motivations. In the initial stages of the conflict, Barzani requested military 
assistance from Turkey, claiming that the KDP now had to simultaneously fight the 
PKK and PUK. Ankara followed the KDP-PUK clashes with growing concern since it 
feared the collapse of political authority would lead to increased PKK activism in the 
region. PUK-PKK ties would potentially be strengthened, and the PKK had already 
contacted the PUK to offer support against the KDP. More importantly, the PKK sought 
to exploit the situation to gain concessions from both parties. In fact, while courting the 
PUK, Öcalan instructed PKK terrorists in the region to pressure Barzani to conclude an 
agreement that would allow PKK’s presence and camps in the KDP-controlled region. It 
397 The ethnic Turkomen had not participated the body in protest at the low number of seats they were 
allocated. 
398 The Iraqi name of the gate is Ibrahim Khalil. Turkey reopened the Habur gate to facilitate the cross-
border diesel trade in 1993. Around 2,000 trucks crossed the Habur border, controlled by the KDP, and 
the customs tax levied on these trucks provided approximately 60 percent of the funds available to the 
regional administration. Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 333. Süleyman Demirel suggests that, even more 
than OPC-II, it was these the revenues and custom duties levied at Turkish-Iraqi border and collected 
from Turkish truck drivers that helped the Kurdish factions to establish a de facto state in Northern Iraq. 
Demirel, interview. 
399 Alfred Prados, ‘The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq’, CRS Report for Congress, 16 November 1995.  
400 David Hirst, ‘West Embarrassed as Kurd Kills Kurd’, The Guardian, 14 May 1994. 
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was also apparent that the KDP would not engage in a direct fight with the PKK without 
Turkey’s active and ongoing support. The most viable strategy for Ankara seemed to be 
active engagement with Barzani and Talabani to check the course of events. This 
strategy was based on pursuit of balance between the KDP and PUK. To resolve the 
conflict and address its concerns about the PKK’s role in Northern Iraq, Turkey 
convened a meeting of KDP and PUK representatives in Silopi, a Turkish town near the 
Iraqi border, on 30 May 1994.401 Turkish messages to the Kurdish parties focused on 
growing concern about KDP-PUK hostilities and the opportunities that the conflict 
created for the PKK. Turkey advised the parties of its resolve to eliminate the PKK in 
the region and warned them that it would not tolerate any cooperation with the terrorist 
organisation. Barzani and Talabani shared responsibility for exercising authority in the 
region in the absence of Baghdad’s control. Ankara was ready to host both leaders to 
resolve their factional differences. The Kurdish parties agreed to work together with 
Ankara for a swift end to the conflict, to restore stability in Northern Iraq, and to 
address Turkey’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ about PKK terrorism.402 However, 
when Barzani objected, Turkey’s call for a meeting went unheeded.  
In contrast, US concern over the continued KDP-PUK conflict focused on its 
implications for Iraq policy. The conflict undermined the fundamental logic of OPC-II, 
weakened the opposition to Saddam, and jeopardised the international relief effort in the 
region. Washington encouraged the INC to resolve the conflict, urged the parties to 
refrain from further hostilities and called for negotiations to resolve their political 
differences and prevent Baghdad from exploiting the political instability in the 
region.403 
While Turkey and the US embarked upon these individual efforts to stop the conflict, 
France entered the picture, convening a series of meetings between KDP and PUK 
officials in Paris on 16-22 July 1994. The meeting was organised under the auspices of 
President François Mitterrand and the Kurdish Institute in Paris. Representatives from 
the US and UK attended the meetings as observers.404 Turkey was the only OPC-II 
partner nation that was not invited to the meetings. The Paris meetings produced a draft 
KDP-PUK agreement to end the conflict, and called for elections in Northern Iraq to be 
401 KDP-USA Press Release, Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish Officials Meet to Resolve the Current Crisis in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, 30 May 1994. 
402 Turkish official, interview. 
403 For the INC’s role in Northern Iraq, see Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: 
The Resurrection of Saddam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), pp.178-179. 
404 Gunter, Kurdish Predicament, p.77. 
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held in 1995. The agreement was to be signed in September in Paris by Barzani and 
Talabani at a meeting chaired by Mitterrand.405 
Turkey reacted harshly to the Paris meetings which it perceived had turned into an 
international conference on the future of ‘Kurdistan’. Ankara opposed the involvement 
of non-regional countries in the affairs of Northern Iraq and any further 
internationalisation of the Iraqi Kurdish issue.406 The draft agreement, furthermore, 
contained provisions for the creation of a separate Kurdish state without any 
commitment or reference to the territorial integrity of Iraq. In order to placate Turkey, 
the KDP and PUK reassured Ankara of their preference for addressing the conflict 
internally and reiterated their commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity.407 As a result of 
Turkey’s pressure and objections on all sides, the second round of Paris meetings, 
scheduled for September, was cancelled.408 
Despite the Paris talks, the fundamental KDP-PUK disagreement over control of the 
region remained divisive, and there were several abortive ceasefires from August to 
December 1994.409 During this period, Talabani complained that Ankara was taking 
sides in the conflict while he himself was engaged in contacts with the PKK. The KDP 
denied Talabani’s claims and announced that Turkey had ‘observed neutrality and 
mediated in conflict and played a constructive role to contain the internal conflict.’ 
According to the KDP, Ankara had also provided the Kurdish parties with military and 
logistical support, facilities and freedom to travel on an equal basis ‘despite the PUK’s 
relations with the PKK.’410 
The KDP and PUK reached a fourteen-point agreement on 24 November 1994.411 
However, the agreement did not hold and another round of conflict ensued. The 
resumption of hostilities led to a new unilateral Turkish attempt to mediate in January 
1995, and Turkey extended $13.5 million in aid to the regional administration.412 The 
405 Barham Salih, ‘Status for Prospects for the Kurdish Question in Iraq’, Statement to the Conference on 
Europe and the Kurdish Question Vienna, 2-3 July 1998; ‘Whatever Happened to the Paris Conference’, 
Turkish Probe, 30 September 1994, p.8. 
406 Sanberk, interview. 
407 İlnur Cevik, ‘Ankara Tough on Northern Iraqi Kurds’, Turkish Probe, 26 August 1994, pp.13-15. 
408 ‘Turkey Seeks to Prevent Kurdish Summit in Paris’, Turkish Daily News, 28 September 1994. 
409 For instance, see, KDP UK Representation Press Release,  A Comprehensive Peace Agreement Signed 
between KDP and PUK in Iraqi Kurdistan, 24 November 1994. 
410 KDP Press Release, Turkey Has Not Taken Sides in the Kurdish Internal Conflict in Iraq, 10 
September 1994.  
411 ‘A Comprehensive Peace Agreement’.  
412 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p.334. 
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Turkish effort was followed by a US mediation initiative at the end of January 1995.413 
Washington urged the Kurdish leadership to stop the fighting and avoid any contact or 
dialogue with Baghdad. The intra-Kurdish fighting had increased the prospects of each 
Kurdish party seeking Saddam’s help and consequently some reinstitution of Baghdad’s 
control in the region; the worst of all alternatives for the US policy of containment. It 
appeared that, to prevent the collapse of the containment policy, the US would intensify 
its attempts at mediation between the KDP and PUK. There was also the prospect that 
the US would attempt to ease the UN sanctions vis-à-vis Northern Iraq and create 
economic conditions to encourage the Kurdish groups to resolve their conflict. Lastly, 
the US strategy attributed a central role to the INC for the resolution of intra-Kurdish 
hostilities and in monitoring the ceasefire.414 
4.2. Ankara’s Review of Iraq Policy and Cross-border Military Operations 
The continued KDP-PUK conflict and the involvement of outside parties forced Ankara 
to review its policy on the situation in Northern Iraq.415 Turkey’s primary interest was 
in maintaining the regional balance of power, which required preventing any country 
from attaining a dominant position in the region.416 Iraq’s disintegration along ethnic or 
sectarian lines would eventually provide Iran with the strategic advantages to wield 
assertive regional dominance. The preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity and unity 
and the re-establishment of the pre-Gulf War status quo were critically important in 
sustaining some form of balance between Iran and Iraq. The greatest single threat to 
Iraq’s unity was Kurdish secessionism, which, from Ankara’s perspective, was a 
challenge to regional stability even without the prospects of its spill over effect on 
Turkey. Turkey’s third interest was in maintaining the fight against the PKK. Baghdad’s 
lack of control in Northern Iraq posed a challenge for Turkish national security as the 
region became a base for the PKK’s terrorist activities. The situation had further 
deteriorated due to KDP-PUK clashes and the PKK terror attacks continued to mount. 
The regional balance of power and Turkey’s national security and stability would 
remain in jeopardy until the situation in Iraq was normalised. Such normalisation meant 
restoration of Baghdad’s sovereignty and control over all parts of the country and its 
413 Carol Migdalowitz,  ‘Turkey’s Military Offensive in Northern Iraq’, CRS Report for Congress, 13 
April 1995. 
414 Prados, ‘The Kurds: Stalemate in Iraq’. 
415 İlnur Çevik, ‘Turkey Toughens Up on Northern Iraq’, Turkish Probe, 2 September 1994, p.9; Robert 
S. Greenberger, ‘Turkey, American Ally in Gulf War, Asserts Its Independence from US’, Wall Street 
Journal, 3 October 1994. 
416 For instance, in the 1970s, Turkey was able to carefully balance its relations with Iran and Iraq, and 
pursued a policy of active neutrality during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. 
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return to the family of nations through reconciliation with its neighbours and its people. 
Ankara also recognised that the US insistence on the containment policy and the trust 
gap due to the tragedies perpetrated on the Kurdish people by Saddam would prevent 
any meaningful dialogue between Baghdad and the Kurdish parties. Normalisation thus 
remained less a policy than an objective reflecting Turkey’s preference for keeping Iraq 
intact.  
Furthermore, Ankara saw that the rivalry between Barzani and Talabani for control of 
the region would persist and even escalate with the involvement of Syria and Iran. 
Damascus would clearly continue to use the PKK as a trump card against Turkey. 
Despite the expansion of Turkey-Iran commercial ties,417 political relations between 
Turkey and Iran were fraught with sporadic tensions over Tehran’s interference in 
Turkish domestic politics, clandestine operations against Iranian dissidents residing in 
Turkey, and inadequate cooperation on border security.418 Ankara remained wary of 
Iran’s ties to the PKK due to its reluctance to cooperate against it and of Tehran’s 
attempts to undermine the Iraqi regime and curtail Turkish and US influence by 
interfering in Northern Iraqi affairs.419 
On the other hand, it was clear that the PKK would exploit the KDP-PUK hostilities. 
Talabani would not satisfactorily meet Turkey’s demand to cooperate against the 
PKK420 and would most likely seek its assistance in the PUK’s hostilities with the KDP. 
Barzani principally favoured Kurdish solidarity, and would not compromise the military 
strength he needed against the PUK by also fighting the PKK. Thus both the KDP and 
PUK could potentially use the PKK as a lever in their dealings with Turkey.421 
Turkish officials were also mindful of possible Israeli intervention in Northern Iraq. 
According to Sanberk, Tel Aviv took an interest in developments in the region since, 
together with Iran, Saddam’s Iraq represented a significant part of Israel’s perception of 
threat.422 Onur Öymen, then undersecretary at the MFA, noted in interview that Israel 
had historical connections with the Iraqi Kurds and special ties with the Barzani family, 
and considered Northern Iraq a springboard for its policies vis-à-vis Iraq and Iran. For 
417 Mustafa Aydın and Damla Aras, ‘Political Conditionality of Economic-Relations between Paternalist 
States: Turkey's Interaction with Iran, Iraq, and Syria’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 27:1-2 (2005), pp.21-44. 
418 John Calabrese, ‘Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship’, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, 25:1 (1998), pp.75-94. 
419 Korutürk, interview.  
420 Ibid.  
421 İlnur Çevik and Hayri Birler, ‘Turkish Government Set to Revitalize Baghdad’s Authority in Northern 
Iraq’, Turkish Daily News, 29 August 1994.  
422 Sanberk, interview. 
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Öymen, the Iraqi Kurds were traditionally a strategic asset for Israel against Baghdad 
and for subversive activities against the Iranian regime.423 Sanberk also asserted that 
influential figures in the US administration took Israel’s security interests into account 
in crafting Washington’s strategy of dual containment. However, he also underlined that 
Ankara carefully refrained from raising the Israeli factor, since any perceived 
correlation between US policy, Israel and the situation in Northern Iraq would create 
additional political problems.424 Then Deputy Director General for the Middle East at 
the MFA Osman Korutürk, on the other hand, noted that Israel’s primary aim was to 
weaken Baghdad due to Saddam’s anti-Israeli policies, but that it did not support the 
dismantling of Iraq to preserve its good relations with Turkey and prevent any change 
of the regional power balance in Iran’s favour.425 
Ankara’s conclusion was that Turkey’s Iraq policy was in a vicious circle. Turkey 
worked with the US to protect the Iraqi Kurds, essentially constraining Iraqi 
sovereignty, while the PKK exploited the situation in Northern Iraq, and the KDP-PUK 
fighting exacerbated Turkey’s problems.426 The intermittent clashes prevented the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups from curtailing PKK activities in the region, and Turkey became 
particularly concerned about increased PUK-PKK ties.427 Ankara now decided to take 
on the PKK on its own terms. The major cross-border military operation ‘Stealth’ was 
launched on 20 March 1995, with Turkey sending 35,000 troops to eliminate PKK 
encampments and an estimated 2,500–3,000 terrorists in Northern Iraq. Ankara justified 
the operation on the grounds that since there was no authority that could be held 
responsible under international law for terrorist acts committed or originating there, the 
Turkish government had to carry out an operation to stop such acts, duly limited in 
duration and scope, and with due respect for Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Ankara gave assurances that Turkish troops would be withdrawn immediately following 
the elimination of the PKK targets.428 
423 Onur Öymen, interviewed by author, Ankara, 2 February 2011. 
424 Sanberk, interview. 
425 Korutürk, interview. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Talabani argued that certain circles in Turkey had taken a position against the PUK because of his 
initiative leading to the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by Abdullah Öcalan in 1993. Talabani 
claimed that the initiative was coordinated with President Özal and other senior officials. Raşit Gürdilek, 
‘Interview with Talabani: KDP Has the Money, We Have the People’, Turkish Daily News, 8 March 
1995.   
428 Letter dated 28 March 1995 of the Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN, to the UN Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali. 
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The US extended Turkey firm support in its fight against the PKK: First, the US 
recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation, and expressed understanding and 
support of Turkey’s legitimate fight against the PKK. Second, the US officially 
endorsed the cross-border military operation.429 Washington’s support was crucial at a 
time when there was increasing condemnation of the Turkish operation, especially from 
France and Germany.430 The German government reacted to the operation by 
suspending military aid to Turkey while the EU warned that the proposed customs 
union was at risk.431 The League of Arab States also called for an end to the ‘Turkish 
military invasion’ of Northern Iraq.432 Third, Washington categorically rejected PKK 
requests that the US act as an intermediary with Turkey, refusing to enter into dialogue 
or meet with members of the organisation. Fourth, the US recognised that the 
administrative vacuum created as a result of OPC-II and the NFZ had allowed the PKK 
to establish terrorist camps in Northern Iraq as a springboard for attacks into Turkey. 
Fifth, the US urged Syria to cut its ties with the PKK, and called on the Iraqi Kurds to 
work with Turkey against the PKK presence in the region. However, US endorsement 
of Turkey’s struggle against the PKK and cross-border military operations in Northern 
Iraq was not unqualified. Washington expressed opposition to any kind of permanent 
Turkish military presence in Iraq, and expected that the operation would be limited in 
scope and duration with full respect for the rights of non-combatants.433 
During the operation, Ankara contemplated establishing a buffer zone in Northern Iraq 
to stop the infiltration of PKK terrorists into Turkey. President Demirel made a 
statement at the time that the border between Turkey and Iraq had not been correctly 
delineated, but that resolution of the problem was not under consideration. This remark 
reflected the resentment over the notion that Turkey suffered injustice at the 1926 
429 ‘Turkey Unleashes a Massive Raid on Kurdish Bases in Iraq’, International Herald Tribune, 21 March 
1995. 
430 Migdalowitz, ‘Turkey’s Military Offensive’. 
431 Tony Paterson, ‘Turks Risk Losing Customs Union’, The European, 31 March 1995. 
432 Diplomatic Note Verbal dated 16 April 1995, Ref: 3/1587 of the General Secretariat of League of Arab 
States to Turkey. 
433 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefings in 1995 on 
22 March, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9503/950322db.html; 
24 March, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9503/950324db.html; 
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31 March, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9503/950331db.html;  
6 April, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9504/950406db.html; 
10 April, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9504/950410db.html; 
13 April, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9504/950413db.html; Statements by 
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Turkey-Iraq border delineation. Turkey claimed the borders with Iraq were drawn 
without taking into consideration the security requirements of the two countries, and 
particularly the need to prevent terrorist infiltration.434 Washington remained non-
committal over the idea and expressed its readiness to give fair consideration to a 
Turkish proposal.435 Yet, in face of harsh reactions from Iraq, the European capitals and 
the Arab world, Turkish officials swiftly dismissed the idea and declared that no 
decision had been made over a new border arrangement with Iraq.436 
The reaction of the KDP and PUK to the Turkish military operation was cautious. The 
PUK stated that the Kurdish leadership appreciated Turkey’s legitimate security 
concerns about the PKK. From their perspective, the only effective and reliable way to 
address the security of Turkey’s border with Iraq was through cooperation between the 
Turkish government and the Iraqi Kurdish authorities. The PUK expected the earliest 
possible withdrawal of the Turkish troops, enabling a more viable collective security 
arrangement along the border region. The PUK believed that the long-term stability of 
the region depended on encouraging peace and reconciliation between the KDP and 
PUK and assisting the Kurdish leadership in their ‘desire to help neighbours regarding 
their legitimate security concerns.’ 437 The PUK, accordingly, expected the government 
of Turkey to help them achieve this common objective. 
4.3. Turkey-US Joint Mediation in Northern Iraq: Towards the Drogheda Process 
Turkey concluded the Stealth operation in mid-May and withdrew all Turkish forces 
from Northern Iraq. The problems that Turkey had encountered forced Ankara to 
explore alternative strategies to respond to the situation. The question was simple: The 
continuation of OPC-II for an indeterminate period created severe implications for the 
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. In view of the connection between OPC-II and the 
emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, the introduction of certain changes to 
434 The Turkish position paper handed over to Iraq’s Foreign Minister by the chargé d’affaires of the 
Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, as annexed to the letter dated 6 May 1995 from the Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1995/361, 6 May 
1995; Tuncay Özkan, Bush ve Saddam’ın Gölgesinde Entrikalar Savaşı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003), 
pp.30-31.    
435 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing on 24 and 27 March 1995.  
436 Letter dated 13 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, to the President of 
the Security Council, S/1995/484, 14 June 1995. 
437 Letter dated 27 March 1995 by the PUK Foreign Relations Committee to Erdal İnönü, the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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OPC-II seemed essential. However, it was not clear whether and to what extent 
negotiations with the US would make changes to OPC-II possible.438 
For Ankara, even though the reinstitution of Baghdad’s authority in Northern Iraq was 
the desired outcome, whether that would result in the elimination of the PKK presence 
in the region was doubtful. Cross-border military operations offered the only effective 
alternative for dealing with the PKK in the region. However, while fighting the PKK, 
Turkey faced damage to its international reputation, even leading to difficulties in 
approval of the customs union with the EU. Ankara’s problems were amplified by 
international sympathy for the Kurds and the difficulty of explaining the distinction 
between Turkey’s Kurdish population and the PKK, or between the PKK and the Iraqi 
Kurds. The third and most viable alternative seemed to be to compel the Iraqi Kurds to 
cooperate with Turkey. The military operation’s success in destroying the PKK’s bases, 
infrastructure and logistical supply lines would not suffice to prevent it returning to the 
region so long as KDP-PUK hostilities continued and neither party took action against 
it. The remedy was to devise a three-fold strategy of KDP-PUK reconciliation, 
formation of a security mechanism between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdish factions, and 
more efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance to the region.439 This strategy, in 
essence, was the revival of Turkey’s failed 1992 agreement with the KDP and PUK to 
eliminate PKK terrorism in Northern Iraq.440 Its success, however, hinged upon 
arranging a permanent KDP-PUK ceasefire and ensuring the cooperation of the Kurdish 
groups, especially Barzani’s KDP, in working with Turkey to secure the border against 
the PKK. The strategy involved establishment of checkpoints and joint border controls 
by Turkish troops and the KDP. Washington supported Turkey’s new strategy to 
reconcile the Kurdish factions as it conformed to US interests,441 agreeing to join 
Turkish efforts in pressing both Kurdish factions to stop the internecine fight.442 The 
KDP and PUK also welcomed the Turkish initiative. For their part, it was a welcome 
change in Ankara’s previous policy to pressure them to pursue dialogue with Baghdad 
and a demonstration of Turkish intention to open up a new page in relations that would 
438 Sanberk, interview.  
439 MFA Background Note of 30 March 1995 to EU Troika on Turkish Military Operations in Northern 
Iraq.  
440 Amberin Zaman, ‘Turkey Tries to Sooth Allies over Incursion’, The Daily Telegraph, 3 April 1995. 
441 Patrick Cockburn, ‘Ankara Plans for Iraqi Kurds to Police Border’, The Independent, 11 April 1995.  
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Times, 14 April 1995; Alan Makovsky, ‘Turkey Merits US Backing as It Hunts Terrorists’, The Christian 
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help bring stability to the region.443 The PKK reacted harshly against a possible Turkey-
KDP-PUK security agreement and Washington’s endorsement of this strategy. Öcalan 
declared that, even though the PKK desired to improve ties with the KDP and PUK, if 
they improved relations with Turkey, he would consider it a declaration of war.444 
The fourth aspect of Turkey’s reviewed strategy involved the Turkomen issue. Ankara 
had been concerned about the fate of the Turkomen in Iraq for a long time, and had 
traditionally opposed Iraq’s assimilation policies during bilateral contacts.445 In the 
aftermath of the Gulf War, the fate of the Turkomen and the potential damage that the 
KDP-PUK fight in Northern Iraq would inflict upon them became a crucial Turkish 
concern. However Ankara had to deal with the Turkomen issue in a discreet manner, 
without pushing it to the forefront of its Iraq agenda, to prevent creating the impression 
that Turkey’s was exploiting its links to the Turkomen to advance its interests in 
Northern Iraq.446 In 1988, Ankara had been instrumental in the formation of the Iraq 
National Turkomen Party (Irak Milli Türkmen Partisi, IMTP). Following the Gulf War, 
the Turkomen were divided due to sectarian differences and conflicting interests, and 
Ankara launched an initiative to unify the Turkomen parties and ensured the 
establishment of the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF) on 24 April 1995. From Ankara’s 
perspective, the Turkomen and their representative, the ITF, had to be part of the 
equation regarding the situation in Northern Iraq.  
In line with the new strategy, Turkey hosted the Kurdish leadership in May 1995. 
During the talks, Barzani requested the reconstruction and resettlement of 350 villages 
destroyed by Saddam in areas adjacent to Turkish border, claiming that populating the 
area would prevent PKK infiltration. His second request was to form Peshmerga forces 
numbering 20,000 men to protect the Iraqi side of the border on a permanent basis. For 
Ankara, these proposals were unviable; the establishment of 350 villages was a huge 
long-term undertaking that would require enormous financial resources, and the KDP’s 
ability to curb PKK infiltration into Turkey was questionable. The formation of a 
20,000 strong Peshmerga border forces was also unrealistic since Barzani’s existing 
Peshmerga force of only 25,000 was already fully engaged in fighting the PUK instead 
443 Interview with Talabani, Al Hayat, 9 April 1995; John Pomfret, ‘US Backs Turkish Plan for Iraq 
Border’, International Herald Tribune, 12 April 1995. 
444 APO to Barzani and Talabani, ‘War If You Side with Turkey Against Us’, Mideast Mirror, 7 April 
1995, pp. 11-13; Interview with Abdullah Öcalan, Assharq Al-Awsat, 14 April 1995; Interview with 
Abdullah Öcalan, Al-Hayat, 16 April 1995. 
445 Korutürk, interview.  
446 Korutürk, interview. 
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of opposing the PKK. A similar measure had failed in 1992 and Turkey now doubted 
how reliably committed the Kurdish leaders were. Nevertheless, the KDP-PUK 
hostilities could also invite interference from Iran and Syria in Northern Iraq, and 
Ankara felt it crucial to prevent Barzani and Talabani from becoming tools in the hands 
of Tehran or Damascus. 
As part of new strategy, Ankara requested that Washington use its influence on Barzani 
and Talabani to urge them to cooperate with Turkey. Washington proposed increased 
US engagement with the KDP and PUK to restore stability, provide some kind of 
longer-term solution to the situation in Northern Iraq, and address Turkey’s security 
concerns. However, US interests remained preventing Saddam from re-establishing 
control in Northern Iraq and continuing OPC-II.447 The US proposal was to jointly 
explore a new mediation process to reach an agreement on the plan that the US 
negotiated with the Kurdish parties with the INC’s participation in January 1995. The 
new strategy of mediating Kurdish reconciliation with Turkey’s active involvement 
marked a change from Washington’s previous initiatives. In interview, Mark Parris, 
then at the State Department’s Near East Affairs Bureau, observed that Washington 
recognised Turkey’s concerns about the situation in Northern Iraq, particularly 
regarding the PKK and the Turkomen’s vulnerability during intra-Kurdish hostilities. 
The US strategy became to address these concerns to ensure Turkey’s participation in 
brokering a peace that would also keep Saddam from moving back into the north. 
According to Parris, the US began to realise at that point that ‘you couldn’t really 
manage this problem in the north without Turkey being happy . . . making sure that 
Turkey’s interests were covered [became] part of US consciousness in dealing with this 
part of the world.’448 Robert S. Deutsch, then a director at the US State Department’s 
Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, underlined that Washington had acknowledged that 
‘Turkey had been part of what the US was trying to do to stabilize the area’ and the only 
way to make the Turkish government comfortable with the US efforts was to be 
‘completely transparent.’449 However, Turkey-US interests still diverged on the details. 
Turkey’s interest in Northern Iraq was primarily related to the PKK and restraining any 
Kurdish drive for independence. In contrast, as Deutsch points out, for Washington, ‘the 
PKK issue at that point was very much secondary’ since the US was ‘more concerned 
447 Transcript of the Unpublished Briefing by Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Advisor for European Affairs at the National Security Council, Washington Press Center, 17 April 
1995.  
448 Parris, interview. 
449 Deutsch, interview. 
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with trying to sustain Northern Iraq [as] a separate, stable part of Iraq.’ In the end, 
Deutsch notes, the US ‘had no option but was obliged to manipulate its actions to be 
acceptable to Turkey’ as it ‘had no access to Northern Iraq except through Turkey.’450 
Talabani now accepted the US proposal for a renewed reconciliation process while 
Barzani remained reluctant. Washington sought Ankara’s assistance to convince 
Barzani and requested Turkish participation in the planned preparatory meeting. Ankara 
agreed with Washington’s proposals and informed the KDP of Turkey’s endorsement of 
the US initiative for KDP-PUK reconciliation.451 The KDP instead put forward a new 
four-stage peace proposal for the restoration of peace in Northern Iraq.452 Despite the 
new Turkey-US cooperation for Kurdish reconciliation,453 KDP-PUK fighting again 
broke out in Erbil in mid-July, sparking a harsh reaction from the US. Washington 
warned the Kurdish parties that their conflict was incompatible with US efforts to help 
re-establish peace and security in Northern Iraq and urged them to withdraw to their 
positions prior to the breakdown of the ceasefire. The KDP and PUK stated that they 
welcomed continued US mediation, claiming that stopping the fighting was extremely 
difficult without a neutral separating force on the ground. The clashes raged on and the 
situation appeared to be degenerating even further. Washington again warned the 
Kurdish parties that their conflict threatened US interests in Northern Iraq; a secure and 
peaceful region was a central US objective, Iranian involvement was a US redline, and 
the US opposed any negotiations of the Kurdish parties with Baghdad. The US was 
willing to actively seek a comprehensive settlement to the disputes on the condition that 
each party committed to refrain from military action for the duration of negotiations. 
The US plan attributed a special role to the INC, separating the forces and providing a 
neutral security service in certain areas. Both parties publicly announced their 
agreement with the US proposal.454 
The first stage of the KDP-PUK peace process took place in Drogheda in Ireland on 9-
11 August 1995 under the auspices of the US, with the INC and Turkey as observers. 
The discussions produced the Drogheda statement outlining confidence and security-
building measures (CBMs) and principles for a more comprehensive agreement. The 
450 Ibid. 
451 Korutürk, interview.  
452 KDP USA Press Release, KDP’s Proposal to End Fighting and Instil Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan, 10 June 
1995. 
453 Deutsch, interview. 
454 PUK Press Release, Statement by the Political Leadership of the PUK Regarding US Initiative to 
Restore Peace to Iraqi Kurdistan, 23 July 1995; KDP USA Press Release, KDP Welcomes US Peace 
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Kurdish factions agreed to maintain the ceasefire and make it permanent, to continue 
talks aimed at finalising a peace agreement that would include the demilitarisation of 
Erbil, formation of a neutral INC commission to monitor the ceasefire, and the 
deposition of the customs revenues and all fees collected by each party into bank 
accounts under the supervision of a neutral commission acting on behalf of the regional 
authority. At Turkey’s insistence, the KDP and PUK agreed to include a paragraph in 
the statement about respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity and consideration for Turkey’s 
legitimate security concerns,455 referring to the PKK presence and activities in Northern 
Iraq.  
4.4. From Dublin to the Chairman’s Text: The PKK as a Third Party in Northern 
Iraq 
On 24 August 1995, the PKK declared all-out war on the KDP to terminate the 
Drogheda Agreement. The objectives of the PKK attack were to occupy the KDP-
controlled northern districts of Dohuk and Erbil and establish a ‘democratic federation’ 
in Northern Iraq.456 The KDP announced that the PKK’s ‘unwarranted aggression’ was 
instigated and motivated by regional powers that wanted to undermine the reconciliation 
efforts.457 Ankara believed the PKK attack on the KDP was a result of a coordinated 
strategy devised jointly by Syria, the PUK, and the PKK. For Ankara, the Syrian 
regime’s primary motivation was to undermine the Drogheda process. This would help 
to curtail Turkey’s growing influence on the Iraqi Kurdish groups, which could 
potentially lead to the elimination of the PKK, Syria’s chief protégé against Turkey, and 
thereby increased Syrian influence in Northern Iraq.458 An additional Syrian motive 
seemed to be curbing the extension of US influence in the region.459 KDP officials 
informed Ankara that the PUK, dissatisfied with the Drogheda Agreement, also sought 
to undermine its implementation by using the PKK in close collaboration with Syria. 
The PUK, however, denied any cooperation with the PKK, reaffirmed its commitment 
to Drogheda, and claimed that the future stability of the region was contingent upon the 
peaceful resolution of the KDP-PUK conflict. For the PUK, the restoration of the ‘rule 
of law of Iraqi Kurdistan’s regional authority’ and the end of KDP’s militia rule were 
imperative to reassure neighbouring countries regarding their security concerns. The 
455 See the text of the Drogheda Statement of 11 August 1995. 
456 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 
pp.121-123; ‘Kurds in Crisis, Current Affairs’, The Middle East, November 1995, pp.6-10. 
457 KDP Press Release,  PKK Suffers Major Military Defeat in Iraqi Kurdistan’, 3 September 1995.  
458 Uğur Ziyal, interviewed by author, Ankara, 31 August 2010; Korutürk, interview. 
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PUK also underscored that it was not party to and would not intervene in the KDP-PKK 
conflict.460 Talabani assured Turkish officials in early September that the PUK was not 
involved in the PKK attack against the KDP. He claimed Iran and Syria instigated the 
attack to mitigate Turkish and US influence in the region. Talabani also pledged the 
PUK would not attack the KDP during the KDP-PKK conflict.461 However, Ankara 
remained sceptical of Talabani’s explanations. It seemed that a relationship with the 
PKK was part of PUK’s complex set of ties, especially with Syrian intelligence. Any 
association of the KDP or PUK with the PKK was unacceptable for Ankara, which 
based its relationship with both parties on their stance vis-à-vis the terrorist 
organisation. The KDP was motivated to fight the PKK, which created a dynamic for 
extended Turkey-KDP cooperation. This could provide the KDP with an advantage in 
the power struggle with the PUK over control of Northern Iraq. This factor made the 
PUK careful to take into account Turkish demands about the PKK. It appeared that 
Talabani was pursuing a prudent strategy for intensified engagement with the US, whilst 
observing the realities on the ground that dictated a balanced relationship with Turkey, 
Iran and Syria. 
As the KDP-PKK conflict escalated, Washington explored ways to build on the 
Drogheda accord to revitalise the ceasefire, and a second meeting took place in Dublin 
on 12-15 September 1995. During the meetings, Turkish officials continued to insist 
that any agreement had to conform to Iraq’s territorial integrity. The responsibility of 
the KDP and PUK to prevent the use of Northern Iraq by the PKK was a Turkish 
prerequisite for any agreement. Also, all ethnic groups, including the Turkomen, had to 
have proportional representation in temporary administrative bodies.462 Ultimately, 
however, the Dublin talks ended in failure, largely because the PUK objected to 
relinquishing control of Erbil while the KDP refused to share its custom revenues. The 
PUK delegation also opposed a provision in the final statement recognising Turkey’s 
legitimate security interests, claiming the PKK was a political organisation, members of 
which committed terrorist acts; a stark deviation from Talabani’s previous assurances to 
Turkey that the PUK recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation. Talabani further 
accused Turkey of not wanting inter-Kurdish reconciliation to take place under 
international auspices.463 In an effort to deflect the PUK’s responsibility for the failure 
460 PUK Press Release, Statement on KDP-PKK Confrontation, 29 August 1995. 
461 Turkish official, interview. 
462 The Turkish MFA Non-paper on Guidelines for the Dublin Meeting, 12-15 September 1995. 
463 Interview with Jalal Talabani, ‘Kurdish Struggle Within’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 9-15 November 1995. 
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of the Dublin talks, he argued that it was Ankara’s desire to impose its position on the 
Iraqi Kurdish groups that had impeded KDP-PUK agreement.464 Talabani now 
approached Tehran, stating that Iran could play an influential role in the settlement of 
the intra-Kurdish hostilities.465 In September, KDP and PUK delegations met in Tehran 
for talks, raising the prospect that the Iranian-supported Badr Brigade of the Supreme 
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) could assume a monitoring role in 
Northern Iraq. Washington warned both parties that Iran had no useful role to play in 
the region, and that any Iranian influence ran counter to US interests. The US criticised 
any public commitment by the KDP and PUK to Iranian-sponsored mediation and 
categorically objected to a security or monitoring role for the Badr Brigade.466 
Talabani’s second move was to meet with Öcalan twice, allegedly in Lebanon, although 
in reality the meetings took place in Damascus. Talabani stated that the PUK refused to 
act as ‘Turkey’s policeman’ to guarantee border security. The PUK would also not 
interfere on behalf of any party in the armed KDP-PKK confrontation. He claimed that 
Turkey supplied the KDP with arms and financing, and had thus relinquished its neutral 
position. For Talabani, the PKK’s new orientation called for a peaceful solution of 
Turkey’s Kurdish problem; Öcalan had pledged to renounce terrorism and declare a 
unilateral ceasefire to enable a political solution within the framework of Turkey.467 For 
Talabani, the PKK was not a terrorist organisation; on the contrary, it was ‘one of the 
most powerful Kurdish parties, mainly based in Turkey.’468 However, during meetings 
with Turkish officials, Talabani complained that both Syria and Iran supported and 
encouraged the PKK to limit Turkish influence in Northern Iraq, which he claimed was 
manifested through the KDP. He also admitted that the Syrian government had provided 
support for PKK attacks against the KDP.469 
As KDP-PKK fighting escalated in August-September 1995, Washington warned 
Talabani not to engage in any hostilities against the KDP, and urged Damascus to cut its 
ties with the PKK. The KDP requested Turkey increase its financial assistance and 
provide military supplies. While fighting the PKK, Barzani also sought Turkish 
guarantees against the alleged agreement between Iran, Syria, the PUK and the PKK to 
464 Interview with Jalal Talabani, ‘Kurds Will Not Be Turkey’s Policeman’, Al-Hayah Arabic, 24 
September 1995. 
465 IRNA Interview with Jalal Talabani, Kayhan International, 16 September 1995. 
466 Briefing note on US Secretary of State’s messages to the leaders of the KDP and PUK, 30 October 
1995.  
467 Talabani, ‘Kurds Will Not Be Turkey’s Policeman’. 
468 Talabani, ‘Kurdish Struggle Within’.  
469 Turkish official, interview. 
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eliminate the KDP, and thereby the influence of Turkey and the US in Northern Iraq. 
Ankara assured Barzani that, irrespective of whether such an agreement had been 
concluded or not, Turkey would act decisively against any party that sponsored PKK 
terrorism. Turkey maintained neutrality towards both the KDP and PUK until it became 
obvious that the PUK was collaborating with the PKK while the KDP fought against it. 
Turkey could therefore not pursue a balanced policy so long as the PKK was attacking 
the KDP. A KDP-PUK ceasefire and establishment of peace and stability in the region 
would serve Turkish interests. If the PUK-PKK engaged in joint aggression against the 
KDP, Turkey would extend its full support to the KDP. On the other hand, Ankara 
calculated that cutting off all ties with Talabani would potentially make him desperate 
for assistance from Iran and Syria in the fight for survival against the KDP, eventually 
making him another instrument to be used against Turkey along with the PKK. 
Consequently, Turkish officials met with Talabani, who claimed that the PUK, far from 
wishing to damage Turkish interests, would even prefer to have Northern Iraq integrated 
with Turkey. His chief complaint centred on Turkish assistance to the KDP.470 
In the midst of the KDP-PKK clashes, Turkey-US interests converged in the 
reconciliation strategy to end the intra-Kurdish rivalry. The implications of the 
continued instability were obvious. Iran had initiated an alternative mediation effort 
between the Kurdish parties in early October 1995,471 and its renewed proposal for 
deployment of the Badr Brigades aimed to substitute the US proposal for a ‘Neutral 
Commission.’ It seemed that, without a settlement to the conflict, the Kurdish parties 
would not long resist pressure from Iran, which was willing and able to affect the 
outcome of the KDP-PUK rivalry. The result of an Iranian-sponsored agreement would 
be continued instability in the region, manipulation of the Kurds as agents of Iranian 
influence, and long-term weakening of Iraq into any post-Saddam era. Based on this 
calculation, the US, in coordination with Turkey, presented a draft agreement—the 
‘Chairman’s Text’—to the parties on 29 September 1995 as a follow up to the 
Drogheda and Dublin meetings. This was followed by a joint Turkey-US delegation to 
Northern Iraq on 12-18 November 1995. Once the parties consented to the Chairman’s 
Text, the next step would be the signing of the final agreement. The draft agreement 
called for a neutral commission established under the auspices of the INC. It would be 
responsible for security in the open city of Erbil, monitoring the separation of the KDP 
470 Turkish official, interview. 
471 Gunter, Kurdish Predicament, p.85.  
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and PUK forces, policing services within revenue collection facilities, monitoring the 
collection and deposit of revenues, and assisting in resolving disputes. 
During the joint Turkey-US efforts for the resolution of the KDP-PUK conflict, the 
PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on 10 December 1995 following a three and a half 
month conflict with the KDP. The KDP accepted the ceasefire the following day, on the 
condition that the PKK took steps to end its intervention in the affairs of Northern Iraq. 
According to the KDP statement, the PKK had to respect the Northern Iraqi people’s 
‘free will . . . to decide their own political choices and future which has been determined 
through parliamentary election.’472 Ankara reacted fiercely to the KDP acceptance of 
the PKK ceasefire, and urged Barzani to refrain from entering into any agreement that 
would legitimise the PKK presence in Northern Iraq. According to Zebari, the KDP had 
been disappointed at the inadequate assistance from Turkey and having to fight the PKK 
with only its own means.473 
4.5. An Impasse in Kurdish Reconciliation 
By the end of 1995, the question of Iraq, and the situation in Northern Iraq, had become 
defined by a complex set of issues for both Turkey and the US. The problem of how to 
deal with Saddam seemed likely to continue for an indeterminate period with sporadic 
tensions between the US and Iraq. The containment policy and the attempts of the Iraqi 
opposition had fallen far short of overthrowing the regime. The efforts to reconcile 
KDP-PUK differences had produced no stability in Northern Iraq, and the region 
remained divided into two separate administrative regions controlled by the KDP and 
the PUK. Turkey’s relations with the KDP had cooled due to the KDP-PKK ceasefire. 
The PKK was seeking to create ‘liberated regions’ under its control. Tehran made 
efforts to impose the Badr Brigade as a monitoring force to manipulate developments in 
the region, which thus risked falling under Iranian influence. Syria continued to use the 
PKK to curtail Turkey’s influence in the region. In the following months, it was 
reported that Iran had stepped up its efforts to foster closer ties with both Kurdish 
factions, and had persuaded the KDP to sign a peace agreement with the PKK.474 
472 KDP Press Release, A Statement on Cease-Fire between PKK and KDP, 11 December 1995. 
473 Zebari,   interview.  
474 Patrick Cockburn, ‘US Seeks Deal between Iraqi Kurds’, The Independent, 3 April 1996; Scott 
Peterson, ‘While US Slept, Iran Gained Toehold among Iraq’s Kurds’, The Christian Science Monitor, 18 
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Paradoxically, the US now failed to provide funds for the $4 million operating costs of 
the INC’s Neutral Commission.475 
Nevertheless, Turkey and the US once again sought a new round of KDP-PUK 
reconciliation to constrain rising Iranian influence. A US delegation visited Northern 
Iraq on 22-24 April 1996, accompanied by Turkish officials as observers. The purpose 
of the talks, with the participation of the INC, was to recommit the Iraqi Kurdish 
leadership to the proposals in the Dublin process, to discuss how UNSCR 986 related to 
the region, to address Turkey’s legitimate security concerns, and to warn the Kurdish 
factions to limit Iran’s increasing influence in the region.476 Both parties reaffirmed 
their commitment to the eight-month-old ceasefire and the reconciliation process, but no 
agreement was reached to further the Chairman’s Text as the basis for a final 
agreement.  
By the end of April 1996, however, Ankara was becoming increasingly frustrated with 
the situation in Northern Iraq. It felt that the Gulf War had had a tougher legacy for 
Turkey than any other country, with the exception of Iraq itself. Turkey had suffered 
billions of dollars of financial losses and severe security problems with real political 
implications.477 It seemed that the Turkish and US perspectives on how to preserve and 
promote Iraq’s territorial integrity were not convergent. The KDP and PUK remained 
hostile to each other and sought to expand their spheres of influence while the PKK 
continued to gain ground. OPC-II entered into its sixth year and the Kurdish institutions 
for statehood flourished. In Turkey, the ruling ANAP government was able to secure a 
three-month extension of the mandate for OPC-II at the end of March as a result of 
conditional support from the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), which 
otherwise opposed further extension of the operation in its existing form. The TBMM 
also introduced new conditions for the conduct of OPC-II.478 While Turkey recognised 
that the continuation of OPC-II constituted a major element of US Iraq policy, the 
public perception was that PKK terrorism hurt Turkey and not the US, and that Turkey 
thus had a much greater interest in Iraq’s territorial integrity. Terrorism also created far 
475 Chalabi, Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown?; Jim Hoagland, ‘Failures in Kurdistan’, Washington Post, 
31 March 1996. 
476 Oran, Kalkık Horoz, pp. 195-197. UNSC Resolution 986 stipulated that a 13% share would be 
allocated for Northern Iraq to be dispensed by the UN without Baghdad’s interference.   
477 According to one contemporary estimate, the fight against the PKK cost approximately around $7 
billion a year and tied down nearly three-quarters of Turkey’s army. ‘Springtime Means Wartime’, The 
Economist, 11 May 1996, pp.49-50.  
478 See the decision of the TBMM dated 28 March 1996, ‘409 Sayılı ve 28 Mart 1996 Tarihli TBMM 
Kararı’, Resmi Gazete, 30 March 1996. 
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more serious political problems for Turkish governments than it did for the US 
administration.  
Consequently, Turkey requested that the US issue a high-level statement to dispel 
public misperceptions about OPC-II, affirm US commitment to Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, offer its support against PKK terrorism and prohibit Western NGOs from 
political and intelligence activities. The second Turkish demand was to change the 
structure of OPC-II and introduce additional restrictions on its conduct. Thirdly, Ankara 
asked for greater support in fighting PKK terrorism, including US assistance to establish 
effective border monitoring systems and intelligence sharing. Fourth, Turkey requested 
that the US exert pressure on Damascus to withdraw its support of the PKK and keep 
Syria on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.479 During this period, Prime Minister 
Mesut Yılmaz warned Syria over providing a safe haven to the PKK. This warning 
came after the disclosure that Turkey and Israel had signed a military cooperation 
agreement in February 1996. The Arab world reacted negatively to the agreement and it 
sparked public protests in Iran and Syria, worsening their relations with Turkey.480 A 
final Turkish request was the implementation of UNSCR 986 to allow Iraq to sell oil for 
food, particularly through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. 
The TBMM was scheduled to debate the future of OPC-II in June 1996. The US 
intensified consultations with the Turkish government on OPC-II related problems and 
agreed to issue a public statement on Northern Iraq and PKK terrorism. Washington 
relayed the elements of its position: First, the objectives of OPC-II were to secure Iraqi 
compliance with all relevant UNSCRs and deter Baghdad’s repression of the Iraqi 
Kurds by enforcing the NFZ. Second, the US supported Turkey’s efforts to deal with 
PKK and believed that Northern Iraq should not serve as a sanctuary for PKK activity, 
nor should the PKK receive support from any quarter. Washington would enhance 
intelligence sharing with Turkey, and assist in developing a border-monitoring regime 
along Turkey’s Iraqi border. The US also urged the Kurdish factions to deny the PKK 
opportunities to exploit Northern Iraq for its own purposes. Third, the US supported the 
independence, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and would not support an 
independent state for Iraqi Kurds. Fourth, the US recognised the great economic and 
479 Oran, Kalkık Horoz, pp. 198-200; The Turkish MFA Talking Points on Iraq and Provide Comfort, 1 
June 1996; Meliha Benli Altunışık, ‘Turkish Policy towards Israel’, in Makovsky and Sayarı (ed), 
Turkey’s New World, p.65.  
480 ‘Turkey: Its Problems, Its Triumphs’, VOA, 7 May 1996.   
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other losses Turkey had incurred and would favourably consider Turkish requests to 
alleviate these losses with coalition partners. The US would also work with Turkey on 
the implementation of UNSCR 986.481 Lastly, Washington would keep Syria on the 
state sponsors of terrorism list and make a statement that Syria supported terrorist 
groups, including the PKK. The US also regularly urged the Syrian government to 
desist from supporting the PKK. 482 The US expected to resolve the issues pertaining to 
OPC-II and looked forward to a positive decision by the TBMM.483  
However, 6 June 1996 saw the resignation of the ANAP-led minority coalition 
government which had secured the extension of OPC-II until the end of July. On 8 July 
1996, a new coalition government emerged in Ankara, led by the Islamic-oriented 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) of Necmettin Erbakan and the True Path Party 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) of the former Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller. In opposition, 
Erbakan had vigorously criticised OPC-II and vowed to eliminate it, also pledging to 
revoke Turkey's military agreements with Israel.484 In view of the risk of non-extension 
of OPC-II by the TBMM, the White House issued the previously agreed statement on 
26 July 1996.485 With this new and publicly announced modus vivendi with the US on 
Iraq’s territorial integrity, the situation in Northern Iraq, support against the PKK, and 
redesigned rules of conduct for OPC-II, the new coalition government was able to 
secure the TBMM’s approval for renewal of OPC-II’s mandate on 31 July 1996.486 
In August, Ankara made a formal application to the UNSC Sanctions Committee for 
Iraq to be allowed ‘to resume on an urgent basis its import of petroleum and petroleum 
products from Iraq in limited quantities essential for Turkey’s own needs,’487 while 
assuring the committee that it remained committed to enforcing the sanctions.488 
Washington expressed interest in addressing Turkish concerns within the framework of 
481 Turkish official, interview.  
482 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefings on 
30 April 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9604/960430db.html, and 
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the sanctions regime. However, it opposed Turkish requests for committee approval for 
increased cross-border trade with Iraq outside procedures related to the implementation 
of UNSCR 986. From Washington’s viewpoint, Turkey would thereby accrue benefits 
from the implementation of UNSCR 986, as the majority of the oil exported would be 
sent through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline and the UN envisaged a mechanism to buy 
humanitarian goods in Turkey for distribution in Iraq. On 26 August, the sanctions 
committee deferred action on Turkey’s request for relief from UN sanctions ‘until an 
evaluation of all technical aspects of the application can occur and the economic impact 
of the UNSC Resolution 986’ be determined.489  
4.6. Resumption of Intra-Kurdish Conflict and Baghdad’s Entry  
The tentative intra-Kurdish balance and yearlong ceasefire collapsed yet again on 17 
August 1996. A fierce KDP-PUK fight erupted, again over regional control and customs 
revenue. The KDP claimed the PUK had initiated the clashes with heavy weapons 
obtained from Iran.490 The PUK occupied areas that were traditionally under KDP 
control. Washington urged the parties to immediately cease hostilities, and resist Iranian 
interference.491 The US obtained KDP and PUK agreement for a ceasefire on 30 August 
at talks held in London. However, the Kurdish parties were not convinced of the need 
for broader reconciliation, and continued factional hostilities.492 
Talabani had allegedly become desperate to guarantee the PUK’s supply line, and had 
allowed an Iranian ground force incursion into Northern Iraq. Talabani allegedly cut a 
deal with Iran in return for light artillery and other supplies necessary for conflict with 
the KDP. Barzani was concerned that Iranian support to the PUK would change the 
balance in its favour and requested US help to stop Iranian intervention.493 The PUK 
seized a few strategic positions and additional PUK successes seemed certain. However, 
Robert Pelletreau argues that, according to a later account of events, ‘there was no direct 
Iranian intervention in the fighting.’494 The situation became so critical that Barzani 
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requested support from Baghdad, and US intelligence disclosed that an Iraqi military 
build-up was underway.495 It seemed that Iraq was preparing for an attack to re-establish 
control over the north. Washington requested assistance from Ankara in urging the KDP 
and PUK to focus on fulfilling and maintaining their ceasefire commitments, to make 
clear to Baghdad that the US would not tolerate military action and repression in 
Northern Iraq, and to urge the Iranian government not to seek to exploit intra-Kurdish 
tensions. The US also directly warned Iraq not to use military force.496 
The US secured commitments from both parties to work towards restoration of the 
ceasefire. However, during US efforts at mediation, Barzani sent a letter to Saddam on 
22 August asking for Iraqi forces to intervene to provide support to the KDP to fend off 
‘the foreign threat and to end the conspiracy and treason of Jalal.’497 Barzani claimed 
that his reasons for seeking Baghdad’s assistance were Iranian intervention on behalf of 
the PUK against the KDP and abandonment by the US despite calls for help against the 
PUK-Iran alliance.498 Saddam, seeing an opportunity to regain control of Northern Iraq, 
ignored US warnings, and launched a major attack on Erbil with the support of the KDP 
on 31 August.499 Iraqi forces swiftly seized control of the city, which had been at the 
centre of the KDP-PUK power struggle since December 1994. Iraqi special forces 
executed the vestiges of pro-Iranian groups, the PUK, and dozens of Iraqi opposition 
figures.500 Baghdad declared its right to act in its own country on principle of 
sovereignty and to defend Iraqi citizens. Iran’s attempts to control the region, directly or 
indirectly through the PUK, were a grave threat to Iraq’s sovereignty, security and 
national unity and would not be tolerated.501 
The US, however, decided not to intervene militarily in the Kurdish civil war. 
According to American officials, this choice was consistent with US national 
interests,502 which were not tied to which party prevailed in the conflict in Northern 
495 Press Conference of William Perry, the Secretary of Defense and General Ralston, the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 September 1996. 
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498 Hugh Pope, ‘US Abandoned Us, Say Kurds’, The Independent, 4 September 1996; Patrick Cockburn, 
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Iraq.503 Washington reacted strongly to the Iraqi military action by stating that the KDP 
alliance with Baghdad could not justify the unleashing of the Iraqi army ‘against the 
civilian population of Erbil.’504 The US and UK launched a limited military strike with 
cruise missiles against Iraqi military installations in southern Iraq and extended the NFZ 
from below the 32nd to the 33rd parallel. The strike was carried out in southern Iraq 
whereas the Iraqi forces had attacked the region above the 36th parallel. The purpose 
was to prevent Iran backing the PUK against the KDP-Iraqi alliance, ensure the 
continuation of OPC-II, and send a warning to both Iran and Iraq to keep out of the 
region above the 36th parallel.505  
The involvement of Baghdad in the intra-Kurdish conflict created a paradoxical 
situation for Washington. First, OPC-II and the NFZ were in place to protect the Kurds 
from Saddam. However, the PUK had enlisted Iran’s support against the KDP, and the 
KDP, in retaliation, had invited Saddam, archenemy of the Kurds, to attack the PUK. It 
was a dramatic and unexpected setback for US Iraq policy that undermined OPC-II and 
the NFZ as pillars of the policy of containing Saddam and protecting Northern Iraq.506 
Due to Barzani’s alliance with Baghdad, the covert CIA operation in Northern Iraq to 
overthrow Saddam’s regime collapsed. With Turkey’s cooperation, the US now 
evacuated nearly 2,500 local people who worked for the US in the anti-Saddam 
opposition.507 Second, the continued KDP-PUK conflict enabled Saddam to extend his 
power in Northern Iraq, despite the US policy of containment. The KDP’s defeat of the 
PUK led to a dramatic change in the strategic situation. The overall US strategy of 
containment then depended upon the type of relationship Barzani chose with Saddam, 
enmeshing the US in Kurdish politics. Third, it seemed that consolidation of Barzani’s 
political power and control of the region would lead to a stronger and more unified 
Kurdish political entity. This would ultimately clash with Iraq’s interests in the region, 
making any long-term KDP-Saddam alliance unsustainable. Relying on Saddam’s 
regime had been a choice that tipped the balance in favour of the KDP in the fight for 
political survival. However, as a leader of Iraqi Kurdish people who had suffered years 
of oppression by Baghdad, Barzani had to put some distance between himself and 
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Saddam’s regime. Barzani also needed to take a balanced approach in cooperation with 
Baghdad to maintain US support. Nevertheless, without Saddam, it seemed that the 
PUK would continue to challenge the KDP hegemony by any means available.  
The intra-Kurdish hostilities had also provided Iran and Syria with the opportunity to 
play off one Kurdish faction against the other. The KDP and PUK both used the 
prospects of intervention by Iran and Syria and a possible political deal with Saddam as 
instruments to pressure the US administration to get involved in the inter-Kurdish 
rivalry and extract US guarantees of protection for the Kurdish region.508 Barzani also 
threatened that, if the US and its allies did not fulfil their commitments, the KDP would 
enlist the support of any party able to protect the Kurds from injustice and invasion.509 
Zebari argues that the KDP’s move changed the political landscape, attracted 
international attention, and demonstrated that Kurdish parties were not mere tribal 
actors but capable of real politics.510 
The US called the hostilities a tragedy for Iraqi Kurdish people and urged Barzani to re-
engage in negotiations with Talabani instead of trusting Saddam, who had tried to 
exterminate the Kurdish people, and to work with the Turkish, British, French and 
American governments for stability in Northern Iraq, which the US viewed as an issue 
of national interest. Washington asked both Kurdish leaders to put aside their 
differences, to provide a better measure of stability in Northern Iraq, and not to accept 
offers of an alliance from either Iran or Saddam. The US, again in cooperation with 
Turkey, now embarked on a new mediation between the Kurdish factions.511 
Restoration of the balance of power was essential to resolve intra-Kurdish disagreement 
and to prevent the interference of third parties in the conflict. 
For Ankara, KDP-PUK reconciliation and the restoration of stability in Northern Iraq 
were imperative to prevent the PKK from exploiting the chaotic situation. The clashes 
had allowed the PKK to become a third power in the region through its potential to 
make alliances. A simultaneous Turkish objective remained checking Kurdish 
aspirations for independence. Turkey made clear that preservation of Iraq’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty was vital and that it would categorically oppose any effort to 
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establish an independent state in Northern Iraq. Ankara called for resumption of KDP-
PUK dialogue to end hostilities and achieve reconciliation. Ankara also warned that all 
interested nations ought to adopt constructive approaches instead of pursuing policies 
that would escalate tensions. Turkey’s position was a reflection of its assessment that 
the PUK’s relationship and cooperation with Iran had been a miscalculation by 
Talabani. It seemed he would now seek to retake Erbil to reinstitute his power base and 
balance the situation. Any potential Iranian intervention to help the PUK or involvement 
by Syria would create further destabilisation of the region. For Ankara, Syria was 
chiefly concerned with being constrained in Northern Iraq due to increasing American 
and Turkish influence. The Syrian regime had opposed the Drogheda and Dublin 
processes, the strengthening of either Kurdish faction against the other, and the 
reinstitution of Saddam’s control in Northern Iraq. Talabani’s cooperation with Iran, 
Syria’s regional ally, and the enhanced PUK-PKK cooperation conformed to Syrian 
interests. Ankara also calculated that the KDP would engage in a renewed effort to 
improve its relations with Turkey, including cooperation against the PKK, in order to 
maintain dominance in Northern Iraq. The renewal of dialogue between Turkey and the 
KDP would also serve US interests, given that it would curtail Iranian and Syrian 
influence in the region. The PKK would likely try to exploit the KDP-PUK conflict by 
forcing concessions from each party, which Turkey had to prevent. Provided they broke 
all ties with the PKK, Turkey would extend support to the KDP and PUK.512 Öcalan, on 
the other hand, threatened to enter the fighting if the KDP killed prisoners.513 
In a new military move, Turkey declared a ‘temporary security zone’ to extend from 5 
to 15 miles on the Iraqi side of the border to prevent infiltration by PKK terrorists. 
Foreign Minister Çiller stated that Turkey would take every precaution to protect its 
borders and would not permit any action that undermined the balance in Northern 
Iraq.514 For Ankara, the authority vacuum in Northern Iraq was the main cause of the 
security threat that Turkey had faced ever since the Gulf War. Turkish policies were not 
responsible for either Iraq’s inability to exercise authority in the north or its direct 
consequences. Turkey would not remain idle when its own territorial integrity and 
security were threatened by the cross-border attacks of the PKK, based in and operating 
from Iraqi territory. Given that Iraq was in no position to prevent the terrorist acts 
512 Statement by Tansu Çiller, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, 
regarding developments in Iraq, 4 September 1996.  
513 ‘Rebels in Threat to Intervene’, The Times, 3 September 1996. 
514 Statement by Çiller.  
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emanating from its territory, or to fulfil other international requirements, Turkey would 
continue to undertake that responsibility. Washington supported Turkey’s initiative as 
legitimate self-defence against the PKK.515 Iraq, in contrast, strongly protested Turkey’s 
initiative as interference in Iraqi internal affairs, an occupation of Iraqi territory, and a 
threat to Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.516 According to Iraq, Turkey and the 
US were collaborating in a major interference in its internal affairs, ‘undermining Iraq, 
changing its national political regime and threatening its territorial integrity.’517 
Ironically, while protesting the temporary danger zone, Iraqi officials also proposed 
Turkey and Iraq revive the 1983 MOU that permitted limited cross-border military 
operations against terrorist groups.  
Overall, the struggle between the Kurdish factions undermined both Turkish and US 
interests. Consequently, Turkey-US strategic calculations converged in robust 
mediation efforts to reconcile the KDP and PUK and restore stability in Northern Iraq. 
For Washington, its containment policy required preventing the Kurdish groups entering 
any deal involving the reinstitution of Baghdad’s control, and a KDP-PUK truce was 
essential to re-establish the region as a base for Iraqi opposition to Saddam’s regime. A 
common Turkey-US strategic concern in the restoration of stability was to prevent any 
Iranian interference or role in intra-Kurdish hostilities or the region. The extension of 
Iranian influence in Northern Iraq through alliances with either Kurdish faction would 
give Iran direct access to its strategic ally, Syria, and the ability to supply arms to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both Turkey and the US also wished to avoid becoming 
embroiled in an internecine Kurdish fight. Against the backdrop of these shared aims, a 
new initiative to reconcile the Kurdish factions and restore US influence in Northern 
Iraq was launched in September 1996,518 as examined in the next chapter. 
4.7. Conclusion  
The period between 1994 and 1996 was marked by the deepening impact of divergent 
Turkish and US perceptions on the nature of the Iraqi threat and the resultant 
nonconformity between their respective definitions of national interest in their 
respective strategies on Iraq, as table 5 overleaf shows. 
515 ‘This Week with David Brinkley’, ABC Channel, 8 September 1996. 
516 Letter dated 9 September 1996 from the MFA of Iraq, to the President of the UN Security Council, 
S/1996/731, 10 September 1996. 
517 Letter dated 30 September 1996 from the MFA of Iraq addressed to the UN Secretary General, 
A/51/438- S/1996/812, 30 September 1996. 
518 Lappman, ‘US Aims to Unify Foes of Saddam’. 
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Table 5: Integrative model of Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq, 1994-1996 
Independent Variable 1: 
 
Agreement on a 
significant/strategic 
common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to 
deal with perceived strategic  
threat 




I. The US 
Saddam and his regime 
remained a threat to vital 





II. Turkey  
Saddam’s regime was no 







I. Elements of US strategy 
1. Regime change (-) 
2. Containment (+) 
i. Maintain sanctions (+) 
ii. NFZ’s through OPC-II (+) 
3. Protect Northern Iraq as base for 
Iraqi opposition to Saddam (-)  
 
II. Elements of Turkish strategy 
1. Fight against the PKK in Northern 
Iraq (+) 
2. Check Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for 
self-rule/federation (-)  
3. Prevent Iraqi Kurdish independence 
(+) 
4. Address Turkey’s economic losses 
(-) 
5. Protect interests of the Turkomen (-) 
 
Unwilling cooperation  
1. No alternative strategy 
2. US ability to define Iraq strategy  
3. Alliance security dilemma / 
entrapment:  
i. No concurrence of interests  
ii. Turkey supports US strategy 
of containment despite 
repercussions on Turkish 
national interests. 
iii. Asymmetrical Turkish 
dependence on the US 
means preserving alliance 
outweighs risks and costs of 
cooperation on Iraq 
4. Turkey’s need for US support in 
fight against the PKK in Northern 
Iraq, including cross-border 
military operations and 
preventing Kurdish independence 
5. US reliance on Turkish 
cooperation on the containment 
strategy, including mandate for 
OPC-II and access to Northern 
Iraq 
 
The alliance security dilemma became more evident in this period. Turkey and the US 
still cooperated on independent variable two, the strategy of containment, despite 
evident disagreement on independent variable one, the nature of the Iraqi threat. In other 
words, Ankara’s commitment to US Iraq strategy was not in its own interests since 
Turkey incurred substantial economic and security costs. As a result, Turkish and US 
interests became increasingly divergent during this period while they paradoxically 
strove to realise compatible and conflicting interests. Simultaneously, both nations were 
constrained by the need to coordinate their policies and accommodate their mutual 
interests to a certain extent. Thus, even though Turkey and the US had no identical and 
even some conflicting preferences for Iraq strategy, this did not disrupt their 
cooperation due to their relative dependence on each other’s assistance in pursuit of 
their respective interests. For Turkey, this period was marked by increased pressures 
from the unintended consequences of the Gulf War and the US strategy of containment.  
First, in strategic terms, the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq gradually turned 
into a de facto state, rendering the future of Iraq’s territorial integrity and unity 
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questionable. Ankara feared that the dismemberment of Iraq would undermine regional 
balance, create severe ethnic and sectarian tensions, and leave Turkey alone to check 
Iran’s influence.519 Second, Ankara was concerned about the possible effect an 
independent Kurdish state would have on Turkey’s own Kurdish population. However, 
the KDP-PUK clashes demonstrated that the Iraqi Kurds were far from forming a 
unified administration in Northern Iraq, let alone establishing their own state. Besides, 
both Barzani and Talabani acknowledged that the prospects for independence were 
remote despite their aspirations. While Kurdish self-esteem increased, the Kurdish 
leaders assured Ankara of their respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity, and that they 
strove to achieve a federal arrangement with greater autonomy from Baghdad.520 
Ankara, though, opposed Kurdish federalism on the grounds that all Iraqis should 
decide on such an arrangement and insisted the Kurds remain within the 1970 
arrangement for autonomy.521 An additional Turkish concern was the plight of the Iraqi 
Turkomen community in Northern Iraq during the intra-Kurdish conflict. In the final 
analysis, preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity and preventing Kurdish secessionism 
remained the cornerstones of Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Iraq. Third, for Ankara, 
developments in Northern Iraq increasingly became a profound security threat. The 
PKK used the region as a base and springboard to dramatically expand its terrorist 
attacks against Turkey, costing thousands of lives.522 Ankara had to deal with the PKK 
presence in Northern Iraq, either by direct cross-border military operations or with the 
support of Iraqi Kurdish groups. Ankara pursued a strategy of providing military and 
logistical support, mainly to the KDP, to prevent PKK infiltrations. That strategy proved 
ineffective when KDP-PUK clashes created more favourable conditions for the PKK in 
Northern Iraq.523 Fourth, Turkish frustration at the economic implications of the 
seemingly indefinite sanctions deepened. The economic and social toll mounted while 
Ankara’s numerous calls for compensation and partial relief from the sanctions regime 
remained unaddressed. In short, as Parris argues, Ankara had to cope with the largest 
519 Sanberk underlines that the Turkish MFA examined the impact of Iraq’s possible dismemberment, 
giving special consideration to the Shiite factor and the prospects for Iran’s increased regional influence. 
Sanberk, interview. 
520 Prepared statement of Mark R. Parris, Hearings to Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional 
Considerations Surrounding Iraq, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 
107th Congress, 31 July-1 August 2002.  
521 Korutürk, interview. 
522 Barkey and Fuller, Kurdish Question, p.51. 
523 Korutürk, interview. 
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share of the Gulf War’s unintended strategic, security and economic consequences, and 
came to believe that it had emerged a loser in its aftermath.524 
In terms of the alliance security dilemma, and Schweller’s balance-of-interests 
proposition, Turkey and the US felt the need to balance their divergent interests and 
priorities with respect to their strategy on Northern Iraq. During 1994–1996, the 
situation in Northern Iraq was in constant turmoil due to continuous KDP-PUK clashes. 
While Turkey and the US appreciated and acknowledged their respective positions 
regarding Northern Iraq, their analysis of the situation and perception of their interests 
in the region differed quite radically. First, Turkey’s primary interests in Northern Iraq 
remained preventing the fragmentation of Iraq, constraining the Kurdish drive for a 
quasi-independent state, wiping out the PKK presence, preventing the KDP-PUK from 
entering into cooperation with the PKK, and limiting the interference and influence of 
Iran and Syria. US interests in the region were a subset of Washington’s overall Iraq 
policy to ‘prevent the regime in power in Iraq from regenerating itself and re-
establishing itself in a position to be the biggest threat to its neighbours again,’525 and 
therefore, to ‘contain Saddam at all costs.’526 For Washington, Northern Iraq became a 
base for anti-Saddam opposition and ‘a significant part of the US policy of 
containment.’527 
Second, from Ankara’s perspective, the new status quo in Iraq after the Gulf War 
created fundamental security challenges, including the viability of Iraq as a unified 
state. Ankara fervently called for US assurances over Iraq’s territorial integrity, and 
underlined its preference for Iraq to regain complete control of its territory, irrespective 
of who remained in power in Baghdad.528 Korutürk argues that Turkey was also 
frustrated with Saddam over Baghdad’s maltreatment of Iraq’s Turkomen population 
and the security challenges emanating from his regime. However, for Ankara, the Iraq 
question was larger than the fate of Saddam. Maintaining the regional balance of power, 
and especially Iraq’s key role in balancing Iran, required the restoration of Baghdad’s 
authority in the country.529 Washington, however, was in favour of the new status quo 
until a change occurred in Iraq’s leadership. US officials gave numerous assurances of 
US commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity while dismissing Turkish calls for the re-
524 Parris, Hearings to Examine Threats. 
525 Deutsch, interview.  
526 Parris, interview. 
527 Deutsch, interview. 
528 Barkey and Fuller, Kurdish Question, pp.169-171. 
529 Korutürk, interview.  
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establishment of Baghdad’s authority in Northern Iraq. Turkey-US priorities also 
diverged in terms of the PKK. For Turkey, PKK terrorism was the prime threat to its 
vital national interests. The PKK issue was a secondary one for the US, however, which 
was ‘much more concerned with trying to sustain Northern Iraq as a separate and stable 
base against Saddam’s regime.’530  
Despite this divergence of interests and priorities and Ankara’s growing frustration at 
the repercussions of the overall situation, Turkey and the US were able to achieve some 
accommodation and harmony on their Iraq policies.531 First, Turkey was a key partner 
and ally in global US interests, and remained central to Washington’s policy of 
containment. The success and viability of sanctions and the continuation of OPC-II all 
depended on Turkish cooperation.532 Second, as American officials underlined, the US 
had no option other than to accommodate Turkish concerns since it had no access to 
Northern Iraq except through Turkey.533 It was essential to ensure Turkey was involved 
and its interests covered to manage the situation in Northern Iraq.534 Third, Ankara 
recognised that US commitment and endorsement were crucial in preserving Iraq’s 
territorial integrity, and in Turkey’s fight against the PKK, particularly its cross-border 
military operations. Fourth, given its vital contribution to US policy and interests on 
Iraq, Ankara believed cooperation with Washington was the key to sustaining an 
enhanced partnership with the US on regional and global issues. Fifth, as Hale 
underscores, by providing rights to İncirlik, Ankara retained a certain degree of 
influence on US policy in Northern Iraq and the conduct of OPC-II.535 
Another reason for Turkey and the US to balance their interests on Iraq strategy 
involved the need to stop KDP-PUK clashes and to devise a common strategy to restore 
stability in Northern Iraq. For Ankara, the KDP-PUK conflict had severe implications 
for its fight against the PKK in Northern Iraq. For Washington, the internecine fighting 
undermined the credibility and viability of the US policy of containment. An additional 
motive for both was that the continued instability enabled the interference of outside 
parties, particularly Iran and Syria. However, Turkey’s role in the process remained 
contentious, and prominent Iraqi Kurdish politicians accused Ankara of subverting the 
530 Deutsch, interview.  
531 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.227. 
532 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp.334-335. 
533 Deutsch, interview.  
534 Parris, interview.  
535 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.224-225. 
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reconciliation efforts from within.536 Likewise, the then PUK Representative to the US 
Barham Salih argues that Turkey always considered the Iraqi Kurdish issue ‘a security 
threat related to its own Kurdish situation.’537 He also claims that Turkish policy 
inhibited a viable settlement to the conflict by promoting disunity among the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups, which Ankara perceived as an opportunity to undermine the credibility 
of Kurdish self-government in Iraq and ‘frustrate the Americans and Europeans and 
force their disengagement from Iraqi Kurdistan.’538 However, the Turkish officials 
involved in the process at the time all insist that Ankara preferred stability through 
KDP-PUK reconciliation. According to Korutürk, for Turkey, unlike Iran, stability in 
Northern Iraq enabled it to maximise its national interests in the Middle Eastern 
neighbourhood, including Iraq. He observes that Ankara worked for Kurdish 
reconciliation to establish stability, which served the fundamental Turkish interest of 
preventing the region from becoming a base for the PKK.539 Likewise, Öymen 
underscores that Turkey was eager for reconciliation since Ankara perceived instability 
on Turkey’s borders as contrary to its security interests. He also notes that the 
consequences of continued conflict were difficult to foresee, particularly in terms of the 
potential advantages for the PKK, a new refugee exodus to Turkish borders, or the 
interference of countries such as Iran and Syria.540 On the other hand, according to 
Demirel, Turkish decision makers were cognizant that the KDP and PUK would only 
fight the PKK for their own reasons, to sustain control of Northern Iraq, rather than to 
satisfy Turkish demands.541 Whether Turkey really desired a settlement of the KDP-
PUK conflict remains a contentious issue. Ankara evidently opposed the statements by 
Iraqi Kurdish groups in favour of a federation in Northern Iraq. The continued KDP-
PUK clashes, the PKK factor, and the essential role of the region in the US policy of 
containment meant that both Ankara and Washington became embroiled in intra-
Kurdish politics and the affairs of Northern Iraq. The conflict created the need for both 
countries to coordinate and pursue a common agenda to balance their divergent interests 
and priorities, and reinforced the trilateral nature of the relationship between Turkey, the 
US and the Iraqi Kurdish groups.  
536 Salih, ‘Status for Prospects for the Kurdish Question in Iraq’. 
537 Barham Salih, interviewed by Author, Ankara,1 September 2012. 
538 Ibid.   
539 Korutürk, interview. 
540 Öymen, interview.  
541 Demirel, interview.    
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CHAPTER 5: THE PERIOD 1996-2001 
From 1996 to the end of 1998, overall US policy on Iraq continued to rest on the 
strategy of containment.542 It focused on preventing Iraq from crossing US redlines: 
rebuilding or deploying WMD, aggression towards its neighbours, challenging allied 
aircraft in the NFZs, or moving against the people living in the Kurdish-controlled areas 
of Northern Iraq.543 However, with the enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) on 31 
October 1998, the official US strategy became containment plus regime change.544 The 
ILA authorised the president to provide $97 million assistance to the Iraqi opposition 
and made the removal of Saddam’s regime the fulcrum of US Iraq policy.545 The ILA 
was a result of increased pressure by Republican-controlled Congress, which claimed 
that the Democratic administration had no Iraq policy, and the belief that containment, 
despite being cost-effective, was seeing limited success. Critics further argued that 
support for the US strategy was eroding; while containment kept Saddam in his box, it 
had failed to bring his regime down or compel him to come clean about Iraq’s WMD 
program.546 However, the Clinton administration never fully embraced the ILA, arguing 
that the weak and divided Iraqi opposition could not effectively challenge Saddam.547 It 
remained a statutory policy with no effect until the inauguration of the Bush 
administration in 2001. 
During this period, Ankara continued to reluctantly cooperate with Washington on 
overall US strategy on Iraq. Turkey remained an essential ally in the US containment 
strategy yet kept its distance from the policy of regime change.548 Ankara was 
discontented with the repercussions of US policy toward Iraq on its own national 
interests. For Washington, ‘keeping Turkey on the same page as the US on Iraq’ 
542 Remarks by Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Press 
Club, 23 December 1998, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19981223.html  
543 Statement of Edward S. Walker in Saddam’s Iraq: Sanctions and US Policy; Statement of Elizabeth 
Jones, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, in US 
Policy toward Iraq: Mobilizing the Opposition, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 106th Congress, 23 June 1999, 
US61–045 CC (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999). 
544 Statement of Jones in US Policy toward Iraq. 
545 Statement of Welch in US Policy toward Iraq. 
546 US Policy Toward Iraq, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Congress, 1 March 2001, 71–541 
DTP, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001). 
547 Haass, War of Necessity, p.166.  
548 Albright, interview.  
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became a challenge during this period.549 It sought to address Turkey’s primary concern 
with numerous statements of US commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq and 
opposition an independent Kurdish state in the north.550 At the same time, Turkey-US 
cooperation expanded on the situation in Northern Iraq. They pursued a common 
strategy for KDP-PUK conciliation, beginning the Ankara Process under Turkey-US co-
sponsorship in late 1996. However, the process achieved only limited success in settling 
the Kurdish factional problem. The US then introduced a separate track without Turkish 
participation, leading to the Washington Agreement between the PUK and KDP in 
September 1998. This was a milestone in ending the intra-Kurdish hostilities, yet 
proved limited in its aim to unify the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq. During 
this period, the US continued to extend support to Turkey’s in its fight against PKK 
terrorism, and Turkey-US cooperation in this respect reached a high point when the US 
ensured the delivery of the PKK leader Öcalan, captured leaving the Greek 
Ambassador’s residence in Kenya, in 1999.551  
The overall Turkey-US relationship reached its peak with President Clinton’s visit to 
Turkey in November 1999, during which Clinton defined Turkey as a ‘strategic partner’ 
of the US.552 Parris underlines that the concept of strategic partner, which had 
previously only been used for countries like Great Britain and Israel, also applied in the 
case of Turkey. He notes that Turkey’s performance as a US partner on a wide range of 
difficult international issues, from the Balkans to the Middle East, Iraq, the Caucasus, 
and Central Asia, and over energy security, elevated Turkey to ‘the group of countries 
[among] the inner core of America’s close friends.’553 This chapter follows the 
evolution of the respective Turkish and US Iraq strategies from 1996, through the close 
but sometimes unwilling cooperation of the Clinton years, to the eve of the paradigm 
shift in 2001.  
5.1. Towards the Ankara Process  
In view of the convergence of Turkey and US strategic interests in the restoration of 
stability in Northern Iraq, in September 1996 they agreed to launch a robust mediation 
effort to reconcile the KDP and PUK. The US sought to involve all OPC allies, but 
549 Statement of Parris, in Hearings to Examine Threats. 
550 Albright, interview; Grossman, interview; Deutsch, interview; Statement of Jones in US Policy toward 
Iraq; US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 7 October 1996, 
 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9610/961007db.html 
551 Demirel, interview; Albright, interview; Ziyal, interview. 
552 Parris, interview. 
553 Ibid. 
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France withdrew from OPC-II and rejected engagement, arguing that the Kurdish 
groups had to enter into negotiations with Baghdad.554 The primary questions remained 
whether Barzani’s KDP would continue its alliance with Baghdad, whether Talabani’s 
PUK would look to Iran for further assistance, and whether both factions would respond 
to the mediation efforts of the US, UK and Turkey.555 Barzani announced that Iran 
would no longer be allowed to base forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, and that his cooperation 
with Baghdad had been a one-off arrangement. Nevertheless, in view of the possibility 
of an Iranian sponsored PUK counterattack, the prospects for continued KDP 
collaboration with Baghdad seemed high.  
In response to calls from Washington to resume dialogue among the Kurdish factions, 
Barzani sent a message to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher requesting contact 
with the US administration.556 As a first step, the US consulted Turkey over a 
coordinated mediation initiative. US Secretary of Defense William Perry visited Ankara 
to solicit support for continuing the containment policy and OPC-II and resuming 
dialogue between the Iraqi Kurdish factions. Turkey and the US were in agreement 
about their common interest in stabilising the situation and constraining Iran’s influence 
in Northern Iraq. Turkey believed that creating a coherent strategy without a clearly 
defined ultimate objective on Iraq’s future was impossible. It conceded that it was 
Saddam’s regime that had forfeited Baghdad’s control in the region. Turkey concurred 
with the US in opposing the intra-Kurdish fight and expressed its preference for a 
balance of power between the two groups. Supporting one against the other would lead 
to infiltration of Iran and Syria into Northern Iraq to exploit the divisions. Iran, by 
employing the PUK as a proxy, and especially in the case of increased cooperation 
between the PUK and the PKK, would be able to establish a direct corridor to its 
strategic ally Syria. It was, therefore, crucially important to engage in a joint Turkey-US 
effort to resolve the KDP-PUK dispute. Ankara was resolved to eliminate the PKK 
presence and ensure a full role for the Turkomen people in Northern Iraq; two cardinal 
issues on which the US promised to extend its support to Turkey.557  
The next step was to find out whether Barzani, by now the key leader in the region, was 
committed to strategic engagement with Turkey and the US over KDP-PUK 
554 Lappman, ‘US Aims to Unify Foes of Saddam’. 
555 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 13 September l996, 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960913db.html 
556 William Safire, ‘Be Nobody’s Puppet’, New York Times, 5 September 1996. 
557 Korutürk, interview. 
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negotiations.558 The starting point would be to reengage Barzani through incentives, the 
most efficient of which was an assurance to maintain OPC-II. The second instrument 
would be the implementation of UNSCR 986 in Northern Iraq on a fair distribution 
mechanism. Turkey invited Barzani to Ankara for bilateral talks and a meeting with 
then US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau on 15-
18 September 1996.559 During the bilateral discussions with Barzani, the key Turkish 
messages were the significance of preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
of KDP cooperation against the PKK, and of engaging the Turkomen to allow them an 
appropriate role in the affairs of the region. Barzani replied that the KDP was 
committed to Iraq’s territorial integrity, aspired towards the establishment of a 
democratic regime in Iraq, and looked favourably upon Turkomen participation in the 
administration of the region.560 Barzani insisted that KDP relations with Baghdad were 
limited, had been directed only to defeating the PUK-Iran alliance, and augured no 
prospect of a political agreement with the Iraqi regime. The KDP sought Turkish and 
American security assurances and assistance, including the continuation of OPC-II, and 
pressed for the return of a coalition presence in Northern Iraq. The KDP, according to 
Barzani, considered the PKK a security threat to itself, to Turkey, and the region. He 
hoped that the elimination of the ‘Talabani threat’ would open the way up for KDP 
cooperation with Turkey to wipe out the PKK presence in Northern Iraq through a 
comprehensive and coordinated action plan. The KDP needed time before enacting that 
plan to reconsolidate its power and establish stability in the region while PKK border 
crossings into Iran had to be curtailed. Moreover, the KDP had to have assurances of 
Turkey-US protection in the event of Iranian interference on behalf of the PUK.561  
In the trilateral Turkey-US-KDP talks, Pelletreau emphasised to Barzani that the US had 
done a lot for the Iraqi Kurds, and was seriously disappointed by both the KDP and 
PUK for their respective alignments with Saddam and Iran. The instability caused by 
intra-Kurdish clashes and Barzani’s relationship with Saddam were key US concerns. 
For the US, the way to address the problems of Northern Iraq was peaceful settlement 
558 US Department of State, Daily Briefings. 
20 September 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960920db.html; 23 
September 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960923db.html; Jim 
Hoagland, ‘Diplomacy in Denial’, Washington Post, 22 May 1997.  
559 Korutürk, interview; KDP Europe Press Release,  KDP Leader Masoud Barzani Concludes Productive 
Talks in Ankara with American, British and Turkish Officials, 19 September 1996. 
560 Statement by Tansu Çiller, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 18 September 1996. 
561 Turkish official, interview. 
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of the KDP-PUK dispute and not alliances with either Baghdad or Tehran.562 Barzani 
reaffirmed that the KDP relationship with Saddam was limited to the common objective 
of countering the threat posed by the Iranian-PUK alliance and that he had no political 
agreement with Baghdad. Nevertheless, if the KDP once again faced a choice between 
Baghdad and Tehran, he would not hesitate to seek Saddam’s assistance despite the 
brutal oppression that his regime had inflicted on the Kurds. The KDP, therefore, 
looked for Turkey-US security assurances and assistance and counted on the 
continuation of OPC-II. In terms of a settlement with the PUK, Barzani said he would 
meet Talabani only in Northern Iraq, would only allow the PUK to function as a 
political party and not as a military force, and no longer recognised the validity of a 
fifty-fifty power share. Barzani agreed to Turkey’s demand for increased cooperation 
against the PKK and for a proper Turkomen role in Northern Iraq.563 In view of 
Barzani’s conciliatory attitude, the US invited a KDP delegation to visit Washington 
that October. 
5.2. Factors Leading to a Common Turkey-US Understanding on Northern Iraq  
The situation in Northern Iraq had become the focal point of Turkey-US cooperation as 
both countries responded to the implications of the shifting strategic environment in the 
region. For Turkey, the first objective in cooperation with the US was to prevent 
Kurdish separatism and secure continued US support for opposition to a Kurdish 
state.564 Washington recognised this and gave public assurances on US opposition to the 
dismemberment of Iraq and a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.565 The second and equally 
important dynamic was to ensure that the US recognised the importance of supporting 
Turkey’s fight against the PKK, both in terms of Turkey-US strategic cooperation in 
Northern Iraq and elsewhere. Indeed, the US remained much more supportive of 
Turkey’s fight against the PKK than any other country.566 The third motivation for 
Ankara was gaining US support for increased Turkomen participation in the 
administration of regional affairs. The common Turkey-US strategic objectives 
consequent on these aims were to work with the KDP to attain stability in Northern 
Iraq, to maintain OPC-II to pressure Baghdad to comply with UN obligations, and to 
curtail the terrorist threat from the PKK. However, Ankara’s contacts with Baghdad 
562 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing,   
17 September l996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960917db.html 
563 Turkish official, interview. 
564 Korutürk, interview. 
565 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 7 October 1996.  
566 Grossman, interview. 
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remained a contentious issue for Washington, which consistently urged Ankara not to 
associate itself in any cooperative way with the Iraqi leadership.567 An additional 
component of the joint Turkey-US strategy was to check Iranian influence in Northern 
Iraq. The KDP’s victory against the PUK was a blow to Iran’s interests, and it seemed 
plausible that, if dissatisfied with the KDP, Tehran could sponsor a PUK counter attack. 
The PUK would accept any sponsors in its effort to retake Sulaymaniyah, and the most 
feasible was Iran. Washington and Ankara agreed that a KDP-PUK balance of power 
was essential to prevent Talabani from becoming an Iranian instrument. The new 
Turkey-US strategy involved assurances to Kurdish parties on the continuation of OPC-
II, a reinvigorated enforcement of the NFZ, and the return of a coalition presence in 
Northern Iraq. The increased stability would pave the way to the implementation of 
UNSCR 986 with its resulting economic benefits for the Kurdish parties.568 
Consequently, the US, in close coordination with Turkey, finalised its invitation to the 
KDP for talks in Washington on 17 October 1996. 
On 13 October, PUK forces counter attacked and retook much of the territory that they 
had lost to the KDP. The KDP made statements that the PUK had received help from 
the Iranians.569 The US said that there was no conclusive evidence and urged both sides 
to agree to an immediate ceasefire and to engage in conciliation talks. Washington 
warned both Iran and Iraq to stay out of the fighting and remained in close contact with 
Ankara ‘to rely upon the advice, counsel, and the friendship of the Turkish 
government.’ The joint assessment was that neither of the Kurdish factions could 
prevail militarily on the battlefield. 570 
5.3. The Ankara Process 
The PUK counterattack yet led to the re-establishment of the KDP-PUK balance of 
power,571 creating an opportunity to launch an intensified reconciliation initiative. 
Given the bitter experiences of August, Washington urged both parties to refrain from 
undertaking any action that would weaken the diplomatic course to a peaceful resolution 
of their dispute. At Turkey’s request, Washington also agreed to maintain close contact 
567 US Department of State, Daily Briefing, 20 September 1996. 
568 Turkish official, interview. 
569 KDP, Press Declaration, 13 October 1996.  
570 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefings, 
 15 October 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9610/961015db.html, and 
16 October 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9610/961016db.html 
571 An anonymous Turkish official claimed that the US had provided intelligence reports to the PUK 
about KDP military positions to this end. Turkish official, interview.  
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with the Turkomen population.572  
Turkey now hosted a series of separate and coordinated talks with Barzani and 
Talabani—the ‘Ankara Process’—chaired by the American side with Turkish 
participation. The KDP and PUK agreed to a two-stage process of commitment to a 
ceasefire followed by reconciliation talks. After the conclusion of negotiations, 
Pelletreau made a joint statement on behalf of OPC-II allies Turkey, the US and UK. 
The statement indicated that the KDP and PUK had agreed to form an interim coalition 
government, work to eliminate terrorism from the region, make the city of Erbil neutral 
territory, share the revenues of the region, and set a new date for general elections. The 
statement also emphasised preference for the participation of all parties in the talks, 
including the Turkomen and Assyrians, to restore stability to Northern Iraq within Iraq’s 
unity and territorial integrity. A neutral peace monitoring force (PMF) of Turkomen and 
Assyrians would be formed to demarcate and monitor the ceasefire line.573 Washington 
underscored continued US support for the territorial integrity of Iraq and opposition to 
the establishment of a Kurdish state.574 One change in Talabani’s previous position in 
the Drogheda and Dublin process was to oppose addressing Turkey’s security concerns 
as part of the KDP-PUK reconciliation. During a follow-up visit to Turkey in January 
1997, Talabani said he realised the significance of better relations with Ankara and that 
a stance against the PKK was crucial to maintaining those relations. The PUK sought 
direct access to Turkey to limit its dependence on Iran, but declared it impossible to 
sever ties with Tehran in the face of the Iraqi threat.575 
By the end of 1996, the US had agreed to end OPC-II on Ankara’s insistence that the 
structure of the operation be changed. On 31 December, the headquarters of the Military 
Coordination Center (MCC) in Northern Iraq ceased operations and OPC-II became 
Operation Northern Watch (ONW), limited to reconnaissance missions and, when 
conditions required, interception flights. 
The Ankara Process became the major expression of Turkey-US cooperation on 
Northern Iraq. Its key objectives were to maintain the KDP-PUK ceasefire, devise 
CBMs, and work towards a comprehensive political settlement to stabilise the situation. 
572 USDOS DBP, 16 October 1996. 
573 Statement by Ambassador Robert Pelletrau, Assistant Secretary of State, 23 October 1996, Ankara, 
Turkey; ‘US Aims to Unify Foes of Saddam’; Gunter, Kurdish Predicament, p.87. 
574 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing,  
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A high-level Supervisory Peace Monitoring Group (SPMG) comprising officials of the 
three co-sponsor nations plus representatives of the KDP, PUK and ITF was formed to 
review and implement the progress of the Ankara Process.576 In order to monitor and 
demarcate the ceasefire line between the parties, the neutral Turkomen and Assyrian 
PMF was established with US funding and became operational in April 1997.577 The 
key dispute remained the sharing of customs revenues and the PUK persistently 
threatened to resume fighting unless there was credible progress on this question. 
Turkey and the US drafted proposals for a neutral revenue sharing programme along 
with a mechanism to pay the salaries of civil servants in PUK-controlled areas.578 
The Ankara Process became a positive and satisfactory mechanism for Turkey-US 
strategic coordination and cooperation. Turkey believed its co-sponsorship of the 
process was essential to restore stability as well as maintain a level of control over 
developments in Northern Iraq. However, there remained intermittent tensions as the 
PUK insisted that the reconciliation process had to progress as a single package, and 
would not accept the permanent partitioning of the north. The KDP, in contrast, argued 
for a step-by-step reconciliation process, dragged its feet on the question of revenue 
sharing and opposed handing money directly to the PUK, even for public services in 
PUK-controlled areas. The KDP position was that general elections were indispensable 
for the establishment of a coherent administration. The PUK, in response, claimed that 
Barzani would not agree to a final settlement unless the co-sponsors imposed heavy 
pressure. According to the PUK, the KDP was satisfied with the status quo, especially 
its high income from the Habur border gate, but the PUK was unable to tolerate the 
situation indefinitely.579 It appeared that the long-standing KDP-PUK disputes would 
not be so easily settled. As both parties strove against Saddam’s regime and each other 
for survival, they would continue to manipulate the other actors to their own advantage. 
For its part, Tehran remained hostile to the Ankara Process. Its strategy focused on 
increasing its influence and presence in Northern Iraq and neutralising Iranian 
opposition groups. It put pressure on both the KDP and PUK to engage in an alternative 
negotiation process and an Iran-sponsored peace deal. Despite joint Turkey-US protests, 
576 Statement by Co-chairman on the situation in Northern Iraq, 15 January 1997.  
577 KDP Europe Press Release, Internal Kurdish Conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan, 26 November 1997. 
578 Turkish official, interview. 
579 Letter dated 22 January 1997 by Jalal Talabani, the Secretary General of the PUK, to Onur Öymen, the 
Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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in January 1997, Iran invited Talabani to Tehran to hold talks with Syrian Vice 
President Abdulhalim Khaddam to remedy the relative detachment of PUK relations 
with Syria.580 Following the meeting with Khaddam, Talabani told Turkish officials that 
the Syrian regime, frustrated at PUK cooperation with Turkey and the US in the Ankara 
Process, would continue to play the PKK card against Turkey.581 The situation was 
becoming ever more complex: the KDP demonstrated that it could be drawn closer to 
the Iraqi regime in its rivalry with the PUK while Talabani’s disdain for Saddam forced 
the PUK closer to Iran, and Tehran wielded enough influence to punish the PUK if 
Talabani moved closer to a Turkey-US sponsored agreement with the KDP.582 It also 
seemed to Ankara that Baghdad would stay out of any KDP-PUK conflict as long as 
there was no considerable increase in Iranian involvement and unless the PUK gained 
major advantages against the KDP.  
In early 1997, Turkey’s relations with Talabani improved substantially since he publicly 
recognised the PKK as a terrorist group and assured Ankara that the PKK would not be 
permitted to freely function in PUK-controlled areas. A Turkish military liaison team 
now began to operate in Köysancak/Sulaymaniyah where the PUK had its 
headquarters.583  
5.4. Changing Political Landscape in Turkey and Growing Turkey-Israel Ties  
From early 1997, Turkish domestic politics entered a phase of civil-military tension. 
The TSK traditionally perceived themselves as the custodians of secularism and the 
republic, and now organised considerable opposition to the RP-DYP coalition that had 
come to power in June 1996. Opposition to the Erbakan-led government reached its 
climax during an MGK meeting on 28 February 1997, where he was forced to sign a 
directive pledging strict measures claimed to safeguard the secular structure of the 
republic. Henceforth, the military establishment dominated and shaped Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policy agenda, including its measures against the PKK. During 
this period, calls on General Çevik Bir, the Deputy Chief and the strongman of the TGS, 
became usual practice for high-level dignitaries visiting Ankara. A new strategy now 
emerged of establishing strong ties with Israel as a regional partner to counter Iran and 
580 Interview with Talabani, ‘We Don’t Need Mediation for Direct Talks with Baghdad,’ Al-Rayah, 16 
August 1997. 
581 Turkish official, interview. 
582 Interview with Talabani, ‘US Not a Trustworthy Mediator in Inter-Kurdish Conflict’, Tehran Times, 
15 January 1997; Interview with Talabani, ‘World Will Soon Witness Collapse of Saddam’s Tyrannical 
Regime’, Tehran Times, 16 March 1997. 
583 Hüseyin Avni Botsalı, interviewed by author, Kars-Ankara Flight, 9 January 2011. 
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Syria and obtain high-tech Israeli military equipment. The fast-developing Turkey-Israel 
relations in the political and security realms were also regarded as an instrument to 
strengthen ties with the US administration by enlisting the support of the powerful Israel 
lobby in the US. The initial Turkey-Israel military exercises expanded into joint Turkey-
Israel-US exercises, implying the emergence of a new power bloc in the Middle East.584 
Despite the resignation of the Erbakan government and the formation of a new ANAP-
DSP coalition government by Mesut Yılmaz in June 1997, the influence of the military 
establishment on Turkey’s foreign and security policies continued to increase.  
During the same period, a debate erupted in Washington about whether US policy on 
Iraq had drifted.585 On 26 March 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered 
a speech to reaffirm the fundamentals of the US policy. Albright announced that the US 
would maintain the containment policy to keep Saddam ‘trapped within a strategic 
box.’586 The US would ensure that Iraq never again attacked its neighbours. It would 
retain in the region the military capability required to deter Iraqi aggression, enforce the 
NFZs, maintain the UN sanctions, and continue trying to ease the suffering of Iraqi 
people. Washington would also maintain its policy of promoting a coherent and united 
Iraqi opposition based on Iraq’s ethnic and confessional diversity, and helping the 
people of Northern Iraq to resolve internal tensions within the framework of Iraq’s 
territorial integrity.587 
On 3-4 April 1997, an American delegation visited Northern Iraq, accompanied by 
Turkish officials. The purpose was to prepare for the next high-level meeting in Ankara 
and the implementation of UNSCR 986 in the region.588 The American delegation 
assured the Iraqi Kurdish leaders the US was determined to protect the region from 
Saddam’s potential aggression.589 While revenue sharing remained the key unsolved 
problem of the new drive for reconciliation, the US also pushed for beginning the 
implementation of UNSCR 986 in Northern Iraq without Bagdad’s interference. 
During this period, the PKK gradually turned to a strategy of declaring large border 
areas of Northern Iraq out-of-bounds to the Iraqi-Kurdish administration, establishing 
584 For the details of Turkey-Israel relations on the Middle East, see Joshua Walker, ‘Turkey and Israel’s 
Relationship in the Middle East’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 17:4 (2006), pp.60-90.  
585 Hoagland, ‘Diplomacy in Denial’. 
586 Secretary Albright’s policy speech on Iraq at Georgetown University, 26 March 1997, 
http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1997/03/bmd970327b.htm 
587 Ibid. 
588 KDP Europe, Press Release, Acting US Assistant Secretary of State Visits Iraqi Kurdistan, 3 April 
1997. 
589 US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 4 April 1997, 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9704/970404.html 
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military zones, and intervening in the administrative functions of the region. In order to 
prevent PKK dominance, the KDP launched an attack against the PKK and requested 
Turkey’s assistance. From 14 May 1997, Turkey waged a month-long cross-border 
military operation against the PKK in Northern Iraq involving 50,000 troops.590 The 
purpose of the operation was to provide logistical and fire support to KDP forces, and 
Turkish forces would only intervene in the KDP-PKK clashes as necessary.591 Ankara 
also issued warnings to the PUK through clandestine channels. First, the PUK had to act 
in accordance with the common understanding that the PKK was also the enemy of all 
groups in Northern Iraq and posed a threat to the stability of the region. Second, the 
PUK had to fulfil its pledge to fight the PKK and not allow any terrorists to flee 
southwards into PUK areas, or permit any action in PUK-controlled areas that may be 
of assistance to the PKK. Third, to address the PUK concern that Turkey’s support for 
the KDP would provide Barzani with the edge to supress the PUK, Turkey underlined 
that its cooperation with Barzani’s Peshmerga forces was limited to wiping out PKK 
encampments along the KDP-controlled border regions. Fourth, Turkey warned the 
PUK of the serious consequences of any action that could undermine the stability of the 
ceasefire achieved through the Ankara Process.592 The US reiterated its support for 
Turkey’s military operation and that Turkey had a right to defend itself from the 
PKK.593  
In addition to Iraq’s protests, Iran, Syria, and many Arab countries reacted strongly to 
the Turkish military operation.594 This was largely connected to Turkey’s enhanced 
military cooperation and improved political relations with Israel. Ankara’s assurances 
that its relationship with Israel was mutually defensive rather than offensive did little to 
mitigate the reaction. Ankara perceived Syria to be the driving force and instigator of 
the Arab reaction. Damascus publicly suggested that the US had promoted Turkey-
Israel military cooperation against Syria and the Arab nations. Syria pursued 
coordination with Iran and sought to improve its ties with Iraq in line with its efforts to 
strengthen Arab solidarity to balance Turkey’s enhanced cooperation with Israel. The 
590 ‘A Clarification on Turkish Army Incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan against PKK Elements’, 14 May 
1997. 
591 KDP Politburo, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Turkish MFA, 14 May 1997. 
592 Anonymous source 
593 US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 14 May 1997, 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9705/970514.html 
594 Letter dated 25 May 1997 by Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, to the President of the 
UNSC, S/1997/393, 28 May 1997; İlnur Cevik, ‘Tehran to Ankara: Don’t Enter Iranian Territory’, 
Turkish Daily News, 23 May 1997; ‘Turkish Troops Should Be out of Iraq’, Kayhan International, 27 
May 1997. 
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ultimate purpose of Damascus was to counterbalance a perceived a strategic threat to 
Syrian interests.595  
To counteract the Syrian propaganda, President Demirel sent a letter to his Arab 
counterparts to address the concerns of the Arab countries about Turkey-Israel military 
cooperation. It explained that Turkey’s cross-border military operation in Northern Iraq 
was solely a fight against the PKK, reiterating that Turkey respected Iraq’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity: 
The purpose of the cross border military operation in Northern Iraq is to 
eradicate the terrorist threat against Turkey. It is unfair that some Arab 
countries totally ignore Turkey’s legitimate security concerns in fighting 
terrorism. It is also impossible to comprehend the position that tries to 
confuse and establish a link between Turkey’s relations with Israel and 
the cross border military operation . . . Turkey’s relationship with Israel 
has to be considered on its own merits . . . I would like to draw attention 
to the hostile attitude of Syria, which we believe is behind the anti-
Turkish campaign. The hostile policies of Damascus are the reasons for 
the current state of affairs between Turkey and Syria. Syria supports 
PKK terrorism, provides shelter for its leaders in its country, and thereby 
conducts a proxy war against Turkey. It is impossible to expect 
normalisation of Turkey-Syria relations so long as this support continues. 
Turkey has exerted every effort to solve its problems with Syria through 
dialogue, unfortunately with no success. Syria continues to use terrorism 
as an instrument in its foreign policy towards Turkey. It is legitimate for 
Turkey to expect its Arab friends to comprehend this reality . . . and not 
sacrifice the future of Turkish-Arab relations to the manipulation of 
Syria.596  
5.5. Revitalising the Ankara Process 
Following the conclusion of Turkey’s cross-border military operation, Turkey and the 
US launched a new diplomatic effort to reinvigorate the Kurdish reconciliation 
process.597 They agreed to design and implement a more neutral mechanism that would 
ensure equitable use of local revenues. Yet again, in early July, Washington proposed to 
the Kurdish leaders a two-stage process to strengthen the ceasefire and finally resolve 
the question of revenue sharing. The PUK accepted the US proposals while the KDP 
was reluctant and blamed the PUK for violating the ceasefire in collaboration with the 
595 David Gardner, ‘Syria Opens Up toward Old Foe Iraq’, Financial Times, 5 June 1997. 
596 Letter dated 20 June 1997 by Süleyman Demirel, the President of the Republic of Turkey, to the 
leaders of members of the Arab League. Translated by author.   
597 President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions, 9 July 1997, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1997-book2/pdf/PPP-
1997-book2-doc-pg934-2.pdf  
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PKK.598 Talabani said the situation was explosive due to increased tension and the dire 
economic situation in PUK-controlled territory consequent on the non-implementation 
of UNSCR 986 under pressure from Baghdad. He claimed the Turkey-KDP alliance 
sought to change the balance in Northern Iraq to the detriment of the PUK by alleging 
PUK support for the PKK. He even argued that a new Turkey-Israel axis was in 
confrontation with the Syria-Iran axis,599 implying that Barzani had served Israeli 
interests by cooperating with Turkey. Barzani stated the KDP was not part of any axis 
and that countering the Turkey-Israel axis was the concern of the Arab countries, not the 
Kurds.600 
Despite the Turkey-US engagement, the PUK expressed a loss of trust in the Ankara 
Process since Turkish support had emboldened Barzani in his intransigence. The US 
was concerned that Talabani could launch an attack against the KDP to change the 
status quo, possibly prompting Saddam’s interference in the north. The establishment of 
a KDP-PUK balance was essential to constrain the involvement of Iran and Syria. Yet 
Turkey remained wary of the signs of a new initiative for reconciliation outside the 
Ankara Process. According to the then Undersecretary of the MFA Onur Öymen, 
Ankara received intelligence reports of contacts between the US, UK and Iraqi Kurdish 
parties to initiate a process bypassing Turkey.601 At the end of July, the KDP informed 
the Turkish, US, and UK governments that tensions along the demarcated ceasefire line 
had grown due to systematic attacks against KDP forces by the PUK-PKK. For Barzani, 
progress on other issues, including revenue sharing, was contingent upon the PUK 
upholding its ceasefire obligations and disengaging from PKK activities in the region.602  
In view of the failure to bring the KDP-PUK leaders to a meeting, and the risk that 
Talabani’s growing frustration created, the three co-sponsor countries devised a new 
strategy. The US administration invited Talabani to Washington in late July. New 
Foreign Minister İsmail Cem extended a similar invitation to Talabani to visit Ankara 
after the meetings with US officials. During the Washington meetings, US officials told 
Talabani that the shared interests of the US and the Iraqi Kurds would be best served by 
598 KDP USA Press Release, PUK/PKK Joint Wide Offensive Action Against KDP Positions, 17 July 
1997. 
599 Interview with Talabani, ‘Calling the Turkish Army Is Treason: Why Baghdad Did Not Declare Its 
Position vis-a-vis the Invasion?’ As-Safir, 12 July 1997. 
600 Interview with Barzani, ‘There Is No Israeli Presence Here. Like the Arabs We also Refuse the 
Security Zone and the Tel Aviv-Ankara Axis’, As-Safir, 11 July 1997. 
601 Öymen, interview. 
602 Letter dated 21 July 1997 by Masoud Barzani, the leader of KDP, to Ambassador Onur Öymen, 
Undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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moving the Ankara Process forward.603 Washington’s messages to Talabani were 
manifold: First, the PUK had to avoid the mistakes of the past, especially in terms of 
cooperating with the PKK, Baghdad or Tehran. Any PUK cooperation with those 
parties would make it nearly impossible for the US to maintain its relationship with the 
PUK. Second, Turkey and the UK agreed with the US on the need to accelerate the 
reconciliation process, particularly on revenue sharing. Third, the US would provide 
relief funds to projects in PUK-controlled areas to overcome the immediate problems in 
implementing UNSCR 986. Fourth, Turkish security concerns had to be addressed, 
while Turkey acknowledged that more had to be done for everyone in Northern Iraq. 
Fifth, the US needed Turkey’s cooperation to continue its efforts with the Iraqi Kurdish 
factions. The US believed that it was impossible for the PUK to turn its back on Turkey 
without turning its back on the entire peace process.604  
Following the meetings in Washington, Talabani visited Ankara on 14 August 1997. He 
assured Turkish officials that the PUK sought better relations with Turkey, and denied 
reports that the PUK had assisted the PKK. He emphasised his understanding that a 
KDP-PUK peace leading to the establishment of a united regional government was the 
only workable method to secure Turkey’s borders against PKK infiltration and resolve 
the key problem of revenue sharing.605 The response that Talabani received was 
confirmation of Turkey’s position. First, the chief Turkish objective was to achieve 
stability without damaging Iraq’s territorial integrity and to prevent the PKK staging 
terrorist activities against Turkey from the region. Second, the PKK’s presence and 
activities in the PUK-controlled region posed a direct threat to the ceasefire in Northern 
Iraq and to the Ankara Process as a whole. Preventing PKK activities and attacks along 
the ceasefire line was crucial for the security and effectiveness of the PMF, and thus for 
maintaining the ceasefire and advancing the reconciliation process. Third, Turkey was 
determined to reinvigorate the Ankara Process, and urged both sides to be forthcoming 
on revenue sharing and safe passage from the PUK area to Turkey via the KDP area. 
These proposals would be implemented at a high-level meeting in Washington. Turkey 
also advised the KDP to attend a proposed meeting in Washington to design and 
603 President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions, 23 September 1997, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1997-
book2/pdf/PPP-1997-book2-doc-pg1215-2.pdf  
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implement a neutral mechanism to pay civil servant salaries in PUK areas.606 
5.6. Renewed PUK-PKK vs. KDP Hostilities 
Despite all efforts, the KDP-PUK rift continued to grow due to ongoing ceasefire 
violations, substantially increasing the threat of a renewed outbreak of full hostilities. 
The situation was critical, and Washington urged Talabani to restore the ceasefire and 
pressed Barzani for progress on reconciliation. The US requested that Turkey make a 
determined effort to secure Barzani’s full commitment to the reconciliation process. 
Turkey encouraged both Kurdish factions to swiftly accept recent US proposals for a 
meeting, but Barzani rejected them on the grounds that Washington had undermined the 
regional balance by extending direct support to Talabani. Barzani further accused the 
US of not condemning the ceasefire violations and PUK-PKK cooperation.607 
Following an unsuccessful meeting between the KDP-PUK and the three co-sponsor 
countries in London on 6-7 October 1997,608 PUK forces, in alliance with the PKK, 
crossed the ceasefire line and launched an offensive against the KDP on 12 October.609 
The co-sponsors called upon both factions to immediately restore the ceasefire and 
withdraw to their 12 October positions. They also urged both parties to clearly renew 
their commitment to Turkey’s legitimate security concerns and to re-engage with the 
Ankara Process.610 Talabani informed Turkey that four conditions had to be met for the 
continuation of the Ankara Process: the unification of the regional government, 
normalisation of the status of Erbil as an open city, return of all custom revenues to the 
treasury of the regional government, and new and free elections. While Talabani 
recognised Turkey’s right to defend the security of its borders, he claimed the joint 
Turkey-KDP fight against the PKK was not the appropriate method. Border security 
could only be assured through reconciliation and the formation of a broad-based 
regional authority, after which the PUK would participate in protection of Turkish 
borders. Talabani also requested Turkey remain neutral, said the PUK desired Turkey’s 
606 Letter dated 13 August 1997 by Ambassador Onur Öymen, the Undersecretary of Turkish MFA, to 
Thomas Pickering, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.  
607.Letter dated 27 August 1997 by Onur Öymen, the Undersecretary of Turkish MFA, to Jalal Talabani, 
Secretary General of the PUK.  
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610 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 14 October 1997, 
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friendship, and hoped it would not be forced into the camp of Turkey’s enemies.611 
Turkish officials categorically rejected the claim that Turkey had sided with the KDP 
against the PUK. Turkey’s major interest was to terminate the PKK, which had been 
involved in the recent outbreak of KDP-PUK hostilities, and its cooperation with the 
KDP was directed solely against the PKK threat. Secondly, Turkey could only remain 
neutral between the KDP and PUK so long as the PUK cut its ties with the PKK. There 
was conclusive evidence that PKK elements in the PUK-controlled region had actively 
violated the ceasefire and undermined the stability of the region, which Turkey could 
not allow. Third, it was the PUK’s responsibility to cease hostilities without 
preconditions, withdraw its forces to their previous positions and restore the ceasefire 
line. Turkey was committed to the Ankara Process to restore stability and ensure that 
the region was free from terrorism.612 Following Turkey-US joint pressure, the KDP 
and PUK agreed to a ceasefire on 17 October and to hold a meeting between Barzani 
and Talabani in Ankara. Washington had communicated to Ankara the US commitment 
to the Ankara Process as the best means of achieving stability in Northern Iraq and 
ensuring Turkey’s security. Ankara asserted that the PUK had violated the ceasefire in 
collaboration with the PKK and had to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its 
forces to their previous positions and end its cooperation with the PKK. Only then 
would it be possible to further the resolution of KDP-PUK problems within the Ankara 
Process. In short, for Turkey, the future of the Ankara Process was primarily contingent 
upon the PUK’s stance towards the PKK.613 
The first element of the US position was agreement with Turkey on the need to press for 
PUK withdrawal. Second, the US encouraged Turkey to accept Talabani’s offer to 
dispatch a PUK delegation to Ankara, which could serve as an instrument to press the 
PUK on both troop withdrawal and its connections with the PKK. Third, supporting 
Turkey’s efforts to get substantive guarantees from the PUK to reduce or cease 
cooperation with the PKK, the US warned Talabani about the danger of ties to the PKK, 
Tehran and Baghdad. Fourth, the US respected Turkey’s legitimate security concern 
about the PKK threat and supported its right to use military force to respond to it. Fifth, 
the US was concerned that Baghdad could seize this moment of discord as an excuse for 
611 Letter dated 13 October 1997 by Jalal Talabani, the Secretary General of the PUK, to İsmail Cem, the 
Turkish MFA.  
612 Letter dated 27 August 1997 by Ambassador Onur Öymen, the Undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, to Masoud Barzani, the President of the KDP. 
613 Letter dated 20 October 1997 by İsmail Cem, the Turkish MFA, to M. Albright, the US Secretary of 
State. 
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a military operation in the north. In response, Ankara temporarily suspended air 
operations to allow the US and UK to compel the PUK to withdraw and to restore the 
ceasefire. For Turkey, only unconditional withdrawal of PUK forces to the ceasefire line 
and termination of its cooperation with the PKK would put the Ankara Process back on 
track.  
However, Talabani refused to withdraw PUK forces behind the demarcation line and 
heavy fighting resumed. According to him, PUK forces had simply liberated regions 
invaded by the KDP with Saddam’s help back in 1996. Talabani accused Turkey of 
intervening militarily on Barzani’s behalf by conducting artillery and air operations 
against the PUK. For Talabani, what he called Turkey’s ‘unequivocal bias in favour of 
Barzani’ had encouraged the KDP leader in his utter intransigence, and forfeited 
Turkey’s role and credibility as a neutral arbiter and co-sponsor of peace and 
reconciliation. Nevertheless, Talabani said the PUK still had a sincere desire to 
normalise and improve relations with Turkey and he renewed his proposal to send a 
delegation to Ankara.614 PUK officials also publicly admitted that they had limited 
contact with the PKK without provision of direct assistance. The PUK also permitted 
‘PKK sympathisers’ to live in PUK-controlled territory, though purely for humanitarian 
reasons.615 The KDP, on the other hand, stated that the PUK had grossly exaggerated 
Turkish air attacks that had primarily targeted PKK elements in open alliance with the 
PUK.616 According to Barzani, Talabani was seeking military assistance from Saddam 
and had called for Baghdad to mediate between the PUK and KDP to counterbalance 
Turkey-KDP cooperation. A KDP delegation visited Baghdad to assure Saddam’s 
regime that Turkey was only interested in eliminating the PKK, remained neutral in the 
KDP-PUK fight, and respected Iraq’s territorial integrity. Baghdad put no pressure on 
the KDP over its relations with Turkey.617 The KDP launched a counter offensive and 
regained the territories lost to the PUK-PKK, and PUK forces duly retreated to the 
demarcated ceasefire line. On 24 November 1997, the KDP declared a ceasefire 
conditional upon the PUK preventing PKK terrorists from attacking KDP positions,618 
which the PUK accepted.  
614 Letter dated 3 November 1997 by Talabani, the Secretary General of the PUK, to Çiller, the former 
Turkish Prime Minister and Chairperson of the True Path Party. 
615 Orya Sultan Halisdemir, ‘PUK’s Rashid Urges Turkey to Back Political Solution in Northern Iraq’, 
Turkish Daily News, 17 November 1997. 
616 KDP Europe Press Release, PUK Forces and PKK Terrorists Defeated and Expelled from a Large 
Territory after Two Days of KDP Counter Offensive, 10 November 1997.  
617 Letter dated 31 October 1997 by Barzani, the Chairman of the KDP, to the Turkish MFA. 
618 KDP Press Release, KDP Declares a Ceasefire after Defeating the PUK-PKK Forces, 24 November 
1997. 
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With the restoration of the ceasefire, the US and UK informed Turkey of their intention 
to hold a KDP-PUK meeting in London. Turkey was invited to participate, yet only on 
the second day of the meetings since the PUK viewed Turkey as a combatant in 
Northern Iraq. Ankara expressed alarm at the new US-UK initiative to substitute the 
Ankara Process and their new inclination towards appeasing Talabani.619 It felt 
Talabani, who bore responsibility for the PUK-PKK violation of the ceasefire, had to be 
obliged to return to the Ankara Process instead of being given undue concessions which 
would make the situation more difficult to manage. Turkey advised the US and UK that 
it would neither support nor attend the proposed London meeting. The KDP also 
refused to participate, claiming that a meeting without Turkey would produce no 
results.620  
US officials, however, met with the KDP and PUK, and received their renewed 
commitment to the ceasefire and efforts to stabilise the situation. Both factions assured 
the US that no other parties would be permitted to mount attacks across the ceasefire 
line in areas under their control. Neither group would take any actions that would risk 
the ceasefire or the prospects for the resumption of political negotiations.621 Talabani 
said that the PUK was ready to participate in a viable plan to assure Turkey’s legitimate 
security concerns and help end the PKK military presence in the region by all means, 
peaceful or otherwise. However, he felt Turkey had to help the PUK by instituting a 
constructive Turkish policy to restore peace and support the revival of a unified local 
administration in Northern Iraq. Such an administration could fill the power vacuum 
and take on the task of securing the Iraqi side of the border with Turkey. Talabani 
contended that this plan was a more viable way to end the PKK presence in the region 
than Turkey’s reliance on ‘mercenaries’ and military incursions, ‘the futility of which 
had been proven time and again.’ He argued his plan offered a viable framework to 
restore peace and stability, deny Baghdad further opportunities in the region, and assure 
Turkey of its legitimate security concerns.622  
5.7. Towards the Washington Agreement 
By the end of 1997, it appeared that the Ankara Process was on the verge of collapse. 
619 The strength of Ankara’s reaction reflected the fact that Talabani had been invited to Washington to 
hold separate talks with US officials, including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger. 
620 Turkish official, interview. 
621 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 3 December 1997, 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9712/971203db.html 
622 Turkish official, interview. 
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As well as the questions around Turkey’s role, Barzani was very sceptical of the US 
administration’s Iraq policy, saying he was unaware whether it even had a policy on 
Northern Iraq. He said the KDP would not agree to the Iraqi opposition being used 
against Baghdad unless Washington clearly presented its vision for Iraq’s future. 
According to Barzani, the only way to break the KDP-PUK impasse was to hold 
elections in Northern Iraq.623  
While the three co-sponsor countries disagreed on how to proceed with Kurdish 
reconciliation, a new and direct KDP-PUK dialogue started through an exchange of 
letters between Barzani and Talabani in early 1998. The letters called for ideas to 
initiate a peace plan to end the conflict in Northern Iraq.624 The KDP’s proposal was a 
three-phase plan to be carried out within the Ankara Process. The first phase would 
entail CBMs, to include the end of the armed PKK presence and ‘intrusion in the 
affairs’ of Northern Iraq. The second phase would address normalisation through the 
establishment of a provisional joint KDP-PUK government based on the results of the 
1992 elections. In the third stage, free general elections would be held with international 
supervision and monitoring.625 In response to Talabani’s points about Turkey’s role and 
the PKK issue, Barzani took a firm stance against the PKK:  
The KDP does not believe in settling differences with any group through 
the use of force. Over the past five years, the PKK has initiated three 
wars against the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. The PKK has continuously 
attempted to impose its will through violence and intimidation. The KDP 
is not alone in demanding an end to the PKK’s military presence in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Front, the Joint Regional Government, other 
Kurdish political parties in the Parliament, and the people of Kurdistan at 
large, have all made similar demands . . . In fact, the PUK was the first 
among all parties to agree with Turkey in putting an end to the PKK’s 
unjust intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan’s internal affairs. We maintain our 
position that the PKK should be prohibited from exerting its military 
presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although we prefer to achieve that end 
through peaceful means, there are no indications that the option is 
available. Because the PKK’s military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan only 
causes further instability and tension, we hope that you will take a more 
serious willingness on this issue.626  
In January 1998, a new crisis erupted between the US and Iraq due to Baghdad’s denial 
623 İlnur Çevik, ‘Exclusive Interview with Masoud Barzani: In the End Our Problem Will Be Solved in 
Baghdad’, Turkish Daily News, 12 December 1997. 
624 KDP USA Press Release, Barzani’s Calls for Steps to Enhance Peace Process, 6 January 1998. 
625 Letter dated 14 January 1998 by Barzani, the Chairman of the KDP, to Talabani, the Secretary General 
of the PUK; KDP Europe Press Release, KDP Leader Masoud Barzani Offers PUK Leader Talabani a 
Peace Plan to End Internal Fighting, 17 January 1998. 
626 KDP Press Release, Masoud Barzani’s 3 February 1998 Letter to Jalal Talabani, the Secretary General 
of the PUK, 3 February 1998.  
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of unconditional and unrestricted access to United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) inspectors in their search for Iraq’s WMD. In order to avert the crisis and 
prevent an armed conflict, Turkey launched a diplomatic effort called the ‘Good 
Neighbourly Initiative.’ On 5 February 1998, Foreign Minister Cem visited Baghdad to 
hold talks with Saddam. The purpose of the initiative was to urge Baghdad to 
immediately comply with all relevant UNSCRs to peacefully resolve the crisis, and 
explore ways to avert similar problems in the future. A second goal was to establish a 
regional arrangement for security and cooperation to prevent a recurrence of the events 
of 1990-91. If this was achieved, an additional initiative to establish a zone free of 
WMD and their delivery systems in the Middle East would follow. The lifting of 
sanctions in a reasonable timeframe would be followed by a plan to ensure the security 
of the entire Iraqi population and enable Iraq to exercise its sovereignty over all its 
territory. Saddam welcomed the Turkish initiative, but denied that Iraq had any WMD, 
and said the US maintained the unjust sanctions to topple his regime, and therefore, 
even if the recent crisis were resolved, future crises would be inevitable.627 In fact, 
Ankara recognised that no long-term political solution to the Iraqi problem would 
emerge as long as Saddam stayed in power. The initiative was designed not to 
accommodate Saddam, but to demonstrate that the situation could not conceivably 
continue indefinitely with same parameters. In the end, the crisis ended with an 
agreement brokered by the UN Secretary General in February and March 1998.628  
On 12 February 1998, the KDP and PUK commenced direct talks. In parallel to the 
KDP-PUK negotiations, Talabani sought to normalise PUK relations with Turkey. A 
PUK delegation visited Ankara followed by Talabani’s letter to Cem on 27 February 
1998. Talabani wrote that the PUK desired to strengthen relations with Turkey ‘based 
on firm foundations that will take into consideration the achievement of the security of 
Turkish borders and our legitimate interests together.’629 Talabani reiterated that Turkey 
had the right to expect the Kurdish administration to prevent ‘military operations’ being 
staged from areas adjacent to Turkey, secure the border and deter all terrorist 
activities.630 Yet he again insisted that this would be contingent upon the unification of 
a Kurdish administration that could take charge of ensuring security and stability in the 
region. Talabani also expected that Ankara would act impartially in its dealings with the 
627 Oğuz Demiralp, interviewed by author, Kars-Ankara Flight, 9 January 2011. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Letter dated 27 February 1998 by Talabani, the Secretary General of the PUK, to İsmail Cem, Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
630 It is noteworthy that Talabani’s letter made no direct reference to the PKK.  
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KDP and PUK.631 
After several rounds of talks, the Kurdish factions achieved substantial progress in 
maintaining the ceasefire and the implementation of UNSCR 986 in the region. 
However, disputes over formation of a unified administration, revenue sharing, and new 
elections remained unresolved. The PUK pursued the opportunity to improve relations 
with Turkey and adopted a more constructive policy towards Turkey’s demands 
regarding the PKK. In June 1998, Talabani informed Ankara that the PKK had been 
removed from PUK-controlled regions and requested a Turkish military liaison team 
visit Sulaymaniyah to confirm the situation on the ground. Henceforth, relative 
tranquillity prevailed in Northern Iraq owing to the benefits of the implementation of 
UNSCR 986, which enabled some economic improvement in the region. The flow of 13 
percent of the proceeds from oil sales under UNSCR 986 to the Kurdish region, 
followed by the implementation of UNSCR 1153,632 reduced the economic dependency 
of Kurdish groups on the customs revenue from Habur. On 17-20 July, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch visited Northern Iraq 
and extended an invitation to both Kurdish leaders to a meeting in Washington.633 The 
US motive was to build on the progress that the KDP and PUK had made in direct talks 
towards a permanent reconciliation.634 Barzani reportedly accepted the invitation since 
it was the first time a US official had expressed open support for the Kurds and gave 
assurances about US guarantees for the security of Northern Iraq.635  
In early September, en route to the US, Barzani visited Turkey for discussions with 
senior Turkish politicians. A high-level PUK delegation followed suit. During the talks, 
Ankara advised both delegations of the Turkish position. First, Turkey was committed 
to supporting Kurdish reconciliation through the Ankara Process without undermining 
Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity. Second, Ankara recognised the need to 
hold elections to form a government that would administer the region until 
circumstances would allow the Kurdish groups to resolve their differences with 
Baghdad over the status of the region. Until then, Ankara opposed the concept of a 
predetermined federation for Northern Iraq. Third, the PKK and the wellbeing of the 
631 Ibid. 
632 Gunter, Kurdish Predicament, pp.98-99. 
633 James Risen, ‘US Welcomes Kurdish Leader Who Betrayed C.I.A. in Iraq’, New York Times, 25 July 
1998. 
634 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 8 September 1998, 
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/briefings/9809/980908db.html 
635 David Welch, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: US Brokered 
Northern Iraq Accord and US-Iraq Relations, Worldnet, 15 October 1998. 
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Turkomen community would remain the pivotal issues in Turkey’s relations with the 
Kurdish factions. During the discussions, Barzani assured Turkish officials of KDP 
commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity, anti-PKK stance, and cooperation with the 
Turkomen. Barzani also mentioned that Talabani had refused his proposal to visit 
Turkey together, and that Barzani would not accept any alternative to the Ankara 
Process during the talks in Washington. 
The US hosted Barzani on 9-11 September and Talabani on 14-16 September. 
Following senior-level meetings with US officials, Albright had separate meetings with 
Barzani and Talabani. She assured both leaders of continued US engagement with the 
Kurdish factions and commitment to the security and economic wellbeing of the Iraqi 
Kurds. She advised the Kurdish leaders that KDP-PUK reconciliation was an important 
objective for the US.636 They were also informed that US protection depended upon 
such reconciliation; if they remained unified, the US would not tolerate any renewed 
aggression by Baghdad or any repetition of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
in Northern Iraq.637  
Following intensive discussions at the State Department on 16-17 September and a 
meeting under Secretary Albright’s auspices, after four years of conflict, Barzani and 
Talabani signed the Washington Agreement on 17 September 1998.638 Albright, who 
was instrumental in brokering the agreement and its power-sharing arrangement, 
observed in interview that continued intra-Kurdish fighting hindered US policy towards 
Iraq, and the US was finally able to stop the fighting after getting Barzani and Talabani 
together in her office.639  
The Washington Agreement set out a nine-month timeline to unify the regional 
administration, share revenue, resolve the status of Erbil, and hold elections in June 
1999. Under the agreement, both parties condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain 
from violence in settling their differences, and resolved to eliminate terrorism by 
establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq’s borders. The agreement underlined respect 
for Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity, yet called for a federal system within a united, 
636 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 14 September 1998, 
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/briefings/9809/980914db.html 
637 Welch, ‘US Brokered Northern Iraq’. 
638 President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions, 5 November 1998, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1998-
book2/pdf/PPP-1998-book2-doc-pg1986-2.pdf  
639 Albright, interview. 
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democratic and pluralistic Iraq.640 
The end of the Kurdish infighting and restoration of stability in Northern Iraq, the 
elimination of the terrorist threat from the region, and the prevention of interference of 
Iran and Syria were all congruent with Turkish interests. However, the Washington 
Agreement caused frustration and uneasiness in Ankara. The primary objection was that 
the US had launched a new process between the Kurdish factions without properly 
consulting Turkey, and Albright and other senior US officials made references to the 
Ankara Process to deflect Turkey’s reaction. The Washington Agreement called for a 
dual-track reconciliation process whereby political issues would be handled by talks in 
London, while security issues would be addressed at meetings in Ankara. Turkey 
believed this approach would practically mark the end of the Ankara Process. 
Washington suggested the next step in the reconciliation process be a Talabani-Barzani 
meeting in Ankara focusing on security at the beginning of November,641 but without 
consulting Turkey. In terms of the substance, Ankara noted with satisfaction the 
agreement’s references to the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereign unity 
of Iraq, and the statements by the US to this end.642 Turkey’s chief concerns were with 
the provisions on federalism, general elections, unification of the government, and 
Peshmerga forces, as it felt these would eventually break the region from the rest of 
Iraq. On the other hand, Ankara acknowledged that the commitment of the Kurdish 
factions to terminate PKK terrorism in the region would mitigate Turkey’s problems. 
Equally importantly, this provision would also help lessen the need for Ankara to carry 
out large-scale cross-border military operations and reduce the prospects of outside 
interference in the balance between the PKK and Kurdish parties. Washington 
reaffirmed US support for Turkey’s right to defend itself from PKK terrorism, and 
undertook to diligently monitor the agreement’s assurances for the security of Turkey’s 
borders.643 Nevertheless, as a reaction to the Washington Agreement, Turkey upgraded 
its diplomatic representation in Baghdad to the ambassadorial level—a decision that 
caused resentment in the US.644 The new Turkey-US divisions reflected a substantial 
640 For an analysis of the Washington Agreement from the Kurdish perspective, see Mahmoud Osman, 
‘The Washington Agreement, the Negotiations, the Implementation and Its Prospects’, 1 May 2001, 
http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=8013 
641 Welch, ‘US Brokered Northern Iraq’. 
642 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Jalal Talabani of the PUK, and Masoud Barzani of the KDP, 
Press remarks following their meeting, Washington, DC, 17 September 1998, Released by the Office of 
the Spokesman, US Department of State, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/1998/09/98091707_nlt.html  
643 Welch, ‘US Brokered Northern Iraq’. 
644 Ibid. 
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divergence of their respective positions on Northern Iraq. Ankara focused on 
constraining any KDP-PUK achievement that increased the prospects of an independent 
Kurdish state, including a unified administration and federalism, and explicitly 
expressed its preference for a centralised Iraq. The US, in contrast, sought a unified 
Kurdish administration and supported the KDP-PUK cause for a decentralised, federal 
Iraq. 
5.8. Öcalan’s Capture 
In summer 1998, Turkish leaders and senior military officials started to directly accuse 
Syria of supporting and harbouring the PKK as leverage against Turkey. They alleged 
that PKK leader Öcalan resided in Syria and that the PKK had terrorist training camps 
in the country, blaming Syria for being part of an undeclared war on Turkey. The Syrian 
denials were unpersuasive.645 During a speech before the TBMM, President Demirel 
said that Turkey had reached the limits of its patience, and that Syria would soon face 
the consequences of supporting PKK terror.646 Ankara gave Syria two conditions; return 
or expel Öcalan and close down all PKK training camps. Turkish frustration escalated 
to the brink of war in October 1998 when Syria finally realised that Turkey was serious 
in its threat to use force. According to Demirel, the resolve of the Turkish officials 
during this process was instrumental in convincing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
of Turkey’s determination to undertake military action if its conditions were not met. 
Following his visit to Ankara, Mubarak changed his route to visit Damascus and 
persuaded Syria to expel Öcalan and shut down the PKK camps.647 After Öcalan’s 
departure from Damascus, Turkey agreed to improve relations with Syria and signed the 
Adana Accord, which satisfied Turkish concerns by establishing mechanisms to deal 
with terrorism and enhance security. The then Ambassador to Syria, Uğur Ziyal, 
underlines that the removal of the PKK from the Turkey-Syria agenda was the key to 
normalising relations with Damascus, opening the way to improving Turkey’s relations 
with the Arab world in general.648  
In February 1999, the capture of Öcalan with the direct assistance of the US was a new 
turning point in Turkey-US relations. Öcalan was captured leaving the residence of the 
645 In interview, Süleyman Demirel stated that he had raised Öcalan’s presence in Damascus during a 
state visit with President H. Assad, who denied the claim. Demirel claimed that Assad reddened when he 
gave him the file with Öcalan’s pictures and address in Damascus. Demirel, interview; Altunışık and Tür, 
‘Distant Neighbours’, pp.229-248. 
646 In fact, Demirel instructed Feridun Sinirlioğlu, his chief foreign policy advisor, to give a bold message 
to Syria for harbouring Öcalan. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, interviewed by author, Ankara, 9 May 2012.   
647 Demirel, interview; Ziyal, interview.   
648 Ziyal, interview.  
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Greek Ambassador in Nairobi, and Öcalan was handed to Turkish officials.649 Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit did not mention the US role in the operation and refrained from 
commenting on the details at the time. However, Turkish authorities later praised the 
US assistance. President Demirel maintains that it was the US that ensured Öcalan was 
given to Turkey.650 
Öcalan’s capture created favourable conditions for Turkey’s struggle against the PKK, 
both at home and in Northern Iraq. Domestically, it created a positive psychological 
atmosphere and a sense of superiority over the PKK.651 The PKK declared a ceasefire 
and announced that its militants would leave Turkey and withdraw to Iraq. Syria would 
no longer serve as a safe haven for the terrorist organisation. After the initial shock, the 
public feeling was that the PKK would go into meltdown. The PKK announced its 
renunciation of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil and withdrew its approximately 5,000 
cadres to Northern Iraq, concentrated in the Kandil Mountains.652  
The US now encouraged Ankara to separate the PKK issue from the case for democratic 
reform of the Kurdish problem, particularly on widening the democratic and cultural 
rights of Kurdish people in Turkey.653 The sense of superiority in the struggle against 
the PKK paved the way for the Turkish authorities to tolerate Kurdish publications and 
broadcasts at the local level. It seemed that the PKK would not recover sufficiently to 
militarily challenge Turkey. The perception that the PKK posed an existential threat to 
Turkey’s security in terms of separation, autonomy, or federation gradually abated. The 
Kurdish problem became conceived as a matter of cultural and language rights rather 
than in the context of PKK terrorism.654  
The PKK’s decision to remain inactive after Öcalan’s capture was also a great relief for 
the KDP and PUK despite the large presence of terrorists in the Kandil Mountains. 
Ankara initially pressed the KDP and PUK to prevent PKK terrorists withdrawing from 
Syria into Northern Iraq. However, the PKK presence in the region gradually fell off 
Ankara’s radar, becoming a less pressing security concern as long as the PKK seemed 
649 Michael M. Gunter, ‘The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray’, World Affairs, 167:3 (2005), pp.113-123; 
Tim Weiner, ‘US Played Key Role in Capture of Kurd Rebel, Officials Say’, New York Times, 20 
February 1999. 
650 Demirel, interview. For a detailed account of Öcalan’s capture, see Tuncay Özkan, Abdullah Öcalan 
Neden Verildi? Nasıl Yakalandı? Ne Olacak? (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2005), p.182.  
651 Bill Park, Turkey's Policy towards Northern Iraq, pp.18-19. 
652 Stephen J. Flanagan and Sam Brannen, ‘Turkey’s Military Options for Dealing with the PKK: A 
Preliminary Assessment’, CSIS International Security Program, 31 October 2007. 
653 Alan Makovsky, ‘The Öcalan Affair: What is Next?’, Policy Watch, 369, 24 February 1999. 
654 Ibid. 
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to be contained and remained inactive. This would gradually lead to a downsizing of 
Ankara’s diplomatic engagement with the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. According 
to Fuad Hüseyin, as Turkey saw the Kurdish issue mainly as a security question, 
Öcalan’s capture had removed Ankara’s primary motivation for dealing with the 
Kurdish groups in the region.655 Henceforth, the Turkish interest in Northern Iraq 
focused on restraining the Iraqi Kurdish groups’ drive for federalism and independence. 
The PKK’s strong foothold in Northern Iraq remained a residual issue so long as the 
organisation did not engage in terrorist activities.  
5.9. Conclusion 
From 1996 to 2001, Ankara and Washington remained in no agreement about their 
perception of threat from Saddam’s regime. For Ankara, Saddam was no longer a threat 
at all. For Washington, however, Saddam’s regime remained a vital regional threat to 
US interests. The US maintained its strategy to deal with that threat, namely the policy 
of containment, NFZs, and the adopted policy of regime change. Despite a lack of 
agreement with the US on independent variable one, the nature of the strategic threat, 
Turkey continued to unwillingly cooperate with the US on independent variable two, 
the strategy to deal with the perceived threat, as detailed in table 6 overleaf. Turkey’s 
behaviour was largely due to factors related to alliance management, cost versus benefit, 
relative gains, and the need to accommodate conflicting and common interests. 
Nevertheless, over this period, Ankara steadily elevated its diplomatic representation in 
Baghdad to ambassadorial level, in the face of US objections.  
During this period, Saddam remained in firm control of Iraq, except the Kurdish region. 
Containment seemed to work to ‘keep Saddam in a box,’656 but international support for 
the sanctions, one of the pillars of the containment strategy, gradually faded away.657 
The policy of regime change proved ineffective due to the bitter failures of US-backed 
attempted coups by opposition groups in 1995 and the liquidation of the INC 
infrastructure after the takeover of Erbil by Saddam’s forces in August 1996. Saddam’s 
opponents simply lacked the means to even threaten his regime. In February 1997, 
Washington decided to cut CIA ties and funding to the INC on the grounds that it had  
655 Fuad Hüseyin, interviewived by author, İstanbul, 31 May 2011. 
656 Remarks by Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs, National Press 
Club, 23 December 1998,  
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19981223.html 
657 In essence, as of December 1998, the US estimate was that sanctions had cost Saddam more than $120 
billion. President Clinton’s Address, 16 December 1998, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec98/clinton_12-16.html 
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Table 6: Integrative model of Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq, 1996-2001 




common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to  
deal with perceived strategic  
threat 




I. The US:  
  
Saddam and his regime 












II. Turkey:  
  
Saddam’s regime was no 
longer a threat 
I. Elements of US strategy: 
 
1. Regime change (-) 
2. Containment (+) 
i. Maintaining sanctions (+/-) 
ii. NFZs via OPC-II/ONW (+)  
3. Protect Northern Iraq as base for 
opposition to Saddam (-)  
4. Prevent KDP-PUK clashes (+) 
5. KDP-PUK reconciliation (+/-) 
6. Establish unified Kurdish 
administration to maintain Northern 
Iraq as an element of the 
containment strategy (-) 
  
II. Elements of Turkish strategy: 
 
1. Fight against PKK in Northern Iraq 
(+) 
2. Check Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for 
self-rule/federation (-) 
3. Prevent possible Iraqi Kurdish 
independence (+) 
4. Address Turkey’s economic losses 
(-) 
5. Protect the interests of the 
Turkomen people (-) 
6. Preference for Iraq’s central 
government to reinstitute control 
over Northern Iraq (-)  
7. Establish direct contact / diplomatic 
ties with Bagdad. (-) 
I. Unwilling cooperation on overall 
Iraq strategy  
  
1. No alternative strategy 
2. US ability to define Iraq strategy  
3. Alliance security dilemma / 
entrapment:  
i. No concurrence of interests  
ii. Turkey supports US strategy 
of containment despite 
repercussions on Turkish 
national interests. 
iii. Asymmetrical Turkish 
dependence on the US means 
preserving alliance outweighs 
risks and costs of cooperation 
on Iraq 
4. Turkey’s need for US support in 
fight against the PKK in Northern 
Iraq, including cross-border 
military operations and preventing 
Kurdish independence 
5. US reliance on Turkish cooperation 
on the containment strategy, 
including mandate for OPC-II and 
access to Northern Iraq 
II. Unwilling cooperation on Northern 
Iraq strategy 
  
1. US need to cooperate with Turkey 
to stop KDP-PUK clashes to 
prevent collapse of containment 
policy. 
2. Turkish need to cooperate with the 
US to stop KDP-PUK clashes to 
prevent PKK exploiting / changing 
intra-Kurdish balance to dominate 
region 
3. Agreement on importance of 
establishing KDP-PUK balance 
4. Agreement on need to prevent 
Iranian and Syrian interference in 
the region.  
lost credibility as an umbrella opposition organisation and as an arbiter between the 
Kurdish factions.658 For Deutsch, Washington saw containment as a transitory strategy 
and expected that over time it could create sufficient opposition and resistance to 
overthrow Saddam.659 Despite the adoption of the ILA in October 1998, as Haass 
658 Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Use by the Intelligence Community of 
Information Provided by the INC together with Additional Views, 8 September 2006, 109th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p.24. 
659 Deutsch, interview.  
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argues, ‘regime change appeared to be more wish than strategy.’660 Moreover, from 
December 1999 onwards, the international inspections regime had effectively ended.661  
Between 1996 and 2001, Iraq remained an issue of significant US-Turkish strategic 
convergence,662 though there were also contentions. For Washington, preventing 
Baghdad from reasserting its control in Northern Iraq was imperative for the 
containment strategy, and Turkey’s cooperation was essential. Ankara, in contrast, 
championed the re-establishment of Baghdad’s authority in the region.663 However, as 
Park underlines, being unable to avoid cooperating on the US containment strategy, 
Ankara increasingly viewed involvement in Northern Iraq as a satisfactory 
alternative.664  
For Ankara, the containment strategy created severe economic implications in the loss 
of the lucrative trade with Iraq. More importantly, it posed security liabilities due to de 
facto Kurdish self-rule and the increased PKK activity in the region exacerbated by 
KDP-PUK clashes. Consequently, Ankara had to carry out repeated cross-border 
incursions into Northern Iraq and establish permanent contingents in the region to fight 
PKK terrorists. By the late 1990s, the result was, as Parris argues, ‘a stable modus 
vivendi in which the basic requirements of America, the Turks, and even the Iraqi Kurds 
were being met.’665 However, this modus vivendi failed to establish harmony in the US 
and Turkey’s respective strategies on Iraq. Ankara tolerated the situation because it 
could freely intervene against the PKK and retained certain influence over the KDP and 
PUK, despite its resentment at emerging Kurdish autonomy.666 Turkey had to walk the 
tight rope of aligning with the US while tackling the unintended consequences of its 
strategy. Also, it had to contain Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for an independent state while 
brokering deals with the US to stop the intra-Kurdish clashes and preventing 
Washington from accommodating increased Kurdish self-rule. At the same time, 
Ankara had to ensure that the PKK did not emerge as a player wielding influence in 
Northern Iraq. Collaboration with the KDP and PUK against the PKK, if not garnering 
their direct assistance, became imperative in that objective. Hüseyin states that the PKK 
was ‘arrogant in pursuing a strategy to introduce itself as the leading Kurdish movement 
660 Haass, War of Necessity, pp.166-167. 
661 Ibid., p.166. 
662 Parris, ‘Starting Over’, pp.1-9. 
663 Park, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Complex’.   
664 Ibid.  
665 Parris, ‘Starting Over’, pp.1-9.  
666 Park, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Complex’.   
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representing and talking on behalf of all Kurds everywhere, including Iraqi Kurdistan,’ 
and sought to dominate Northern Iraq through links to ‘neighbouring countries’ that 
posed a threat to the KDP and PUK.667 Demirel underlined the threat that the PKK 
posed to Iraqi Kurds as the key factor for their cooperation with Turkey in the fight 
against the PKK.668  
The Ankara Process, therefore, was key in accommodating Turkey’s interests and 
striking a balance between its conflicting objectives. However, the difficulty of squaring 
every dilemma at once led to the failure of the Ankara Process, and the Kurdish region 
remained in turmoil until the US decisively brokered the Washington Agreement in 
September 1998. However, the key objective of that agreement—to establish a unified 
regional authority to be formed after elections—never materialised, and the region 
remained effectively divided under two separate governments led by the PUK and KDP.  
For Ankara, the capture and detention of Öcalan was the most significant development 
during this period. In addition to its impact on domestic and foreign policy in general, it 
changed the parameters of Turkey’s policy towards Syria, Northern Iraq and the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups. To this day, there is debate in Turkey over the motives of the US in 
ensuring the capture of and surrendering Öcalan to Turkey. As Aras argues, one motive 
appears to be that the Clinton administration intended to eliminate the destabilising 
impact of the PKK in Northern Iraq, especially on its efforts to reconcile the KDP and 
PUK as one front against Saddam’s regime. Aras’ second plausible explanation is that, 
as the PKK was a major factor in Turkey’s involvement in Northern Iraq, the removal 
of Öcalan and reduction of the PKK threat would lead to the exclusion of Ankara from 
intra-Iraqi Kurdish affairs in the region.669 Likewise, Davutoğlu argues that, by handing 
Öcalan to Turkey, the US ensured that the PKK would turn into a domestic political 
issue for Ankara, consequently leading to a limited Turkish interest in the affairs of 
Northern Iraq.670 Ecevit, on the other hand, stated later that he never truly 
comprehended the reason behind the American decision to hand Öcalan to Turkey. 
Nevertheless, Washington’s continued recognition of the PKK as a terrorist group and 
endorsement of Turkey’s right to pursue the PKK in cross-border military operations 
was instrumental in Turkey’s fight with the PKK during the 1990s. The US assistance in 
the capture of Öcalan was consistent with Washington’s support for Ankara in its anti-
667 Hüseyin, interview.  
668 Demirel, interview.  
669 Aras, ‘Threat as a Peace-Maker’. 
670 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p.445. 
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terrorism campaign. However, it also appears that there was an implicit link between the 
Washington Agreement and the US strategy leading up to Öcalan’s capture. The US 
first concluded KDP-PUK reconciliation in September 1998, then endorsed Turkey’s 
coercive diplomacy against Syria in October, and then provided assistance for Öcalan’s 
arrest in February 1999. This argument seems plausible since the PKK subsequently 
became a purely domestic issue for Ankara, which then gradually lost interest in active 
involvement in KDP-PUK relations and the affairs of Northern Iraq.671 The curtailment 
of PKK terrorism and the downscaling of Northern Iraq to a secondary national security 
issue for Turkey meant the strain on Turkey-US relations was diminished, although the 
unintended economic consequences of the containment of Iraq continued.  
Against this backdrop, it can be argued that Turkey’s cooperative behaviour with the 
US on Iraq strategy represents offers a case study of Schweller’s balance-of-interests 
proposition, as well as alliance management and the alliance security dilemma. Given 
Turkey’s high level of dependence, and thus its asymmetrical dependence on its alliance 
relationship with the US, Ankara sought to preserve and maintain the benefits of, and 
advance its interests within, that alliance relationship. Ankara’s influence remained 
insufficient to change the US strategy on Iraq while Washington could obtain Turkey’s 
cooperation via Ankara’s calculation that the potential political, economic, and military 
costs of non-cooperation outweighed the risks of cooperation. However, the 
requirement to support the US containment policy in the absence of identical interests 
and the need to deal with the implications of that strategy on its political, economic and 
security interests posed a significant dilemma for Ankara. At the same time, Turkey and 
the US wielded certain leverage over each other’s policies and they pursued both 
common interests (in preserving the alliance against Iraq) and competitive interests (in 
maintaining the benefits of the alliance through intra-alliance bargaining).  
Turkey’s dilemma and the damage to its national interests notwithstanding, the 
continued Turkish support to US on Iraq strategy became an essential component in the 
US-Turkish strategic relationship. Nevertheless, the resultant frustration and resentment 
in Turkey would constitute the context of the major challenges to Turkey-US 
cooperation once the election of a new US administration brought about a paradigm 
shift in the US approach to Iraq, which is addressed in the next chapter.
671 Aras, ‘Threat as a Peace-Maker’.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE IRAQ WAR 
When it came to power in January 2001, the Bush administration inherited the previous 
government’s Iraq strategies of containment and regime change. Iraq did not emerge as 
a pressing foreign policy issue during the early days of the new administration. 
However, there was a concern that the containment strategy was crumbling largely due 
to the erosion of the sanctions regime.672 The administration launched an ‘Iraq policy 
review’, which focused on tightening the sanctions regime.673  
While the new administration agreed that Saddam posed a threat to US interests, it was 
divided on policy options of ‘containment versus regime change’ and whether regime 
change should be defined as a coup against Saddam or the removal of the entire Baathist 
government.674 The State Department argued for fortifying the sanctions regime. In 
contrast, the ‘neo-cons’—an influential group of senior officials in the administration,675 
mainly composed of civilians in the Department of Defense (DOD) and Vice President 
Richard Cheney’s office—favoured a policy of regime change through direct assistance 
to and involvement with the opposition, thereby making Iraq a central focus in foreign 
policy.676 Divisions over Iraq gradually became a central issue within the 
administration. Even in the early months, neo-cons in the administration repeatedly 
argued that Iraq posed a direct threat to US interests that had expanded since 1991. They 
claimed that Saddam had continued to obtain WMD and the means to deliver them. 
From their perspective, the containment strategy had been proved ineffective as the 
sanctions regime had nearly collapsed, the international coalition against Saddam was a 
shambles, and no UN inspections had taken place since 1998. The argument followed 
that, for the US to secure its own and its allies’ interests, it had to consider removing 
Saddam from power and working with the INC for regime change.677 As John Hannah, 
Cheney’s national security advisor notes:  
672 Bush, Decision Points, p.228; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p.419; Haass, War of Necessity, 
pp.174-186. 
673 Bush, Decision Points, p.228. 
674 Feith, War and Decision, p.52 and 199-205. 
675 These were the same people who had published an open letter on 26 January 1998 to President Clinton 
announcing that removing Saddam and his regime was the best long-term Iraq strategy. Project for the 
New American Century, ‘An Open letter to President Clinton: Remove Saddam Hussein From Power’, in 
Sifry and Cerf (eds.), Iraq War Reader, pp.199-201. 
676 Haass, War of Necessity, pp.174-186. 
677 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp.422-423; Feith, War and Decision, p.52,193-198,200-210; 
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The neo-cons believed for a long time that, after 1991, the Iraqi problem 
should have been taken care of because, with Saddam in power, the US 
would almost certainly face another Iraq War at some point in the future, 
and on terms that would be much more costly and dangerous for the 
US.678  
Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage, on the other hand, 
promoted a new strategy of ‘smart sanctions’; a tightened sanctions regime blocking 
Iraqi imports of military equipment while easing restrictions on non-military items and 
essential civilian needs.679 Thus, by late-summer 2001, US Iraq policy remained largely 
inherited from the Clinton administration with a comprehensive review of policy 
options and military plans underway.680  
The terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001 transformed how Americans 
viewed the world. The Bush administration argued that the world ‘changed 
dramatically’ giving birth to a ‘new reality’ of terrorists potentially armed with WMD; a 
threat that became an overriding US security concern.681 The attacks would henceforth 
determine US foreign and security policy priorities, redefining Bush’s presidency. The 
‘War on Terror’ became the new top priority for the administration, which adopted a 
new doctrine that any nation that harboured terrorists would be held responsible for 
their acts without distinction.682 As Freedman has noted; ‘foreign policy became 
national security.’683 
The attacks also had serious implications on how the US perceived the threat from 
Saddam, and Iraq became a more ‘grave and urgent’ problem.684 According to Bush, in 
the post-9/11 world, the US could no longer afford to tolerate or contain Saddam as ‘a 
sworn enemy of the US.’ He felt Saddam’s Iraq combined all sorts of threats to US 
interests, and decided to confront the threat directly.685 Despite divisions within the 
administration about when to act, the 11 September attacks raised Washington’s level of 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 107th 
Congress, 1 March 2001, 71–541 DTP (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2001). 
678 John Hannah, interviewed by author, Ankara, 24 July 2012. 
679 Feith, War and Decision, p. 205; US Policy toward Iraq; Haass, War of Necessity, pp.174-186. 
680 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp.420-421; Feith, War and Decision, p.210. 
681 Statement of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Next Steps in Iraq, Hearings Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, US Senate 107th Congress, 25-26 September 2002. 
682 Bush, Decision Points, p.134,137,151. 
683 Freedman, Choice of Enemies, p.379. 
684 Rice, No Higher Honor, p.149; Feith, War and Decision, p.xiii. 
685 Bush, Decision Points, pp.228-229. 
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concern about Iraq’s pursuit of WMD and the possibility that he might share them with 
terrorists to indirectly attack the US. 686 
Just days after 9/11, Bush ordered the US intelligence community to inquire if Saddam 
had any connection with the attacks.687 They found no credible proof of Iraq’s 
complicity or assistance in the attacks.688 Bush then decided to seek a diplomatic 
solution to the problems Saddam posed unless conclusive evidence linking him to the 
11 September attacks emerged.689 The neo-cons advised that, irrespective of whether 
Iraq was linked to the attack, the War on Terror had to include a ‘determined effort to 
remove Saddam.’690 However, the administration’s foremost concern remained 
preventing another large-scale terrorist attack on US soil.691 On 7 October 2001, the US 
launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against al Qaeda camps and Taliban 
military installations in Afghanistan.692 Afghanistan became the ‘ultimate nation 
building mission’ in the War on Terror,693 and Bush deferred military action against 
Iraq.694  
Turkey swiftly responded to the 11 September attacks with strong public statements of 
condemnation and extended sympathy and support to the US. The Turkish government 
obtained the TBMM’s approval to send Turkish troops abroad and allow foreign troops 
to be deployed in Turkey in support of OEF. It permitted the use of İncirlik Air Base for 
OEF-related operations and for the transit of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees from 
Afghanistan to Guantanamo.695 
With OEF underway, from late 2001 onwards, Iraq again became an urgent and key 
focus for Washington, which favoured changing Saddam’s regime, if necessary by 
large-scale US military action. As the US devised its Iraq plans, Turkey’s role in a 
possible use of force became a crucial consideration in Washington’s overall strategy. 
This chapter addresses the evolution of US strategy on Iraq and the course of Turkey-
686 Ibid., pp.189-190; Haass, War of Necessity, p.192; Cheney, In My Time, pp.369-371. 
687 Rice, No Higher Honor, p.179; Feith, War and Decision, p.14. 
688 Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  
689 Bush, Decision Points, p.191. 
690 Project for the New American Century, ‘Open Letter to President Bush: Lead the World to Victory’, in 
Sifry and Cerf (eds.), The Iraq War Reader, pp.222-224. 
691 Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Armed Services US Senate on the US Policy on Iraq, 107th Congress, 19,23,25 September 
2002, 84-837 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2003); Feith, War and Decision, p.59. 
692 Cheney, In My Time, p.340. 
693 Bush, Decision Points, p.205. 
694 Feith, War and Decision, p.52. 
695 Cable 02Ankara8305 dated 15 November 2002, ‘Turkey: 2002 Annual Terrorism Report’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/11/02ANKARA8305.html 
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US discussions from late 2001 to the decision of the TBMM on 1 March 2003 not to 
allow US troop deployment for war with Iraq, beginning a new phase in Turkey-US 
relations.  
6.1. The US Administration’s Focus on Iraq and Initial Turkey-US Contacts  
From late November to the end of 2001, the US administration reviewed war plans for 
possible action against Iraq and had its first briefing on a military option on 28 
December 2001. Simultaneously, it launched a dual-track policy of working with the 
UN for sanctions and inspections while also pursuing regime change, if necessary 
through military action.696 For Bush, the success of diplomacy was contingent upon 
convincing Saddam of the seriousness of the US plan to remove his regime unless he 
complied with all UNSCRs. The ‘coercive diplomacy’ against Iraq had two parallel 
tracks; rallying support for a coalition of nations that would pressure Saddam to comply 
with his international obligations and developing a ‘credible military option’ if he 
continued to defy them.697 Discussions then took place within the Bush administration 
over whether its Iraq policy should emphasise increasing international pressure to force 
Saddam to give up his WMD or using force to achieve regime change.698 The then DOD 
Undersecretary Douglas J. Feith has noted that debate centred on whether regime 
change was the only means to disarm Iraq and deal with the threat that Saddam posed. 
By his account, the administration then began to weigh the case for military 
intervention. Yet, the administration remained divided about both a military course for 
regime change and the role of the Iraqi opposition, especially the INC and its leader 
Ahmad Chalabi, who was favoured by the neo-cons.699  
The debate in the US about a possible military intervention against Iraq increased 
Turkey’s wariness about the future course of US policy. In early January, Washington 
officially requested Ankara’s permission to send a CIA team into Northern Iraq. 
According to US officials, Bush had made no decision on Iraq, and would engage in 
prior and full consultations with Turkey on Iraq-related issues. They said that the CIA 
mission was only a fact-finding visit to evaluate the political and military situation of 
the KDP and PUK, since the CIA had had no presence in Northern Iraq since 1996. The 
US would also extend financial support to Kurdish groups to facilitate intelligence 
activities.  
696 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp.427-428; Cheney, In My Time, pp.369-371. 
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To Ankara, it was clear that Iraq would soon become a central issue, and it was a key 
topic of Prime Minister Ecevit’s visit to Washington on 14-15 January 2002. Turkey 
sought information on US intentions, primarily on Washington’s assessment of the 
threat from Iraq and whether it would consider using force to achieve regime change. 
Ankara hoped for in-depth discussions about the implications and consequences of a 
military operation to oust Saddam. However, during Ecevit’s discussions with Bush and 
other senior officials, the economic situation in Turkey and Afghanistan dominated and 
Iraq remained secondary.700 Bush advised Ecevit that no decision had yet been made 
and assured him that the US would consult with Turkey ‘every step of the way on 
Iraq.’701 The Washington talks convinced Ecevit and his delegation that the Bush 
administration was resolved to address the Iraq issue, but left them relieved that a 
military option was not imminent. 
In view of his impressions from the visit to Washington, and Bush’s bellicose State of 
the Union address designating Iraq as part of the ‘axis of evil’, Ecevit sent a letter to 
Saddam on 1 February 2002. The letter warned the Iraqi leader of the dangers of not 
complying with the UNSCRs and called for immediate Iraqi agreement to unimpeded 
UN inspections: 
Iraq now faces a new threat … The elimination of this threat hinges upon 
swift steps from Iraq, particularly in removing all obstacles for UN 
weapons inspections. Had the situation not been so serious, I would not 
have felt compelled to recall your attention to this matter … Turkey will 
also suffer from the consequences of your non-cooperation with the UN 
inspections regime, and we are, therefore, very sensitive about this 
issue.702  
In late January, Washington informed Ankara of its intention to hold a KDP-PUK 
mediation meeting with Turkey’s participation in March. The message first reassured 
Turkey of US opposition to Kurdish independence. Second, the US would refrain from 
inviting the leadership of either party without properly consulting Turkey. Third, the 
purpose was to reach a final agreement to settle all outstanding issues, form a unified 
Parliament, and hold elections to form a single regional government. Alternatively, the 
meeting could be limited to a partial resolution of KDP-PUK disagreements, especially 
on income distribution, while postponing final agreement to a later stage. Ankara 
700 Matthew Bryza, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, 8 December 2009. 
701 Cable 02Ankara8110 dated 8 November 2002, ‘Turkey: Scenesetter for Codels Bereuter, Hastert’, 
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resisted the US proposal, arguing that relative stability had been established in the 
region as both parties were reconciled to coexistence under two separate 
administrations. Turkey’s reluctance reflected the recent deterioration of its relationship 
with the KDP. Ankara had developed a deep mistrust of the KDP, stemming from the 
latter’s ambitions to control Kirkuk, its mistreatment of the Turkomen people, its quasi-
independent activities, and its improved relationship with the PKK. For Ankara, a new 
Turkey-US attempt to resolve the KDP-PUK differences would send the wrong signal, 
especially to Barzani. Ankara proposed an initial Turkey-US bilateral meeting to agree 
on the parameters of the enlarged meeting with the KDP and PUK. Washington agreed, 
but the proposed process reflected divergent Turkey-US views on Northern Iraq and 
Ankara’s scepticism of US intentions.  
Ankara allowed the CIA team to pass into Northern Iraq through Turkey on the 
condition that a member of Turkish Special Forces (TSF) would accompany it during 
contacts in the region. The team visited the region on 12-26 February, and briefed 
Turkish officials upon conclusion of its mission. From the Turkish perspective, the CIA 
activities were evidence of Washington’s inclination towards and preparations for a 
military option against Iraq. In fact, Bush signed a top-secret intelligence order for 
regime change on 16 February, ordering the CIA ‘to support the US military in 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein.’703  
As of late March, reports of division in Washington on US Iraq policy appeared more 
frequently, and Ankara focused on a comprehensive analysis of the situation. First, the 
US administration seemed determined to overthrow Saddam by force. US deliberations 
had concentrated on the political implications of a military option for regime change in 
the region rather than whether the nature and the urgency of threat from Iraq really 
necessitated the use of force. It thus appeared essentially a matter of timing. Second, US 
strategy involved a tactical move to amend the UN sanctions regime and compel Iraq to 
agree to unfettered UN-sponsored weapons inspections. However, Baghdad would 
likely oppose the return of UN inspectors or fail to comply fully, either course 
strengthening the US case for war. Third, Ankara believed it unlikely that smart 
sanctions or the return of UN inspectors would divert the US policy course from its 
steady march towards the military option.  
703 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p.108. 
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The prospects of US military intervention against Iraq posed a complicated challenge 
for Turkey. While no war plans were submitted to Ankara, Turkish strategy had to take 
into account the possibility of a military option. It would be impossible to remain aloof 
from military action since the US would most likely request to use Turkish military 
bases and/or open a northern front through Turkey. The northern front would be 
essential for US troops to protect Northern Iraq from any retribution by Saddam. 
Turkey’s non-cooperation on a northern front would be unlikely to discourage US 
strategic planning to overthrow Saddam, and no country, including Turkey, would have 
power of veto over the US action.  
Turkish concerns about a US military operation for regime change in Iraq related to a 
range of factors. The first was Ankara’s decade-long grievances over its significant 
losses as a result of the Gulf War. Second, the experiences of the 1990s had created a 
trust gap for Ankara regarding US policy on Iraq. The US approach in Northern Iraq, 
and the resultant status quo in the region, had practically invalidated the repeated US 
assurances that Iraq’s territorial integrity should be maintained. Third, there was the risk 
that the US would make trade-offs to achieve its objectives at Turkey’s expense.704  
For Ankara, in advance of a US military operation for regime change, the priority was 
to learn the US vision for ‘the day after.’ The fundamental question was how, in the 
post-Saddam era, the US intended to ensure Iraq’s territorial integrity and unity against 
the possibility of fragmentation and the Kurds’s potential to opt for independence. 
Turkey had vital interests in preventing the disintegration of Iraq and constraining the 
Iraqi Kurds’ quest for independence or ‘its functional equivalent.’705 Second, Ankara 
was sceptical of the US strategy of unifying the Iraqi opposition as an alternative for 
Iraq’s future. A third and larger issue were the potential risks to the stability of the 
Middle East and regional balance of power. In a post-Saddam Iraq, the real problem 
would be how to control and manage the consequences of regime change. The potential 
for Iraq to emerge as a Shiite-controlled state aligned with Iran would provide Tehran 
further influence in the region, and the resulting implications on the regional balance of 
power would pose real challenges for both Turkey and the US. Fourth, a military 
operation would have severe repercussions on the Turkish economy, which had recently 
experienced one of its worst economic crises.706  
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This analysis was the backbone of Turkish strategic calculations about a possible US 
military course in Iraq. Ankara’s primary objective was to have careful, deliberate, 
substantive and in-depth discussions with Washington before subscribing to any new 
US policy. Ankara would seek concrete and specific assurances from the US 
administration that its primary concerns were factored into US policy on Iraq and that 
Turkey would be involved in the creation and execution of any plan for the post-
Saddam era. Ankara also took a dim view of Bush’s January commitment to consult 
with Turkey ‘every step of the way’ and the official US line about consultations on Iraq. 
Senior US officials assured Ankara that the president had no war plans on his desk, that 
the review of US Iraq policy was still underway, and that they would consult with 
Turkey once the president had made a decision. Ankara, however, sought to enter 
consultations in advance of, or at least simultaneous with, the US policy review to give 
Turkey a chance to shape the policy rather than simply to discuss how to execute it once 
it had been determined.  
In March 2002, Vice President Cheney started a tour of twelve countries, reportedly for 
discussions on the next phase in the War on Terror, which for Washington also involved 
the threat posed by Saddam. Cheney exchanged information with US allies, saying that 
Bush had made no decision on military action against Iraq, but that the US would 
consult widely as the process unfolded. If necessary, the US would topple Saddam, and 
‘finish the job.’707 During discussions with senior Turkish officials in Ankara, Cheney 
repeated that no decision on military action against Iraq had been made, but that the US 
would have to deal with the Iraqi problem at some point, and would properly consult 
Turkey along the way. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer stated that, if the diplomatic track 
proved unsuccessful and it came to military action, then the US would have to obtain 
international legitimacy through a UNSCR.708 This emphasis on international 
legitimacy would become a fixture of future Turkey-US discussions on Iraq.  
6.2. Turkey’s Concerns over US Iraq Policy  
To lay out the fundamentals of US Iraq policy, Assistant Secretary of State Ryan 
Crocker visited Northern Iraq on 1–4 April 2002. For Ankara, a bilateral Turkey-US 
understanding on how to revive the Ankara Process had been a precondition of 
involving Iraqi Kurdish groups in multilateral talks. Crocker, however, invited Barzani 
and Talabani to Washington. The US also declared its intention to have a public 
707 Cheney, In My Time, pp.372-373. 
708 Tacan İldem, interviewed by author, Ankara, 22 July 2012. 
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conference to unify the opposition groups in a European venue in the summer. In 
preparation for the conference, the CIA intended to meet the leadership of the KDP and 
PUK separately—and secretly—in the US to discuss expectations of their role in the 
future of Iraq. The key messages to the Iraqi Kurdish leadership would be that the US 
fully supported maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, that the Kurds should refrain 
from seeking independence, and that they had to integrate into a broad-based coalition 
and stop any support for terrorism. In addition, following the CIA team’s visit to 
Northern Iraq in February, the CIA wanted to re-establish a covert presence in the 
region to increase its intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities. The CIA would 
also give clandestine training to KDP and PUK paramilitary personnel in the US.  
Washington requested Ankara’s cooperation in facilitating the clandestine and secure 
transit of CIA personnel, who would regularly liaise with Turkish officials in Northern 
Iraq. Ankara, however, was wary of the intensifying contacts between the US and Iraqi 
Kurdish groups, and especially of CIA involvement. First, Ankara saw that the overall 
US strategy on Northern Iraq had evolved into full implementation of the Washington 
Agreement to unify the region’s two separate administrations. The KDP and PUK 
appeared cautious of any US military operation without solid guarantees of the removal 
of Saddam. They benefited from the status quo and had established a quasi-independent 
Kurdish entity under the security umbrella of the NFZ and using 13 percent of the 
revenue from the Oil-for-Food Programme. Given their bitter history with Washington, 
including the US betrayal and Iraqi slaughter following the Algiers Agreement in 
1975,709 the Kurds looked for assurances of protection and a guarantee that regime 
change would not set their accomplishments back. The KDP and PUK recognised that 
the prospects for full independence remained low; they wanted a system that would 
guarantee Kurdish self-government without intervention from Baghdad, possibly 
integrating Kirkuk. For Iraqi Kurds, federalism and decentralisation, combining 
elements of geography and ethnicity, was the only solution for a post-Saddam Iraq, 
which Washington seemed to favour. Secondly, for Ankara, the prospects of a US 
military operation and the need for their cooperation would put the Iraqi Kurds in a 
powerful negotiating position with Washington.710 The Kurds could attempt to seize 
Kirkuk in return for their cooperation. Thirdly, Ankara’s relations with the KDP were 
strained due to Barzani’s nationalist statements, the KDP’s mistreatment of the 
709 Douglas Little, ‘The United States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 
12:4 (2010), pp.63-98.  
710 Prepared Statement of Parris, in Hearings to Examine. 
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Turkomen people, and its relationship with the PKK. Ankara believed the KDP’s 
increased contacts with the US could encourage it to advance its anti-Turkish course. 
The major US concern was thus not the state of KDP-PUK relations, but the 
deteriorated relationship between the KDP and Turkey.  
At the strategic level, US officials continually reiterated the public US line to their 
Turkish counterparts. This ran that the president had no plan on his desk and that 
Turkey’s concerns would be considered while shaping US policy on Iraq. The officials 
further declared that the US remained committed to maintaining Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, checking the aspirations of the Iraqi Kurds, and prioritising the security of the 
Turkomen people. The US assured Ankara that it would in no way permit a unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Iraqi Kurds in the event of a military operation. 
Washington also delivered a warning to the Iraqi Kurds that if the Turkish army entered 
and controlled Northern Iraq, the US would certainly stand by its strategic ally, Turkey. 
For Ankara, these assurances were unsatisfactory policy statements short on details of 
eventual US objectives in Iraq. Ankara felt frustrated by the absence of an open 
dialogue with the US on strategic issues related to Iraq’s future while receiving 
‘piecemeal’ requests. For Ankara, a thorough dialogue on where the overall Iraq 
strategy was headed was a prerequisite of acceding to US requests. Ankara felt the CIA 
presence in Northern Iraq would simply make it appear an accomplice of subversive US 
activities. Ankara again looked for clarification on US strategy. The primary issue was 
whether Washington was resolved to undertake military action. Despite the official line 
that the president had not decided on war plans, Bush had publicly stated that he had 
made up his mind that Saddam had to go.711 The second issue was about the nature of 
broader strategic US thinking on the future of Iraq, as well as the degree of US 
engagement after a regime change. Consequently, in early May, Ankara’s frustration at 
the absence of a detailed discussion was sufficient for it to reject Washington’s request 
for CIA deployment in Northern Iraq through Turkey. Turkey thus signalled that it 
would approve no US request without being treated as a full strategic partner. 
Turkey’s trust gap on US strategy further expanded when reports leaked out of a secret 
meeting in April between the CIA, senior American officials, and Barzani and Talabani. 
The meeting had reportedly been about improving the military and intelligence 
capabilities of the Kurdish groups, and Barzani and Talabani had also insisted on 
711 Bush made this statement during an interview with ITV Television Network in April 2002. See, 
Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp.119-120. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                174 
 
American guarantees of protection.712 In addition, Ankara was concerned about the split 
within the Bush administration over Iraq’s future.713 There were signs that the State 
Department would deal with the INA, SCIRI, KDP and PUK as a ‘Group of Four’ 
representing the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds respectively, but excluding the ITF, to the 
annoyance of Ankara. Moreover, the KDP had presented a draft constitution as a basis 
for negotiations within the opposition. 
6.3. Road to Turkey-US Consultations on Iraq Policy 
For Washington, Ankara’s rejection of the transit of CIA teams to Northern Iraq was a 
reminder that the US had to assuage Turkey’s concerns about the American strategy and 
particularly its uneasiness about US contacts with the KDP and PUK. Consequently, in 
mid-June, Washington briefed Ankara about CIA contacts with Kurdish groups to 
demonstrate US determination to have open dialogue and coordination with Turkey. In 
addition, KDP Deputy Chairman Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara on 4–7 July to 
restore relations with Turkey. His key message was that the KDP’s relationship with 
Turkey took precedence over that with the US. The second US move was to schedule a 
senior-level delegation to Ankara in July, co-chaired by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz and Grossman, by then undersecretary of state for political affairs, with 
a detailed briefing on US policy on Iraq. 
In early July, Turkey’s domestic politics plunged into a chaos following the dissolution 
of Ecevit’s DSP, the leading partner in the three-party coalition government. 
Speculations about Ecevit’s health led to the involvement of the Turkish military in 
redesigning the political system. Ecevit dismissed calls for his resignation, and many 
leading figures of his party and influential members of the cabinet resigned in response. 
Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), insisted that the 
three-party coalition government needed a renewed mandate. As a result, the 
government announced that early elections would be held on 3 November 2002.714 
Henceforth, the fragile three-party coalition remained a lame-duck government. 
According to Ecevit, the reasons for the collapse of his party were directly linked to US 
involvement. He claimed Washington had executed a plan to dispose of his government 
after he resisted and delayed US plans to invade Iraq. Washington, according to Ecevit, 
712 Alan Sipress, ‘Bush Officials, Iraqis Meet to Explore Hussein’s Ouster’, Washington Post, 13 May 
2002. 
713 Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
714 Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), pp.51-64; 
Fikret Bila, Ankara'da Irak Savas�ları. 
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sought a new government more open to granting US requests.715 However, the then 
NSC Europe and Eurasia Director Matthew Bryza rejects Ecevit’s claim outright as 
‘completely ridiculous.’716 Ziyal, by then Undersecretary of the MFA, observes that he 
saw no resistance from Ecevit and that the coalition government was already engaged in 
discussions with the US on Iraq and seemed inclined to meet all US requests.717  
Finally, Cyprus remained an important topic in Turkey’s relations with the US during 
this period. UN-sponsored negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots were 
underway with a June target date for an agreement on the island. However, the 
negotiations were not proceeding with sufficient urgency to reach a comprehensive 
settlement before the EU’s upcoming decision on enlargement at the Copenhagen 
Council on 12 December; a date with critical importance for both for Turkey’s EU bid 
and Greek Cypriot accession to the EU.  
6.4. First Detailed Turkey-US Consultations on Iraq, July 2002 
The first in-depth Turkey-US political consultations on Iraq took place during 
Wolfowitz’s visit to Ankara on 17 July 2002. His key message was that Saddam 
continued to pose a threat to the international community and defy UNSCRs on Iraq’s 
disarmament. Secondly, if President Bush decided on a military option, the US would 
ensure the fall of Saddam’s regime. Thirdly, Iraq would have a democratic future, in 
which the rights of all groups, including the Turkomen, would be respected. Fourth, the 
US would not permit the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. It would 
conclude no agreements with the Kurds on that matter, and it would also oppose any 
Kurdish move to integrate Kirkuk and Mosul into their region. US contacts with the 
KDP and PUK were therefore in conformity with the policy of maintaining Iraq’s 
territorial integrity. Fifth, the military operation would be planned to prevent a possible 
refugee flow to Turkey. Sixth, Washington acknowledged and would seek 
compensation for the ramifications of a possible military action on Turkey’s economy. 
The US would ensure that Turkey would become one of the main beneficiaries of 
regime change in Iraq. Lastly, the US would exchange information on Iraq’s WMD 
capabilities and would deploy Patriot missile defence systems to protect Turkey from 
Iraq’s missile attacks.718 Wolfowitz neither presented a war plan nor made any requests 
715 Fikret Bila, interviewed by author, Ankara, 26 July 2012, 
716 Bryza, interview.  
717 Ziyal, interviews (2010 and 2012).   
718 For the Confidential Memo of the 17 July 2002 Meeting between Ziyal and Wolfowitz, see Annex 1 in 
Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, pp.252-254. 
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related to a possible US military action. He said that the US wanted to create a future 
Iraq with Turkey, whose support would accelerate and minimise the risks of military 
action and help ensure early success and regime collapse. However, Turkish 
cooperation would not affect the US decision to conduct military action. During the 
talks, senior Turkish officials underlined that all diplomatic means had to be exhausted 
before any military action, and that international legitimacy was imperative for use of 
force in Iraq. The decision by the Ecevit government to open up bilateral, dual-track 
consultations on political and military issues on Iraq was the most significant outcome 
of Wolfowitz’s visit. Ankara cautioned Washington that the opening of negotiations did 
not imply its commitment to US policy on Iraq.719  
Turkey then gave permission for the transit of the CIA’s Northern Iraq Liaison Element 
(NILE) to the region. The NILE teams, accompanied by a TSF team, entered Northern 
Iraq on 21 July 2002. Ankara agreed to extend the stay of the NILE teams despite its 
uneasiness with some of their activities and tensions with the TSF teams on the ground. 
Ecevit remarked in a meeting with senior Turkish officials that the Bush administration 
was determined to wage war on Iraq, which would put the US, Turkey and the region 
into serious jeopardy.720 A further trust gap on the US Iraq strategy emerged when the 
US decided to convene a meeting of the steering committee with six major Iraqi 
dissident groups on 9 August,721 excluding the ITF despite Ankara’s repeated calls for 
Turkomen representation. Following a tough Turkish reaction, Washington assured 
Ankara that the ITF would henceforth take part in all US-supported Iraqi opposition 
activities.722  
By mid-summer, despite its still divergent views on whether to go to war,723 the Bush 
administration began to formulate its goals and strategy on Iraq. The State Department, 
the NSC, and other agencies devised strategies that highlighted different versions of 
success and what was meant by regime change in Iraq. In the end, the administration 
approved a modified NSC plan of 14 August entitled ‘Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy’ 
to ensure consistency within the US government.724 In line with Bush’s dual-track 
719 Tahsin Burcuoğlu, interviewed by author, Paris, 1 September 2011. The NILE team departed from 
Northern Iraq on 25 August 2002. 
720 Burcuoğlu, interview.  
721 Feith, War and Decision, pp.280-281. 
722 Cable 02Ankara7980 dated 7 November 2002, ‘Iraqi Opposition: Ensuring Turkomen Front Inclusion 
in Opposition Activities and USG Statements to Get Turkish Support for Regime Change’,  
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/11/02ANKARA7980.html 
723 Haass, War of Necessity, pp.222-223. 
724 Feith, War and Decision, pp.277-289; Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp.154-155. 
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approach, Central Command (CENTCOM), assured of basing rights from Gulf 
countries, presented an updated war plan to the president on 5 August. The use of 
Turkish territory and ensuring Turkey’s consent to open up a northern front were 
essential to US military planning.725  
As the US Iraq strategy evolved, Turkey devised an action plan formulated in a 
memorandum on 14 August titled ‘The Scenarios about Iraq and Turkey’s Position.’726 
The report argued that regional countries would have problems with the emergence of a 
democratic Iraq because of their domestic political structures. A large-scale and long-
term US deployment in the region would potentially upset the domestic Saudi balance, 
while Syria, benefiting from the status quo in Iraq, would object to US intervention. 
More importantly, Iran would prefer a Shiite-led Iraq with a decentralised power 
structure as providing it more influence in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
remained an important problem which created a negative perception of the US as 
Israel’s partner. The paper proposed four possible scenarios for Iraq’s future: The first 
was the continuation of a unitary, centralised Iraq—with or without Saddam—which 
would only be possible through a non-military settlement. This was also the most 
unlikely scenario since the US clearly sought regime change, and the Iraqi Kurds 
vehemently objected to any centralised system. The second and third scenarios were the 
emergence of a decentralised political structure short of federalism or federalism itself. 
In both scenarios, US military action would lead to a post-Saddam system with Kurdish 
groups controlling Northern Iraq, the Turkomen community becoming a minority in that 
region, and separate Sunni and Shiite structures in central and southern Iraq. Given 
Kurdish aspirations to incorporate Kirkuk, it was crucial to convey to Washington that 
Turkey had a vital interest in preventing such incorporation and in protecting the rights 
of the Turkomen. The fourth scenario was Iraq’s disintegration, which could only occur 
if the Kurds played a decisive role in a US military effort, the Shiites decided to 
establish their own independent state, the US agreed with the unintended consequences 
of its military action, and Turkey did not intervene. The memorandum concluded that 
Turkey had clear redlines with regard to developments in Iraq: territorial 
dismemberment of Iraq; establishment of an independent Kurdish state; Kurdish control 
over Kirkuk; formation of decentralised structures where the Turkomen would become 
a minority group; and continued PKK presence in Northern Iraq.  
725 Bush, Decision Points, pp.235-239. 
726 Confidential MFA Memo of 14 August 2002 titled ‘The Scenarios about Iraq and Turkey’s Position.’ 
See Annex 3 in Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları.  
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In terms of recommendations, the memo noted that Turkey should refrain from taking 
part in any military action that lacked international legitimacy, and had to take into 
account the position of the major Arab countries in the region. Turkey should assume no 
role in any military intervention without seeing and agreeing the full picture of US 
objectives in advance with Washington. It speculated that, in the event of military 
action, US plans would, at minimum, involve the use of Turkish territory, airspace, 
ports, military bases and facilities. The US would also potentially ask for Turkey’s 
direct military involvement. For Turkey, there were two options: The first was to seek a 
non-military solution to the Iraqi question. Iraq remained unresponsive to Turkey’s 
warnings and the US appeared committed to regime change even if it required military 
intervention. The second option was passive involvement in a military action by 
granting permission for US deployment through Turkey without troop contribution, 
provided that the use of force had international legitimacy. A US military action would 
have serious political, military, and economic repercussions on Turkey and on Iraq’s 
territorial integrity and the regional balance of power. Turkey would also struggle to 
retain influence in Northern Iraq if the Kurdish groups had a larger role through 
assisting the US military effort. Additional challenges would be preventing Iranian and 
Syrian intervention in the region and refugee flow to Turkish borders. Ankara, 
therefore, had to enlarge the Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq in advance of 
US military action and deploy massive numbers of troops during the hostilities. This 
strategy would enable the destruction of the PKK presence in the region, direct contacts 
with the Turkomen people, and control of the corridor linking the KDP region with 
Syria. Lastly, the report advised the launch of direct contacts with Iraqi opposition 
groups.  
6.5. The US Shares Military Plans with Turkey  
Bilateral Turkey-US discussions on Iraq expanded with Ziyal’s visit to Washington on 
26–29 August 2002, on which the Bush administration placed special importance. 
Ecevit’s governing coalition had nearly dissolved and the early elections in November 
would most likely produce a fundamental change in the Turkish political landscape. 
According to the polls, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AK Party) expected a clear victory. Washington viewed Ziyal as a key actor in the 
decision-making process in the upcoming months in the event of a governmental 
change.727 Consequently, Ziyal had an unprecedented reception in Washington, 
727 Ziyal, interview (2012).  
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including teleconferences with Cheney and Rumsfeld, and visits with Powell and other 
senior US officials. He was given a detailed briefing on plans for military action—the 
first time the US shared its thinking on the Iraq War with Turkey. Nevertheless, US 
officials reiterated that the president had still made no decision on the military option. 
The plans involved the ‘Northern Option’, the use of Turkish territory, air space, and 
military installations for air and ground capabilities. According to US officials, the 
Northern Option was  
critical to accelerate the operation and minimise the risks, deter any Iraqi 
attack on Kurds and Turcoman, hold Iraqi forces in place, provide 
opportunities for Iraqi forces to switch sides, exploit early success and 
early regime collapse, assist in post-conflict operations, keep 
Kirkuk/Mosul under national control, [and] provide humanitarian 
assistance and refugee control. It is the key for controlling the post-
Saddam Hussein situation, including territorial integrity and key 
infrastructure.728  
The force concept for the Northern Option included land forces of up to one army corps, 
the use of combat and support aircraft, and special operation forces. Turkey’s support 
for this plan would be crucial in generating international support for regime change, 
preparing the battlefield, and accelerating the operations. It would also be essential for 
fixing Iraqi forces in the north, controlling the post-Saddam situation, and reducing risk 
and vulnerability for major ethnic groups. According to US military officials, the 
ground forces would be composed of troops from members of the coalition and any 
Turkish contribution would be at Ankara’s discretion. Ziyal was assured of the US 
administration’s commitment to continue close and fully transparent consultations on 
Iraq and to address Turkish concerns as plans continued to unfold. The US would also 
ensure that military action would respect Turkey’s redlines. Ziyal then advised his 
counterparts of the major contours of the Turkish position. First, it was not yet possible 
for Turkey to commit to support US plans for Iraq as it had to address three important 
issues in the coming months. Ankara’s first priority was to get a definite and 
unconditional date at the EU’s 12 December 2002 Copenhagen summit to begin EU 
accession negotiations. Its second priority was the on-going direct negotiations between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots towards a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, on the basis 
of which the EU was expected to make a crucial decision on the island’s accession. 
Turkey was also facing these problems on the eve of parliamentary elections that were 
expected to introduce landmark changes in the Turkish political scene. For Ankara, Iraq 
728 Ibid. 
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remained secondary to these pressing issues. Second, in terms of Iraq strategy, a 
military action would create long-lasting consequences for regional stability, and 
Ankara stressed the need to reflect on all possible implications. Third, according to the 
Turkish Constitution, any Turkish support for a military action that involved foreign 
troop deployments in Turkey, or the sending of Turkish troops abroad, had to be 
approved by the TBMM, for which international legitimacy in the form of a UNSCR 
would be required. Deployment of any foreign troops other than that of the US, 
including British and French, was inadmissible given the historical baggage, a reference 
to Turkish resentment about the British and French role in the region during World War 
I and its aftermath. More importantly, any multinational force presence in Turkey would 
potentially create the impression of being an occupation force. Fourth, granting 
permission for the US requests on the NILE was contingent upon reaching an agreement 
on the modalities of conduct between the teams and the TSK. Following the meetings in 
the White House, Rice asked Ziyal what would induce Turkey to support US military 
action in Iraq. Ziyal responded, ‘international legitimacy and consensus, nothing less’; 
an answer that apparently upset Rice. Ziyal’s visit to Washington removed any 
remaining doubts in Ankara about whether the US was on course for military action.729  
In August, the US administration debated the need to seek a UNSCR. Following intense 
deliberations within the administration and a meeting with UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, Bush decided to seek a UNSCR. The UN track became an essential component of 
coercive diplomacy in addition to building up US forces in the region.730 Henceforth, 
the challenge for the US would be convincing the international community that the US 
would avoid war if Iraq fully complied with its disarmament obligations while 
simultaneously pursuing regime change.731 Bush also applied to Congress for a mandate 
for use of force against Iraq.  
In his speech before the UN General Assembly on 12 September, Bush laid out the US 
case against Saddam and described his regime as a ‘grave and gathering danger.’ Bush 
first articulated why the Iraqi regime could not be allowed to acquire WMD. Secondly, 
the speech suggested that the outcome of the UN process would in no way deter the US 
729 Ziyal, interview (2012); Yetkin, Tezkere, pp.74-75. 
730 Bush, Decision Points, pp.235-239; Cheney, In My Time, p.391; Rice, No Higher Honor, pp.179-181; 
Colin Powell, It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), pp.209-211; 
Feith, War and Decision, p.298; Alastair Campbell and Richard Stott, The Blair Years: Extracts from the 
Alastair Campbell Diaries (London: Arrow Books, 2008), pp.634-636; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 
pp.177-178; Haass, War of Necessity, pp.214-216. 
731 Rice, No Higher Honor, p.183; Feith, War and Decision, p.305.  
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from addressing the perceived threat from Saddam.732 On the same day, Washington 
approached Ankara, stating that certain actions were to be carried out following Ziyal’s 
visit. The first was a request for immediate Turkey-US military-to-military 
consultations in developing US military plans. Second, the US sought to secure 
agreement for the prompt deployment of two semi-permanent NILE teams to 
Sulaymaniyah and Salahaddin in Northern Iraq. The US proposal was to establish a 
local liaison between the NILE teams and Turkish officials through a Joint Operation 
Centre either in Silopi or in Northern Iraq. Turkey would be a full partner and involved 
in collecting intelligence in Northern Iraq. Third, the US requested immediate and 
discreet pre-deployment site visits to bases, military installations and airports in İncirlik, 
Diyarbakır, Afyon, Antalya, Mersin, İskenderun, Batman and Silopi. Fourth, the US 
requested Turkish consent for U-2 overflights. Lastly, the US reiterated its commitment 
to coordinating with Turkey any significant development regarding its policy towards 
Iraq. 
Ankara had thus reached the point where it had to make a political decision on the US 
requests. On 16 September, Ziyal briefed Ecevit and underscored that agreement with 
these requests would signal willingness to cooperate with the US on Iraq strategy. 
Ankara had to remain noncommittal to US requests to defer the perception that Turkey 
would subscribe to the US strategy of military action. Second, the scope of cooperation 
had to be commensurate with the US response to Turkish concerns and demands. Third, 
international legitimacy was imperative for Turkish support for and contribution to US 
military action. Fourth, it was vital to get definite US assurances on Turkey’s redlines. 
Fifth, US military action would create serious complications for the fragile Turkish 
economy and the economic reform programme underway. Therefore, the potential 
economic impact had to be examined, and a request made for early and substantial 
financial support from the US. In fact, there were signs that the Bush administration had 
already made preparations for an ‘Assistance Strategy for Turkey’. Sixth, Turkey’s 
priorities were the EU and Cyprus, and potential involvement with the US in Iraq could 
not take precedence over these issues. Turkey was faced with a dilemma as the Greek 
Cypriot part of the island might accede to the EU before a comprehensive settlement 
was reached, and before Turkey received a date for accession negotiations. This would 
have severe repercussions for the future of the island, and Turkey’s relations with both 
Greece and the EU. Ankara, therefore, had to seek Washington’s support for the EU 
732 Feith, War and Decision, pp.302-309. 
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Copenhagen summit and Cyprus negotiations.733 Ecevit’s solution was to defer the 
decision on the US requests until after Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
Şükrü Gürel’s visit to Washington on 17-18 September. Washington increased pressure 
for a swift decision on the Ecevit Government, which decided to table the issue in the 
MGK meeting on 30 September.  
Following KDP-PUK agreement on the revised version of the KDP’s draft 
constitution,734 the unified Kurdish Parliament met in full session in Erbil in early 
October; its first meeting in many years. It also approved the constitution, which set out 
a loose federal structure for Iraq’s future, in which the Kurdish-controlled region would 
incorporate Kirkuk as its capital and retain the Peshmerga as its armed forces.735 Ankara 
believed that the Kurdish move reflected their desire for an independent Kurdistan. 
Consequently, as Park observed: 
Ankara intensified its warnings to Washington that war could raise the 
risk of an enlarged, oil-rich, and more autonomous if not fully 
independent Kurdish self-governing entity emerging in Northern Iraqi 
territory—whether by design, default, or through opportunistic 
exploitation of chaos and uncertainty.736  
Ankara noted the US policy to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as statements 
of Powell and Rumsfeld that the US would not support an independent Kurdish state.737 
Yet, from Turkey’s perspective, the message that Powell relayed to the Kurdish 
Parliament was another sign of the US accommodating the Kurdish drive for federalism 
in order to enlist their support for military action. Barzani’s statements about defining 
KDP’s relationship with the PKK as one of a mutual respect compounded Turkish 
wariness.  
6.6. Turkey-US Military-to-Military Talks 
On 7 October 2002, following the deliberations of the MGK,738 Ankara responded to 
the US requests for cooperation on military planning on Iraq. The key condition was 
that exhausting all the political and diplomatic solutions to the Iraq question had to 
733 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
734 Carol Migdalovitz, ‘Iraq: The Turkish Factor’, CRS Report for Congress, 31 October 2002. 
735 Chris Kutschera, ‘Iraqi Kurds Agree to Agree – for Now’, The Middle East, 329 (2002), pp.25-27; 
Chris Kutschera, ‘Federalism First’, The Middle East, 335 (2003), pp.20-21, cited in Bill Park, ‘Iraq’s 
Kurds and Turkey’, Parameters (2004), pp.18-30. 
736 Park, ‘Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey’, p.22 
737 Statement by Secretary of State Colin Powell in Next Steps in Iraq; Statement by Rumsfeld in US 
Policy on Iraq.  
738 The Confidential MFA Memo of 26 September 2002 titled, ‘Preparation for Political Decision’ 
became the basis of MGK deliberations. The memo is published as Annex 4 in Bila, Ankara’da Irak 
Savaşları.   
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precede military action. Second, if military action became unavoidable, it had to have 
international legitimacy. Third, Turkey agreed to start military-to-military consultations 
to enable the US to soundly assess its options for military preparations, but emphasised 
that this did not represent commitment to cooperate in potential military action. Fourth, 
Turkey would allow U-2 flights over Turkish airspace subject to the presence of Turkish 
personnel at the ground liaison unit in Diyarbakır and intelligence sharing. Fifth, the 
NILE teams could transit into Northern Iraq through Turkey. However, the teams’ 
modus operandi had to be agreed with the TGS prior to the commencement of any 
activities, Turkish participation was a precondition to ensure substantive intelligence 
sharing and information, and smooth cooperation would depend upon the ability of 
American officials to check the ambitions of the Kurdish groups. Sixth, to deflect any 
public attention from the proposed site surveys, Ankara would directly provide the US 
with information on Turkish bases, military installations and facilities. Seventh, the 
transfer of opposition elements from Northern Iraq to the US via Turkey for military 
training would only be allowed if Turkish personnel took full part in the screening and 
interview processes. Turkey’s additional consent would be needed for those persons 
who were to be sent back to Northern Iraq.  
The positive response to some of the American requests was a significant step forward 
in the Turkish position on possible US military action in Iraq. During previous 
discussions with the US, Ankara had questioned the virtue and urgency of a military 
course, and its primary concern had been to get US assurances about Turkey’s redlines. 
The US position, however, had dealt in broad principles and fell short on details of the 
plans for Iraq’s future. For Ankara, the new Turkey-US discussions had to focus 
particularly on ‘the day after.’ In any case, the TBMM’s approval was necessary for US 
requests to expand ONW, use Turkish territory, military installations, and ports during a 
military action, and deploy US troops in Turkey. The scope of Turkish cooperation 
would depend upon agreement on political and military issues, including US plans for a 
post-Saddam Iraq, and especially the future status of Northern Iraq. Another crucial 
factor would be the US approach to compensation for Turkey’s potential economic 
losses from military action. The Turkish finance ministry launched a study of possible 
economic impacts as a basis for economic talks to define US assistance to Turkey. 
However, any US assistance package would be subject to congressional approval, and 
Turkey had often had difficulty with Congress’ Greek and Armenian lobbies. For 
Ankara, despite US assurances, a gap remained to any definite understanding with 
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Washington on Iraq. From the Turkish perspective, official US discourse 
notwithstanding, the US still did not perceive Turkey as a strategic partner on a par with 
Israel. The consultations on Iraq would be a test case for the future course of Turkey-US 
relations. Ankara would continue to emphasise the need to exhaust all diplomatic 
options and to highlight the likely repercussions of a military course. However, Ziyal 
again reminded the government that entering the talks would mean Turkey would be 
involved in the planning for the Iraq War, and reversing that course could prove 
impossible.739  
In October, US momentum toward military action became evident. On 11 October, the 
Bush administration secured overwhelming congressional endorsement for use of force 
against Iraq.740 Also in October, the US forwarded additional military planning requests 
to Turkey through its European Command (EUCOM). The government, and particularly 
TSK Chief of Staff General Özkök, were stunned by the scale of the requests to deploy 
80,000 US and coalition troops, 250 combat and support aircraft in six airports and the 
use of eight others, and the use of three major ports to attack Iraq through Turkey.741 
The US military plans gave the Northern and Southern Option equal importance in a 
military attack. For Ankara, the US wanted Turkey to write it a blank cheque; 
inconceivable for any Turkish political party. Moreover, the US had yet to share its 
thinking and designs for a post-Saddam Iraq and regional order. Many scenarios had 
been debated in Washington, including the dismemberment of Iraq, the establishment of 
US military rule, grand regional schemes such as unifying Iraq with Jordan,742 and the 
premise that any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict depended on regime change 
in Iraq. A confidential MFA memo of 15 October, titled ‘New US Requests’, stated: 
These US requests are so momentous … The challenge we face is 
whether to grant permission for deployment of a number of foreign 
troops in our country unprecedented in Republican history. Agreement 
with US requests … will definitely provoke public reaction … Our 
economy will be swiftly affected … It is most likely that the preparations 
for such a deployment will need to start before our condition for 
international legitimacy in the form of a UNSC resolution is obtained.743 
The memo conceded that the political, economic, and military consequences of such a 
deployment would be the same as actual military action, even if the US decided not to 
739 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
740 Bush, Decision Points, p.240; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, pp.435-436. 
741 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
742 For the confidential MFA memo of 15 October 2002 titled ‘New US Requests’, see Bila, Ankara’da 
Irak Savaşları, Annex 5.   
743 Ibid. Translated by author. 
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wage war at the last minute. The memo further underlined that Turkey would be on par 
with other regional countries that would host US forces that would occupy Iraq for a 
period of at least four to five years. This would create serious implications in Turkey, in 
the region, and beyond, provoking reactions from religious fundamentalists and some 
regional countries:  
The increased US presence in Turkey might evolve into a permanent 
one, integral to US designs to reshape the Middle East. Turkey’s ability 
to master its distinctive policies and regional weight will be diminished. 
Our already complex set of regional relations will be further 
compounded … In the end, it will not be exclusively the scope of 
Turkish support for the US military operation that will define whether an 
independent Kurdish state is established in Northern Iraq. It is also 
highly likely that Turkey will face violence and terrorism from domestic 
and external groups, including the PKK, leftist, and religiously motivated 
terrorist organisations. Turkey cannot shoulder the regional moral 
responsibility or financial burden of this intervention … As a result of 
US military action, an Iraqi state will emerge with a collapsed central 
authority, human capacity and economic structure, which will require 
restructuring efforts under conditions of severe instability.744  
As a result, the memo recommended that the government seek clarification from the US 
on a range of issues: whether the US requests reflected a definite decision in favour of 
military action or were just part of operational planning for the Northern Option; 
whether the US had sought a similar level of support from other regional countries and 
what responses it had received; the nature of US designs for Iraq and the region; the 
precise timeframe for military action and its aftermath; guarantees for the rights and the 
security of the Turkomen; the role of the Iraqi Kurds; the nature of US assurances for 
any Kurdish fait accompli; and how any Iraqi retaliation against Turkey would be 
prevented. Additional policy parameters were that Turkey would not grant permission 
for the forces of the other members of the coalition, including those from Britain and 
Australia, to enter Northern Iraq through Turkish territory. Turkey would deploy forces 
in the region, and would expect US cooperation and assistance to that end. More 
importantly, Ankara had to have a say in the shaping and rebuilding of a post-Saddam 
Iraq. US compensation to ease the burden on the Turkish economy was essential, and 
the Bush administration had to assure Ankara of congressional approval for the 
package. Lastly, NATO involvement had to be secured to guarantee Turkey’s national 
security.745  
744 Ibid. 
745 Ibid.  
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After Turkish agreement on their modus operandi, the NILE teams entered Northern 
Iraq on 17 October, and the first group of Iraqi opposition members to be trained in the 
US transited through Turkey on 21 October 2002. Simultaneously, General Ralston of 
SACEUR and General Franks of CENTCOM visited Ankara to lobby for Turkish 
support. Bush called Sezer on 23 October and told him that the US was committed to 
working on the Iraqi question with Turkey as its strategic partner, and took Turkish 
concerns fully into account. Bush said he had taken no decision on military action, but 
looked for full Turkish support if it came down to the use of force. His administration 
was working on a substantial financial package to lessen the economic impact of a 
military action on Turkey provided that it fully cooperated with the US. The 
continuation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme by the new 
government following the 3 November elections would be crucial for congressional 
approval of the assistance package. Bush also encouraged progress in the Cyprus talks 
and described his efforts to lobby EU leaders over a date for accession talks at the 
Copenhagen summit. In response, Sezer once more emphasised the need for 
international legitimacy and consensus if Turkey were to support US military action.746 
In separate discussions with the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, US officials 
requested that Turkey make its decision on the northern front by the NATO summit in 
Prague on 20 November. This was the first of many deadlines that the US 
administration would set in future discussions with Turkey.747  
Washington believed General Özkök would be equally as important as Ziyal with 
regard to the decision-making process in Turkey on whether to support US military 
action in Iraq. Özkök had replaced General Kıvrıkoğlu in August 2002 and seemed to 
Washington to be ‘more democratically oriented and Atlanticist than his 
predecessors.’748 Given the expectation of an AK Party victory in the upcoming 
elections and the sour relationship of the TGS with the forefathers of the movement 
from which it had evolved, Özkök was seen as a key figure who would have great 
impact on the new Turkish political scene. General Myers invited Özkök to visit 
Washington on 4–9 November 2003, and his visit began the first day after the landslide 
AK Party victory in the 3 November election. Like Ziyal, Özkök had an extraordinary 
reception in Washington. He had discussions with a wide-range of senior US officials, 
746 İldem, interview. 
747 Author’s personal account. 
748 Cable 03Ankara2521 dated 18 April 2003, ‘The Turkish General Staff: A Fractious and Sullen 
Political Coalition’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2521.html 
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including Rice, Powell, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, General Myers, and a teleconference 
with Cheney, receiving detailed briefings on US war plans. Özkök advised US officials 
of the importance of respecting Turkey’s redlines, the need for international legitimacy, 
and the necessity of substantial compensation for economic losses,749 which he viewed 
as key elements of any case to the Turkish public that cooperation with the US would be 
less harmful to Turkey’s interests than non-cooperation.750 Özkök stated that the TSK 
accepted the AK Party’s victory and would work with the new government.751 He also 
said that it was up to the new government to have the final say on whether Turkey 
would support and contribute to US military action, reaffirming his position in previous 
meetings with his American counterparts in Ankara in October.752  
6.7. Entry of the AK Party onto the Turkish Political Scene, November 2002 
The AK Party, established in 2001 under the charismatic leadership of former İstanbul 
mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, entered Turkish politics calling for clean politics, a 
liberal economic policy, development, prosperity, and traditional values; messages 
which resonated deeply with the Turkish public. Its progressive and liberal messages on 
democracy, human rights, and the EU attracted broad-based support from a large swathe 
of the Turkish population. However, the Turkish establishment, mainly the TSK, 
remained wary of Erdoğan, and had already planned to isolate him from political life. In 
1998, while still mayor of İstanbul, Erdoğan had been convicted under Article 312 of 
the Penal Code for ‘inciting religious hatred’ for reciting a poem in a 1997 speech. As 
part of attempts to undermine his political status, the High Court of Appeals confirmed 
Erdoğan’s conviction in an exceptionally expeditious manner. This conviction had led 
the Supreme Election Board to decide that Erdoğan was ineligible to stand in the 1999 
elections according to the constitution, which banned anyone convicted under Article 
312.  
It was in this context that the AK Party won a landslide victory securing 362 seats in the 
TBMM with 34.3 percent of the vote. The Republican Peoples’ Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) finished second with 19.4 percent of the votes and 177 parliamentary 
seats. All three parties in the previous coalition failed to cross the 10 percent electoral 
749 Author’s personal account. 
750 Cable 03Ankara404 dated 16 January 2003, ‘Scenesetter for General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Visit to Turkey: Domestic and Regional Political Issues, Economic Situation, and Security 
Assistance’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA404.html  
751 Cable 02Ankara8165, Can AK Party Remove Obstacles to Party Leader Erdogan's Becoming P.M. 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/11/02ANKARA8165.html. 
752 Yetkin, Tezkere, p.85. 
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threshold. Consequently, only the AK Party and the CHP were represented in the 
TBMM and Turkey had its first majority government since 1991.753 Robins observed 
that the AK Party’s ‘formation of a single party government promised greater coherence 
in office.’754 Nevertheless, the AK Party faced several immediate political challenges. 
First, Erdoğan was ineligible to become prime minister, and the restoration of his 
political rights required a constitutional amendment. Therefore, another leading AK 
Party figure had to be presented to President Sezer for the premiership, an anomaly that 
made the political process more complicated. The second challenge was managing 
relations with Sezer, who remained suspicious of the AK Party agenda. The third 
challenge was the cool relationship with the Turkish military, which seemed to have 
accepted the AK Party’s victory, though unwillingly. Abdullah Gül, the second architect 
of the AK Party, received Sezer’s mandate to form the government on 16 November. 
Two days later, under Gül’s premiership, the AK Party government assumed office, 
marking the beginning of an era of transformative change in Turkish politics.  
The new government also inherited enormous domestic political and economic 
challenges. Its chief political objective was to amend the constitution to restore 
Erdoğan’s political rights, clearing the way for him to be elected to the TBMM and 
eventually become prime minister. However, this required overcoming resistance from 
Sezer and establishment circles, as well as securing CHP support in the two-thirds 
parliamentary majority required to change the constitution. The most pressing 
challenge, though, was the economic situation, fragile despite putative signs of upturn 
that autumn. The new government inherited an economic reform programme backed by 
the IMF which it had to abide by and urgently adapt to avoid another financial crisis.755 
The AK Party had developed an urgent action plan to address the economic challenges 
even before the election. When it assumed office, the economy was underperforming to 
such an extent that IMF officials sounded out the possibility of default—a suggestion 
that Minister of State in Charge of Economy Ali Babacan rejected outright.756 The AK 
753 For a detailed analysis of the AK Party’s election victory, see Soli Özel, ‘After the Tsunami,’ Journal 
of Democracy, 14:2 (2003), pp.80-94. 
754 Philip Robins, ‘The 2005 Brismes Lecture, A Double Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy 
Reconsidered’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 33:2 (2006), p.208 
755 Cable 02Ankara8111 dated 8 November 2002, ‘Problems Meeting the 2002 Primary Surplus Target’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/11/02ANKARA8111.html; Cable 02Ankara8064 dated 8 November 
2002, ‘The New Government's Economic Challenges, and Some Benchmarks’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/11/02ANKARA8064.html 
756 Ali Babacan, interviewed by author, Ankara, 20 July 2012. 
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Party designed a detailed and staggered ‘Emergency Action Plan’, which Erdoğan 
announced on 16 November, as Gül received the mandate to form a new government.757  
Finally, the three most urgent foreign policy challenges facing the government were the 
UN-sponsored negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, the question of 
whether Turkey could secure a date for starting accession negotiations at the 
Copenhagen summit, and the Iraq file. The AK Party had declared its top foreign policy 
priority to be Turkey’s accession to the EU. The leadership also viewed EU 
membership as a vehicle to reform democracy by removing the tutelage of the military 
over the political system.758 The EU Council in Copenhagen on 12–13 December would 
be crucial in Turkey’s drive to get a date to begin accession talks. For some observers, 
the AK Party’s pro-EU stance and commitment to the democratic reform process helped 
it gain political legitimacy ‘in the eyes of Turkey’s secular state tradition’ as well as the 
support of ‘Turkey’s pragmatic middle class, business community, and liberal 
intellectuals.’759 In fact, the Ecevit government had already introduced three extensive 
reforms packages in February, March and August to meet the political conditions for 
EU membership under the Copenhagen Criteria. The European Commission’s praise of 
Turkey’s reforms notwithstanding, it still remained for the EU to set a ‘conditional date’ 
pending further reforms.760 On 23 November, a week after assuming power, the AK 
Party government introduced a substantial democratic reform package to fully align 
Turkey with the EU’s political criteria and enhance the prospects of a date for accession 
talks.761 At the same time, Erdoğan started a tour of fourteen European capitals, as 
promised during the election campaign.762 
The second pressing foreign policy priority for the new government was the Cyprus 
settlement talks, which were continuing under UN auspices. In fact, the AK Party found 
on its desk UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s comprehensive settlement proposal—
the ‘Annan Plan’—as submitted to the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on 11 November. 
However, the prospects for a lasting settlement on the island before the Copenhagen 
summit, also expected to decide on the accession of ‘Cyprus’ to the EU, remained low. 
Turkey faced the dilemma that the EU could make a decision to admit Cyprus before a 
757 President Abdullah Gül, interviewed by author, Ankara, 12 July 2012. 
758 Çelik, interview.  
759 Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, ‘Turkey on the Brink’, Washington Quarterly, 29:3 (2006), pp.57-
70. 
760 Cable 02Ankara8110 dated 8 November 2002, ‘Turkey: Scenesetter for Codels Bereuter, Hastert, Issa, 
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761 Gül, interview. 
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settlement was reached and before Turkey had received a date for accession talks. 
Despite Ankara’s efforts to delink the settlement of the Cyprus question and Turkey’s 
EU accession, it was evident that it remained a tacit condition. The challenge for the 
government was to reach a settlement and thereby neutralise the Cyprus question ‘as an 
obstacle to Turkey’s EU process.’763 Erdoğan and the AK Party government adopted a 
bold and pragmatic approach underlining the need for compromise from both sides for a 
settlement. The government accepted the draft Annan Plan as a basis for solution, and 
Gül convinced an unwilling Rauf Denktaş, president of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, to start negotiating the draft plan.764  
In addition to the EU and Cyprus, the Iraq crisis posed a real challenge for the AK Party 
leadership. The government had to figure out the dynamics of the Iraqi situation from 
scratch. They had no detailed information on the Turkey-US discussions to date or the 
scope of US requests.765 Meanwhile, on 8 November 2002, the unanimously adopted 
UNSCR 1441 found Iraq in further ‘material breach’ of its international obligations and 
offered it ‘a final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences.’766 Iraq was 
given until 7 December to ‘make a full and accurate declaration of the state of its 
weapons program and to receive international inspectors to begin the process of 
verifying the declaration’s claims.’767 As the international road to war opened, the AK 
Party struggled to reconcile its conflicting feelings on the issue, as Ömer Çelik, a 
leading figure in the party, explained: 
As a political cadre that witnessed Halabja massacre, we were opposed 
to the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and believed that he had to be 
removed from power. Yet, we also fundamentally disagreed with the US 
plans for a military operation to achieve regime change since we 
believed that foreign intervention would have severe repercussions in 
Iraq and the region. Iraq, therefore, was one of the most debated topics 
during the formulation of the AK Party’s programme.768  
On 19 November 2002, only a day before a scheduled meeting between Bush and Sezer 
in Prague, Washington submitted the US thinking on Iraq and an additional list of 
requests for the Northern Option to the new AK Party government. At the meeting, 
American officials explained the dynamics of US position. First, President Bush clearly 
and forcefully laid out his concerns about the Iraqi regime. Iraq’s refusal to 
763 Robins, ‘Double Gravity State’, pp.199-211. 
764 Gül, interview. 
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unconditionally comply with the UNSCRs constituted a unique and growing threat to 
international peace and security. The US had worked diligently in the UNSC to resolve 
the matter peacefully with a view to offering Iraq a final opportunity to disarm 
peacefully through cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. Second, the US 
administration was resolved to lead a coalition to disarm Iraq if it continued to defy UN 
weapons inspections and hold onto its WMD. The best chance of successfully and 
peacefully resolving the problem now was a credible threat of use of force and a 
collective display of commitment to act militarily to disarm Iraq. The US, therefore, had 
made plans for potential military action to increase pressure on Iraq, and was seeking 
the broadest international support. Third, Washington forwarded an extensive list of 
requests to Turkey to assist or participate in the US military effort, most of which 
required TBMM approval, including: permission for the US and other coalition partners 
to have full access, basing and overflight rights; the deployment of air, ground and 
special operations forces, including 275 aircraft at military installations in İncirlik, 
Afyon, Diyarbakır, Batman and Çorlu; the establishment of a forward operating base at 
Silopi and theatre logistics at Mardin, with approximately 40,000 US personnel on 
Turkish territory, and an equivalent number of troops to be deployed in Northern Iraq 
through Turkey; seaport debarkation operations at Mersin, İskenderun and Taşucu to 
enhance force protection for US and coalition personnel and equipment at bases within 
Turkey; and the availability of equipment and supplies.769 Moreover, the US demanded 
permission for coordination cells to be established and to commence work no later than 
1 December on preparatory tasks at the approved sites, stating that it would provide 
substantial funds for construction at these bases. In addition, the US wanted to discuss 
the types of Turkish transportation and air combat capabilities that could be factored 
into planning for military operations. Washington viewed Turkish support as critical to 
the success of the military effort, which would both increase the chances of success by 
diplomatic means, and ensure a successful military outcome should the use of force 
become necessary. It also proposed a joint visit by Wolfowitz and Grossman in 
December for further consultations on Iraq.  
During the Bush-Sezer meeting in Prague the following day, the major topic of 
discussion was Iraq, though Cyprus and Turkey’s bid for EU membership also figured. 
Bush said that his administration looked for a swift Turkish response to the US requests 
for the Northern Option. He claimed the US was working on a substantial economic 
769 Deniz Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, pp.28-29. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                192 
 
assistance package, and would ensure the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. 
Sezer responded that Turkey shared US concerns about Iraq’s WMD, but again insisted 
on the need for military action to have international legitimacy and consensus, and said 
that Turkey would follow the progress of weapons inspections in line with UNSCR 
1441. According to Sezer, if Iraq did not comply with its obligations, there had to be a 
second UNSCR explicitly mandating the use of force in order for Turkey to support the 
US requests, an obligation he said was dictated by the Turkish constitution. Bush was 
apparently irritated by Sezer’s categorical approach to international legitimacy.770 
6.8. Expansion of Turkey-US Talks: Wolfowitz and Grossman in Ankara, 3 
December 2002  
Washington steadily mounted pressure for a Turkish decision in late November. During 
contacts with their Turkish counterparts, senior US officials insisted that time was 
running out for the Northern Option. The new AK Party government began to receive 
interagency briefings on Iraq and US requests. Secretary Rumsfeld also ordered a 
selective deployment of US troops to the Gulf region.771 
Wolfowitz and Grossman visited Ankara on 3 December for detailed talks on Turkey’s 
potential contribution to preparations for possible military action against Iraq and to 
convince Ankara of the ‘urgency for clarity’ on that matter.772 They met with Gül and 
the interagency group chaired by Ziyal, as well as Deputy Chief of Defence General 
Yaşar Büyükanıt. At the strategic level, Wolfowitz reiterated the US line that ‘President 
Bush had made no decision on whether to go to war with Iraq.’ He claimed the US 
sought to resolve the question peacefully, but that Iraq was to be disarmed of its WMD 
‘voluntarily if possible, but, if necessary, by force.’ Washington believed that only a 
show of force stood a chance of getting a positive result, and hence military 
preparations underpinned its diplomatic efforts. Wolfowitz said Washington primarily 
required Turkey’s involvement in planning and preparation for the use of force against 
Iraq. The US sought Turkey’s decision on the Northern Option by 6 December, while 
fully acknowledging that the AK Party government had only recently arrived in power. 
The specific US requests were:  
Resumption of military-to-military planning talks; permission to conduct 
site surveys and begin site preparation of specified Turkish military 
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facilities; Turkish participation in the development of the Northern 
Option; acceptance of proposed troop lists; removal of constraints on 
ONW; approval of overflight rights; and, support, if necessary, against 
terrorists in Northern Iraq.773  
It was most urgent that Turkey agree to resume planning talks on when to initiate site 
surveys, to be followed by site preparations. It was critical for the US in deciding 
whether to have a ‘Northern and Southern Option’ or switching war plans to solely 
pursue a Southern Option without Turkey’s assistance. According to Wolfowitz, 
Turkey’s agreement to a Northern Option would make the war ‘less risky, shorter in 
duration, and less economically damaging to Turkey’s and the region’s economies.’ It 
would limit the prospects of a power vacuum in Northern Iraq and would make post-
Saddam Iraq much easier to manage. Turkey’s non-cooperation, in contrast, could make 
the war ‘longer, costlier and less certain about events in Northern Iraq.’ On its strategic 
vision for Iraq’s future in the aftermath of regime change, Wolfowitz assured Turkish 
officials that the US totally concurred with Turkey’s redlines. The US administration 
also recognised Turkey’s concerns about the economic repercussions of military action 
and ‘President Bush was prepared to provide a substantial assistance package for 
Turkey.’ If Turkey fully cooperated with US requests for the Northern Option, the 
package would include: 
$2 billion/yr. for two years of some mix of FMF [Foreign Military 
Financing] and ESF [Economic Support Fund], the latter being 
synchronised with World Bank and IMF disbursements; $1 billion in oil 
to be donated by other nations; and, up to $500 million in local 
procurement by US Defense forces.774  
In the event war was avoided, the package would consist of $250 million in assistance 
in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year to be augmented by another $105 million. 
Additional benefits would be ‘closer cooperation on missile defence, greater access to 
excess defence articles, and improvements to facilities at İncirlik and Konya military 
bases.’775  
Nevertheless, there remained five areas where Turkey-US approaches diverged.776 First, 
the imposition of a deadline for a final decision on the US requests was a fundamental 
problem for the new AK Party government, which had not had the chance to examine 
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to make an informed decision and needed more time to consider US requests for 
Turkey’s possible contribution to the Northern Option, which also required 
parliamentary approval. However, resumption of military-to-military talks and 
permission to conduct site surveys of Turkish military facilities would be possible. The 
second was the US insistence on Turkey’s commitment before it had itself made a final 
decision on whether to wage war. Third, there was no convergence in Turkish and US 
foreign policy priorities since the Gül government faced more pressing issues than Iraq. 
For Turkey, the top priority was to obtain a date for accession negotiations at the EU 
Copenhagen Summit on 12 December 2002. An associated priority was the 
comprehensive settlement negotiations on Cyprus. The results of these two tracks would 
have a defining impact on Turkey’s ability to cooperate with the US on Iraq. From the 
US perspective, Bush would continue to exert every effort to endorse an EU decision to 
grant Turkey a date for accession negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit. A clear 
‘commitment to the UN Secretary General’s plan as a basis for settlement’ and ensuing 
progress in the Cypriot negotiations would also have a positive impact on getting a date 
from the EU for starting accession negotiations.777  
The fourth area of divergence was the proposed economic assistance package, which 
fell short of meeting Turkey’s expectations. Any US military action against Iraq would 
potentially damage the fragile Turkish economy and the on-going economic reform 
programme. Ankara believed the financial package on offer was no match for the risks 
and costs that Turkey would incur in the event of war. The Turkish counter proposal 
was the creation of a $20 billion stand-by arrangement for early and substantial US 
financial support to Turkey, bypassing IMF conditionality. This would allow Turkey to 
use the funds only to the degree of need and lessen the negative impacts on the 
economy. However, the US rebuffed Turkish criticism of the economic package and 
claimed the proposed numbers were too large for Washington. It was agreed to launch a 
third track of negotiations on economic and financial matters in addition to the political 
and military talks underway.  
The fifth area of divergence arose over site preparations. The US would spend $200–
300 million for site preparations, involving up to 6,000 engineers and logisticians. 
While these teams could not actually start work before mid-January, the US did want to 
know in advance ‘that Turkey would indeed allow US and possibly other coalition 
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troops to come to Turkey.’778 However, Turkish officials insisted that even the site 
preparation teams involved deployment of foreign troops in Turkey and so required 
authorisation from the TBMM, whose decision the Turkish government could not pre-
empt. Ziyal emphasised that Turkey’s agreement to work on contingency planning with 
the US should not be misinterpreted since he doubted any Turkish government or 
politician could secure TBMM permission for the deployment of tens of thousands of 
foreign troops. He also said that Ankara would not permit deployment of any foreign 
troops other than that of US, including British, given the historical baggage.779 The 
Turkish side also raised the question of US activities related to the Iraqi opposition, 
underscoring that they ‘had become too powerful, to the exclusion of the Turcoman.’780 
For Ankara, it was profoundly important that the Turkomen, the third largest component 
of the Iraqi population, take part in the core group. Lastly, in the event of war, Turkey 
was prepared to deploy forces to Northern Iraq and sought US assistance to assure the 
Iraqi Kurdish groups that the troops would not be there ‘as an occupying force.’781 
The concrete results of the Wolfowitz-Grossman mission to Ankara were the decision to 
resume military-to-military discussions, Turkish permission for site surveys, and the 
launch of economic talks. However, the US still had no proper understanding of internal 
Turkish political dynamics and foreign policy priorities. This could only widen the 
mutual expectations gap over cooperation on military action against Iraq. President 
Sezer’s insistence on a second UNSCR also diverged from the US position, which was 
that a new resolution was unnecessary and action could be undertaken by a ‘coalition of 
the willing.’ It also appeared that, while the US had not publicly opposed the 
deployment of Turkish troops into Northern Iraq, it preferred a single US operational 
command of all forces on the ground.  
6.9. Erdoğan in Washington, 10 December 2002 
By early December, Ankara was convinced that that the US was resolved to use force to 
change the Iraqi regime and that a political settlement to the Iraq question was most 
unlikely. Also, it understood that Turkey’s decision on the US requests for full and 
complete support would not be decisive in changing the Bush administration’s 
determination to wage war. From the US perspective, its commitments to respect 
778 Cable 02Ankara9058, 20 December 2002, ‘Wolfowitz and Grossman’. 
779 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
780 Cable 02Ankara9058, 20 December 2002, ‘Wolfowitz and Grossman’ 
781 Ibid. 
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Turkey’s redlines and a compensation package to lessen the economic impact of war 
meant it was now time for Ankara to stop delaying its decision. 
It was in this context that Bush invited Erdoğan to visit Washington. Washington 
viewed Erdoğan as the central figure in Turkish politics, holding the key to whether and 
to what extent the new AK Party government would cooperate with the US on Iraq. For 
Washington, Erdoğan’s visit would be an excellent opportunity and would yield many 
dividends for US interests. Firstly, treating Erdoğan as if he were already the head of 
government would demonstrate that the US respected the outcome of the election and 
supported the AK Party’s resolve for democratisation. Secondly, it would help establish 
US influence with the AK Party leadership. Finally, convincing Erdoğan would be 
crucial for Turkey ‘to make the right decisions on Iraq, Cyprus, and domestic political 
and economic reform.’ It would also demonstrate to the EU that the US strongly 
favoured a decision at the Copenhagen summit to set a date for Turkish accession 
talks.782 
On 10 December, Erdoğan received a warm reception from Bush, Cheney, Powell and 
other senior US officials. The vital issue for the Bush administration was to convince 
Erdoğan to support US military action, and Iraq was the main topic during the meetings. 
Bush spoke highly of Erdoğan’s leadership and of the AK Party’s electoral victory.783 
He acknowledged that Erdoğan had a difficult decision to make on whether and to what 
extent Turkey would support the US preparations for a possible military operation. The 
US, however, sought Turkey’s full and complete cooperation, and looked for a prompt 
response since time was short. In return, the administration would ensure Turkey’s 
redlines were observed, and do whatever it would take to secure congressional approval 
for the assistance package. The essence of the message was that ‘the lack of a yes from 
Turkey on Iraq would, for all intents and purposes, be a no.’784 Erdoğan presented his 
‘vision of Turkey as a prosperous, democratic, Muslim model.’785 He underscored that 
he shared US concerns about Saddam, opposed all oppressive regimes in principle, and 
favoured democratic change in Iraq. Erdoğan said that rallying the support of leading 
782 Cable 02Ankara8852 dated 4 December 2003, ‘Scenesetter for Dec. 9-10 Washington Visit of AK 
Party Chairman R. Tayyip Erdoğan’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/12/02ANKARA8852.html 
783 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-
9/11 World  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), p.177.  
784 Cable 02Ankara8996 dated 17 December 2002, ‘Defmin Hopes for Decision on Iraq within Days’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/12/02ANKARA8996.html 
785 Cable 03Ankara476 dated 21 January 2003, ‘Ambassador's Meeting with AK Party Leader Erdogan: 
Concerns about Got Economic Policy and Reforms’,  
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA476.html 
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Arab nations for the US strategy was essential since Turkey did not want to be the only 
Muslim nation endorsing US action. He also argued that the best possible outcome 
would be a solution similar to Nawaz Sharif’s forced departure from Pakistan.786  
Erdoğan was also briefed in the Pentagon on the US analysis of the Iraqi threat, US 
military plans, and the composition of the coalition of the willing. However, Erdoğan 
remained unconvinced of the US case against Saddam since it was short on concrete 
evidence and current information about Iraq’s WMD stocks and capacity. Erdoğan was 
also disturbed by Bush’s restrained response to his question about how the US would 
defend Turkey if it was attacked by Saddam.787 During the talks, Erdoğan repeated that 
the final decision was a parliamentary prerogative. He remained totally noncommittal 
on extending Turkish support for US military action.788  
6.10. Turkey-US Divergence on Financial Assistance and Turkish Deployment in 
Northern Iraq  
The next morning, on 11 December, the Turkey-US talks on the US economic 
assistance package began in Washington, DC. The Turkish delegation headed by 
Babacan met with a US delegation led by John B. Taylor, undersecretary of the US 
Treasury. Taylor presented the US proposal for the financial package, explaining that it 
had flexibility in the form of trade-offs between grants and loans, and that $1 billion in 
grants would be equivalent to an $8 billion loan. The Turkish delegation, in return, 
made a presentation showing different scenarios to explain the cost of the war to the 
Turkish economy. Under the most optimistic scenario, the estimated cost would be 
$92.2 billion over a five-year period (2002-2007), whereas the pessimistic scenario 
envisaged a cost of $138.1 billion. The short-term cost for 2003 was expected to be 
$21.6 billion. The US economics team challenged the figures by arguing that there was 
a huge bid-ask gap and that it was hard to objectively estimate the impact of the war on 
the Turkish economy.789 The widely differing Turkish and US estimates of Turkey’s 
potential economic losses led to the US assistance package falling far short of Turkey’s 
expectations.  
The second point of division in Turkey-US negotiations was the Turkish plans for a 
military deployment to Northern Iraq during the military action. US officials argued that 
786 Çelik, interview. 
787 Viewing cable 03Ankara626 dated 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Follow-Up Readout on AK Party Chairman 
Erdogan's Views’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA626.html 
788 Çelik,  interview; Cüneyt Zapsu, interviewed by author, Ankara, 22 July 2012. 
789 Taylor, Global Financial Warriors, pp.179-180. 
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they were worried about a unilateral Turkish intervention and preferred Turkish troops 
to act with coalition forces under a single US command. US thinking was expressed in a 
confidential State Department memo of 26 September 2002:  
Turkey could move to occupy Northern Iraq to ensure that Kurdish 
nationalism there does not spill over and fuel irredentist tendencies 
amongst its own large Kurdish minority. Iran, attacked by Baghdad in 
the past, will likely seek to expand its influence in Iraq through contacts 
with Iraqi Shiite Muslim and through longstanding relationships with 
Kurdish parties in the North. Iran could also unilaterally seek to rectify 
some of its outstanding territorial disputes with Iraq, particularly if 
Turkey moved into Northern Iraq … We should begin bilateral 
consultations to lay down clear redlines to prevent such meddling.790 
On 12-13 December, the EU summit in Copenhagen decided to review Turkey’s 
accession process in December 2004 without setting a date to start accession 
negotiations and to admit ‘Cyprus’ to the EU before a settlement was reached on the 
island. This fell short of Turkey’s expectations of a clear date for accession talks. The 
accession of the Greek part of the island to the EU before a settlement further 
complicated the negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.  
By mid-December, Ankara had weighed its options in supporting the US. On 16 
December, the Gül government gave permission for US site surveys at the requested 
military installations, airports, and ports. However, Turkey advised that consent for site 
surveys was for planning purposes and did not represent commitment to support 
military action, which remained subject to due political and legal process. Nevertheless, 
the US insisted on 15 January 2003 as a start date for site preparations, expected to cost 
$250-300 million. 
In the meantime, US requests continued to flow to Turkey. The CIA asked for 
permission for overland transport from Ankara to provide military aid to the KDP, 
PUK, and Turkomen opposition groups in Northern Iraq that would be used to assist US 
efforts against Saddam. Transport through Turkey was the most efficient and secure 
means of delivering this material to Northern Iraq. The proposal was that the Turkish 
side would take physical possession during the transfer through Turkey to verify the 
quantity and quality of the material. Furthermore, the CIA sought to send 600 Special 
Forces troops into Northern Iraq and increase the number of NILE teams. Ankara, 
790 The released confidential State Department Information Memo of 26 September 2002 on 
Reconstruction in Iraq, as published in appendix in Haass, War of Necessity, pp.279-293. 
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however, became intensely concerned about US intentions to improve the military 
capability of the Peshmerga forces and the increased CIA contacts with the Iraqi Kurds. 
By late December, President Bush had concluded that ‘Iraq was in material breach of 
UN Resolution 1441,’791 and the US pressure on Ankara began to mount almost daily. 
US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson relayed Bush’s messages in a meeting with 
Gül on 21 December. He said that, for the US, it was now a ‘defining moment’ for the 
future course of the Turkey-US strategic relationship.792 The US administration was 
determined to make its plans for Iraq with Turkey, and accordingly expected an 
immediate response on the proposed arrival of 150 US military personnel to start 
conducting site surveys on 24 December and the stationing of 3,500 US military 
personnel to start site preparations from 7 January 2003. In addition, the US requested a 
temporary deployment of approximately 40,000 US ground combat forces in Turkey 
and transit rights for another 40,000 troops through Turkish territory, an increase in the 
numbers of combat and support aircraft stationed at military airbases and installations, 
and the deployment of US Special Forces. Washington also expected a response on 
whether Turkish troops would participate in coalition military action in Northern Iraq, 
and on the CIA request for the transfer of military assistance to Iraqi Kurdish groups 
through Turkey. The US acknowledged that the Turkish government required 
parliamentary approval in a very short timeframe, but expected a Turkish response by 
24 December. Gül responded that, while he appreciated the pressure on the US to 
finalise its military plans, his government had to take into account Turkish public 
opinion, 95 percent of which opposed war with Iraq:  
Turkey might be part of the Middle East, yet our position totally differs 
from the rest of the region. We are a democratic nation. There is even 
opposition to war within my own party. We ought not to rush the 
democratic process and be mistaken by wrong calculations which will 
lead us to a detrimental situation, the outcome of which will eventually 
undermine our relations.793  
6.11. Turkey’s Action Plan on Iraq Strategy, December 2002  
In late December, a political process over whether and to what extent to meet US 
requests for full and complete support for military action began to take shape. At the 
strategic level, it was a matter of striking a balance between contradictory objectives. 
The Turkish public and the political parties, including a large portion of the AK Party, 
791 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p.442. 
792 Gül, interview. 
793 Ibid.  
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overwhelmingly opposed the war. Ankara recognised the need for Iraq’s disarmament, 
yet did not share Washington’s perception of the urgency of the threat from Saddam’s 
regime. For many in Turkey, the course to war was less an attempt to ensure Iraq’s 
disarmament that the initial step in a grand strategy to redesign the Middle East by the 
neo-cons in the US administration. The most pressing questions were whether Turkey 
could do anything to prevent a war, such as convincing Iraq to fully comply with its 
disarmament obligations, or whether such compliance would indeed persuade the US to 
alter its course. Turkey had no power of veto over US military action, irrespective of 
whether it extended full, limited or no support. Should the US opt for military action, 
Turkey would see serious negative consequences on its economy, on the regional 
balance of power and stability, and in Northern Iraq, potentially including a large 
refugee inflow, increased PKK activities, a Kurdish drive for independence, or a 
Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk. In the event of military hostilities, cooperation with the US 
seemed the only way to address these negative consequences, and make Turkey a player 
on the ground, participating in shaping Iraq’s future. Furthermore, Ankara recognised 
that Washington viewed the accommodation of US requests as a test of the strategic 
relationship. The dilemma was how to maintain the strategic partnership with the US 
when 95 percent of the public opposed war.794 The real challenge would centre on 
convincing the TBMM and the public of the necessity of supporting the US war on Iraq. 
This predicament, as Park has observed, was a ‘duality in Turkish policy.’795 However, 
cooperation with the US still appeared to be the least costly and most rational choice 
under the circumstances.  
The challenge of making a political decision on the conditions and scope of Turkey’s 
cooperation was discussed at the December MGK meeting. First, it was a constitutional 
requirement that, for Turkey to support US military action, that action had to have 
international legitimacy established by a second UNSCR explicitly mandating the use of 
force. Second, the government had to follow the democratic process, taking into account 
the views of the TBMM, the AK Party, the CHP, and public opinion. Third, as the war 
would have significant consequences for the regional balance of power, Gül would visit 
regional countries for consultations on Iraq. Fourth, the government would seek, at an 
appropriate time, TBMM approval for a course of action that would not deprive the US, 
its strategic ally, of the Northern Option, but would also limit Turkish support subject to 
794 Ahmet Davutoğlu, interviewed by author, Ankara, 19 January 2013; Ziyal, interviews (2010 and 
2012); Deniz Bölükbaşı, interviewed by author, Ankara, 13 August 2012; Burcuoğlu, interview. 
795 Park, Turkey’s Kurdish Complex, p.24. 
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certain conditions. Ankara would grant permission for US air operations and the 
deployment of its Special Forces, based on a bilateral agreement between military 
authorities that would define the magnitude and duration. Turkey could not allow 
40,000 US ground troops to be deployed inside its borders or another 40,000 troops to 
transit the country, and these figures were too large to accommodate even if a second 
UNSCR were secured. Fifth, Turkey would give immediate permission for the 
commencement of site surveys by signing a modus operandi, but site preparations 
required TBMM approval.796 Sixth, Turkey planned on a separate deployment of 
Turkish troops to Northern Iraq and would not join the coalition forces. These troops 
would remain a non-combatant force in Iraq, and would closely coordinate with 
coalition forces. Their mission would be to secure Turkey’s national interests, including 
fighting the PKK and controlling the situation in Northern Iraq. The transfer of military 
supplies to Iraqi Kurdish groups would only be possible if managed by Turkish military 
forces in the region. The Turkomen community also had to be a full partner in all 
opposition activities. Seventh, consultations with the US had to concentrate on the 
shape of post-war Iraq. Eighth, all measures had to be put in place to provide for 
Turkey’s security against possible Iraqi WMD retaliation. To this end, consultations 
under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty had to start immediately. For Ankara, it was 
extremely difficult to cope with a crisis over Cyprus while totally pre-occupied with the 
Iraq problem. Ankara, therefore, would seek US support for certain revisions to the 
Annan Plan. A settlement of the Cypriot issue by 28 February to ensure its 
incorporation into the Cyprus EU accession treaty was of paramount importance. Lastly, 
the US assistance package had to mitigate the implications for the Turkish economy to 
the largest extent possible, the attachment of any conditions was unacceptable, and 
economic talks had to run concurrently with military and political negotiations. The 
military talks, to also cover the deployment of Turkish troops to Northern Iraq, could 
start in a week.797 
Taylor and Grossman visited Ankara on 27–28 December to finalise the economic 
assistance package and receive an indication of the Turkish government’s decision in 
order to meet the timelines for war preparations. They emphasised that the US 
recognised the complexities of the matter given the overwhelming disapproval for war 
among the Turkish public and opposition party. The US respected the democratic 
process, but expected a prompt decision from the government while appreciating the 
796 Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, p.29. 
797 Ziyal, interviews (2010 and 2012). 
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Turkish commitment to the Northern Option.798 Taylor explained the US assistance 
package, which totalled $4 billion, consisting of $2 billion from the ESF and $2 billion 
in FMF. The FMF was strictly for military purposes, and the whole package was tied to 
Turkey’s full and complete cooperation. Taylor also underlined the need for the Turkish 
government to implement the existing IMF-backed economic reform programme. He 
explained that the $2 billion ESF grant could be converted into $20 billion in loans. The 
whole package would be amended if Turkey did not allow the deployment of US 
ground troops. However, Babacan declared the US offer unacceptable.799  
The US did not believe that a second UNSCR was necessary. Taylor and Grossman 
asked for Turkish flexibility on international legitimacy, arguing that the same concept 
also applied to the existing plans for increased Turkish military presence and NILE 
team activities in Northern Iraq. The US would support NATO consultations to ensure 
Turkish security, and would work on improving relations between Ankara and the KDP. 
Furthermore, the US was ready to discuss post-Saddam Iraq with Turkey, and concurred 
with the Turkish proposal for parallel military, political, and economic talks.800 The US 
believed Turkey viewed the American assistance package as an instrument to cover 
economic and budget shortfalls.801 The Turkish side responded that Ankara would agree 
to the Northern Option if the TBMM approved, but could not allow the deployment of 
80,000 troops. Ankara would agree to site surveys and looked favourably on site 
preparations.802 Ultimately, Taylor and Grossman returned to Washington without 
obtaining any commitment from Ankara.  
6.12. Application of Turkish Strategy on Iraq 
From January 2003 onwards, the Turkish government applied a multi-layered strategic 
framework to address the Iraq problem devised by the then Ambassador and Chief 
Adviser to Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu.803 The first was to try to prevent war by forcing 
Saddam to comply in full with all UNSCRs, including his disarmament obligations. Gül 
believed it was worth a last ditch attempt to warn Saddam. He sent Kürşat Tüzmen, the 
state minister in charge of trade, as his special envoy to personally deliver his letter to 
the Iraqi leader. The 9 January 2003 letter read: 
798 Cable 03Ankara33 dated 2 January 2003, ‘U/S Taylor's Discussions with GOT on Economic Reform 
and Economic Outlook, December 27-28’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA33.html 
799 Taylor, Global Financial Warriors, pp.184-186. 
800 Cable 03Ankara33, 2 January 2003, ‘U/S Taylor's Discussions’. 
801 Cable 03Ankara160 dated 7 January 2003, ‘Turkey's Economy: Growing Concerns over AK 
Economic Policies’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA160.html 
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I feel strongly compelled to bring certain issues to your attention as an 
obligation of our friendship with Iraq. Iraq is on the brink of a war on an 
unprecedented scale that could take an enormous humanitarian and 
material toll.… We, and the nations of our region, are saddened and 
concerned by this possibility. A war on such scale is destined to achieve 
results… As a statesman who often makes reference to the history of the 
region, you must be cognizant of the mass-scale devastation that our 
region has been plunged into as a result of intervention by other parties. 
Today, it is all the more imperative that Iraq abide by its international 
obligations to prevent such catastrophe… It is absolutely not the time to 
set preconditions, apply short-term tactics or resort to rhetoric.804  
However, still relying on rhetoric, Saddam claimed that Turkey had to work to convince 
the US to change its policy rather than advising Iraq to comply with the UNSCRs. 
The second dimension of the strategy was to put together a regional platform. The 
initiative was called ‘peace diplomacy’, and was intended to create a regional dynamic 
for a peaceful solution to the Iraq problem. It had multiple purposes. The US moved in 
the direction of a military action with a coalition of the willing, which in essence was a 
US-UK led effort. Some regional countries opposed war, and it seemed that the US paid 
no due attention to the regional dynamics, raising the prospect of regional polarisation. 
Turkey did not want to be isolated for supporting the US and preferred regional 
coordination.805 Domestically, the initiative would demonstrate to the Turkish public, 
and especially to the AK Party’s electoral base, that all measures to prevent a war had 
been exhausted. Based on this conclusion, Gül made a tour of five regional countries—
Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—all of which had real concerns about the 
post-Saddam period. Following the tour, Turkey hosted a peace conference of the 
foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran on 23 January 
2003. The conference produced a statement urging Saddam to abide by all his 
obligations under the UNSCRs.806  
The third component of the strategy related to Turkey’s security concerns stemming 
from the risks associated with possible Turkish support for US military action. Ankara 
initiated Article 4 discussions in NATO in mid-January to prepare an allied response to 
any Iraqi contingency. NATO discussions were also a way to obtain international 
legitimacy and ease the Turkish public’s anxiety over a military operation in Iraq.807 
804 Gül, interview.  
805 Davutoğlu, interview. 
806 Gül, interview. 
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The fourth part of the strategy was to intensify talks with other Iraqi opposition groups 
in addition to the KDP, PUK and ITF. The purpose was to restore relations with the 
KDP, as relations with the PUK were on a relatively good footing. For Ankara, the main 
challenge remained controlling Kurdish aspirations for independence. On 7–9 January, 
Ankara hosted Barzani, who had meetings with Gül and other senior MFA, military and 
intelligence officials.808 Barzani later reported to the US Embassy in Ankara that 
Turkish officials had demonstrated a significant positive change of tone, setting the 
stage ‘for the KDP to once again be Turkey’s good friend and ally.’809 Barzani, in 
return, had underlined the KDP’s intention to reciprocate by acknowledging Turkey’s 
importance in Northern Iraq. He also assured Turkish officials that ‘the KDP did not 
seek an independent Kurdish entity’ and would maintain good relations with the 
Turkomen community. Nevertheless, Barzani told the Americans he was adamantly 
opposed to any Turkish military intervention in Iraq ‘even it was part of a US-led 
coalition.’ He argued that Turkey would exploit the prevention of a refugee flow as a 
pretext for intervention, while the main objective would be to suppress Kurdish 
aspirations. Turkish military presence could also lead to a potential Iranian intervention 
in the region. In short, the KDP would consider and treat Turkish forces ‘as invaders 
whether alone or part of a coalition’ since they would not leave, viewing this as a 
‘matter of survival.’ In the event of Turkish troop deployment, the KDP would 
withdraw its cooperation with the US, which had ‘repeatedly assured him that there 
would be no Turkish forces entering Northern Iraq.’810 
The last aspect of the Turkish strategy was to expand the political, military, and 
economic talks with the US on a non-committal basis to establish the principles and 
modalities for Turkey’s support of US military action.  
6.13. Intensified Turkey-US Talks, January–March 2003  
On 3 January, Turkey and the US resumed military-to-military talks to address US 
requests short of ground force deployment or transit through Turkey and Turkish plans 
for power projection into Northern Iraq. An agreement on a modus operandi for the site 
surveys was reached a week later, and the teams commenced their operations. On 13 
‘NATO/Iraq: Turkey Patient for Now but Looking For NATO Cover’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA331.html 
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January, military talks continued with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard 
Myers’ visit to Ankara. EUCOM submitted a draft MOU to the TGS setting out the 
principles that would govern US activities related to a possible operation in Iraq.811 For 
Ankara, the conclusion of a military MOU was a precondition for seeking a 
parliamentary mandate for site preparations and the inflow of US forces. During the 
initial military talks, two key problems emerged; the US government’s opposition to 
Turkish plans for unilateral deployment in Northern Iraq and Turkey’s rejection of US 
ground troop deployment in and transit through Turkey. From Washington’s 
perspective, the unilateral deployment of Turkish troops could pose substantial 
difficulties for US military operations. Khalilzad, then presidential special envoy on 
Iraq, notes that the US objected to a unilateral Turkish deployment in Northern Iraq 
since it would create potential for a Turkish-Kurdish conflict—‘a war within a war’—a 
situation that the US sought to avoid. According to Khalilzad, Washington simply did 
not want to be distracted by a Turkish deployment.812 This line of thinking also held that 
any Turkish intervention could potentially provoke interventions from Iran and Syria, as 
well as clashes between Turkish and Peshmerga forces. Washington wanted to discuss 
ways to take joint action that would secure the interests of both countries in the region. 
The overriding US message was that Turkish forces had to stay out of the region, not act 
unilaterally, and recognise only one command and one fight. In fact, the draft US MOU 
on military cooperation on Iraq did not even make reference to the possible Turkish 
deployment to Northern Iraq.813 For the Iraqi Kurds, the objective of the Turkish 
deployment was to control Northern Iraq and to disarm the Peshmerga.814 Khalilzad 
points out that, during his deliberations with the KDP and PUK, both parties 
‘vehemently opposed’ Turkish intervention, even jointly with the US, out of fear that 
the Turks sought to dismantle their achievements towards self-rule over the last 
decade.815 It was apparent to Ankara that the US opposition to unilateral military action 
was an extension of the KDP’s categorical rejection of Turkish deployment in Northern 
Iraq.816 As a result, Washington began to explore alternative ways to address and meet 
the Turkish concerns behind Ankara’s plans for deployment in Northern Iraq.817  
811 Cable 03Ankara548 dated 23 January 2002, ‘Scenesetter for SACEUR General Jones's January 24 
Visit to Ankara’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA548.html 
812 Zalmay Khalilzad, interviewed by author, Ankara, 24 July 2012. 
813 Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, pp.24-26. 
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On the other hand, Washington insisted that ground operation capability and the 
deployment of ground forces were vital for the Northern Option. Ankara moderated its 
approach and agreed to discuss preplanning for land force operations with two US 
brigades.818 However, Turkey would not allow access to the forces of any coalition 
country other than the US, including the UK, which had also applied for overflight 
permission.819 Turkey also submitted a long list of questions regarding Phase 4 
operations, mainly on the administration of Iraq in the post-Saddam era.820 As Bryza 
notes, the questions were intended ‘to say “we are warning you about what will happen 
after the military phase if you just go to war without clear objectives.”’ 821  
At the end of January, at Blair’s insistence, Bush grudgingly agreed to seek another 
UNSCR explicitly mandating the use of force despite objections from his national 
security team.822 However, it seemed that the French and the Russians would block such 
a resolution.823 Ankara now decided to take a sequential approach to the US requests: 
First, in early February, the government would submit a motion to the TBMM to allow 
military site preparations at certain Turkish ports and military installations. If 
successful, the government would then, in the second half of February, seek 
authorisation for a military operation, to include the deployment of a logistical force of 
37,742 US troops in Turkey and the transit of 23,784 combat troops through the 
country.824 Nevertheless, this approach would be contingent upon reaching written 
agreements with the US on related military, political and economic issues. Turkey 
would also continue its simultaneous diplomatic efforts for a peaceful outcome to the 
crisis. 
However, divergences between Turkey and the US over Iraq strategy became more 
evident during this period. Washington expressed fervent opposition to a unilateral 
Turkish deployment in Northern Iraq. Turkey became increasingly concerned over CIA 
plans to arm the KDP and PUK. The CIA had revised its previous proposal to send arms 
to Northern Iraq via Turkish territory, avoiding Turkish control of weapons, and 
818 Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, pp.24-26. 
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requested overflight permission for the action. It seemed that the CIA wanted to avoid 
any Turkish control, which Ankara strongly opposed, denying any need to arm the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups. As one Turkish official explained, ‘We simply do not want another 
Afghanistan in our neighbourhood, nor do we want these arms turned against us at some 
point.’825 For the government, the arming of Kurdish groups would create an additional 
political risk in obtaining a TBMM mandate to support US military action. The third 
area of discord was about Turkey’s seeking authorisation from the TBMM in the third 
week of February. The Turkish timeline did not match US planning since vessels 
carrying the US Fourth Infantry Division and loaded with weapons would reach the 
eastern Mediterranean by 10 February. US officials claimed that ‘a late Turkish decision 
was no decision’826 since Bush had to decide whether to redirect the vessels to the Gulf 
region for the Southern Option by 12 February. The Turkish response was that, given 
tremendous public opposition and strong resistance to war within the ruling AK Party 
itself, there had to be a transparent and democratic process in making the case for 
Turkish support. This required time, and any rushing of the TBMM debate would most 
likely result in failure.827 
As Turkey-US talks progressed, Gül made a last diplomatic effort for a peaceful 
outcome, asking Saddam to secretly send one of his most trusted officials to Ankara. 
Hussein sent Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan as his special envoy.828 Gül observes: 
The Iraqis lost touch with basic realities and were ignorant of the 
seriousness of the situation to such an extent that Ramadan asked for the 
Iraqi Minister of Trade to accompany him. I said, if he definitely wants 
company, he ought to have the foreign minister with him.829  
Ramadan was flown to Ankara in an MİT plane, to keep the meeting confidential. In the 
meeting on 3 February, Gül openly warned Ramadan: 
You are on the verge of a point of no return. War is knocking on your 
door. You have to take all steps to come clean once and for all to comply 
with your disarmament obligations. Otherwise, war is inevitable. There 
will be no one to help you once the war starts, and rest assured that your 
army will not fight.830  
825 Author’s personal account.  
826 Ibid. 
827 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
828 Yetkin, Tezkere, pp.143-144. 
829 Gül, interview.  
830 Ibid. 
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Ramadan’s non-conciliatory response showed that the Iraqi regime still did not 
understand its predicament. At that point, it seemed that the only non-military options 
left were either exile for Saddam or his dignified surrender.831  
Despite disagreements with the US on some fundamental issues, Gül mandated the start 
of military, political and economic negotiations with a view to finalising the MOUs so 
the government could seek parliamentary authorisation. Gül informed Cheney in early 
February that, provided all three documents were agreed, the government could seek the 
TBMM’s approval on 18 February.832 The military talks began in early February, 
chaired by Ambassadors Deniz Bölükbaşı and Marisa Lino, and Turkey submitted a 
revised MOU to the US. On 5 February, Turkey-US political talks began with the 
objective of reaching an agreement on a vision for Iraq’s future. From the Turkish 
perspective, agreement on a legally binding political MOU was crucial to ensure that 
Turkey’s redlines were respected and to safeguard Ankara’s role in shaping post-
conflict Iraq. The agreement could then be used to help Gül ‘convince AK Party, 
Turkish public and the Parliament that the political concerns of Turkey have been met, 
and the US and Turkey were in agreement.’833 Washington, however, rejected any 
legally binding document that had to go through a ratification process in the Senate. It 
was also politically risky since it could lead to the misperception that Turkey and US 
had agreed on a blueprint for Iraq and the region reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement.834 The US preference was for a non-binding joint statement of ‘political 
principles.’ Khalilzad’s discussions in Ankara were the first occasion that the Bush 
administration shared with Turkey its detailed vision for Iraq’s future. It was decided to 
continue political talks on the proposed Turkish text.835 
On 5 February, Secretary Powell made the US case against Iraq at the UNSC.836 On 6 
February, the Turkish government obtained authorisation from the TBMM to allow US 
site preparations at some Turkish ports and military installations, but only after a 
difficult and heated debate during which the CHP strongly opposed the government’s 
motion. Also, despite Gül’s and Erdoğan’s considerable efforts at persuasion, fifty eight 
AK Party members voted against or abstained. Ankara advised Washington that the 
831 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
832 Yetkin, Tezkere, p.147. 
833 Cable 03Ankara947 dated 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq and Turkey: ‘‘Agreed Minute’‘ vs. Joint Statement 
on Political Future of Iraq’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA947.html 
834 Cable 03Ankara945 dated 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Turkish MFA U/S Ziyal and Ambassador Pearson 
Discuss Military and Political MOU's’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA945.html 
835 Cable 03Ankara947, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq and Turkey: ‘‘Agreed Minute’‘ vs. Joint Statement’ 
836 For Powell’s account of the briefing, see Powell, It Worked for Me, pp.217-224.   
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result showed that any TBMM vote on the Northern Option would risk failure unless a 
convincing case was made to representatives. It seemed that the only credible 
bargaining chip would be the US economic support package and the finalisation of the 
MOUs on military and political matters. 
Following intense negotiations, the ‘MOU on the Establishment and Implementation of 
Basic Policy, Principles, Procedures and to Determine the Status of the Site Preparation 
Personnel of the US in Turkey for the Purposes of Site Preparation Activities’ was 
signed in Ankara on 8 February. The first group of US officers arrived three days later. 
The remaining issue was to begin the negotiations on a military MOU to address the 
governance and status of the presence and activities of US forces to be provisionally 
deployed in Turkey, as well as the legal and military framework for the conduct of 
military operations. Turkey submitted its draft MOU to the US on 12 February, with a 
view to reaching an agreement by 17 February. The progress on the military MOU also 
depended on reaching an understanding in political and economic talks.837  
The economic talks on the US assistance package were held on 6-7 February headed by 
Taylor and Babacan. One area of disagreement was the conditionality that the US 
sought to attach to the package, which had not figured in the talks in December. Any 
economic assistance was now predicated upon Turkey’s completion of its Fourth 
Review under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement, expected to take place in April 2003, 
and upon its full cooperation with the US military operation in Iraq. The Turkish team 
rejected the concept of conditionality, arguing that the US package was to offset the 
damage of the Iraq War on the Turkish economy. However, the real problem was the 
magnitude of the package, which fell far short of meeting Turkish expectations that it be 
instrumental in persuading the public and the TBMM.838 Turkish officials underlined 
that Ankara preferred to sign an economic MOU to complement the military and 
political MOUs. The Turkish expectation for the economic package was $92 billion, a 
figure that the US delegation found unacceptable. In addition, Babacan opposed having 
full and complete military cooperation ‘either as a condition precedent or a cause for 
termination’ of the assistance package.839 
837 Cable 03Ankara1005 dated 8 February 2003, ‘Iraq: USG-GOT Sign MOU on Site Preparations’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA1005.html 
838 Cable 03Ankara819 dated 31 January 2003, ‘Minister Babacan Tells Ambassador Economic Reform 
Conditionality Is ‘‘Clear’‘’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ANKARA819.html 
839 Cable 03Ankara1007 dated 9 February 2003, ‘U/S Taylor's Talks on The Grant/Loan Facility, 
February 6-7 in Ankara’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA1007.html 
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Despite Gül’s plans to take the motion to allow US troops into Turkey to the TBMM on 
18 February, it proved difficult to overcome the divergent views on the crucial issues 
during negotiations, making a vote in the TBMM risky. As a result, Gül sent a letter to 
Bush to convey his concerns about the lack of satisfactory progress on the economic 
assistance package, the political document and the military MOU. Securing 
authorisation from the TBMM, said Gül, would be no easy task given the pressure from 
the public, the opposition party, and even his own party. Gül hoped to be in a position to 
tell the TBMM that Turkey and the US concurred on every issue, and that Ankara had 
received full and concrete assurances from the Bush administration. Gül proposed 
sending a delegation to Washington composed of Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış and 
Babacan to resolve the problems with the military MOU and the political document 
about Iraq’s future and finalise both.  
Yakış and Babacan visited Washington on 13-14 February for extensive discussions 
with Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, and Rumsfeld. During the talks, administration 
officials stated that the US had decided to go to war, identified a commencement date, 
and stated that the UN process no longer appealed to Washington. The US needed and 
sought Turkey’s cooperation, especially to shorten the war and reduce casualties and 
other costs. The administration viewed Turkey as a strategic partner and ally, recognised 
the Turkish government’s political difficulties, and respected the democratic process. 
However, a vote in the TBMM no later than 18 February was critical since the US had 
shifted its timelines for military action to correspond to this date and American vessels 
had already reached the eastern Mediterranean.840 The US expected a prompt ‘positive 
outcome’ in the TBMM, and any failure of the vote would damage Turkey-US relations. 
Bush made it clear that, with or without Turkey’s partnership, he was determined to 
overthrow Saddam’s regime. The Turkish delegation’s message centred primarily on 
three issues: First, Turkey was determined to stand by the US at this critical moment. 
Secondly, 18 February was too soon for a vote in the TBMM and the prospects of 
failure seemed high since the representatives and Turkish public were unconvinced of 
the case for war. Instead of pushing for an early vote, it would be more prudent to 
postpone it to achieve a successful outcome. Thirdly, the lack of progress on the 
political document and the military MOU increased the risk of failure. Completing these 
documents and finalising a satisfactory US assistance package were prerequisites for 
winning support for the government’s motion in the TBMM. Turkey expected a figure 
840 One US official told, ‘One day late, forever too late.’ 
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that corresponded to its estimates on the costs of war to the Turkish economy submitted 
in December, namely $92 billion over a five-year period. The figure reflected Turkey’s 
bitter experience of the unintended consequences of the Gulf War, which had cost, 
according to Turkish economists, approximately $100 billion over the last decade. This 
time, Ankara was being cautious not to repeat the same mistake and safeguard its 
economic interests. At the same time, Babacan was concerned about the lag between the 
start of war and the Congress vote to approve the financial assistance package. 
Washington insisted this figure was impossible, yet decided to increase the package by 
50 percent, and suggested a short-term bridge loan for immediate Turkish needs. The 
draft economic MOU sought to address Turkish concerns about congressional approval 
while retaining full cooperation as the key condition of the package.841  
6.14. Towards the 1 March Vote  
As negotiations on the three documents continued without clear agreement, on 20 
February, Ziyal informed Pearson of Turkey’s decision to seek the parliamentary 
approval for US requests in relation to the Iraq War. Ziyal said that the government 
would send the motion to the TBMM on the 24 February, but that the outcome looked 
bleak:  
As of today, it is impossible to be hopeful of the outcome in the 
Parliament. As well as the difficulty of a sceptical AK Party group in the 
Parliament, the government itself is divided on the policy. The 
finalisation of the political, economic and military documents is vitally 
important to secure a positive decision.842  
On 24 February, the government sent a formal request to the TBMM for the deployment 
of US troops in and through Turkey as well as for the deployment of Turkish troops 
abroad for operations in Northern Iraq.843 The government was divided, and some 
members of the cabinet unwillingly signed but continued to oppose the motion.844 
Deputy Prime Minister Abdüllatif Şener stated publicly that a significant number of 
ministers ‘did not find it convincing.’845 In addition, TBMM Speaker Bülent Arınç 
openly opposed the passage of the motion.846 On the same day, Bush sent a letter to Gül 
with two crucial messages: First, Turkey and the US stood at a strategic crossroads; the 
841 For full details of the Turkey-US economic talks in this period, see Taylor, Global Financial Warriors, 
pp.177-191. 
842 Ziyal, interview (2012).  
843 For the text of government’s request for authorisation, see Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, Annex 6. 
844 Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, p.225. 
845 Cable 03Ankara1207 dated 24 February 2003; ‘On the Eve of the Iraq Vote: Which Way Will Turkey 
Go?’ http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA1207.html 
846  Ibid. 
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approval of the US request would elevate the US-Turkey partnership to new heights 
and cooperation in Iraq would open a new chapter in their relations. Second, in order to 
satisfy Turkish concerns about the non-binding nature of the documents, Bush pledged 
that they constituted a sound framework outlining Turkey-US mutual support, and stated 
his commitment to act in accordance with them.847 
After exhaustive negotiations, an agreement was finally reached on the military MOU on 
26 February 2003. The most sensitive problem was Turkish military activities in 
Northern Iraq. The parties had had severe disputes during the negotiations on the military 
MOU, and in some instances the Turkish delegation had left the table. Bölükbaşı states 
that ‘the US side tried everything possible at first to prevent Turkish deployment in 
Northern Iraq, but they unwillingly came to terms with it once they recognised that there 
would be no Northern Option if they continued to object to Turkish military plans.’848 
However, according to Bölükbaşı, the US still wanted to constrain the freedom of 
Turkish troops with a set of rules of engagement, which Turkey did not accept. In the 
end, the US unwillingly agreed with Turkish plans for military deployment in Northern 
Iraq. While the MOU reflected a compromise,849 it satisfied nearly all Turkish concerns; 
Turkey would deploy four to five brigades into Northern Iraq under national command 
in addition to the 1,500 troops already stationed in the region. Their primary mission 
would be to establish a security belt up to the limit of the so-called ‘Green Line,’ 
covering all the areas that the PKK had used to infiltrate Turkey.850  
On 26 February, the prominent newspaper Milliyet published a report titled ‘Military 
Disturbed by Motion’ without naming its source.851 The general who spoke on 
condition of anonymity was General Aytaç Yalman, the commander of the Land Forces, 
an ardent opponent of General Özkök and the AK Party government. Yalman’s 
statements were a reflection of the power struggle within the TSK.852 It demonstrated 
the concerns of some senior generals that Turkey-US cooperation in Iraq could result in 
better relations between the US and the AK Party government, strengthening the latter’s 
hold on political power. Gül called General Özkök, who said that the statement merely 
847 For the copy of Bush’s letter see Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, Annex 7, p.191. 
848 Bölükbaşı, interview. 
849 Cable 03Ankara1357 dated 3 March 2003, ‘Feb 26 Session: US/TU Teams Agree on Text for OPS 
MOU’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03ANKARA1357.html 
850 Statement of the then Chief of TGS, General Hilmi Özkök, Murat Yetkin, ‘Turkey-US had agreed on 
Turkish troops in Iraq’, Hürriyet Daily News, 6 August 2012; Bölükbaşı, interview. For the details of the 
military MOU, see Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, pp.44-48. 
851 Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, pp.226-227. 
852 Bila, interview.  
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reflected General Yalman’s personal views, and not that of the TGS.853 However, the 
report created the public impression that the military opposed cooperation with the US. 
Coupled with Sezer’s insistence on international legitimacy as a prerequisite for any 
vote in the TBMM, and the resistance to the government’s motion, this helped create 
‘the impression that the AK [Party] wants to pull the country into war over the 
objections of the military and the president.’854 This put additional pressure on the 
government as it faced the challenge of shouldering the burden and the full 
responsibility for any decision. In an effort to avoid the trap and strengthen its hand, the 
government planned to seek a decisive recommendation from the MGK meeting on 28 
February. However, Sezer prevented the discussion, arguing that the subject had been 
debated, that its results were reflected in the recommendations of previous MGK 
meetings, and that it was now the government’s responsibility to take the decision.855 
The silence of the TGS during the MGK meeting was a surprise to the government. 
According to Bölükbaşı, throughout the negotiations with the US on the military MOU, 
not only were military officials present, but the Turkish position had totally reflected the 
military’s views, and the leadership of the TGS, including General Yalman, had 
expressed their satisfaction with the final MOU, saying it was an ‘excellent 
document.’856 In the end, the MGK meeting provided no green light or support for US 
deployment, and all responsibility was left to the AK Party government and the TBMM. 
The government’s motion went before the TBMM on 1 March. Before the vote, the AK 
Party group convened and the government briefed representatives about the outcome of 
the political, military and economic negotiations, as well as the plans for the future of 
Iraq. Gül delivered a detailed speech, underlining that this was one of the biggest 
moments in Turkish history and that it was up to the representatives to make the 
decision. He said that ‘We are a democratic party, you are the representatives of the 
nation, and I cannot ask you to put your will into my pocket.’857 In addition to a 
presentation from Minister of Defence Vecdi Gönül on the military agreement, Babacan 
also briefed the AK Party group about the US financial assistance package. He 
explained the magnitude of the package, but underlined that its implementation was not 
to be taken for granted. Before the vote, the AK Party group took an initial unofficial 
vote to sound out the general inclination of the representatives. The result was 
853 Gül, interview.  
854 Murat Yetkin, ‘Hükümet-Çankaya Savaşı’ Radikal, 28 February 2003.  
855 Ziyal, interview (2012); Burcuoğlu, interview.  
856 Bölükbaşı, interview. 
857 Gül, interview. 
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overwhelmingly to support the motion on the floor.858 However, the AK Party 
leadership decided not to have a binding group decision to allow the representatives to 
vote freely on the floor.859  
After an extensive debate in a closed session on the floor, the TBMM voted for the 
motion to allow US troop deployment for Iraq operations. Reportedly, of the 533 
members present, 264 voted in favour and 250 against, while 19 abstained. All CHP 
representatives voted against the motion. From the AK Party group, 73 representatives 
voted against, while 19 abstained.860 However, the CHP reportedly objected to the vote 
on legal grounds as the passage of the UNSCR required the support of the absolute 
majority of the representatives present. Accordingly, Arınç, who had made his 
opposition to any US troop deployment public, reviewed the legislation and announced 
that the motion had not garnered the 267 votes required for approval,861 or only three 
votes short. The TBMM then adjourned until 4 March 2003. 
The result was a shock for the AK party leadership and the US. The TBMM did not 
support the US deployment, and also rejected Turkish deployment in Northern Iraq. In 
his memoir, Bush notes his frustration and disappointment, expressing that ‘on one of 
the most important requests that we had ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let 
America down.’862 On the same day, Ziyal met with Pearson and explained the 
extensive efforts the government had made to convince the TBMM to vote in favour. 
The result also proved the government’s point about the difficulties of obtaining 
parliamentary approval, which Washington had not comprehended, seeing it as a tool 
for procrastination and bargaining. Ziyal also noted that, ‘Prime Minister Gül and the 
government had risked their political future to stand by American friendship.’863 Two 
issues of immediate concern for Ankara were the reactions of the market and the Kurds. 
The AK Party leadership would soon meet to define the future course of action. It was 
also evident that the possibility for a quick resubmission of a new UNSCR could only 
858 Babacan, interview.  
859 Çelik, interview.  
860 However, it was a closed session and the details are confidential and subject to non-disclosure for ten 
years. 
861 This is known as some civil servants, including Ziyal and Bölükbaşı, were allowed to be present during 
the closed session by all-party agreement.  
862 Bush, Decision Points, p.250. 
863 Ziyal, interview (2010). 
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occur following the by-election in Siirt on 9 March, in which Erdoğan was expected to 
be elected and consequently assume premiership.864  
In fact, after a long legal and political battle to regain his political rights, Erdoğan won 
the by- election and was subsequently mandated by Sezer to form a new government. 
Sezer approved Erdoğan’s cabinet list on 14 March, and Erdoğan officially became 
prime minister. Gül was designated deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The US 
invaded Iraq on March 17, without the deployment of the Fourth Infantry Division 
though Turkey.865 On 20 March, the new AK Party government secured the TBMM’s 
authorisation for US aircraft to overfly Turkish airspace for a period of six months and 
for the deployment of Turkish troops to Northern Iraq. In the end, during the Iraq War, 
Turkey extended to the US similar support to that Özal provided in 1991 during the 
Gulf War. 
6.15. Conclusion 
The 1 March defeat of the parliamentary motion to deploy US troops against Iraq in and 
through Turkey marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkey-US relations and in 
Turkey’s role in Iraq in post-Saddam era. Abramowitz has noted that the Iraq War 
‘produced the worst break in American-Turkish relations since the arms embargo.’866 
For Parris, the Iraq War marked a ‘watershed’ which essentially ended the post-Cold 
War phase of Turkey-US relations,867 while Wolfowitz terms the outcome ‘the big 
disappointment.’868 In fact, the TBMM’s decision stirred a debate in Washington about 
the ‘value and predictability of the bilateral relationship.’869 To date, the debate still 
continues over why Turkey did not allow the US troop deployment and whether the 
consequences of that vote served Turkish interests. Most likely, there will be no 
definitive answer to that question for many years. John Hannah’s view of the 
divergence is suggestive: 
It never quite seemed that Turkey and the US were really hooked up on a 
strategically common vision and it was hard for the US to figure out how 
Turkey fit into the overall strategic pose that the US sought to put 
864 Cable 03Ankara1346 dated 3 March 2003, ‘Turkey: Parliamentary Vote Post-Mortem’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03ANKARA1346.html 
865 Taylor, Global Financial Warriors, p.192.  
866 Morton Abramowitz, ‘The Future of Turkish-US Relations’ (Presentation,  Global Leadership Forum, 
Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey, 3 June 2006).  
867 Parris, afterword to Turkish-American Relations; Mark Parris, ‘Allergic Partners: Can US-Turkish 
Relations Be Saved’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 4:1 (2005), pp.49-58.  
868 Bülent Ali Rıza, ‘Seeking Redefinition: US-Turkish Relations after Iraq’, CSIS Turkey Update, 5 June 
2003.  
869 Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, p.11.  
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together.870  
In fact, it is possible to make a multi-layered analysis of why the vote failed. Firstly, 
while there was a broad, fundamental agreement on the need for Iraq’s disarmament, 
Turkish and US views never converged on the nature and urgency of the threat from 
Saddam and whether it necessitated the use of force.871 The US case against Saddam 
was primarily built on proving that his regime was a menace to the international 
community and the Iraqi people and had systematically flouted its obligations as set out 
in UNSCRs. Additionally, the US argued that Saddam’s regime continued to pursue 
WMD, support terrorism, and employ brutal oppression against the Iraqi people. For 
Washington, in the post-9/11 world, Saddam’s regime had become a grave and urgent 
danger for vital US interests.872 However, the US rationales for going to war with Iraq 
and overthrowing Saddam’s regime constantly shifted between three elements; the 
elimination of Iraq’s WMD arsenals, reducing the threat of international terrorism, and 
introducing democracy in Iraq to start a region-wide domino effect of 
democratisation.873 In essence, the American case for the Iraq War reflected a strand of 
thinking within the US administration that ‘a new and more optimistic regional order 
could emerge as a result of reformed Iraq.’874 On the other hand, Ankara’s assessment 
of the Iraqi threat recognised that Saddam had destabilised Iraq and the region but that, 
while it would prefer a different type of regime, it did not believe that war would be the 
right way to achieve it. From the Turkish perspective, the US had largely inflated and 
over-dramatized the nature and urgency of the threat from Saddam to win public and 
international support for military action, which it did not warrant. Ankara did not agree 
with the US proposition that Iraq had serious WMD potential and thought that the 
disarmament of Iraq had to be addressed through a new UN process and diplomatic 
pressure. In addition, Ankara believed that the US administration had not given serious 
consideration to the consequences of war on internal Iraqi dynamics, including the 
Shiite-Sunni sectarian balance and the Arab-Kurdish-Turkomen ethnic balance, or on 
regional stability. For Ankara, a US military action in Iraq would most likely result in 
instability that could last for many years and the US would be forced to stay in Iraq as 
an occupying power for a long period. Rather than simply introducing democracy to 
870 Hannah, interview. 
871 Gül, interview; Babacan, interview; Ziyal, interview; Bölükbaşı, interview; Altunışık, ‘Turkey’s Iraq 
Policy’.  
872 Rice, No Higher Honor, pp.195-196. 
873 Michael T. Klare, ‘Deciphering the Bush Administration’s Motives’, in Sifry and Cerf (eds.), Iraq War 
Reader, p.393. 
874 Freedman, Choice of Enemies, pp.429-430. 
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Iraq and the region, the war would have a profound and enduring effect on the regional 
balance of power. It was certain that Iran would emerge the major beneficiary of regime 
change in Iraq, with great leverage stemming from its links with Iraqi Shiite groups.875 
In short, there was no Turkey-US agreement on a common threat from Iraq or on the 
strategy to address that threat.  
Secondly, notwithstanding its articulation of a vision for a democratic, unified, post-
Saddam Iraq at peace with its neighbours, the Bush administration was in disarray on 
overall Iraq strategy due to the clashes between the Pentagon and the State Department. 
The administration especially failed to lay out ‘an assessment of how it thinks the 
course of a war will run’876 or explain its designs for Iraq’s future following regime 
change. Perle, by then chairman of the US Defense Policy Board, observes that the real 
division within the administration was not on whether to go to war or how to line up the 
coalition, but on post-war planning.877 The neo-cons argued for swiftly handing over 
responsibility to the Iraqi opposition once Saddam’s regime was overthrown, and 
limiting the function of the US military to advising the new Iraqi government. In 
contrast, the State Department and CIA insisted on the need for the American military 
to govern Iraq for a certain period before the Iraqis were given the responsibility of 
government.878 For Ankara, Iraq’s future unity and territorial integrity would have 
direct implications for Turkey’s security. Ankara believed that Washington did not 
thoroughly comprehend internal Iraqi dynamics and the regional forces at work. Setting 
aside the US support for federalism, as favoured by the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara concluded 
there was no coherent or convincing US strategy for the post-Saddam period. It seemed 
that what would follow regime change in Iraq was a secondary issue for Washington.879 
As then President of the INA Iyad Allawi observes, ‘the invasion was never linked to a 
clear-cut policy about what to do next in Iraq.’880 
Thirdly, from Turkish perspective, the course to military action against Iraq lacked 
proper justification. Turkey, however, lacked the power to stop the US, and neither 
would its non-contribution make the US alter its course. It was obvious that the US was 
committed to overthrowing Saddam’s regime by military action with or without Turkish 
875 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
876 Al Gore, ‘Against a Doctrine of Preemptive War’, in Sifry and Cerf (eds.), The Iraq War Reader, 
pp.326-327. 
877 Perle, interview.  
878 Perle, interview (2012); Hannah, interview; Khalilzad, interview (2012). 
879 When a senior US official claimed that the war with Iraq would introduce democracy in the region, 
Ziyal responded, ‘You must be living on the moon. It is not going to happen. You are invading a 
country.’ Ziyal, interview (2012). 
880 Iyad Allawi, interviewed by author, Ankara, 27 April 2010. 
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support. Turkey remained reluctant to support the war because of the serious 
repercussions that would follow a military conflict, including the possible disintegration 
of Iraq, years of instability, and the potential shift in the regional balance of power. 
Ankara knew that maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity would be harder than the US 
assurances supposed. The situation in Northern Iraq could get out of control, provoking 
a refugee inflow, increased PKK activities, a Kurdish drive for independence, or a 
Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk. Also, the impact on the Turkish economy would be huge. 
Consequently, for Ankara, accommodating US requests for cooperation was not a 
preference but a realpolitik choice that circumstances dictated, allowing Turkish views 
to factor in US designs for Iraq’s future. Washington considered regime change itself a 
vital US interest. For Ankara, however, the question centred on how to minimise the 
repercussions of a war on its vital national interests. Consequently, the political, 
economic, and military tracks of Turkey-US talks were fraught with a trust gap, and 
were disrupted by the divergent priorities and interests of the two sides. For Ankara, an 
agreement on the political and economic documents was an essential part of its strategy 
to secure Turkish interests in Iraq following regime change, and to lessen the effects of 
the war on the Turkish economy. For Washington, in contrast, all other issues were 
secondary to the conclusion of the military MOU to secure Turkey’s full support for 
war.  
Fourthly, from the very outset, the Bush administration appeared unrealistic in its 
expectations and requests from Turkey. It never fully grasped the complexities and the 
challenges for any Turkish government of allowing a large-scale US military 
deployment in Turkey to attack and occupy a neighbouring Muslim country. The 
Turkish public, all parties in the political spectrum, and academia overwhelmingly 
opposed war. For instance, Gül underscored that the first question directed to him in all 
TV interviews was ‘how do you think your government will manage to support war 
when 95 percent of the Turkish public is against it?’ Gül always responded that Turkey 
was a democratic country and would follow a due and transparent democratic 
process.881 In short, it was a big political risk for the government to make the unpopular 
decision to support the US, and not just in terms of electoral strategy. The TGS had 
advised the government that the stationing of the Fourth Infantry Division, the 
deployment of 40,000 to 80,000 US troops, the use of all major Turkish military 
installations and civilian airports, ports and other facilities, and ensuring the security for 
881 Gül, interview. On one occasion, to reflect the difficulty of the decision, Gül said, ‘I can explain this to 
the opposition, but not to my own party.’ Quoted in Yetkin, Tezkere, p.117.  
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US troops in Turkish territory would require a ‘state of emergency’ in many cities, 
especially in south-eastern Turkey.882 The AK Party government was determined to 
pursue democratic reforms, yet the introduction of a state of emergency in many cities 
would be reminiscent of the 1990s when democracy and rule of law were forsaken for 
security, particularly in south-eastern Anatolia. In such an atmosphere, it would simply 
be impossible for the government to implement further democratic reforms, creating 
setbacks in Turkey’s relations with the EU and regional countries.883 Furthermore, the 
TGS and the Turkish government were worried that the scale of the US military 
presence would make the whole of Turkish territory a ‘US military base’ and that US 
troops would thus constitute an ‘occupation force’, remaining for an indeterminate 
period.884 Such a situation would also have implications for the AK Party government in 
managing the civil-military relationship. In the end, the Turkish government was faced 
with one of the most momentous decisions in the history of the republic.885 Its dilemma 
was how to support its strategic ally the US while minimising the risks of war and 
without compromising the domestic political situation or regional balance of power.886 
Scowcroft rightfully observes that one of Washington’s biggest mistakes was to take 
Turkish support for granted when the issue was far more complicated in Turkey.887  
Fifthly, the strains during the Turkey-US talks reflected a broader problem of Turkish 
mistrust of the frankness of the consultation and the ensuing feeling of exclusion from 
the US strategy on the future of Iraq. For instance, Washington told Ankara that the 
mission of the NILE teams in Northern Iraq was to fight terrorism, whereas Ankara 
discovered that these teams had made preparations for military action on the ground. In 
discussions about Iraq’s future, both the US and Turkey broadly agreed on the 
principles of preserving Iraq as a unified state and of establishing a democratic regime 
at peace internally and with its neighbours. However, Turkish views diverged from US 
thinking on what constituted a positive outcome following regime change, especially 
with regard to the status of Northern Iraq. From the Turkish point of view, the situation 
in Northern Iraq was a serious threat to Turkey’s national security, due both to the 
persistent PKK presence in the region and the emergence of a possible independent 
882 Gül, interview; Yetkin, Tezkere, pp.118-119. 
883 Davutoğlu, interview. 
884 Ziyal, interview (2012).  
885 For instance, Gül remarks on the magnitude of the challenge: ‘In those four months, we had to cope 
with problems that a government would normally face in four years. I did not sleep for more than three 
hours in any day, and my hair turned grey in that period.’ Gül, interview. 
886 Davutoğlu, interview. 
887 Brent Scowcroft, interviewed by author, Washington DC, 10 February 2012. 
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Kurdish state with its potential spill-over effect on Turkey’s own Kurdish population. 
For their part, the KDP and PUK continued to increase Ankara’s frustration with public 
statements on their aspirations for an independent Kurdish state with Kirkuk as its 
capital. Meanwhile, for Washington, Northern Iraq remained ‘the most stable area in the 
country,’ and Iraqi Kurds were ‘friends and partners’ in pursuit of US strategy.888 
Additionally, while Turkey favoured the establishment of a centralised structure after 
regime change, the US explicitly supported the Kurdish drive for federalism in Northern 
Iraq.889 During the talks, Washington did not seem to understand Ankara’s lack of trust, 
especially towards the KDP. For Masoud Barzani, the trust gap between Turkey and the 
Iraqi Kurds was the result of ‘a misunderstanding and misperception that the Iraqi 
Kurdistan posed a problem for Turkey’s interests.’890 However, Washington’s effort and 
encouragement to remove these misunderstandings and establish better relations 
between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds fell short of eliminating this trust gap.891 More 
importantly, the US opposition to Turkish deployment in Iraq largely stemmed from 
Kurdish resistance to the idea. It seemed Washington would rather consider Kurdish 
views and share details with the KDP and PUK on its vision for the future of Iraq than 
accommodate Turkey’s key national interests. The CIA plans to arm the KDP and PUK 
and the exclusion of the ITF from US-sponsored opposition activities, including the 
opposition leadership council, further compounded the trust gap about real US 
intentions in Iraq. It was clear that a lot of what the US could achieve in the post-
Saddam period would depend on its bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and its dealings with the 
Iraqi opposition.892 This subsequently lessened Turkish confidence in US assurances of 
respect for Turkey’s strategic interests in Iraq, including maintaining Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, preventing regional instability, and giving Turkey a say in shaping a post-
Saddam Iraq. 
In the final analysis, this trust gap was a serious problem throughout the Turkey-US 
negotiations,893 further deepened by an expectations gap on both sides. The difficulties 
in the negotiations were on every critical issue; the status of Northern Iraq, relations 
with the Iraqi Kurds, the unequal status of the Turkomen with the Arabs and the Kurds, 
and the US objections to Turkish deployment in the region. Ankara came to believe that 
888 Cable 04Ankara4131 dated 27 July 2004, ‘Iraq, the Turks and US’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/07/04ANKARA4131.html 
889 Ziyal, interview (2012). 
890 Barzani, interview. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Hannah, interview. 
893 Ali Tuygan, Gönüllü Diplomat: Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl (İzmir: Şenocak Yayınları, 2012), p.133. 
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Washington had adopted a policy of satisfying Turkish concerns to the minimum extent 
possible while pressuring Turkey for maximum cooperation with US military action. In 
the end, the negotiations failed to produce a coherent understanding on Northern Iraq or 
a satisfactory agreement on the economic assistance package for Turkey. More 
importantly, it seemed that the US did not understand or recognise the problems the new 
and inexperienced AK Party government might have in making an overwhelmingly 
unpopular decision in the context of pressing domestic political problems and foreign 
policy issues. The AK Party’s problems were further compounded by the noncommittal 
approach of the TGS to supporting the US and the public resistance of President Sezer 
on the grounds of a lack of international legitimacy. In essence, as Erdoğan expressed to 
a US congressional delegation a week after the vote, he and the AK Party government 
had exposed themselves to ‘great political risk by pushing the resolution in the face of 
opposition from political parties, NGOs, and the public.’894 Furthermore, the ugly, anti-
Turkish cartoons that had appeared in the US press ‘became convenient material for the 
opposition CHP to use to humiliate AK Party representatives and change votes.’895 
Indeed, Bryza admits that US officials ‘stumbled over the cliff without a clear 
understanding of the internal Turkish political dynamics.’896 
Sixthly, a further complicating factor in Turkey-US negotiations was the ‘back 
channel’—a reference to unofficial contacts between Cüneyt Zapsu, an advisor to 
Erdoğan, and US officials; namely Wolfowitz, Grossman and Perle. It was widely 
reported that Zapsu made unsubstantiated commitments to his American contacts that 
Turkey would support the US in the Iraq War.897 Ziyal repeatedly warned US officials 
to listen to what they had heard from the official negotiations instead of counting on 
informal promises made through back channels, but admits his efforts failed.898 US 
officials also note that the back channel was confusing,899 damaged the process,900 
misrepresented the facts, and made claims to understand the key players that ultimately 
proved false.901 However, Zapsu stresses that he only acted on behalf of Erdoğan and 
followed his instructions to the letter. Despite his personal view that Turkey should 
894 Cable 03Ankara1485 dated 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Codel Wexler Presses Ruling AK Party Leader 
Erdogan for Accelerated Re-Vote on US Troop Deployment’, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03ANKARA1485.html 
895 Ibid. 
896 Bryza, interview. 
897 Bölükbaşı, interview. 
898 Ziyal, interview (2010). 
899 Grossman, interview. 
900 Bryza, interview. 
901 Deutsch, interview. 
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cooperate with the US as a way of ensuring its national interests, especially in Northern 
Iraq, Zapsu underlines that he made no official commitments at all during back channel 
contacts.902 Indeed, Perle notes that there were no major differences between what was 
discussed through back channels and the content of the formal talks.903 Lastly, some US 
officials have argued that the TBMM no vote was a failure of US diplomacy, which 
they attribute to Secretary Powell. They argue that Powell neither visited Ankara in 
those crucial days to make the US case personally, nor encouraged President Bush or 
Vice President Cheney to make personal appeals to the Turkish leadership.904  
In this context, Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour during the Iraq War in 2003 offers a 
fine illustration of scenario three of the integrative model, as displayed in table 7 
overleaf. Accordingly, despite Turkey having no agreement with the US on independent 
variable one, the nature of the Iraqi threat, it felt compelled to cooperate with the US in 
implementing independent variable two, the actual strategy of regime change in Iraq by 
military action. This was largely due to a clear alliance security dilemma. First, the US 
was set on regime change in Iraq by use of force and Turkish support or lack thereof 
would not influence, change, or stop the US in the implementation of that strategy. For 
Ankara, it seemed that the risks and costs of non-cooperation with the US outweighed 
those of cooperation, including exclusion of Turkish views and red lines in US plans for 
the post-Saddam period. Ankara believed that granting Washington’s request for full 
support offered relatively a less costly option along with the possibility of curtailing the 
repercussions of US strategy while creating an opportunity to incorporate Turkish views 
into Washington’s plans for Iraq’s future. The result was a reluctant effort to take part in 
the actual implementation of the US strategy without an agreement on the perceptions 
of threat or the virtues of the strategy itself. An additional factor was the scope of US 
expectations, which significantly outweighed Turkish designs for a potential role in 
supporting the US strategy, greatly limiting the prospects for cooperation. Thus, 
throughout this period, there was a considerable expectations gap compounded by a 
trust gap. Turkey thus faced a secondary level alliance security dilemma in the form of 
entrapment in deciding on whether to commit itself to cooperation with the US and on 
the modalities and degree of its support for the US strategy of war. Due the factors 
explained above, the resultant Turkish behaviour was non-cooperation, expressed in the 
1 March TBMM vote.  
902 Zapsu, interview. 
903 Perle, interview.  
904 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 451; Feith, War and Decision, p.395. 
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Table 7: Integrative model of Turkey-US non-cooperation on the Iraq War, 2001-2003 
Independent Variable 1: 
 
Agreement on a 
significant/strategic 
common threat  
Independent Variable 2: 
 
Agreement on strategy to  
deal with perceived strategic  
threat 
Dependent Variable /  
Result 
I. The US 
 
Saddam’s regime and its 
WMD capabilities are vital 
and urgent threats to 
regional and global 
security. The regime has to 
be overthrown, if required 











Saddam’s regime does not 
pose an urgent threat that 





I. Elements of US strategy 
 
1. Regime change through military action  
2. Ensure Turkey’s full support and 
cooperation on Northern Option in: 
i. Deployment of 80,000 US troops 
ii. Overflight, basing and transit 
permissions on Turkish territory, 
including the use of military 
bases, facilities, airports, and 
ports 
iii. Deployment of CIA’s NILE 
teams to Northern Iraq via Turkey 
3. Arm Iraqi Kurdish groups 
4. Site surveys 
5. Site preparation  
 
II. Elements of Turkish Strategy  
 
1. Diplomatic solution to prevent war:  
i. Bilateral efforts to urge Saddam 
to comply with UN obligations. 
ii. Establishment of regional 
platform.  
2. Seek legally binding MOUs with US 
to mitigate the repercussions of 
possible war on national interests: 
i. Political MOU: 
a. Maintain Iraq’s territorial 
integrity and unity  
b. Prevent Iraqi Kurdish entity’s 
independence, federalism, and 
integration of Kirkuk 
c. Protect Turkomen rights  
d. Prevent a refugee influx from 
Northern Iraq to Turkey 
ii. Military MOU:  
a. Address governance, status, 
presence, and activities of US 
forces  
b. Deploy Turkish troops in 
Northern Iraq to ensure Turkey’s 
redlines are respected  
c. Prevent PKK exploiting war 
conditions to increase terrorist 
activities through Northern Iraq 
iii. Economic MOU: 
a. Achieve compensation for 
possible economic losses 
b. Seek larger assistance package  
c. Secure guarantees of 
congressional approval 
d. Remove any conditions attached 
to the package. 
I. Factors in Turkey’s 
unwillingness to fully cooperate in 
US military action:  
 
1. No power of veto over US 
action 
2. Implications for national 
interests  
3. Irrelevance of scope and extent 
of Turkish support 
4. Alliance security dilemma / 
entrapment:  
i. Risks and costs of non-
cooperation: 
a. exclusion from talks on 
Iraq’s future  
b. non-observance of 
redlines 




II. Factors in Turkey’s non-
cooperation in US military action:  
 
1. Divergence on: 
i. Existence, nature and 
urgency of threat 
ii. National interests  
iii. Requisite strategy 
2. Expectations gap 
3. Trust gap 
4. US inability to comprehend 
Turkish domestic politics 
 
In the final analysis, the decision of the TBMM was a product of a Turkish democracy 
that the US had supported for many years, and a rare instance of a single-party 
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government losing a parliamentary vote. The vote heralded the start of a new phase in 
Turkish foreign policy, and in Turkey’s relations with the US, regional countries, and 
the EU.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
From the Gulf crisis in 1990 to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, cooperation on the US 
containment policy of Iraq was one of the most crucial issues in Turkey-US relations. 
Turkey’s contribution to US policy during the Gulf War and cooperation in the 
following decade was a central factor in adapting the Turkey-US alliance relationship to 
the new strategic setting after the Cold War. As Ian O. Lesser has observed, Turkey’s 
stance reinforced its image as a staunch strategic US ally ‘at the forefront of new 
security challenges emanating from the Middle East.’905 
Nevertheless, Iraq also remained one of the most contentious areas between Turkey and 
the US due to their divergent priorities and conflicting objectives and interests. After the 
TBMM’s refusal to allow a northern front for the US war in Iraq on 1 March 2003, 
despite broad agreement on the central principles of preserving Iraq’s unity and 
territorial integrity, the two countries’ divergent perceptions and approaches vis-á-vis 
Iraq placed severe pressure on the strategic nature of their alliance relationship. Their 
contradictory impulses, particularly on the status of Northern Iraq, remained a source of 
real controversy. Additionally, a severe diplomatic crisis was triggered by an incident in 
which US forces raided TSF headquarters in Sulaymaniyah, mistreating the Turkish 
officers during apprehension. The ‘Iraq gap’ in the following period jeopardised the 
very essence of the Turkey-US alliance—the strategic partnership—despite efforts by 
both countries to downplay their differences. This continued until November 2007, 
when the Bush-Cheney administration defined the PKK terrorist organisation as ‘the 
common enemy.’906  
Even today, the Iraq question continues to have contradictory implications for Turkey-
US relations. Turkey and the US worked as close partners in helping the ethnic and 
sectarian groups in Iraq to establish a functioning, quasi-democratic political system in 
the post-Saddam era. They even formed a trilateral mechanism with the Iraqi 
government to address the PKK presence in Northern Iraq’s Kandil Mountains, though 
this has so far proved largely unsuccessful. Following the Iraqi elections in 2009, 
Turkey-US cooperation was instrumental in forming a coalition government under 
Maliki’s premiership. However, Maliki’s sectarian-driven political agenda and his 
905 Lesser, ‘Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics’, p.84. 
906 BBC News, ‘US declares PKK “a common enemy”’, Friday, 2 November 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7074361.stm 
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expanded relations with Iran and pro-Assad stance drove Ankara and the Baghdad 
government apart. Consequently, Turkish and US perspectives once again diverged on 
Iraq, including the views on Maliki Government and Turkey’s flourishing energy 
cooperation with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).  
This research has sought to find an analytical response to the two fundamental questions 
of, firstly, why Turkey chose to cooperate with the US during the Gulf War and its 
aftermath, and, secondly, why it then changed policy leading up to the Iraq War. The 
research has evaluated factors identified in the rich literature on Turkey’s cooperative 
and non-cooperative foreign policy behaviours after 2002, such as a divergent 
conception of interests by Turkey’s new leadership, the relative inexperience of the new 
Turkish government in office, and the overwhelming opposition to war of the Turkish 
public. Nevertheless, it has chiefly been concerned to develop and apply a conceptual 
model of when and why Turkey engages in security cooperation with the US on Middle 
Eastern issues that could serve as a comparative analytical tool. In focusing on the 
Turkish perspective, it has aimed to present a fuller account of the underlying motives 
and factors in Turkey-US policy-making, conceptions of threat, and corresponding 
strategies on Iraq.  
The integrative model outlined in chapter 1 introduces a two-stage approach about when 
and how security cooperation arises between Turkey and the US on Middle Eastern 
issues. In the model, Turkey-US security cooperation is ensured by the concurrent 
existence of two independent variables; one, an agreement on a significant/strategic 
common threat, and two, agreement on the requisite strategy to deal with the perceived 
strategic threat. In the following sections, the validity of the integrative model will be 
tested in three stages of Turkey-US relationship on Iraq during 1990-2003.  
1. Empirical Case for Scenario One: The Gulf Crisis and War, 1990-1991 
The Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War, 1990-1991, constitutes a sample case of scenario one 
of the integrative model. It demonstrates that Turkey-US cooperation occurred because 
of fulfilment of both independent variables one and two.  
Independent variable one: Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
Independent variable one involves reaching an agreement on a strategic threat at the 
systemic level, in the form of Walt’s proposition about balance-of-threat against an 
external power and/or Schweller’s balance-of-interests. In this sense, for the US, 
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Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait was a vital threat to security, stability and strategic 
balance in the Middle East as well as to its regional interests.  
For Turkey, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait occurred at a time when Turkey was facing 
systemic level changes in its international, regional and bilateral strategic environment, 
with consequences for Turkey’s policy formulation. First, at the international level, 
Turkey faced the challenge of adjusting and maintaining the strategic relationship with 
the US/West in view of the disappearance of the overarching Soviet threat. Second, this 
shift was compounded by strategic changes that had taken place in the 1980s in 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbourhood. Turkey needed to formulate strategies to 
address threats such as the rise in PKK terrorism, the strained relations with Syria due 
its support for the PKK, and the water dispute with Iraq and Syria. Third, after the 
Halabja massacre and the immediate aftermath of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, Turkey had 
become increasingly wary of Saddam’s regional ambitions, his huge military arsenal, 
and Baghdad’s more assertive tone, especially on the cross-border water dispute. More 
importantly, Turkey perceived that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would likely have 
ramifications for its national security, including the disruption of the regional balance of 
power and the potential of a direct threat from Saddam’s regime itself, evidenced in its 
regional aggression and military capability. Thus, for Turkey, Saddam’s Iraq conformed 
to Walt’s formulation of balances-of-threat proposition.  
However, the systemic level context was not the only determinant for Turkey’s foreign 
policy behaviour during the Gulf Crisis and War. Like all national security decisions, 
Turkey’s cooperation was effected through a domestic political process, in which 
structural-level changes interacted with unit-level causes. In other words, Turkey’s 
perception of and policy response to the Iraqi threat was defined at the unit-level, as 
understood by neoclassical realism, with the domestic political process as an 
intervening variable. In this case, President Özal was the primary actor in formulating 
Turkey’s perception of threat from Iraq. Özal defined Turkey’s interests relative to his 
assessment of the Iraqi threat at the structural-systemic level of analysis and it was his 
perceptions and expectations that linked the threat to Turkish policy throughout the 
crisis. Özal responded to uncertainties in the face of structural level changes by actively 
controlling and shaping Turkey’s strategic international and regional external 
environment.  
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At the same time, Turkish foreign policy was not only a balancing behaviour in 
response to Iraqi aggression. It also involved a strong element of Schweller’s 
proposition of balance-of-interests, since Özal also considered costs, risks and relative 
gains in the context of the global and regional balance of power (i.e., both threats and 
interests). Özal believed that the Gulf Crisis presented an opportunity for Turkey to 
establish a new and enhanced partnership with Washington in the new international 
structure in which the US had emerged as the supreme power. Consequently, Özal’s 
choices reflected the interaction between domestic factors and Turkish perceptions 
about how best to respond to the external systemic conditions which finally concurred 
with the US perception of threat from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.  
Independent variable two: Agreement on strategy to deal with the 
significant/strategic common threat 
Turkey and the US also agreed on independent variable two; the requisite strategy to 
address the commonly-defined threat and reverse Iraq’s aggression. This strategy 
included ensuring immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, deterring an immediate Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, and restoring the 
ante bellum status quo and balance of power in the region. The instruments of this 
strategy were UNSC mandated international sanctions and use of force when economic 
coercion proved ineffective. Most importantly, US expectations of Turkey were also 
congruent with Turkish perceptions of its possible contribution in the actual 
implementation of that strategy. The US requested Turkey’s cooperation in the 
enforcement of sanctions, use of military bases on Turkish soil during any attack on 
Iraq, and deployment of Turkish troops to the Iraqi border. Turkey cooperated in the 
sanctions by promptly closing down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, mobilising 
100,000 troops along the northern border of Iraq, and allowing coalition forces to use 
Turkish bases once military operations started on 16 January. Most importantly, there 
was no expectations gap in terms of the implementation of the strategy since the US 
never asked to open up a ground front against Iraq through Turkish territory; a concept 
that Turkish politicians, including Özal, dismissed outright. 
As a result of their agreement on independent variables one and two, Turkey and the US 
cooperated closely throughout the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War. This marked a milestone in 
Turkey-US partnership, added Iraq as a positive dimension of the alliance relationship, 
redefined Turkey’s value as a security partner for Washington, and set Turkey-US 
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bilateral cooperation in a new context. For Turkey, the prospects of threat from 
Saddam’s regime were largely removed by the war.  
Finally, even though Turkey-US cooperation on Iraq in 1991 was a balancing behaviour 
in terms of alliance politics, there was no alliance security dilemma. As Snyder points 
out, the degree to which allies’ respective interests are in conflict with an adversary is 
one of the determinants of the alliance security dilemma in the form of entrapment and 
abandonment.907 In this case, Turkey and the US reciprocally depended on each other’s 
cooperation, shared similar valuable interests, and explicitly recognised the need to 
reverse Iraq’s aggressive behaviour to address the threat it posed. Thus the risks of an 
alliance security dilemma were minimal and neither entrapment nor abandonment 
occurred at any point. In other words, Turkey supported the US against the adversary, 
Iraq, and the ensuing cooperation did not result from US pressure or fears of the costs of 
non-cooperation, but chiefly from Turkey-US convergence over threats, interests, and 
strategy.  
However, despite the allied victory, Saddam remained in power, and the ultimate 
balance sheet of the conflict was not to Turkey’s benefit, despite its unwavering 
cooperation with the US. Ultimately, Turkey had to endure increased political and 
security risks and economic hardship as a result of the conflict. Firstly, Turkey suffered 
substantial economic losses because of the UN sanctions, and US attempts to offset 
some of Turkey’s losses and finance the modernisation of the TSK failed to live up to 
Turkish expectations of its gains from cooperation. The unforeseen continuation of the 
sanctions inflicted further damage on the Turkish economy. All this led to heavy 
political costs for Özal, the chief proponent of cooperation. Most important were the 
unanticipated strategic consequences of the conflict: due to Saddam’s brutal repression 
of the Kurdish uprising in Northern Iraq, the plight of Iraqi Kurds emerged as an 
international issue, and OPC created a safe haven for Kurdish autonomy in Northern 
Iraq, marking a new security challenge for Turkey.  
2. First Empirical Case for Scenario Three: Unintended Consequences of the Gulf 
War, 1991-2001 
The period of unintended consequence of the Gulf War, 1991-2003, is an illustration of 
scenario three in the integrative model. However, in this example, a state unwillingly 
agrees to cooperate with an ally on independent variable two, the strategy to deal with 
907 Snyder, ‘Security Dilemma’, p.474 
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the perceived threat, without agreement on the independent variable one, the nature of 
the strategic threat. The integrative model argues that under this scenario, the defining 
factors for an agreement on independent variable two become matters of alliance 
management, cost versus benefit, relative gains, and whether both parties’ expectations 
of the nature of cooperation converge or diverge.  
Independent variable one: Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
During this period, Turkish and American perceptions of the threat from Saddam’s 
regime differed widely. For successive US administrations, Saddam’s Iraq continued to 
pose a threat to regional and global US interests. From the Turkish perspective, 
notwithstanding its initial preference for a change in Iraqi leadership, Saddam’s regime 
no longer posed an urgent threat to regional stability given its diminished aggression 
and the curtailment of its offensive military capabilities and intentions.  
Independent variable two: Agreement on strategy to deal with the 
significant/strategic common threat 
The US response to its perception that Saddam’s regime remained a serious threat to 
regional peace and stability was its strategy of containment. This strategy had political, 
economic and military elements: Politically, the US sought to isolate Saddam’s regime 
internationally, and also organised and supported Iraqi opposition to Baghdad inside 
and outside the country, sponsoring failed attempts to overthrow Saddam’s regime. The 
US sought to protect and sustain a unified Northern Iraqi administration to maintain the 
region as a base of US-sponsored opposition activities to Saddam. Washington therefore 
pursued a policy of preventing KDP-PUK clashes that became detrimental to overall US 
strategy on Iraq, and sought to mediate their reconciliation. Militarily, the US continued 
to retain significant force levels in the region to deter Iraq from threatening its 
neighbours, reconstituting its WMD program, or oppressing the Kurds in Northern Iraq. 
Through the actual operational components of this strategy, the US used limited force 
against Iraq for tactical and strategic purposes. Economically, the US maintained UN 
sanctions against Iraq and opposed any relaxation in the sanctions regime. Washington 
also requested Ankara’s support in implementing its containment strategy, and Turkey’s 
contribution was essential to both continued enforcement of the sanctions and effective 
military deterrence.  
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                231 
 
Despite divergence from the US on independent variable one, Turkey closely 
cooperated with the US on the actual implementation of independent variable two, 
albeit unwillingly and conditionally. Turkey’s cooperative behaviour thus offers a case 
study of Schweller’s balance-of-interests proposition, as well as alliance management 
and the alliance security dilemma. At the systemic level, given Turkey’s high level of 
dependence on its alliance relationship with the US, Ankara’s cooperation with 
Washington on the containment policy functioned to preserve and maintain the benefits 
of, and advance its interests within, the alliance relationship. Turkey continued to 
prioritise its strategic alliance with the US as the sole-remaining super power in the new 
international setting. Ankara believed cooperation on Iraq fitted into broader Turkish 
interests by reinforcing the value of continued Turkey-US strategic relations. 
Consequently, Turkey continued to hope that cooperation on Iraq would be instrumental 
in strengthening the alliance relationship. 
Nevertheless, Turkey’s unwilling and conditional cooperation with the US represents a 
good case of an alliance security dilemma: Turkey had to carefully balance its interests 
in its predicament over whether to support the US containment policy and to what 
degree. It had to accommodate the US request for cooperation while dealing with the 
implications of that strategy on its national interests. The Turkish position at this time 
suggests entrapment; Turkey unwillingly continued to support Washington’s conflict 
with Saddam’s regime in which it shared no identical interests because of the need to 
preserve its asymmetrical alliance with the US. Turkey had to deal with the damage to 
its political, economic and security interests of the US strategy of containment itself.  
The first of these consequences was the diplomatic impact of the internationalisation of 
the Kurdish issue, which made Turkey’s counter-terrorist campaign against the PKK 
ever more challenging to justify abroad. The second consequence was the regional 
security problem for Turkey arising from the new situation in Northern Iraq. Turkey had 
an interest in preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity and unity and preventing the 
fragmentation of Iraq, as well as constraining the Kurds’ aspirations for an independent 
state in the north. However, in addition to the limitations OPC placed on Iraq’s 
sovereignty over a part of its territory, the KDP and PUK joined their forces to create a 
de facto local Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and argued for a federal future for Iraq. 
The Turkish concern was not only the possible spill-over effects of the emergence of an 
independent Kurdish state on its own Kurdish population, but also the implications of 
Iraq’s disintegration on the regional balance of power. For Ankara, Washington’s 
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commitment was critical in keeping Iraqi Kurdish ambitions for self-rule within the 
limits of Iraq’s territorial integrity. However, the US assurances to this end did not 
divert the course of developments in the region, which gradually became increasingly 
separate from Iraq. Thus agreement on the principle of Iraqi unity could not translate 
into a joint Turkey-US strategy since the risks to Iraq’s territorial integrity were actually 
a result of the US policy. Turkey viewed the situation as transitory and expressed a 
preference for the reinstitution of Baghdad’s authority over the whole country as the 
only viable alternative for Iraq’s future security. The US, on the other hand, was 
determined to perpetuate the containment strategy to keep Saddam boxed in. Turkey 
maintained a common regional platform with Iran and Syria to promote Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, while seeking to limit their influence in Northern Iraq. Turkey also had to 
compel the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to constrain their aspirations for federalism and 
independence.  
The third consequence was the substantial economic losses Turkey incurred due to the 
enforcement of sanctions regime for an indefinite period. The sanctions cost the Turkish 
treasury an estimated $40 to $100 billion, depending upon the criteria used to calculate 
such losses, without compensation and partial relief from the sanctions regime. In the 
meantime, the trade in diesel carried by trucks across the Iraqi border in violation of the 
UN sanctions provided much-needed income for the Iraqi Kurdish groups to sustain the 
local economy. 
The fourth consequence was the dramatic increase in PKK terrorism. The power 
vacuum in Northern Iraq provided the PKK with the chance to establish itself firmly on 
the ground and use the region as a springboard to carry out terrorist attacks against 
Turkey. Syria also continued to support the PKK as a proxy for hostility against Turkey. 
PKK terrorism became a profound national security threat with severe political, 
economic and human costs. Ankara had to deal with the PKK not only at home, but also 
in Northern Iraq. Politically, the strategy was to enlist US support for Turkey’s fight 
against the PKK and prevent either the KDP or PUK from entering into pragmatic 
cooperation with the PKK. Militarily, the strategy was to establish permanent 
contingents in the region and conduct cross-border military operations to fight the PKK, 
with or without the support of Iraqi Kurdish groups. However, such operations incurred 
negative reaction from European and Arab nations. The US recognised the PKK as a 
terrorist group, and endorsed Turkey’s strategy and cross-border operations, 
instrumental in Turkey’s fight with the PKK during the 1990s. However, for the US, the 
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PKK presence remained a secondary problem in comparison to sustaining Northern Iraq 
as part of its containment policy. Another component of Turkish strategy was to supply 
the KDP and PUK with military and logistical support against the PKK presence and 
infiltration in the region. The Kurdish groups, for their part, had an interest in limiting 
the influence of the PKK, which gradually became able to challenge their own authority 
in the region. Turkey’s strategy ultimately failed because of the KDP-PUK clashes over 
political dominance and survival from 1994 until 1998, which created favourable 
conditions for the PKK to operate more freely in Northern Iraq.  
Finally, intra-Kurdish conflict and clashes posed significant challenges for Turkey and 
the US, and the situation in Northern Iraq became a distinct issue of Turkey-US 
cooperation within the overall Iraq strategy. The KDP-PUK conflict undermined the US 
containment strategy to the point where the US had to withdraw its covert presence to 
organise the Iraqi opposition to overthrow Saddam’s regime from the region in 1996. 
More importantly, the fight for political survival became so bitter that the KDP 
requested and received assistance from Saddam, the Kurds’ archenemy, while the PUK 
enlisted Iranian support. The escalating clashes damaged the very essence of the US 
rationale to protect the Kurds from Baghdad. For Ankara, the intra-Kurdish hostilities 
indicated that the Kurdish groups remained far from forming a unified administration 
for independence. However, the conflict was paradoxically against Turkey’s interests, 
since it led the PKK to increase its presence in the region and even become a power 
broker in the KDP-PUK fight. The initial Turkey-US response to the situation was to 
launch separate, unilateral efforts for KDP-PUK conciliation. When that failed, despite 
divergent perception of interests and priorities on the situation, they developed a 
coordinated strategy to end the fighting. Washington’s motivation was to sustain the 
credibility of the containment policy while Turkey’s was to prevent increased PKK 
influence in the region. At the same time, both countries had a joint motive to prevent 
interference by third parties, namely Iran and Syria. Turkey-US efforts to mediate a 
Kurdish conciliation began at talks in Drogheda and Dublin, followed by the Ankara 
Process, and centred on accommodating and balancing divergent Turkey-US interests 
and priorities. Though these efforts failed, the US eventually brokered the Washington 
Agreement in 1998—a modus-vivendi for regional stability under two separate Kurdish 
administrations in Northern Iraq that brought about a relatively calm period. Overall, 
during this period, Turkey and the US became embroiled in Iraqi Kurdish politics and 
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the affairs of Northern Iraq and a trilateral relationship emerged between Turkey, the 
US and Iraqi Kurdish groups. 
Ultimately, alliance management issues in the form of entrapment were clearly evident 
in Turkey’s cooperation with the US during this period. First, the US was the dominant 
power defining the strategy on Iraq, and Turkey had no ability to change the US 
strategy. More importantly, in light of Ankara’s perception of potential political, 
economic, and military costs of non-cooperation, Washington had coercive potential to 
exact cooperative behaviour from Turkey, the weaker partner. For example, though 
Turkey never fully realigned with Saddam’s regime, it argued for a strategy of 
normalisation with Iraq as an alternative to the containment strategy and elevated its 
diplomatic representation in Baghdad to ambassadorial level in 1998. The US was 
resolved to oppose any effort to undermine the containment policy, and categorically 
opposed any rapprochement with Iraq, especially Turkish initiatives to that end.  
Nevertheless, both parties also enjoyed considerable leverage over each other’s policies 
in terms of alliance management. They both pursued common interests (in preserving 
the alliance against Iraq) and competitive interests (in maintaining the benefits of the 
alliance through intra-alliance bargaining). This was what Snyder describes as a process 
to ‘maximize joint benefits and minimize costs to one’s independent interests.’908 
Accordingly, for Ankara, US commitment and support were imperative to maintain 
Iraq’s territorial integrity, to constrain Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for federalism and 
independence, to enlist support in its fight against the PKK, and to prevent the PKK 
becoming a third Kurdish force wielding considerable regional influence. Cooperation 
with the US on containment offered the only prospect for achieving all these objectives 
and for ensuring that Turkey’s considerations were factored into US policy on Iraq. For 
Washington, the perpetuation, viability, and success of containment hinged largely on 
Turkey’s cooperation in the sanctions regime and its renewal of the mandate for 
continuation of OPC-II/ONW through İncirlik air base. More importantly, Turkey 
provided the US its only viable access to Northern Iraq, which was a significant 
dynamic for managing the situation in the region. The result was certain level of mutual 
accommodation of basic interests without harmony in the bigger picture of what Turkey 
and the US wished to accomplish through their respective strategies on Iraq. 
908 Ibid., pp.165-166. 
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Against this backdrop, despite Turkey’s dilemmas and the damage to its national 
interests, it continued to support and cooperate with the US on Iraq policy, which 
remained a significant factor in the US-Turkish strategic relationship. Nevertheless, 
Turkey’s divergence from the US on interests and priorities, and the costs, risks and 
necessity of preserving the alliance relationship for Turkey’s national interests 
translated into frustration and resentment in Turkey. This negative legacy formed the 
context of the major challenges to Turkey-US cooperation in the subsequent period.  
3. Second Empirical Case for Scenario Three: Towards the Iraq War, 2001-2003  
Turkish foreign policy behaviour during the Iraq War in 2003 offers a demonstration of 
scenario three. In this scenario, when state (a) does not agree on independent variable 
one, the nature of the strategic threat, and if the demands and expectations of state (b) 
from (a) for the actual strategy are likely to create high costs and risks for (a), there is an 
expectations gap, and (a) will disagree on the actual strategy, (independent variable 
two). Nevertheless, in the second part of this scenario, (a) might still feel forced to 
cooperate with (b) in implementation of the actual strategy if the perceived costs of non-
cooperation are higher than those of cooperation. In this scenario, security cooperation 
may vary from cooperation to limited or non-cooperation in the absence of agreement 
on independent variable one, but conditional agreement on independent variable two. In 
other words, in the absence of an agreement on a strategic threat, there is still a 
possibility for cooperation on strategy, conditional on issues of alliance management, 
costs and benefits, relative gains, and whether the expectations of both parties converge 
or diverge, although the resultant state behaviour may vary from cooperation to limited 
or non-cooperation. This scenario is applied to Turkey’s behaviour during the Iraq War 
below.    
Independent variable one: Agreement on a significant/strategic common threat 
As argued in Chapter 6, there was no convergence of Turkish and American perceptions 
of the Iraqi threat before the Iraq War in 2003. From the US perspective, Saddam and 
his regime constituted a grave and urgent threat to vital US interests, especially in the 
post-9/11 world. Turkey, however, while appreciating the destabilising effect of 
Saddam’s regime on the region, neither concurred with nor was convinced by the US 
case, which seemed to greatly exaggerate the nature and urgency of the threat from Iraq. 
This divergence was therefore prevalent in the Turkish approach to Turkey-US 
discussions on strategy to deal with Saddam’s regime.  
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The first area of consideration is the impact of unit-level factors in Turkey’s definition 
and perception of the threat from Iraq before the Iraq War. Schweller argues that 
balancing is not the expected form of state behaviour when there is a significant 
disagreement among state elites in terms of threat perception, or when elites agree on 
the threat but disagree over the appropriate remedy.909 In this sense, the two successive 
Turkish governments of Ecevit and Gül pursued near-identical approaches during 
negotiations with the US in 2002-2003 in that they had no agreement with the US over 
the nature of the threat from Iraq. At the same time, three significant factors were at 
play in terms of determining the domestic political context of Turkey’s behaviour: the 
continued resentment over the unintended consequences of the Gulf War on Turkey’s 
political, security, and economic interests; the overwhelming public opposition to war; 
and the risks that cooperation with the US on Iraq posed for the AK Party government’s 
democratisation reforms. 
Independent variable two: Agreement on strategy to deal with the 
significant/strategic common threat 
The absence of agreement on the first independent variable, the strategic threat, 
precipitates the questions of whether there was still the possibility for Turkey and the 
US to agree on the requisite strategy to deal with Saddam’s regime. The answer 
involves analysing the parameters for a state to agree on the requisite strategy and the 
prospects of the resultant cooperation.  
The US strategy to address the perceived threat from Saddam’s regime was military 
coercion to ensure Iraqi compliance with UNSC obligations, but, more importantly, to 
achieve regime change. The US sought Turkey’s full support and cooperation in the 
implementation of this strategy. Turkey would have preferred Saddam’s replacement 
with a more democratic regime, and agreed with the US case for disarmament. Yet, for 
Turkey, the Iraqi situation neither warranted war, nor did the use of force offer the 
appropriate method for achieving the desired ends. From the Turkish perspective, there 
were a number of complicating factors regarding the merits of the strategy. First, 
Turkey believed the US had not seriously considered the likely consequences of war, 
especially on Iraq’s internal balance of ethno-sectarian identities and on external 
dynamics, including implications for the regional balance of power, whereby Iran could 
potentially become the major beneficiary of regime change with substantial leverage on 
909 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p.173 
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Iraqi Shiite groups. Second, the Bush administration was seriously divided on Iraq 
strategy, including on US objectives, post-war plans, designs for Iraq’s future, and the 
role of opposition groups. The split within the US administration and the absence of a 
coherent strategy for any post-Saddam phase magnified Turkey’s concerns about the 
potential consequences of war on Iraq’s future. Third, the US strategy focused on use of 
force against Iraq, which lacked proper justification or a UN mandate. In short, in 
addition to divergence on threat analysis, there was also disagreement on the key 
strategy to address the Iraq problem.  
Given these clear divergences on the threat and requisite strategy, the most pertinent 
question is why Turkey, albeit unwillingly, felt compelled to attempt to cooperate with 
the US in the actual implementation of the strategy to overthrow Saddam’s regime by 
force. The answer involves an element of alliance security dilemma. It was obvious that 
the US was determined to pursue a strategy of regime change even if it required large-
scale military action. It was equally clear that Turkish support or lack thereof in the 
implementation of that strategy would not influence, change, or stop the US pursuit of a 
military solution. When war became unavoidable, Turkey would face all its corollary 
implications, including Iraq’s fragmentation and continued instability and shifts in the 
regional balance of power. It would also create direct challenges to Turkish interests, 
including Kurdish independence, a resurgence of PKK activities in Northern Iraq, a 
refugee flow across Turkey’s borders, and a heavy blow to the Turkish economy. Thus 
the risks and costs of non-cooperation with the US seemed higher than those of 
cooperation, including exclusion of Turkish views and red lines in US plans for the 
post-Saddam period. In view of the importance that Washington placed on regime 
change and its apparent inevitability, accommodation of Washington’s request for full 
support offered Ankara a less costly option along with the possibility of curtailing the 
repercussions of US strategy. It also presented an opportunity to factor Turkish views 
into Washington’s plans about Iraq’s future. The result was a reluctant effort to take part 
in the actual implementation of the US strategy without an agreement on the level of 
threat or the virtues of the strategy itself. This problem became evident and prevailed in 
the ensuing Turkey-US talks on political, economic, and military tracks.  
The Turkish motive was thus to secure its interests following regime change and, 
especially after AK Party’s rise to power, the Turkish strategy on Iraq was an extension 
of this general concept. Concurrently, Turkey sought a diplomatic solution to the Iraq 
problem through bilateral and regional efforts to convince Saddam to comply with his 
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disarmament obligations. At one stage, Turkey even initiated an effort among Iraq’s 
neighbours to mitigate the negative ramifications of the increasingly inevitable war.  
In explaining Turkey’s behaviour in 2003, in addition to the apparent problem of 
divergence on independent variables one and two, the question of the expectations gap 
is another area that is worth analysing. Scenario three in the integrative model argues 
that an expectations gap plays an important role in determining security cooperation. 
Turkey fundamentally disagreed with the US perception of the nature and urgency of 
the Iraqi threat. However, had the US requests and expectations from Turkey regarding 
its strategy to address the threat been minimal or limited, and had there been minimal 
costs, risks, or even some relative gains for cooperation, in all likelihood Turkey would 
have agreed with the US on the actual strategy, yielding full security cooperation. 
However, from the very outset, the considerable expectations gap was a complicating 
factor during the negotiations. Washington never appreciated the difficulty and risks for 
Ankara of allowing enormous levels of US troop deployment in and through Turkish 
territory, or of basing rights and use of military installations in a political context in 
which the Turkish public was overwhelmingly war averse. Most importantly, the scale 
of the US deployment would have required declaring a state of emergency in many 
Turkish cities, undercutting the AK Party government’s focus on democratic reforms. 
The dilemma for Ankara in supporting the US was to mitigate the associated risks of 
war without compromising the domestic political situation and regional balance of 
power. Since non-cooperation would create high costs and risks, Turkey tried to 
implement the US strategy on a conditional basis. Turkey pursued a strategy of eliciting 
binding political, military, and economic MOUs with the US with a view to mitigating 
the repercussions of war on its national interests. For the US, all these issues seemed 
secondary to its primary interest in assuring full Turkish support in its military action. 
The tension that prevailed in the Turkey-US discussions on Iraq strategy reflected 
another problem; the trust gap over the frankness of the bilateral consultations. The 
negotiations stalled on every critical issue, including the status of Northern Iraq, 
relations with the Iraqi Kurds, the treatment of the Turkomen, and the objections of the 
US to Turkish military deployment in the region. The Turkish motive was to constrain 
the Iraqi Kurdish drive for independence and federalism, while the US enlisted the 
support of the Kurdish groups in pursuit of the strategy of regime change through 
military action, explicitly endorsing the Kurdish cause for federalism. The most 
sensitive issue emerged in Washington’s fervent opposition and reluctant agreement to 
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Turkish force deployment in Northern Iraq, apparently in tandem with Kurdish 
objections. From the Turkish perspective, Washington’s policy was to, as far as 
possible, avoid accommodating vital Turkish national interests, even as it pressured 
Turkey for full cooperation in the military action. This calculation undermined Turkish 
confidence in the reliability of US assurances that it would respect Turkey’s strategic 
interests in Iraq, maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity, prevent regional instability, and 
give Turkey an important voice in shaping post-Saddam Iraq. In the end, Turkey and the 
US reached agreement on the political, economic and military MOUs, but failed to 
overcome their considerable expectations and trust gaps. The TBMM’s decision on 1 
March 2003 to reject the AK Party government’s motion to allow the opening up of a 
northern front through Turkey for the US invasion of Iraq was thus a result of these 
intertwined factors. However, it should be remembered that this was not the last act of 
the TBMM regarding the Iraq War; on 19 March 2003 it accepted the government’ 
second motion to grant unconditional overflight permission to US forces, which 
Wolfowitz defines as ‘enormously important’ since the US used Turkish airspace to 
conduct air operations and transport special forces and airborne troops during the Iraq 
War.910 
In the final analysis, in the lead up to the Iraq War, there was no agreement between 
Turkey and the US on whether Iraq was an adversary posing a significant/strategic 
threat (independent variable one), or on the merits of the proposed strategy (independent 
variable two), yet there remained a possibility for cooperation on its implementation. 
For Turkey, whether to commit itself to cooperation with the US, and the modalities and 
degree of its support for the US in its strategy of war was a secondary level alliance 
security dilemma in the form of entrapment: Turkey’s attempt to cooperate with the US 
resulted from pressure and fear of the costs and risks of non-cooperation rather than 
from convergence of interests and perceptions. First, Turkey had no power of veto over 
the US course of action since the scope and extent of Turkish support was irrelevant for 
Washington in pursuing the strategy of regime change through military action. Second, 
Turkey had no identical interests with the US in the implementation of the strategy, and 
in fact the strategy would most likely produce repercussions on Turkey’s national 
security interests. Third, for Turkey, the risks and costs of non-cooperation with the US 
seemed to outweigh those of cooperation since non-cooperative behaviour would 
potentially lead to Turkey’s exclusion from talks and plans for a post-Saddam Iraq, as 
910 Special Hearing on Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 Before the Committee on 
Appropriations of the US Senate on 27 March 2003, 108th Congress.  
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well as non-observance of Turkey’s redlines. The problem of Turkey and the US’ 
divergent expectations of the actual implementation of the strategy and the trust gap 
between the parties also undermined the prospects for cooperation. Lastly, the US 
administration was unable to comprehend the unit-level factors in terms of the 
sensitivities of Turkish domestic politics. The resultant Turkish behaviour was non-
cooperation, expressed in the 1 March TBMM vote.  
Against this backdrop, what happened in the TBMM on 1 March 2003 defined not only 
a decision on whether to support the US in the Iraq War, but determined the future 
orientation and scope of the Turkey-US strategic partnership. As Parris observes, ‘what 
is indisputable is that US-Turkish strategic partnership, to the extent it still meant 
anything at all, meant something quite different on the evening of March 1 than it had 
that morning.’911 That vote, despite the later decision to extend limited support to the 
US war effort, put Turkey-US relations in a new strategic context defined by the ‘Iraq 
gap’; an issue of continuing controversy in Turkey-US relations. In the final analysis, 
however, Turkey’s decision in 2003 was a reflection of Ankara’s decade-long 
grievances over the unintended consequences of the Gulf War. These grievances were 
instrumental in how Turkey conceived both the prospects for its cooperation with the 
US on Iraq and Washington’s assurances about the application and consequences of the 
US strategy.  
This research has presented a detailed empirical analysis of Turkey’s relationship with 
the US vis-á-vis Iraq in 1990-2003, based on an integrative model of Turkey-US 
security cooperation. However, the question remains of whether the integrative model is 
a valid conceptual framework to explain Turkey-US relations on Middle Eastern issues 
beyond the Iraq case. In this sense, two recent cases stand out: Iran’s nuclear program 
and the situation in Syria.  
Firstly, there is the question of Turkey-US non-cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program. 
Turkey and the US agree on the general principle that all nations are entitled to peaceful 
nuclear energy and that any nation with a nuclear program has to fully abide by their 
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Turkey and the US also both fully 
object to Iran developing nuclear weapons capability. Thus, in accordance with 
independent variable one of the integrative model, Turkey and the US concur on the 
significant/strategic threat that a nuclear Iran could pose to regional and global stability. 
911 Parris, ‘Starting Over’ 
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The question then remains of why Turkey voted against the resolution that introduced 
additional sanctions on Iran in the UNSC in 2010. There are various conflicting 
explanations for Turkey’s behaviour, including the popular contemporary implication 
that the perceived shift in the axis of Turkey’s foreign policy was due to the 
government’s ideological orientation. However, that argument soon dropped out of 
public debate as events soon demonstrated its nonsensical character, especially after 
Turkey’s decision to allow basing rights for NATO missile defence radar systems in 
Turkish territory in 2011. The integrative model offers a rather more accurate 
explanation. Even though Turkey and the US agreed on independent variable one, in 
terms of independent variable two, there was no agreement on the strategy to deal with 
Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey argued that diplomacy and dialogue with Iran were key 
to settling the risks of and concerns about Iran’s nuclear program while the US insisted 
on implementing enforcement measures on Iran, including multiple sanctions through 
the UNSC and in coordination with the EU. Turkey was opposed to the sanctions on the 
grounds that they had never worked efficiently to change the foreign policy behaviour 
of states. In view of the experience of UN sanctions against Saddam, the policy was 
most likely to inflict damage on neighbouring countries without achieving the intended 
outcome. However, Turkey did agree to implement sanctions against Iran mandated by 
UNSCRs, but opposed the additional sanctions devised by the US and the EU alone. 
More importantly, in coordination with the US, Turkey worked closely with Brazil to 
negotiate the Tehran Agreement in 2010, which satisfied US expectations from Ankara 
for a swap of Iran’s enriched uranium. Surprisingly, however, Washington then opposed 
the agreement once it was concluded, and this was instrumental in Turkey’s no vote in 
the UNSC. Thus, in the end, despite agreement on independent variable one, the 
absence of agreement on independent variable two was the major factor in non-
cooperation between Turkey and the US on Iran’s nuclear program.  
The same argument can be applied to Turkey-US cooperation on the situation in Syria 
today. In terms of independent variable one, Turkey and the US agree that Bashar 
Assad’s regime and its massacre of thousands of Syrian civilians is a threat to regional 
stability and that his regime has to be replaced with a democratic one. They have also 
agreed on independent variable two during discussions in terms of the need for 
UNSCR-mandated policies to protect civilians, but these have never materialised due to 
Russian and Chinese vetoes in the UNSC. However, it is not possible to argue at this 
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point that, despite Turkey-US concurrence on the threat, they have an agreement on a 
tangible strategy to achieve transition and regime change in Syria.  
Finally, questions over the explanatory power of any theoretical model of state 
behaviour and foreign policy formulation remain central among scholars of international 
relations and practitioners of diplomacy. In addition to exhibiting certain limitations, 
even regarding relevant cases, such models might prove unreliable when tested 
empirically. This raises the question of what explanatory power any theoretical strand 
can bring to bear in understanding and capturing what Waltz defines as the ‘complicated 
business’ of states foreign policy formulation.912 As this author witnessed in the office 
of the Turkish Foreign Minister over four and a half years, the formation and making of 
foreign policy is really a very dynamic and complicated process, contingent on human 
responses to both long-term structural factors and sudden, unprecedented developments 
on the international and domestic political scenes. Although structural realism, alliance 
theory and neoclassical realism all contribute to a conceptual framework for 
international politics, it is impossible for either the realist paradigm or any other theory 
to exhaustively explain foreign policy formulation as well, which involves both first-
hand knowledge and interdisciplinary work across fields. This challenge was perhaps 
best formulated by Madeleine Albright, when she lamented in interview the ‘disconnect 
in many ways between people that are pure academics and people that are practitioners.’ 
This underlines the need for active diplomats to understand theory and historical 
context, as well as for theorists to aim at policy relevance .913 To that end, it is hoped 
that the integrative model developed here will continue to offer an analytical tool that 
contributes to the understanding and study of Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour in 
terms of whether it cooperates or not with the US on issues related to the Middle East.  
 
  
912 J. J. Mearsheimer, ‘Reckless States and Realism’. p.241. 
913 Albright, interview. 
                                                 
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON TURKEY-US RELATIONS 1990–2003                                                243 
 
APPENDIX 1: CAST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Morton Abramowitz: US Ambassador to Turkey, 1989-1991. 
Yıldırım Akbulut: Prime Minister of Turkey, 1989-1991. 
Mustafa Akşin: Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, 1988-1993. 
Madeleine Albright: US Secretary of State, 1997-2001. 
Iyad Allawi: President of Iraqi National Accord, 1991-2003; Prime Minister of Iraq, 
2004-2005. 
Ali Babacan: Turkish Minister of State for Economic Affairs, 2002-2007; Foreign 
Minister, 2007-2009; Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey 2009-. 
Masoud Barzani: Chairman of the KDP, President of the Governing Council of Iraq, 
2004, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 2005-.  
Nechirvan Barzani: Deputy Chairman of the KDP, Prime Minister of Kurdistan 
Regional Government 2006-2009, and 2012-.  
Fikret Bila: Turkish journalist and columnist for Milliyet. 
Hüseyin Avni Botsalı: Head of Department for Middle East and Gulf Affairs of the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1996-98; Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in 
Washington DC, 1998-2001.  
Ali Bozer: Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, 1989-1990; Foreign Minister, 1990. 
Deniz Bölükbaşı: Ambassador and Turkey’s negotiator on the military Memorandum 
of Understanding with the US before the Iraq War  
Matthew Bryza: Director for Europe and Eurasia of the US National Security Council, 
2001-2009. 
Tahsin Burcuoğlu: Deputy Director General for Policy Planning Department of the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993-1997; Ambassador, Director General for 
Middle East of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002-2004; Secretary General 
of the Turkish National Security Council, 2007-2010. 
Cengiz Çandar: Turkish journalist and columnist, adviser to the late President Turgut 
Özal. 
Ömer Çelik: Member of the Turkish Parliament since 2002 and political adviser to 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Deputy Chairman of the AK Party 2010-2013; 
Minister for Culture and Tourism, 2013-. 
Hikmet Çetin: Turkish Foreign Minister, 1991-1994; Speaker of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, 1997-1999. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu: Turkish Foreign Minister, 2009-; Chief Adviser to Prime Minister 
Abdullah Gül, 2002-2003 and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan 2003-2009.  
Oğuz Demiralp: Special Adviser to Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, 1997-2000. 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AK Party  Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) 
ANAP  Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) 
CBM  Confidence Building Measures 
CENTCOM  Central Command 
CENTO Central Treaty Organization 
CHP   Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples’ Party)  
CIA   US Central Intelligence Agency 
D-8 The Developing Eight Countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey) 
DOD  US Department of Defense 
DSP   Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) 
DYP   Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) 
EC   European Community (EU after 1993) 
ESF   Economic Support Fund 
EU   European Union 
EUCOM  European Command 
FMF   Foreign Military Financing 
FOIA  US Freedom of Information Act 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMTP  Irak Milli Türkmen Partisi (Iraq National Turkomen Party) 
ILA   Iraq Liberation Act 
INA   Iraqi National Accord 
INC   Iraqi National Council 
ITF   Iraqi Turkomen Front 
KDP   Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq) 
KF   Kurdish Front 
KRG   Kurdistan Regional Government (Iraq) 
MCC  Military Coordination Center 
MFA   Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MGK   Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (Turkish National Security Council) 
MHP   Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Turkish Nationalist Movement Party)  
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding  
NAC   North Atlantic Council (NATO) 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFZ   No-Fly Zone 
NILE   Northern Iraq Liaison Element (CIA) 
NSC   US National Security Council  
ODS  Operation Desert Storm 
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIC  Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
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ONW   Operation Northern Watch 
OSW  Operation Southern Watch 
OPC  Operation Provide Comfort (both phases) 
OPC-I  Operation Provide Comfort I (April 1991-July 1991) 
OPC-II Operation Provide Comfort II (July 1991-December 1996)  
PKK   Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
PMF   Peace Monitoring Force 
PUK   Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan 
RP   Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)  
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SCIRI   Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq  
SEATO  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
SPMG  Supervisory Peace Monitoring Group  
TBMM  Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) 
TGS   Turkish General Staff 
THK  Türk Hava Kuvvetleri (Turkish Air Force) 
TSF   Turkish Special Forces 
TSK  Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces) 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
US  United States 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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